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Abstract  
 
The maintenance of reputation and privacy and the protection of freedom of expression 
are vitally important both for individuals and for society in any democracy. The purpose 
of defamation and privacy regimes is to find an appropriate triangulation of the rights and 
interests of plaintiffs, defendants and the general public. This is pursued through a system 
of legal rules, remedies, defences and procedural requirements. Despite the enormous 
value of reputation, privacy and expression, it is surprising how little is understood 
regarding whether and the extent to which the law – as understood by the principal 
protagonists and applied by courts – shapes the motivations of plaintiffs and defendants 
in order to achieve an appropriate accommodation between the competing interests. This 
is particularly true in respect of the new Central and Eastern European democracies. 
This thesis seeks to address these limitations in our knowledge. Taking the 
example of Slovakia between 1996 and 2016, it provides a systematic, holistic, fine-
grained, empirical analysis of the interplay between the laws of defamation and privacy 
and freedom of expression in the context of journalistic speech. The thesis investigates 
from the viewpoint of the principal protagonists whether, to what extent and how the 
defamation and privacy regime triangulated the individual and social interests in 
reputation, privacy and expression. It employs a socio-legal approach and draws on an 
analysis of statutes, case-law, media reports and fifty-three semi-structured interviews 
with media managers, professionals, plaintiffs, lawyers and experts. The study examines 
the extent to which and how the regime provided plaintiffs with instruments to defend 
their reputation and privacy against unwarranted attacks and remedy the suffered harm; 
prevented unwarranted harm and protected the public interest in the availability of truthful 
information by creating a benign ‘chilling effect’ on irresponsible journalism; and 
prevented powerful individuals and/or entities from abusing the law and producing an 
invidious chilling effect on important, warranted reporting concerning their activities.  
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 Triangulation of Reputation, Privacy and 
Freedom of Expression 
1.1 Introduction: The “Vicious Spiral” of the Slovak Defamation 
and Privacy Regime’s Interplay with Journalism 
My research interest into the effects of defamation and privacy laws in the context of 
journalistic speech in Slovakia was sparked in 2010-2011. I investigated the impact on 
editorial freedom of the 2008 Press Act (Act No. 167/2008 Coll.), the adoption of which 
prompted widespread protests from the press as well as domestic and international human 
rights organisations (Belakova 2011, 2013a). The critics of the Act had rejected the 
government’s argument that the newly-stipulated correction and reply provisions sought 
to strike a fair balance between freedom of expression and personality/goodwill rights.1 
They feared that the vague and broad provisions might constrain editorial freedom by 
“flooding” the pages of the press with replies and/or corrections, particularly from 
politicians seeking free publicity. The Act’s critics also forewarned of a potentially 
detrimental effect on public debate as journalists might hesitate to publish contentious 
information for fear of monetary sanctions imposed for non-publication of corrections 
and/or replies (Belakova 2013a). Despite the apparent intentions of politicians to obtain 
free publicity or even muzzle the press, the research found that the provisions did not 
constrain editorial autonomy unduly or deter media professionals from publishing 
contentious information. As one senior editor put it, ‘the law has brought some fear’, but 
since the press were able to reject an overwhelming majority of requests ‘a normal, 
creative working atmosphere’ was preserved in the newsrooms (cited in Ibid., 209).  
The interviewees among editors, publishers and experts argued that since the mid-
2000s there was a growing trend for high-profile politicians and senior members of the 
judiciary to bring civil defamation actions for substantial damages against the media 
 
 
 
1 The Slovak legal system recognises the concept of general personality rights that belong to every 
natural person and include his/her physical integrity, personal freedom, honour, dignity, reputation 
and privacy. Reputation of legal entities is protected under the goodwill provisions (see Chapter 5). 
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which affected journalistic speech much more significantly than the provisions of the 
Press Act. Media professionals believed that the ordinary courts’ bias towards personality 
protection for influential plaintiffs, and/or lack of independence were permitting such 
litigants to abuse the law, muzzling critical reporting of their conduct whilst enriching 
themselves (Belakova 2013a). According to the then Chair of the Slovak Association of 
Press Publishers, personality protection lawsuits ‘became the outright most serious threat 
for us’ due to the ‘sometimes crazy’ non-pecuniary damages awards in tens-of-thousands 
of euro. He believed that as publishers had learnt to work with the Press Act, political, 
business and wider elites recognised that they had other, ‘more threatening and 
liquidating’ means to muzzle the press.2 According to a senior editor, ‘the most serious 
[interference with freedom of expression] are personality protection lawsuits because 
they involve big money. It is a total attempt to get the media into a box to make them 
obey’.3 Between late 2008 and mid-2010, various international and domestic human 
rights monitoring organisations also observed this trend as part of the increasing pressures 
on press freedom in the country (Mesežnikov, Kollár, and Vašečka 2010, 486-7; Freedom 
House 2011; IVO 2009, 2010; IPI 2009; BDHRL 2009, 2008).  
According to interviewees, the behaviour of leading public functionaries, 
motivated by court decisions in their favour, was unique in comparison to that of their 
counterparts not only in Western Europe but also in neighbouring countries. The starkest 
contrast was in relation to the situation in the Czech Republic where identical provisions 
of substantive law had applied for decades,4 but where politicians seldom won defamation 
disputes against the media and, if awarded, monetary compensation tended to be ‘more 
or less symbolic’ (Šimečka 2009, 2). As one publisher argued, ‘personal enrichment or 
an attempt to attack the media’s economic foundation’ instead of suing only in 
unequivocally justified cases and pursuing moral satisfaction or remedy of factual 
inaccuracies, was ‘a Slovak or Balkan … specialty’. In his opinion, such abuses of law 
did ‘not occur westwards of [Slovak] borders’, as Czech politicians sued 
 
 
 
2 Interview with Miloš Nemeček, Bratislava, 27 September 2010. 
3 Interview with Matúš Kostolný, Bratislava, 23 September 2010. 
4 Until 2014, when the Czech Republic adopted a new Civil Code, civil actions for defamation and 
privacy infringements were regulated by the relevant provisions of the 1964 Civil Code adopted by 
the former Czechoslovakia. 
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‘demonstratively’ and ‘vigorously’, but they did it to ‘prove that [they] were in the right’.5 
The chairwoman of the Slovak Syndicate of Journalists claimed similarly that when suing 
for almost identical articles published by sister outlets in the two countries, plaintiffs 
tended to claim moral satisfaction and symbolic damages in the Czech jurisdiction in 
contrast to the substantial monetary compensation claimed in the Slovak jurisdiction.6  
Media professionals and international observers (IPI 2009; BDHRL 2009; 
Freedom House 2010), raised concerns that even a small number of large lawsuit losses 
could threaten the financial stability of most outlets and that the financial risks might, in 
the medium term, have a detrimental effect on public discussion. They feared that 
journalists would no longer be willing to pursue contentious stories about leading public 
figures even if they believed them to be accurate and in the public interest. As one editor 
suggested, if journalists realised their articles had led to large damages awards, it was 
extremely likely ‘that at a point in time they would start self-censoring and making 
concessions just to avoid similar trouble’ (cited in Belakova 2013a, 212). It was suggested 
that the mere threat of a lawsuit might ‘chill’ journalistic speech as reporters might wish 
to spare themselves the emotional distress associated with litigation. As another editor 
put it, pre-publication litigation threats were a form of ‘psychological blackmail’ that 
subconsciously made journalists write about the contentious issue ‘in a slightly softer way 
in case the outlet gets sued’, even when they were certain about the veracity of their 
claims. As the editor explained, reporters might think that they would eventually succeed 
if sued, however, they ‘would be dragged through courts for ten years. That is nothing 
pleasant’ (cited in Ibid., 211).  
The issue of equality before the law was also raised during the course of my 
research as respondents perceived that ordinary courts not only valued ‘preserving a 
politician’s personal reputation more highly than the public’s interest in the truth’ 
(BDHRL 2009), but also more highly than the reputation and personality rights of 
ordinary citizens. One commentator found it ‘literally revolting’, particularly in 
comparison to compensation received in cases of serious physical harm, that one of the 
highest representatives of the country and the judiciary gained tens-of-thousands of euro 
 
 
 
5 Interview with Miloš Nemeček, Bratislava, 27 September 2010. 
6 Interview with Zuzana Krútka, Bratislava, 26 September 2010. 
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in lawsuits against the media.7 Other interviewees were also under the impression that 
ordinary courts perceived ‘reputational damage as multifariously larger than damage to 
health’, even when compared with cases where a person died or suffered life-long 
consequences.8 A later study analysing ordinary courts’ decision-making in high-profile 
politicians’ disputes against the press similarly concluded that ‘either some courts respect 
reputations of politicians and judges more than life and health of common citizens or it 
gives an impression of hypocritical collegiality with public officials and public figures’ 
(Wilfling and Kováčechová 2011, 54).  
While perceptions of an undesirable ‘chilling effect’ on truthful journalistic 
speech in matters of public interest and inequality before justice between public and 
private claimants were raised, the study also revealed a further paradox regarding the 
operation of the Slovak personality/goodwill protection regime. Following the adoption 
of the 2008 Act, it became even more difficult than previously for ordinary citizens to 
defend their reputations against abuses of freedom of expression in the press. The 
reluctance of editors to publicly admit mistakes and publish corrections or clarifications 
(Chmelár 2007; Šípoš 2007b), intensified as a result of the mutual suspicions and hostility 
between the governing elites and the press. Publishers actively resisted their publication, 
perceiving correction/reply requests from politicians and business elites as attempts to get 
unlimited access to publicity and to ‘chastise commercial media somewhat or get them 
under control’.  
As a senior editor acknowledged, the conflict escalated to such an extent that 
newsrooms tended to ignore all claims, including those which merited a reply or 
correction to redress unwarranted personality rights’ violations (Belakova 2013a, 210). 
Claimants, whose reputation and privacy rights were seriously injured as a result of poorly 
verified or sensationalist articles, consequently had no alternative to litigation to defend 
their rights. Many did not pursue litigation for publication of corrections/replies as this 
involved a protracted process that rendered the remedy ineffective or even counter-
productive. This had detrimental effects not only on their reputational and privacy rights, 
but also for the public that received incorrect, misleading and sensationalist information, 
 
 
 
7 Interview with Branislav Ondrášik, Bratislava, 28 September 2010. 
8 Interview with Gabriel Šípoš, Bratislava, 27 September 2010. See also Prušová (2009). 
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as some of the media professionals also admitted (see also Šípoš 2007b; SPW and DBM 
2008). Alternatively, injured parties were forced to take equally protracted civil 
personality protection action, which at least allowed them to claim larger damages but 
which contributed to the fear experienced by journalists. 
The research thus painted a picture of a defamation and privacy regime that was 
in danger of descending into a “vicious spiral” of deleterious consequences for all the 
protected interests that the regime tried to balance. In this apparent vicious spiral, in 
contrast to an optimal functioning defamation and privacy law, the media felt under threat 
from civil actions brought by leading figures from the spheres of politics, the judiciary 
and business; plaintiffs seemed unequal before the law and in their ability to effectively 
protect and vindicate their reputational and privacy rights. Instead of hard-hitting stories 
bringing the powerful to account, the public received poorly verified, misleading, trivial 
and sensationalist information. The research further suggested that the unintended 
consequences of the defamation and privacy regime were a result of numerous factors 
other than the substantive legal provisions, including procedural rules, perceived 
emotional and financial costs of litigation, interpretation and application of the law by 
courts, and the motivations, interactions and mutual relationships between the principal 
protagonists (Belakova 2011, 2013a). This thesis sets out to investigate this vicious spiral 
that the Slovak defamation and privacy regime in the early 2010s apparently risked 
descending into. This study seeks to investigate, from the viewpoint of the principal 
protagonists, the extent to which the Slovak defamation and privacy regime descended 
into the vicious spiral between 1996 and 2016. It aims to provide a rich, empirically-
grounded study of the interplay between the Slovak defamation and privacy regime and 
journalism. It specifically looks as the ability of the regime to find an appropriate balance 
between the protected interests at its heart. 
This chapter sets the empirical problem within the existing theoretical 
understanding of the optimal operation of defamation and privacy regimes and the 
existing academic research into the interplay between defamation and privacy laws and 
journalism. The chapter outlines the general purpose of defamation and privacy laws in 
the context of journalistic speech, explores the values that the law strives to protect, and 
introduces the principal protagonists of defamation and privacy regimes in the context of 
journalism. It distinguishes three specific objectives that defamation and privacy regimes 
seek to achieve. The chapter then identifies the limits in our knowledge of the subject and 
outlines how the thesis attempts to address these and what contribution will be made to 
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our understanding of the relationship between defamation, privacy and freedom of 
expression in the context of journalism.  
Slovakia’s legal system is based on continental Roman law with historical 
influences of German and Austrian legal traditions (Školkay 2011b, 12). Slovakia is a 
party to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and Slovak judges are thus 
bound to consider the European Court of Human Rights’ (ECtHR) case-law in their 
decision-making. The focus of the following paragraphs will therefore be on the optimal 
operation of defamation and privacy regimes, as understood under the Convention. Given 
its predominance in judicial and academic discussions on this topic, the following 
chapters will also heavily draw on common law (especially England and Wales) and US 
scholarship, with major differences between defamation and privacy laws and their 
operation in England and Wales, US and Slovakia clearly stated. 
1.2 The Aims and Principal Protagonists of Defamation and Privacy 
Regimes in the Context of Journalism 
The essential purpose of a defamation and privacy regime is to deter harm to reputation 
and privacy resulting from unwarranted speech and in the last resort to provide the injured 
party with a means to redress the harm suffered (Barendt 1999, 112-115; Hanna and Dodd 
2012, 238; Parkes et al. 2013, Chapter 1; Mullis 2010b, 15). The enormous value of 
reputation and privacy has been universally recognized and protected for centuries in both 
domestic and international law.9 Privacy and reputational rights have long been 
recognized and protected strongly in many civil law countries (Barendt 2005, 198), 
including Slovakia, often under the umbrella of ‘personality rights’. Personality rights 
essentially refer to a group of rights that ‘protect the dignity, the emotional and 
 
 
 
9 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) (in Article 12) and the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (in Article 17) recognize the right to legal protection against 
interferences with privacy, as well as attacks against individual honour and reputation. The right to 
respect private and family life is also guaranteed in Article 8 ECHR. Under the now well-established 
case-law of the ECtHR, in most cases, the right to reputation is subsumed under Article 8 alongside 
privacy rights (see Mullis 2010b, 18-20; Barendt et al. 2013, 363-368). 
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psychological integrity, and the inviolability of a person’. They may afford general 
protection to privacy and private life; protect individuals from the dissemination of 
truthful information about their private life, afford them control over the use of their 
image as well as protection of reputation (Article 19 2016, 5). Many jurisdictions, 
including Slovakia and England and Wales, also grant reputational protection to corporate 
entities.  
Inevitably, any defamation and privacy regime designed to protect reputation and 
privacy against harm from unwarranted publication will necessarily constrain another 
well-established, universal human right anchored in international human rights law, and 
in constitutions of most countries around the world: freedom of expression.10 Since none 
of these competing rights is an absolute right, in their design and application modern 
democratic defamation and privacy regimes aim at striking an appropriate balance 
between them (Parkes et al. 2013, Chapter 1; Barendt et al. 2013, 361; Mullis and Scott 
2012b, 25; Article 19 2016, 3; Barendt 2005, 205; Mullis 2010b, 28).  
According to philosophers like Habermas (1984, 1987, 1992, 1996) and Dewey 
(2008), legal protection of individual rights is not derived from the fact that they are 
immutable possessions of individuals, but from the fact of society. Dewey wrote (2008, 
373) that individual rights’ value primarily lies in ‘the contribution they make to the 
welfare of the community’. One could therefore argue alongside Mullis and Scott (2012a, 
4 – 5) that an appropriate accommodation or balance between the conflicting interests in 
any democratic society can only be achieved by a defamation and privacy regime that 
includes ‘an appropriate valuation of the individual and social importance’ of the right to 
freedom of expression, on the one hand, and reputation and privacy, on the other. Most 
modern defamation and privacy regimes therefore seek to find an appropriate 
triangulation of the individual rights and public interests in reputation, privacy and 
expression. 
Different legal regimes take different approaches to the balancing exercise, with 
consequences for the operation of the defamation and privacy regime in the context of 
 
 
 
10 Articles 19 of the UDHR and the ICCPR recognise the right to freedom of opinion and expression, 
including freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas. Article 10 ECHR stipulates that 
‘[e]veryone has the right to freedom of expression’, including ‘freedom to hold opinions and to receive 
and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers’.  
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journalism. Defamation and privacy regimes can also gradually become re-centred over 
time as policymakers and/or courts reassess the balance.11 There are two broad 
approaches to constitutional balancing of freedom of expression with reputation and/or 
privacy (Barendt 2005, 205; Milo 2008, 7–8). The ECtHR and most European 
jurisdictions, including those of Slovakia and England and Wales, weigh the competing 
interests in a case-by-case, ‘ad hoc’ way within the framework of general principles. 
Courts resolve the conflict between the rights by assessing for each case the magnitude 
of the harm to the plaintiff’s rights against the importance of the particular publication. 
The below discussion will primarily revolve around this approach. 
The US is a prime example of a jurisdiction that has undergone radical re-
balancing of its defamation and privacy regime. From the traditional common law 
approach that largely balanced the competing interests in an ad hoc way, in the seminal 
1964 New York Times v. Sullivan case,12  the US Supreme Court developed the so-called 
‘categorization’ approach or the ‘definitional balancing technique’ to ‘formulate 
categorical rules differentiating between speech protected by the first amendment and 
speech subject to governmental restrictions and regulation’ (Schauer 1978, 687). The US 
Supreme Court’s reasoning stemmed from its appreciations of the imperfections of the 
legal process (Barendt 2005, 206). The Court recognised the inherent uncertainty of all 
litigation and the errors it might lead to – in the context of defamation litigation those are 
‘an erroneous limitation of protected speech’ or ‘an erroneous overextension of freedom 
of speech’ (Schauer 1978, 687-688). Applying the comparative harm principle, the Court 
reasoned that wrongful limitation of speech, which, in contrast to reputation (and 
privacy), is constitutionally protected under US law, is, a priori, the more serious error 
because it could deter legitimate speech on matters of public concern (Ibid., 701). 
To remove this ‘chilling effect’ of defamation law, during the 1960s and 1970s, 
the US Supreme Court formulated precise legal rules pertaining to the status of the 
plaintiff, the nature of speech and damages awards. In New York Times v. Sullivan, the 
Court introduced into constitutional law a federal rule that ‘prohibits a public official 
 
 
 
11 For a discussion of re-centring of the English defamation regime in the past three decades see Mullis 
and Scott (2012b). 
12 New York Times v. Sullivan 376 US 254 (1964). 
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from recovering damages for defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct, unless 
he proves that the statement was made with “actual’ malice” – that is with knowledge that 
it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not’.13  
Such definitional approach to balancing secures greater clarity and predictability 
of decisions, as clear rules are stipulated for future disputes without the need to further 
weighing of interests. By reflecting the preference for errors made in favour of protecting 
speech, it enables judges to give more weight to speech as is the case under ad hoc 
balancing (Nimmer 1968, 935; Milo 2008, 7-8; Barendt 2005, 205). However, it is rather 
rigid and risks deserving claimants, whether public officials or private individuals, not 
being able to vindicate their reputation and protect their privacy, as had largely been the 
case in the US between the 1970s and 2000s, at least (Anderson 1992, 1-14; London 1993, 
10-16).14  
While it might be appropriate to use such approach in jurisdictions where one or 
more of the competing interests are subordinated to another, like in the US, it is 
inapplicable in jurisdictions where all rights have equal standing and constitutional 
protection as in Slovak law or under the Convention (at least since 2008 as will be 
discussed below). There, the ad hoc approach must be used (see Barendt 2005, 225). The 
following paragraphs explore the individual and social values of reputation, privacy and 
free expression before the chapter moves to describing the aims of an optimal defamation 
and privacy regime which constitutionally protects all the competing interests. 
1.3 Individual and Social Value of Reputation 
The past two decades have seen a flurry of academic interest in the value of reputation 
(Gibbons 1996; Solove 2007; McNamara 2007; Milo 2008; Rolph 2008; Craik 2009; 
Howarth 2011b). Reputation refers to ‘the perception of a person by others, or the esteem 
in which he or she is held in society’, and is thus to be distinguished from a person’s 
 
 
 
13 Brennan J. in 376 US 254, 279-80 (1964). 
14 For a critical assessment of the post-New York Times v. Sullivan regime see, for instance, the edited 
volume by Soloski and Bezanson (1992).  
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character (Barendt 1999, 115). The law protects this relational value of reputation. Given 
its long history, reputation cannot be easily understood as a unitary concept but as 
encompassing a plurality of values. In the most influential academic discussion of 
reputation, Post (1986, 692) characterised it as a ‘mysterious thing’, the importance of 
which rested on the values of honour, dignity, and property. As Post admitted, none of 
these conceptions can entirely explain why reputation is protected by defamation law, but 
each of them throws light on some of its features. Milo (2008, 42) argued that it was 
‘better that the influences of property and dignity, and to a lesser extent, honour are 
acknowledged’ because it would be ‘too optimistic to expect reputation to be fully 
explained by only one justification’. 
The conception of reputation as honour understands it as an attribute of the social 
rank or position which is conferred on individuals whether they have earned it or not. 
Historically, it played an important role in law as it was assumed that judges, for instance, 
deserved a high reputation solely by virtue of their social position, and a verbal attack on 
them lowered their standing in society (Mullis 2010b, 24).  
The justification of reputation as property best explains why some legal systems, 
including the Slovak and English ones, confer protection on corporate reputations. Since 
personal and corporate reputations are typically hard-won as a result of considerable 
effort, they are protected by the law. Otherwise the result of those efforts would be 
undermined and personal exertion and labour would be disincentivised. Lord Bingham 
stated in Jameel v. Wall Street Journal Europe SPRL,15  ‘the good name of a company, 
as that of an individual, is a thing of value. A damaging libel may lower its standing in 
the eyes of the public and even its own staff, make people less ready to deal with it, less 
willing or less proud to work for it’.16  
Most judicial and scholarly discussions of reputation view it as an integral part of 
the dignity of each individual and thus as an essential aspect of personality. Under this 
conception, reputation is deemed worthy of protection as a safeguard of either an 
individual’s autonomy and/or the stability of social relations (Weaver et al. 2006, 3). In 
 
 
 
15 Jameel v. Wall Street Journal Europe SPRL [2006] UKHL 44, [2007] 1 AC 359, [2006] 4 All ER 
1279, [2007] EMLR 14. 
16 Jameel v. Wall Street Journal Europe SPRL [2006] UKHL 44, at 26. 
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the former case, dignity is understood as inherent in every human being. By virtue of their 
humanity, persons are entitled to be treated as worthy of respect. The right to reputation 
thus ‘aims to protect individuals from being reduced to the status of mere objects, rather 
than being viewed as autonomous subjects’, whereby ‘[p]ublication of false statements, 
or expressing opinions on the basis of false facts’ demonstrates ‘a lack of respect for a 
person’s moral integrity’ (Milo 2008, 35). The latter conceptualisation of dignity sees it 
as being contingent on one’s membership of a particular community. For Post (1986, 
710), ‘our own sense of intrinsic self-worth, stored in the deepest recesses of our “private 
personality” is perpetually dependent upon the ceremonial observance by those around 
us of rules of deference and demeanor [sic], thereby protecting the dignity of its 
members’. Denied that esteem, a person’s intrinsic sense of his/her own self-worth and 
dignity is reduced. The value protected by law is thus the ‘respect (and self-respect) that 
arises from full membership in society’ (Ibid., 711). Reputation in this sense is ‘both a 
private and a public good’ (Milo 2008, 35) as it simultaneously safeguards against the 
loss of dignity associated with exclusion from the company of one’s fellow human beings 
and reinforces societal norms.  
It is thus easy to understand why reputation would be crucial for sociality or for 
the formation and maintenance of social relationships, as Howarth has argued (2011b, 
849). One of the key functions of reputation within society is to help form and maintain 
social bonds. Since our judgments of self-worth are primarily affected by the perceived 
level of esteem that we think other members of our community hold for us, a defamatory 
publication can have a detrimental impact on an individual’s level of self-worth and his 
or her ability to engage in community. As explained by Justice Cory in Manning v. Hill,17  
reputation is the “fundamental foundation on which people are able to 
interact with each other in social environments”. At the same time, it serves 
the equally and perhaps more fundamentally important purpose of fostering 
our self-image and sense of self-worth.  
 
Reputation has another social function. It is crucial for democratic self-
government as ‘an investment in social capital and as signalling an individual’s 
trustworthiness to others’ (Weaver et al. 2006, 3). As Lord Nicholls noted in Reynolds, 
 
 
 
17 Manning v. Hill (A-G for Ontario, interveners) (1991) 126 DLR (4th) 129 Can SC at 117. 
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apart from being ‘an integral and important part of the dignity of the individual’, 
reputation ‘also forms the basis of many decisions in a democratic society which are 
fundamental to its well-being: whom to employ or work for, whom to promote, whom to 
do business with or to vote for’. Once tainted by an unfounded allegation in the media, it 
could be damaged forever, especially if the individual had no opportunity to vindicate 
his/her reputation. When this happens, according to Lord Nicholls, ‘society as well as the 
individual is the loser’ because far from being solely ‘a matter of importance only to the 
affected individual and his family’, safeguarding an individual’s reputation is also 
‘conducive to the public good. It is in the public interest that the reputation of public 
figures should not be debased falsely. In the political field, in order to make an informed 
choice, the electorate needs to be able to identify the good as well as the bad’. 18  
1.4 Individual and Social Value of Privacy  
The concept of privacy has been subject of vigorous scholarly debate since the publication 
of Warren and Brandeis’s (1890) seminal article. Commentators have proclaimed privacy 
to be ‘essential to democratic government’ (Gavison 1980, 455), key to ‘our ability to 
create and maintain different sorts of relationships with different people’ (Rachels 1984, 
292), and critical for ‘permitting and protecting autonomous life’ (Rössler 2004, 1). 
Despite the intense interest in and the almost universal consensus on the importance of 
protecting privacy, there remains a lot of confusion regarding its value. It is widely 
considered that ‘the voluminous literature on the subject has failed to produce a lucid or 
consistent meaning of the concept’ (Wacks 1993, xi). 
Drawing on Warren and Brandeis’s article, Prosser (1960) discerned four types of 
harmful activities remedied under the tort of privacy: intrusion in a person’s solicitude, 
or private affairs; public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about a person; publicity 
that places a person in a false light in the public eye; and appropriation of a person’s name 
or likeness for their own advantage.  
A recent systematic attempt at conceptualising privacy for contemporary times was 
 
 
 
18 Reynolds v. Times Newspapers Ltd [2001] 2 AC at 201. 
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made by Solove (2008, see also 2002, 2003, 2006). Like other scholars before him, 
Solove conceptualises privacy as having a social value that lies in ‘the benefits it confers 
on society by enhancing and protecting certain aspects of selfhood’. According to Solove, 
a theory of the value of privacy thus ‘requires a theory of the relationship of the individual 
to the community’ because privacy does not protect individuals ‘merely for their sake but 
for the sake of society’ (2008, 92). Besides protecting individuals, privacy facilitates 
relationships between individuals, which are essential for family life, social engagement 
and political activities (Solove 2008, 93). 
In Solove’s conceptualisation, privacy is understood pluralistically as a set of 
protections from a multitude of problems or activities. The value of privacy is thus not 
uniform, but ‘varies depending on the nature of the problem being protected against’ 
(2008, 100). There are four principal categories of privacy problems: i) information 
collection, including surveillance and interrogation; ii) information processing, including 
aggregation, identification, insecurity, secondary use and exclusion; iii) information 
dissemination, including breach of confidentiality, disclosure, exposure increased 
accessibility, blackmail, appropriation and distortion; and iv) invasion, including 
intrusion and decisional interference (Ibid., 101-170). Among these, the most relevant 
privacy problems in the context of journalistic speech are disclosure, exposure and 
intrusion.  
Disclosure entails the revelation of truthful information about a person which 
results in reputational harm. Protecting against disclosure can advance individual 
autonomy and democratic self-government (Solove 2003), as the risk of disclosure can 
deter persons from engaging in activities that further their own self-development, and 
might inhibit criticism of aspects of public life. As a substantial part of communication 
essential for democratic participation occurs in ostensibly private conversations, 
guarantees of privacy enable individuals to communicate with others they trust. The threat 
of disclosure might thus alter what has been said in private conversations about matters 
of public interest and/or prevent people from associating with others. Disclosure can also 
destroy anonymity, which might sometimes be critical for the reading and consumption 
of ideas, and/or jeopardise a person’s security as the disclosed information might be used 
by others to cause him/her harm. Disclosure protections also guard against irrational 
judgments based on stereotypes or misinformation (Solove 2008, 140-146).  
Similarly, Scott (2010, 574) argued that ‘in the context of harms caused by 
publication, it is most often interference with [the] instrumental interest in informational 
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privacy that is at issue (although occasionally, direct invasion of privacy – such as 
trespass or covert surveillance – may have been necessary to obtain the information 
concerned)’. Invasion of informational privacy involves publication of sensitive personal 
information, which might cause direct harm in terms of pressure on an individual brought 
by other members of society. Indirectly, it may also damage one’s sense of personal 
dignity, trigger a perceived reputational loss, quash confidence or self-esteem in the 
individual’s dealings with others and produce a feeling of loss of control for the injured 
party. 
Exposure in Solove’s (2008, 146-149) conceptualisation involves revealing 
information about another person’s nudity, grief, health or bodily functions. Even though 
doing so would not affect the injured party’s reputation, it can often cause severe 
embarrassment, debilitating humiliation and loss of self-esteem. This is because exposure 
involves attributes and activities that people have long been socialised into concealing 
and thus strips people of dignity. Hence, the need for protection of privacy and the 
prevention of exposure arises from the need to safeguard social relationships and people’s 
ability to participate in society.  
Intrusion encompasses invasive actions that disrupt one’s tranquillity or solitude, 
often motivated by a desire to gather and disclose information. The harm suffered lies in 
the interruption of one’s activities through the unwanted presence or activities of another 
person. A typical example of intrusion in the context of journalism is the conduct of 
paparazzi (Ibid., 161-165).  
1.4.1 Individual and Social Value of Freedom of Expression 
The central importance in a democracy of freedom of expression is universally 
recognised. Theories of freedom of expression suggest that speech is worth protecting 
because it is vital for the working of a democracy, enables the attainment of truth and is 
an aspect of human self-fulfilment or autonomy. The different arguments emphasize the 
interests in democratic societies of either the speaker, the audience, the wider public (this 
is not always identical with the interests of the recipients of expression) or a combination 
of those (Barendt 2005, 6). 
The dominant theory of freedom of expression is the view of citizen participation 
in a democracy associated with the writings of Alexander Meiklejohn (1965). The 
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purpose of expression from this perspective is to serve democracy in enabling the 
formation of public opinion on political questions. Since democracy denotes popular 
sovereignty, its citizens, as the ultimate decision-makers, must be well-informed and 
receive a wide variety of views to be able to make intelligent political choices and hold 
the government to account. Freedom of expression thus performs two main functions: the 
informative and the critical one (Lichtenberg 1987, 337). Freedom of expression allows 
the flow of information necessary for the electorate to make informed decisions and for 
politicians to learn the former’s interests. The latter function of free speech, delegated to 
the press in particular, is that of a watchdog, which provides independent criticism and 
evaluation of the performance of elected officials so that they continue to act in the 
public’s best interest. One might argue alongside Barendt (2005, 23) that the argument 
from democracy recognises that speakers such as politicians or political commentators, 
as participants in the political process have important interests in freedom of expression. 
However, it is clear that this predominant view of freedom of expression primarily 
stresses the interests of the recipients in receiving information and ideas in order to enable 
individuals to make their political choices.  
The argument from truth also attaches particular importance to the interests of 
recipients when it states that ideas, as well as information, should be freely discussed in 
order to enable society to discover the truth.19 Classical theorists like John Stuart Mill20 
argued that anyone might contribute to the search for truth and that valuable contributions 
to discovering truth come in many forms and that even fallacy has its place in the search 
for truth. Therefore, if the proscribed expression is truthful, the public is deprived of the 
truth itself. If it is objectively false, the public is denied the ability to discover the truth 
through a free exchange of competing views. Another form of the argument from truth 
associated with Justice Holmes – the ‘market place of ideas’ theory – claims that ‘the best 
test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the 
 
 
 
19 As Barendt (2005, 7–8) observed, in the myriad versions of the argument from truth, truth is 
considered either as an autonomous and fundamental good, or as a prerequisite for progress and 
development of society. While some theories assume that the truth is a coherent concept and that 
particular truths can be discovered and justified, other relativist theories contest such conception of 
truth. 
20 See Mill’s classic essay Of the Liberty of Thought and Discussion. 
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market’.21 
According to the justification from autonomy, freedom of expression is an integral 
element of each individual’s right to self-development and fulfilment. Restrictions on 
what we are allowed to express constrain our personality and its growth. This is because 
the right to express beliefs and political attitudes epitomises what it is to be human 
(Barendt 2005, 13). The fundamental value of freedom of expression lies in our ability to 
communicate our thoughts to others, making a mark on the world (Lichtenberg 1987). 
The speaker’s interest seems paramount if the value of freedom of expression is linked to 
fundamental rights to self-fulfilment and development. The rights and interest of 
recipients of speech were once emphasised by Scanlon (1972), who argued that a person 
is only autonomous if he/she is at liberty to weigh up for him/herself the arguments for 
different courses of action that others propose. In Scanlon’s early view, restricting 
expression is harmful to the interests of the audience who need to enjoy access to ideas 
and information in order to make up their own minds and act upon them. Scanlon (1979) 
also argued that the interests of the speaker lie in his/her ability to bring ideas and 
propositions to the attention of a wide audience.  
The ‘classical’ arguments presented above stress that freedom of speech should 
be protected from government interference because individuals have a strong interest in 
its exercise. There are positive aspects to free speech as numerous commentators, 
including Lichtenberg (1987), Raz (1991), and more recently Kenyon (2014), as well as 
the ECtHR22 have acknowledged. Raz (1991) argued that there is a general public interest 
in the disclosure of political information, regardless of whether individuals wish to 
participate in political discussion or vote. According to Raz, political expression 
represents a public good of living in a democracy. Central to Raz’s argument is a belief 
in pluralism, i.e., the value of diverse ways of life which may be conflicting and clash, 
but which tolerate each other (Raz 1991, 321-323). Implicit in Raz’s argument is what 
Lichtenberg (1987, 334) called the ‘multiplicity of voices principle’ by which ‘the 
purposes of freedom of speech are realised when expression and diversity of expression 
 
 
 
21 Abrams v. US, 250 US 616, 630-631 [1919]. 
22 For a brief overview of positive free speech principles in ECtHR jurisprudence, see Kenyon (2014, 
393-95). 
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flourish’. According to Lichtenberg, this is the second principle justifying freedom of 
expression. It is complementary to what she termed the ‘noninterference or no censorship 
principle’, denoting that ‘[o]ne should not be prevented from thinking, speaking, reading, 
writing, or listening as one sees fit’.  
This positive conception of free speech implies that an absence of government 
restrictions on expression is insufficient. The ECtHR acknowledged that affirmative 
government action may be required to protect freedom of expression. In Özgür Gündem 
v. Turkey, the Court stated, ‘Genuine, effective exercise of this freedom does not depend 
merely on the State’s duty not to interfere, but may require positive measures of 
protection, even in the sphere of relations between individuals’.23 Empirical research also 
demonstrates that some form of positive government action can be valuable for 
supporting public interest in freedom of expression (for an overview, see Kenyon 2014). 
It follows from the above discussion, as Lichtenberg (1987, 334) wrote, ‘[a]ny 
monistic theory of free speech, emphasizing only one of these values will fail to do justice 
to the variety and richness of our interests in free speech’. This has widely been 
recognised by international law and in numerous constitutions around the world, which 
guarantee protection to freedom to impart as well as receive information and ideas. It has 
also been recognised by the ECtHR and domestic courts across Europe. In Steel and 
Morris v. United Kingdom, the ECtHR held that ‘[f]reedom of expression constitutes one 
of the essential foundations of a democratic society and one of the basic conditions for its 
progress and for each individual's self-fulfilment’. Freedom of expression is, according 
to the ECtHR, ‘applicable not only to “information” or “ideas” that are favourably 
received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that 
offend, shock or disturb. Such are the demands of pluralism, tolerance and 
broadmindedness without which there is no “democratic society”’.24  
In modern democracies, the media have a central role to play in promulgating 
information on matters of public interest and as public watchdogs who investigate and 
report the abuse of power, holding the state and the powerful to account. It has therefore 
been widely recognised that the law should protect the media’s freedom from abuses of 
 
 
 
23 Öztürk v. Turkey [GC], No. 22479/93, ECHR 1999-VI, §43. 
24 Steel and Morris v. the United Kingdom, No. 68416/01, ECHR 2005-II, §87. 
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defamation and privacy laws by the powerful who might wish to muzzle the press. The 
ECtHR, for instance, repeatedly held that the principles relating to freedom of expression 
‘are of particular importance as far as the press is concerned’, otherwise ‘the press would 
be unable to play its vital role of “public watchdog”’.25 
To say media freedom should be protected does not mean that the law should 
entitle the media to publish any speech or provide them any wider immunity from 
legitimate restrictions on their right to freedom of expression than is accorded to any other 
person (Lichtenberg 1987, 332-33; Mullis 2010b, 31; Barendt 2005, 418). While media 
organisations can help enable public access to important information and participation in 
debate, it is not a given that media freedom will always serve the public’s freedom of 
expression. The exercise of media freedom can, in some instances, go against the societal 
interests in protecting free speech (Fenwick and Phillipson 2006, Chapter 1; Phillipson 
2013). As Justice Tugendhat J argued in JIH v. News Group Newspapers Ltd,26 ‘it is not 
to be assumed that news publishers are always concerned to protect the Art 10 rights of 
the public’. Gibbons (1998, 28) similarly observed, ‘the media may want to claim that 
their interests are identical with protection of free speech, but often their association with 
truth and participation in a democracy is only incidental’. Media freedom is only an 
‘instrumental’ human right (Barendt 2005, 422), or ‘instrumental good’ (Lichtenberg 
1987, 332), which should be protected only if it promotes the values of freedom of 
expression. As O’Neill (2002, 4) argued, ‘[a] free press is not an unconditional good. It 
is good because and insofar as it helps the public to explore and test opinions and to judge 
for themselves what to believe’.  
Under the Convention and most European jurisdictions, law thus only confers 
protection on such journalistic speech that communicates information on matters of 
public interest. These are not necessarily the matters the public finds interesting. The 
German Constitutional Court held that a tabloid publication is not entitled to freedom of 
expression protection for an unfounded story infringing a person’s privacy rights, which 
contributes nothing valuable to public debate,27 and one could argue nothing to the search 
 
 
 
25 Observer and Guardian v. the United Kingdom, 26 November 1991, Series A No. 216, §59(b). 
26 JIH v. News Group Newspapers Ltd [2010] EWHC 2818 (QB) at 61. 
27 Soraya, 34 BVerfGE 269, 283-4 (1973), http://www.servat.unibe.ch/dfr/bv034269.html 
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for truth (Barendt 2005, 417). While the public interest is often crucial for balancing the 
competing rights in defamation and privacy disputes, and features as an important part of 
journalistic ethics codes, it has been characterised as ‘a hazy and subjective concept’ 
(Townend 2014, 73) that lacks ‘one firm definition’ or ‘a universally-understood 
“shorthand” description’ (Morrison and Svennevig 2002, 1, 4). In Reynolds, Lord 
Nicholls noted that ‘[p]ublic interest has never been defined’. Citing Lord Denning’s 
definition developed in  London Artists Ltd. v. Littler28, Lord Nicholls argued that it is not 
to be confined within narrow limits: ‘Whenever a matter is such as to affect people at 
large, so that they may be legitimately interested in, or concerned at, what is going on; or 
what may happen to them or others; then it is a matter of public interest’. Lord Nicholls 
introduced the responsible journalism standard in UK law when he argued that the 
common law did not ‘seek to set a higher standard than that of responsible journalism, a 
standard the media themselves espouse’. 29 
Lord Hobhouse further clarified in Reynolds that freedom of expression and public 
interest did not encompass the freedom to communicate misinformation, as ‘[t]here is no 
human right to disseminate information that is not true’ and ‘[n]o public interest is served 
by publishing or communicating misinformation’.30 Their Lordships thus recognised that 
the media’s freedom of expression cannot be wholly unrestricted even with respect to 
coverage of matters of public interest or ‘political information’. Even then, the rights of 
the press should be balanced against the individual rights and the public’s interests in 
reputation, privacy and freedom of expression based on the circumstances of the case, in 
particular emphasis should be on whether, when publishing the impugned statements, the 
press acted responsibly. The common law Reynolds defence was abolished in the law of 
England and Wales by the Defamation Act 2013 and replaced by the ‘publication on a 
matter of public interest’ defence (Section 4), which no longer mentions the reasonable 
journalism standard. Nonetheless, it still remains appropriate for discussions of 
triangulation of the competing interests in expression, reputation and privacy. This is the 
case not least because there is still no agreement among legal scholars on what the 
 
 
 
28London Artists Ltd. v. Littler [1969] 2 QB 375, 391. 
29 Reynolds v. Times Newspapers Ltd [2001] 2 AC at 202. 
30 Reynolds v. Times Newspapers Ltd [2001] 2 AC at 238. 
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difference in wording signifies for judicial practice (see, e.g., Mullis and Scott 2014, 89-
91).  
The concept of “duties and responsibilities” inherent in the exercise of freedom of 
expression under Article 10 of the Convention remains cited by the ECtHR.31 The Court 
held, for instance, in Bergens Tidende and Others v. Norway that ‘Article 10 of the 
Convention does not guarantee a wholly unrestricted freedom of expression even with 
respect to press coverage of matters of serious public concern’. ‘By reason of the “duties 
and responsibilities” inherent in the exercise of freedom of expression’, the Court 
continued, ‘the safeguard afforded by Article 10 to journalists in relation to reporting on 
issues of general interest is subject to the proviso that they are acting in good faith in 
order to provide accurate and reliable information in accordance with the ethics of 
journalism’.32 
In contrast, the US defamation regime post-New York Times v. Sullivan does not 
seek to foster responsible journalism. Its role is solely to prevent publication of 
falsehoods. Public plaintiffs must prove that the defendant published falsehoods about 
them while acting with ‘actual malice’. This entails proving that the publication 
communicates factual statements that are actually false, which the publisher believed to 
be so when publishing. The plaintiff therefore must prove the publisher was actually 
aware of the falsity of the published statements, or at least that he/she had a ‘high degree 
of awareness’ of the publication’s ‘probable falsity’ and recklessly disregarded that 
danger (Kenyon and Dent 2004, 12). The plaintiff must prove this with ‘convincing 
clarity’, which is a substantially higher standard than the usual requirement in civil actions 
(Barendt 2005, 206; Dent and Keynon 2004, 12; London 1993, 5). Serious, erroneous 
factual allegations that journalists tried to verify without certainty about their veracity, 
but which they did not think were false, can thus be published with minimal legal risk. 
According to Barendt (2005, 207), US law precludes reputational vindication for public 
officials and punishment of extremely carless and irresponsible journalism. He illustrates 
 
 
 
31 For recent cases emphasising journalists’ duties and responsibilities when exercising their freedom 
of expression, see, for instance Alpha Doryforiki Tileorasi Anonymi Etairia v. Greece, No. 72562/10, 
from 22 February 2018, §61; and Brambilla and Others v. Italy, No. 22567/09 from 23 June 2016, 
§55. 
32 Bergens Tidende and Others v. Norway, No. 26132/95, ECHR 2000-IV, §53. 
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his point on a case of a newspaper, which mistakenly published a report that a candidate 
for local office was facing perjury charges when in fact it was his brother who had been 
indicted, but which was nevertheless not held liable for defamation.33 Moreover, value 
judgments under the US law are only actionable if they contain ‘false facts’.34 Therefore, 
a mere publication of someone’s opinion that does not convey false facts, however 
expressive and harmful to one’s reputation, is not actionable (Keyon and Dent 2004, 14). 
The extent of protection for opinion under US law thus goes beyond the scope afforded 
to it under Convention law. 
Just as the rights of the public and the media can come into conflict, so can the 
rights of media organisations and individual media professionals. An owner directing an 
editor to take a particular editorial line or keeping a particular topic out of the paper could 
be considered as an exercise of the owner’s freedom of expression or as an interference 
with editorial freedom (Barendt 2005, 418). It is often very difficult to determine who 
enjoys the right to freedom of expression in the media context, and indeed there might be 
‘no single right answer to the resolution of [such] conflicts’ as Barendt argued (2005, 
443).  
1.4.2 The Role of Law and the Principal Protagonists  
It is apparent from the discussion above that the maintenance of reputation and privacy 
and the protection of freedom of expression are vitally important both for individuals and 
for society in any democracy. This is perhaps even more the case during the turbulent and 
uncertain times of democratic transition and consolidation, that is a state where the 
democratic constitutional and intuitional framework is accepted by all political actors 
(e.g. Linz and Stepan 1996, 3), which Slovakia went through in the studied period. The 
purpose of defamation and privacy regimes is therefore to find an appropriate 
triangulation not only of the rights and interests of plaintiffs and defendants but also those 
of the wider public. This is primarily pursued through a system of legal rules, remedies, 
 
 
 
33 The case of Ocala Star-Banner Co v. Damron 401 US 295 (1971). See Barendt (2005, 207, footnote 
38). 
34 See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co 497 US 1 (1990).  
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defences and procedural requirements that seek to condition the behaviours and cost-
benefit calculi of would-be plaintiffs and defendants. In the last resort, the legal regime 
provides a means for resolving potential disputes among the rights and interests of 
plaintiffs, defendants and the wider public. 
While the law seeks to protect the rights and interests of the wider public, the 
public remains on the sidelines of the operation of the defamation and privacy regime. 
The principal protagonists are to be found among those actors who participate in 
defamation and/or privacy disputes, i.e. the plaintiffs and would-be plaintiffs, the 
defendants, and the lawyers on both sides. In modern democracies, the plaintiffs are found 
among the persons and entities who become subject of a publication that impinges on 
their reputation or privacy, while defendants are typically – although not-exclusively – 
found among media organisations. Cases that reach court are therefore concerned, in the 
first instance, with the rights and interests of particular categories of litigants. The legal 
arguments offered by such persons will necessarily represent a narrower range of 
perspectives than that which would be presented on behalf of the broader public. Hence, 
there is a danger that the law might become skewed in favour of “repeat players”, and 
under-representative of the public interest. It falls upon judges and other decision-makers 
to ensure that the broader context is reflected in the determination of disputes and the 
development of legal understandings. 
1.4.3 Unintended Consequences of the Law 
Given the complexities and conflicting interests at play, finding an appropriate 
triangulation in a system where all the interests enjoy constitutional protection, is not a 
simple task for policy-makers and judges. There is something ‘artificial’ about the 
metaphor of triangulation or balancing of rights, as Mullis and Scott observed. It implies 
that there is ‘some single, natural outcome to be found by the application of reason’ in 
every instance. However, since freedom of expression and respect for reputation and 
privacy are ‘incommensurable goods’, there is ‘no easy equation for the exchange of a 
proportion of one for a given amount of the other’ (Mullis and Scott 2012b, 43). There is 
indeed no single perfect solution to resolving the conflict between the competing 
interests.  
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Defamation and privacy disputes can be viewed as, what Fuller (1978) termed, 
‘polycentric’ problems that ‘involve many affected parties and a somewhat fluid state of 
affairs’. Intervention in such situations can have ‘complex repercussions’. Fuller (1978, 
369) likened this kind of situation to a spider’s web: ‘A pull on one strand will distribute 
tensions after a complicated pattern throughout the web as a whole. Doubling the original 
pull will, in all likelihood, not simply double each of the resulting tensions but will rather 
create a different complicated pattern of tensions’.  
Policy-makers and judges therefore often walk a tight rope as a small change 
might unsettle the whole balance within the defamation and privacy regime and even the 
best intentioned actions may have unintended consequences. The ramifications of these 
can only be assessed in retrospect after the protagonists have experienced the 
repercussions. Moreover, even a carefully designed defamation and privacy regime may 
possibly lead to unintended consequences for any or all of the protected interests since 
laws operate in a context that may change over time, and because human behaviour is 
often unpredictable.   
Inappropriately designed and applied legal rules governing defences, costs, 
processes and remedies might allow misuse of defamation and privacy law by powerful 
individual and/or corporate plaintiffs who wish to preclude investigative journalism. For 
fear of incurring litigation costs, the media and journalists might be deterred from 
publishing important, legitimate comment on the powerful plaintiffs’ conduct, products 
or ideas. Such deterrence, or ‘chilling effect’, is detrimental for media organisations’ and 
journalists’ individual right to freedom of expression. More importantly, a legal regime 
that permits such invidious chilling effects on journalistic speech is ‘socially 
dysfunctional’ (Mullis and Scott 2012a, 6), as public debate and the public’s right to 
receive truthful information on matters of general interest that enables informed choice, 
will be seriously hampered.35  
The concept of the chilling effect of defamation law has been increasingly 
employed by academics (e.g. Schauer 1978; Barendt et al. 1997; Townend 2014; Kenyon 
 
 
 
35 The exact meaning of the chilling effect depends on the jurisdiction. Invidious chilling effect refers 
to different phenomena under the Convention and US law. These differences will be discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 2. 
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2010; Kenyon and Marjoribanks 2008b; Boies 1994; Forer 1987; Garoupa 1999; Hansen 
and Moore 1990) and practitioners (see, e.g. Dill 1993), and was a major theme of the 
discussions preceding the adoption of the 2013 Defamation Act in England and Wales 
(Glanville and Heawood 2009; see also Mullis and Scott 2009). The chilling effect on 
debates on matters of legitimate public interest is also of central concern to courts 
worldwide, including the ECtHR. According to the ECtHR, such chilling effect, which is 
present where a person engages in ‘self-censorship’36 due to fear of disproportionate 
sanctions, ‘works to the detriment of the society as a whole’.37 
A defamation and privacy regime that does not grant appropriate remedies, 
safeguard plaintiffs’ access to justice, deal with the alleged falsity of the impugned 
publication, or offer legal certainty, provides plaintiffs – whose rights were harmed by 
unwarranted attacks in the press and whose livelihood often suffered as a result – little 
redress. Such ‘curtailment of individual rights’ (London 1993, 3) might stem from the 
fact that they are effectively denied access to justice (Mullis and Scott 2014, 109), have 
little chance of success (London 1993; Anderson 1992, 24-25; London 1993), are 
deterred from pursuing a claim (Kenyon 2007, 228), or get little vindication if the 
reasonable publication/public interest defence conceals the fact that the truth of the 
impugned publication has never been proven (Mullis and Scott 2012a, 7).  
The effects of such a regime are detrimental for society in several respects. First, 
the knowledge that they would not be able to defend their reputation against defamatory 
accusations might deter worthy individuals’ participation in public debate and public life 
(Anderson 1992, 28–30). As Judge Loucaides argued in his concurring opinion in Lindon, 
Otchakovsky-Laurens and July v. France, uninhibited debates on public issues, ‘may be 
suppressed if the potential participants know that they will have no remedy in the event 
that false defamatory accusations are made against them’.38 Moreover, ‘false accusations 
concerning public officials, including candidates for public office, may drive capable 
persons away from government service, thus frustrating rather than furthering the political 
process’.  
 
 
 
36 Vajnai v. Hungary, No. 33629/06, ECHR 2008, §54. 
37 Cumpănă and Mazăre v. Romania [GC], No. 33348/96, ECHR 2004-XI, § 114. 
38 Concurring opinion in Lindon, Otchakovsky-Laurens and July v. France, [GC], Nos. 21279/02 and 
36448/02, ECHR 2007IV, §11. 
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Secondly, such a regime fails adequately to secure the public interest in provision 
of accurate information on matters of public importance, as some falsehoods are never 
challenged, and others never corrected (Mullis and Scott 2012a, 6–7). Given the ‘public 
appetite for scandal’, such a regime would most certainly encourage ‘the journalism of 
scandal’ (Anderson 1992, 30; also Barendt 2005, 202), as in the absence of credible legal 
restraints, the media would be free to publish defamatory or privacy intrusive information 
about plaintiffs whose legal standing effectively precludes them from succeeding and/or 
those who are unable to access justice. As Lord Hobhouse explained in Reynolds, ‘[t]he 
working of a democratic society depends on the members of that society being informed 
not misinformed. Misleading people and the purveying as facts statements which are not 
true is destructive of the democratic society and should form no part of such a society’.39  
Lastly, in the long term, such a regime leads to the loss of credibility of traditional 
journalism as the public has no guarantee of the accuracy of media reports (Barendt 2005, 
202). Already in the early 1990s, Anderson (1992, 31) decried ‘depreciation of truth in 
public discourse’ as a major social cost of the actual-malice rule. The harm done to the 
functioning of a democratic society as a consequence of such inadequate triangulation of 
the individual and public interests in reputation, privacy and expression has been 
poignantly demonstrated by the recent crisis in public information, including declining 
trust in traditional media and dissemination of misinformation or “fake news” online (see, 
e.g., LSE Truth, Trust & Technology Commission 2018). 
1.4.4 Three Specific Objectives of an Optimal Defamation and Privacy Regime 
A defamation and privacy regime under the Convention that properly triangulates 
constitutionally protected individual rights and public interests in reputation, privacy and 
freedom of expression, must effectively perform three interconnected tasks. First, it ought 
to safeguard injured parties’ access to justice and provide them with adequate instruments 
to defend their reputation and privacy rights against unwarranted attacks in the press. 
Access to effective redress safeguards the plaintiff’s ability to engage in society, and the 
 
 
 
39 Reynolds v. Times Newspapers Ltd [2001] 2 AC at 238. 
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public interest in quickly receiving corrected information enabling people to make an 
informed choice about whom to trust in the social, professional and political contexts. 
Secondly, a coherent defamation and privacy regime should prevent unwarranted 
harm to reputation and privacy rights, and protect the social interest in the availability of 
reliable information on matters of public interest by creating a benign ‘chilling effect’ on 
irresponsible journalism and promoting responsible journalistic practices.40 As explained 
by Judge Loucaides in Lindon, Otchakovsky-Laurens and July v. France, ‘the suppression 
of untrue defamatory statements, apart from protecting the dignity of individuals, 
discourages false speech and improves the overall quality of public debate through a 
chilling effect on irresponsible journalism’. ‘The prohibition of defamatory speech’, 
Judge Loucaides added, ‘also eliminates misinformation in the mass media and 
effectively protects the right of the public to truthful information’.41 As Cheer (2008, 92) 
observed, the adjective benign, ‘does not relate to the effects per se, but to the overall 
acceptability of them’. The actual effects of the law ‘can be and are intended to be 
significant, because damages awards, sometimes quite large ones, can encourage 
responsible media behaviour by punishing and deterring irresponsibility’. 
Lastly, to secure the media’s and journalists’ right to freedom of expression and 
the public’s right to reliable information on matters of collective importance, the regime 
must prevent abuses of defamation and privacy laws by powerful individuals and/or 
corporate entities who wish to prevent the media from publishing important, warranted 
reporting concerning their activities. The law thus strives to prevent an invidious chilling 
effect on responsible journalism and consequent undesirable effects on the public interest 
in information. 
 
 
 
40 As discussed above, the US law does not seek to promote responsible journalism, only to prevent 
publication of lies. The meaning of a benign chilling effect under US law therefor differs to the one 
used throughout this thesis. The difference will be further explored in Chapter 2. 
41 Concurring opinion in Lindon, Otchakovsky-Laurens and July v. France, [GC], Nos. 21279/02 and 
36448/02, ECHR 2007IV, §11. 
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1.5 Existing Knowledge of the Relationship between Defamation and 
Privacy Laws and Journalism 
Despite the enormous value of reputation, privacy and expression, it is surprising how 
little is understood regarding whether and the extent to which the law – as perceived by 
protagonists and applied by courts – shapes the motivations of both plaintiffs and 
defendants in order to achieve an appropriate accommodation between the competing 
interests. Researchers themselves have recognised that there is room for more systematic, 
empirically-informed, grounded research that would provide a more sophisticated 
account of whether and how the law shapes the motivations of plaintiffs and defendants 
in order to achieve an appropriate triangulation between the competing interests. Over a 
decade ago, Kenyon (2001, 546) argued that defamation law ‘remains an area that 
deserves greater attention from researchers, and from their funders’. More recently, 
Townend (2014, 303) called for ‘further examination of the subjectivities and 
complexities at play in freedom of expression negotiations and disputes by gathering new 
empirical material and building on past research’.  
There are two main reasons for the lack of systematic empirically-informed 
research into the interactions between reputation, privacy and expression in the context 
of journalism. Firstly, researchers are missing a suitable conceptual framework that would 
allow for analysis of how law conditions the behaviours and cost-benefit calculations of 
the principal protagonists within a legal regime that involves balancing of the competing 
private and public interests (further discussed in Chapter 2). Secondly, there are inherent 
methodological difficulties in investigating effects of the law on human behaviour, and 
reliable data is rarely available (see Chapter 3). Our understanding of the workings of 
defamation and privacy regimes had therefore long been based on little more than 
anecdotal evidence and assumptions about protagonists’ intentions and behaviour. 
Schauer (1978, 730), the author of the pioneering theoretical discussion of chilling effect 
admitted, ‘while the chilling effect concept appears to be premised upon predictions or 
assumptions about human behavior [sic], no evidence has been proffered to justify those 
predictions’. Discussing the deterrent effects of the actual malice clause for individuals’ 
willingness to participate in public life, Anderson (1992, 30) admitted that these effects 
were ‘all speculative’. According to Anderson (Ibid.), so was the chilling effect on speech 
as the constitutional law of libel rested ‘on the unproven assumption that failure to protect 
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those who report on public life will tend to deter news reporting and commentary’. 
Kendrick forcefully argued that given the difficulties ‘to establish either the presence or 
the absence of a chilling effect, let alone to measure the extent of such an effect’, the US 
Supreme Court ‘has founded the chilling effect doctrine on nothing more than 
unpersuasive empirical guesswork’ (2013, 1675, 1684). 
In the past three decades, there have been several notable attempts at systematic, 
empirical research into the interplay between defamation and privacy laws and 
journalistic speech in common law countries and the US. These included research by 
Weaver et al. (2006) in the context of US, English and Australian defamation law, 
Kenyon and colleagues’ (e.g. Kenyon 2010; Kenyon and Marjoribanks 2008b; Kenyon 
and Marjoribanks 2005; Marjoribanks and Kenyon 2004) investigation of the US, 
Australian, Malaysian and Singaporean jurisdictions, Cheer’s (2008, 2006, 2005) 
examination of defamation and the media in New Zealand, and studies of defamation law 
in England and Wales by Barendt et al. (1997) and Townend (2014). However, these were 
predominantly interested in investigating the viewpoint of the media. There have been 
many fewer investigations from the plaintiffs’ viewpoint. The most prominent one has 
been the Iowa Libel Project focusing on the US (Bezanson, Cranberg, and Soloski 1987; 
Bezanson 1986; Bezanson, Cranberg, and Soloski 1985). This is now thirty years old and 
the developments in the law and its effects on protection of reputation and privacy since 
the late 1980s have not been systemativally studied.  
No major research project exploring the effects of the operation of defamation and 
privacy regimes on all the private and public interests at its core from the viewpoint of 
both defendants and plaintiffs has been attempted to date. The lack of research on civil 
law countries, let alone new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe, is also 
astonishing. Systematic, empirical studies of the interplay between reputation, privacy 
and expression is the new Central and Eastern European democracies are highly desirable 
and timely, as media scholars have drawn some sweeping conclusions about the abuses 
of the law by powerful individuals leading to invidious chilling effect of the law on 
freedom of expression in the region. Writing about criminal defamation, Gross (2002, 75-
6) argued that ‘the dubious definitions of “defamation”, and particularly of “insults” to 
individuals, have the potential “chilling effect” of curbing any criticism or bona fide 
reporting of wrongdoing on the part of elected or appointed public officials and civil 
servants’. Sükosd and Bajomi-Lazar (2002, 14) claimed that ‘attempts to introduce 
suppressive libel laws’ in CEE ‘posed threats to freedom of speech in general, and for 
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professional journalists in particular’. However, in a recent, small-scale investigation of 
the perceptions of Slovak investigative journalists, Hanák (2016) found little evidence of 
the chilling effect of criminal defamation law. Despite these contradictory arguments, the 
author of this study is not aware of a major empirical research project into the relationship 
between defamation and privacy laws and journalism in the region. 
1.6 Contribution 
This thesis seeks to address these limitations in our knowledge. It does so by taking the 
example of Slovakia between 1996 and 2016 and providing a systematic, holistic, fine-
grained, empirical analysis of the interplay between the laws of defamation and privacy 
and freedom of expression in the context of journalistic speech. This thesis presents the 
first major empirical study of these interactions in a civil law country. It is original 
in setting the research in a young Central and Eastern European democracy. Covering 
a period of twenty years during the crucial years of Slovakia’s democratisation, the thesis 
sheds light on the complex problems involved in implementing a fair, certain and 
effective defamation and privacy regime that is able to balance the competing interests in 
freedom of expression on the one hand and privacy and reputation on the other. As such, 
the study provides important new insights into the workings of the defamation and 
privacy regimes, not only in consolidating democracies. 
The original contribution of this study to our knowledge lies in presenting a 
holistic picture of the triangulation by a legal regime of the competing interests. In 
contrast to existing studies, which have tended to explore the effects of the law on a single 
interest, most frequently freedom of expression, from the viewpoint of one party to the 
disputes, this project is more ambitious in investigating the law’s ability to safeguard all 
the protected interests, i.e. those of plaintiffs, defendants as well as the general public. 
This thesis investigates from the viewpoint of all the principal protagonists whether, to 
what extent and how the defamation and privacy regime – as applied by courts – 
triangulated the individual and social interests in reputation, privacy and expression. 
Employing a socio-legal approach, the study explores not only the legal but also the 
various contextual factors at play. Drawing on an analysis of statutes, case-law, media 
reports and fifty-three semi-structured interviews with media managers, professionals, 
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plaintiffs, lawyers and experts, the study examines the extent to which the Slovak 
personality/goodwill protection regime i) provided plaintiffs with effective instruments 
to defend their reputation and privacy against unwarranted attacks and remedy the 
suffered harm; ii) prevented unwarranted harm and protected the public interest in the 
availability of truthful information by creating a benign ‘chilling effect’ on irresponsible 
journalism; and iii) prevented powerful individuals and/or corporate entities from abusing 
the law and producing an invidious chilling effect on important, warranted reporting 
concerning their activities.  
Drawing on Habermas’s theory of ‘discursive democracy’, new institutionalism 
and previous socio-legal studies of defamation regimes, the study develops an innovative 
conceptual framework for investigating how laws condition the behaviour and cost-
benefit calculi of the principal protagonists in legal regimes that seeks optimal 
triangulation of the competing private and public interests in reputation, privacy and 
freedom of expression. The conceptual framework is flexible enough to be applicable in 
common and civil law countries relating to any legal regime that seeks to balance 
competing protected interests in the context of public discourse, including hate speech, 
data protection or regulation of social media platforms. 
The study also opens up the black box of the chilling effect. It considers why the 
effects of the law on private and public interests in freedom of expression are felt and 
manifested more pronouncedly in some legal contexts than in others, even where the laws 
are similar. By exploring the manifestations, mechanisms and particular factors present 
in the Slovak case, this study contributes to our understanding of the workings of the 
chilling effects of defamation and privacy laws beyond the case at hand. The key effects 
of the prevalence of clientelism in society in general and in the judiciary in particular, and 
the new conceptualisation of chilling effects based on their harmfulness for the public 
interest in freedom of expression provide new possible avenues for future research into 
the relationship between reputation, privacy and freedom of expression.  
1.7 Conclusion 
This chapter introduced the empirical problem at the heart of this thesis, situated it in the 
context of current academic knowledge and presented the theoretical underpinnings of 
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the empirical analysis that ensues in the following chapters. Before turning to the findings 
chapters (6-9), the remaining two chapters in Section 1 will outline the conceptual 
framework and the research design that underpin this study. Drawing on new 
institutionalism and Habermas’s contribution to the theory of ‘discursive democracy’ 
(1984, 1987, 1996), Chapter 2 outlines the conceptualisation of modern democratic 
society that informed the theoretical understanding of the interplay between the 
defamation and privacy regime and expression in the context of journalism. The chapter 
reviews the existing socio-legal studies investigating the effects of the law on the rights 
of plaintiffs and defendants to produce a conceptual framework that will allow for an 
investigation into how the perceived fairness, certainty and effectiveness of the regime, 
combined with various contextual factors, affects the motivations and behaviour of the 
principal protagonists and the ability of the legal regime appropriately to triangulate the 
conflicting interests. 
Chapter 3 explains the case selection; discusses the inherent methodological 
difficulties in studying the effects of laws; explicates how and why qualitative, socio-
legal research into the motivations, beliefs, perceptions and experiences of plaintiffs, 
plaintiff lawyers, media professionals and managers, and defendant lawyers was carried 
out; how the interview evidence was contextualized by documentary analysis, and how 
the data obtained was analysed.  
Section 2 provides the necessary socio-political and legal contexts for the findings 
chapters. Chapter 4 introduces the key socio-political developments in Slovakia in the 
studied period. After introducing Slovakia’s constitutional set-up, it explores the 
country’s complicated road to democratic consolidation and links it to the prevalence of 
clientelism, corruption and informality in society and the developments in the media 
environment and journalistic culture. The chapter then presents a quantifiable picture of 
the personality/goodwill protection regime between 1996 and 2016 and its principal 
protagonists among plaintiffs and defendants. Chapter 5 examines the aims and 
assumptions of the relevant substantive and procedural rules and investigates the extent 
to which they safeguarded fairness, certainty and effectiveness of the 
personality/goodwill protection regime.  
Section 3 presents the empirical findings of the study. Chapter 6 explores the 
principal protagonists’ experiences with the adjudicatory practice of courts and their 
perceptions about the fairness, certainty and effectiveness of the regime. Chapters 7, 8 
and 9 investigate how the principal protagonists’ perceptions about the legal regime 
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combined with contextual factors affect the cost-benefit calculations of the plaintiffs and 
defendants, and thus affect the ability of the personality protection regime to find an 
appropriate triangulation of the competing interests. Chapter 7 addresses the extent to 
which and how the law provided plaintiffs with appropriate means to defend their 
reputation and privacy rights. Chapter 8 investigates the extent to which and how the 
law deterred unwarranted attacks by creating a benign chilling effect on irresponsible 
journalism and promoting responsible journalistic practices. Chapter 9 examines the 
extent to which the regime prevented abuses of the law by powerful plaintiffs and 
invidious chilling effects on media and journalists’ freedom and thus undesirable effects 
on the public interest in expression. 
Chapter 10 in Section 4 draws empirical and theoretical conclusions, and reflects 
on the avenues for future research. 
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 The Law and the Cost-benefit Calculi of Principal 
Protagonists – A Conceptual Framework 
2.1 Introduction  
In Chapter 1, I argued that defamation and privacy regimes seek to regulate the behaviour 
of would-be plaintiffs, plaintiffs, defendants, including media organisations and media 
professionals, and their lawyers in an attempt to find an appropriate triangulation between 
the private and public interests in reputation, privacy and freedom of expression. I further 
argued that in triangulating the competing interests in the context of journalism, 
defamation and privacy regimes seek to achieve three specific objectives: to protect 
reputation and privacy interests from abuses of freedom of expression by the media; to 
produce a benign chilling effect and promote responsible journalism; and to prevent the 
law being abused by powerful individuals or companies who wish to deter negative, but 
legitimate coverage, of their actions. I have also argued that no regime will be able to 
fully achieve all these objectives in each case, as one of the competing constitutionally 
protected interests will have to be restricted to a certain extent to protect the others. When 
investigating to what extent and how the Slovak defamation and privacy regime 
triangulated the private and public interests in reputation, privacy and expression, the 
analytical focus must be on to what extent and how it conditioned the behaviour of the 
principal protagonists in achieving the three specific objectives. 
Researchers wishing to investigate the interplay between defamation and privacy 
regimes and journalism in the context of democratisation and their ability to shape 
principal protagonists’ actions to achieve desirable effects face the hurdle of a lacking 
suitable analytical framework. Although independent media are thought to be pivotal for 
democratisation, and vice-versa (e.g., Merkel 1996), save a few exceptions (e.g. O’Neil 
1998), they have been largely ignored in democratisation studies which have tended to 
focus on elites and institutional design (e.g., Przeworski 1991; Elster, Offe, and Preuss 
1998) or the democratic character of existing regimes (e.g. Diamond and Morlino 2005). 
While communication studies have explored media transformation in the region, most of 
the research of the first two decades after the fall of communism had been largely 
descriptive, examining implementation of normative standards and the struggles for 
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media freedom or prescribing policy alternatives (e.g., Gross 2002; Paletz et al. 1995; 
Jakubowicz 1995, 2006). Since the 2000s, researchers have increasingly emphasised the 
need for more analytical and systematic research into media transformation (e.g. Voltmer 
2006; Sparks 2009), with some notable attempts including volumes edited by Gunther 
and Mughan (2000), Voltmer (2006), Hallin and Mancini (2012), Downey and Mihelj 
(2012) and Zielonka (2015) to mention just a few. Like previous studies of defamation 
and privacy regimes in the West these do not offer a comprehensive analytical framework 
for investigation of whether and how law shapes the behaviour of all the principal actors 
in a given legal regime. 
This chapter develops a unique conceptual framework for investigating the 
complex interplay between defamation and privacy regimes and journalism that can be 
used by researchers exploring the interactions between the law and journalism in other 
public discourse contexts. It draws on new institutionalism, Habermas’s 
conceptualisation of law in modern societies, news production studies, studies of the 
relationship between media and politics, and political communication and media system 
approaches. In this framework, the law is understood to be a social institution that is 
formulated, enacted, interpreted and applied in mutual strategic interactions between the 
principal protagonists located at different levels of society. These mutual interactions 
occur within their structural, cultural and international contexts. A change within these 
interactions, in legal rules or in the context may re-centre the regime and have unintended 
consequences for any or all of the protected interests.   
With this conceptualisation of the law and its operation in mind, the chapter 
reviews the existing socio-legal studies investigating the effects of the law on the rights 
of plaintiffs and defendants to identify the mechanism of the cost-benefit calculations 
involved in the plaintiffs’ decision to sue and editorial decisions to publish or not to 
publish certain information, which lie at the heart of the operation of defamation and 
privacy regimes. Attention is paid to the mutual relationships between the principal 
protagonists, as well as to the legal and contextual factors that have been said to affect 
the calculi. 
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2.2 Conceptualisation of Law and its Operation in Modern 
Democracies 
Drawing on new institutionalism and Habermas’s (1984, 1987, 1996), conceptualisation 
of  ‘discursive democracy’, law is understood in this thesis as a dynamic social construct 
that structures, constrains and enables the behaviour and mutual interactions between 
actors operating at different levels of society.42 In Habermas’s (1996, 81) ideal-typical 
conceptualization, law is the means by which citizens transpose collectively and 
democratically agreed values to the economic, political and cultural frameworks 
structuring their lives. Law becomes ‘a kind of “transmission belt” that picks up structures 
of mutual recognition that are familiar from face-to-face interactions and transfers these, 
in an abstract but binding form, to the anonymous, systematically mediated interaction 
among strangers’ (Habermas 1996, 448). 
The actors – both individuals and organisations – operate either in the lifeworld 
or the system, each of which encompasses conceptually different forms of social activity 
(Habermas 1984, 1987). The lifeworld comprises the familial and public spheres within 
which civil society operates. It functions as a forum for communicative rationality in 
which individuals and organisations pursue collective development of consensual norms. 
The system, comprised of the political, economic and legal subsystems, encompasses 
those self-regulating sectors of society in which decisions are guided primarily by 
instrumental rationality, involving strategic calculations to achieve their objectives.43 The 
legally constituted institutions of government within the political subsystem are 
responsible for the formal transposition of the collective political will into law. While 
arguably part of the system, the media can be understood as the main communication 
channel or bridge between the lifeworld and the system. This dichotomy provides a useful 
categorization of actors for analytic purposes. It is, however, not ultimate. The system 
remains grounded in the lifeworld context. Systemic actors may therefore sometimes act 
based on communicative rationality.  
While the law seeks to constrain and enable the principal protagonists’ behaviour, 
 
 
 
42 I developed this framework in my previous works (Belakova 2013b, 2013a). 
43 Note that in Habermas’s original conceptualisation, legal actors are part of the political subsystem. 
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it is simultaneously a social institution which is formulated, enacted and interpreted in 
mutual strategic interactions between the principal protagonists within the given legal 
regime. Far from being explicit, authoritative and static, laws are often ambiguous, 
contested, socially constructed and replete with unintended consequences. Enforcers, 
lawyers and target populations have to ‘negotiate the meaning of the law in each 
application’ (Suchman and Edelman 1996, 932). Eventually, a provisional working 
agreement on what the law “is” and what it “requires” may emerge. Actors’ behaviour 
within the given legal regime is strategic in that the choices they make depend not only 
on their understanding of the law but also on their expectations about the behaviour of 
other actors. These are based on actors’ past experiences with institutions and other actors 
and their interpretations thereof (Howard 2003, 19). Habermas’s (1987, 196) model is 
sufficiently flexible to recognise the possibility of ‘colonisation of the lifeworld’ by 
systemic instrumentalism – or that law can be subverted by systemic actors in pursuit of 
their objectives, resulting in unintended consequences, such as invidious chilling effects.  
The conceptual framework suggests that in addition to the ‘law-on-the-books’, 
any investigation of the interplay between a defamation and privacy regime and 
journalism therefore must focus on the interests, experiences and mutual relationships 
between the different social actors whose behaviour defamation and privacy law seeks to 
regulate. Within a defamation and privacy regime, political, economic and legal actors 
are expected to figure as plaintiffs and would-be plaintiffs. It is envisaged that economic 
actors – businesspeople and companies – pursue profit maximisation and value their 
reputations. They may have legitimate interest in protecting it against unwarranted attacks 
by the press through legal means. Some may attempt to preclude negative reporting of 
their actions by embroiling the media in costly litigation for warranted action. The ability 
of political actors – including elected politicians and public officials – to perform well in 
their roles depends on the public’s receiving truthful information about their actions. This 
may necessitate pursuit of legal action in order to correct spurious publication. However, 
they may attempt to deflect justified criticism of their conduct and performance in the 
media through threatening or pursuing litigation.  
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Legal actors of interest for this study are lawyers and judges.44 Lawyers are 
expected to be motivated to provide the best service to their clients – plaintiffs and/or 
defendants. Their interactions with their clients shape the operation of defamations and 
privacy regimes (Marjoribanks and Kenyon 2004, 8; Townend 2014) and might 
contribute to or hinder the ability of the regime to achieve its three specific objectives. 
Lawyers may become plaintiffs themselves.  
While judges have been largely ignored in non-US socio-legal studies of 
defamation regimes, they are of immense importance for investigations of the interplay 
between expression, reputation and privacy because they interpret and apply the law in 
defamation and privacy disputes. The US Supreme Court recognized in New Your Times 
v. Sullivan45 that if weighing the strength of the conflicting interests is left to the discretion 
of courts, freedom of expression interests might be subordinated to the interests in 
reputation and privacy, as judges might place undue emphasis on the particular harm 
suffered by the plaintiff (Barendt 2005, 205, 226; Schauer 1987, 695). Similarly, Eady 
J.46 highlighted in the context of privacy claims the risk of personal prejudices of judges 
tainting legal judgments with personal attitudes inherent in the balancing of the competing 
rights (see Mullis and Scott 2012b, 43). 
American legal scholarship has also long recognised that judges are influenced in 
their decision-making by political and ideological considerations, their individual values, 
career advancement or the legal community’s approval (e.g., Segal and Cover 1989; 
Ducat and Dudley 1989; Ashenfelter, Eisenberg, and Schwab 1995; Baum 1997; Yates 
and Whitford 1998; Segal and Spaeth 1998; Steffensmeier and Britt 2001; Miles and 
Sunstein 2008). Scholars in civil law countries similarly argued that far from 
mechanically applying ‘a set of complete, self-explanatory, pre-existing legal rules’ 
judges have to invent concrete legal rules (Shapiro 1981, 155), while they are subject to 
a great deal of discipline by their supervisors, who control their promotion prospects 
(Ibid., 151), and influence of their individual attitudes, beliefs, and values (e.g., Annus 
 
 
 
44 In Habermas’s original conception, judges and lawyers are part of the political subsystem. 
45 New York Times v. Sullivan 376 US 254 (1964). 
46 CC v. AB [2006] EWHC 3083 (QB), at 27.  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and Tavits 2004). Researchers also observed the prevalence of ‘the politicization of 
judging’ (Goldstein 2004, 614) in the second wave of democracies of Latin America – a 
tendency of political parties or factions to turn to prosecution in court as a way of 
eliminating political opponents (Guarnieri and Pederzoli 2002) or media critical of their 
policies (Maravall 2003). 
In addition to being arbiters of defamation and privacy disputes, judges might 
become plaintiffs if unlawfully attacked in the media or they may want to abuse the law 
to intimidate the media from further reporting on their actions.  
Drawing on previous socio-legal studies of defamation and privacy regimes 
(Bezanson, Cranberg, and Soloski 1987; Barendt et al. 1997; Weaver et al. 2006; Kenyon 
2010; Kenyon and Marjoribanks 2008b; Kenyon and Marjoribanks 2005; Marjoribanks 
and Kenyon 2004; Cheer 2008; Townend 2014), media organisations and media 
professionals are expected to figure as defendants in the defamation and privacy regime. 
As businesses generating profit by targeting audience and advertisers, the media may be 
engaged in reckless, sensationalist journalism. At the same time, media organisations and 
professionals may also view themselves as watchdogs holding the powerful to account. 
As discussed in Chapter 1, as audiences, civil society actors, encompassing individuals 
and their voluntary organisations (see, e.g., Ekiert and Foa 2011), are dependent on 
provision of important reliable information (e.g. Meiklejohn 1965; Lichtenberg 1987). 
They are not expected to be frequently active as plaintiffs but their activities or campaigns 
may influence the operation of the law and the interactions between plaintiffs and 
defendants.  
Because the cost-benefit calculations of the principal protagonists take place 
under conditions of uncertainty with limited information, they are not expected to act 
purely rationally in the pursuit of their own interests (Black 1997). Drawing on news 
production studies (Cottle 2003; Schudson 2005), media systems (e.g. Hallin and Mancini 
2004; Voltmer 2008, 2012) and political communication studies (e.g. Pfetsch 2004), and 
studies of the relationship between politics and the media in new democracies (e.g. 
Zielonka 2015; Stetka 2012; Stetka and Örnebring 2013; Örnebring 2012) the actors’ 
calculus and resulting actions within the defamation and privacy regime are expected to 
  54 
be shaped by the structural, cultural and international context in which they take place.47 
The structural context encompasses formal legal, economic and political institutions, 
technological change and media political economy factors, such as market size and 
competitiveness. The cultural context is understood to operate at the level of ‘personal 
commitment’ and at the level of the society’s ‘cultural code’ (Mihalikova 2006, 188). The 
former embodies personal values and beliefs, self-perceptions and thought patterns (see 
also Pfetsch 2004, 345).48 The latter encompasses the shared informal norms, values, 
beliefs, myths and traditions in society, including political and journalism cultures. 
Protagonists’ interactions are also influenced by the international context, particularly the 
country’s international legal obligations (Schudson 2005, 178; Hallin and Mancini 2004, 
41–44). Legal regimes also respond to changes in the broader environment in which they 
operate. Democratisation is expected to trigger a process of renegotiating the power 
balance between the actors, often resulting in conflicts (Voltmer 2006, 16). The particular 
constellation of the institutional constraints of transition, alongside cultural trajectories 
thus establish particular pathways that might affect the regime’s ability to optimally 
triangulate the competing interests at its core. 
Other empirical studies of the interplay between journalism and defamation and 
privacy laws that sought to systematically examine the mechanics of the chilling effects 
of the law followed similar conceptualisations of contextual factors. Kenyon and 
colleagues argued that ‘[r]elationships between defamation and journalism can be 
illuminated by exploring how organisations are embedded in institutional contexts’ 
(Kenyon and Marjoribanks 2008a, 383) and that ‘the concept of a chilling effect could be 
placed within a wider context’ (Kenyon 2010, 442). Drawing on Cottle’s (2003) 
conceptualisation of journalism practices as social processes influenced by the interaction 
of organisational and cultural contexts and the broader political economy, in their 
research, Kenyon and colleagues explored the interactions of micro-level workplace 
 
 
 
47 For instance, Downing (1994, 2–3) argued already in the early 1990s that to understand post-
communist media, scholars ‘need to steer away from media-centric explanations’ and ‘acknowledge 
the specificity of each nation’ and ‘relate media to a series of processes and institutions in these 
nations, such as economic forces, international relations, the State, political movements, and cultural 
production as a whole’. 
48 In the context of sociological approaches to news production, scholars have asserted that journalists 
will quickly become socialised into the culture and routines of their organisational setting and alter 
their own values ‘in accordance with the requisites of the organisations’ (Epstein 1973, xiv). 
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practices, meso-level organisational and editorial cultures, and macro-level contexts of 
regulatory, technological and competitive environments (Kenyon and Marjoribanks 
2005; 2008a).  
Drawing on Benson’s (2009, 413) argument that publications in a given country 
‘are arguably affected to a similar degree by both political field influences (state 
regulations, reporter relations with their information sources, etc.) and by the internal 
logic of the journalistic field as expressed in the dominant formats of organising and 
presenting the news’, Townend (2014) investigated the relationship between the political, 
legal and journalistic fields in its national and global contexts. Townend (2014, 283) 
argued for the value of the networked media ecosystem approach advanced by Anderson 
(2010, 2013a, 2013b), which focuses on the effects of the law within the context of the 
‘continually shifting relationships between actors, organisations and news objects’, for 
contextualising research of defamation and privacy related law and regulation and 
journalistic practice.  
Investigation of a defamation and privacy regime thus conceptualised implies not 
only examination of the internal legal norms of the legal regime, or the law-on-the-books, 
but also of the perceptions, experiences, motivations and mutual interactions of the 
principal participants within the regime in their particular structural, cultural and 
international contexts. These interactions may reaffirm or alter the dominant 
understanding of law, and thus contribute to changes in its operation (Marjoribanks and 
Kenyon 2004, 8). The conceptual framework does not assume that legal change will 
produce instantaneous re-centring of the regime because the emergent local standards or 
practice and interpretation are an endogenous product of evolving social interactions set 
in particular structural, cultural and international contexts (Belakova 2013b, 161). The 
regime’s operation is expected to change only gradually, as cognitive and normative 
beliefs become increasingly institutionalised (Edelman and Suchman 1997, 498). 
2.3 Investigating Protection of Reputation and Privacy 
To understand to what extent the law is able to accommodate individuals’ and the public’s 
legitimate interests in protection of reputation and privacy in the context of journalistic 
speech, who uses the law to defend their rights against the media, why they sue and what 
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objectives they pursue must be examined. It can then be assessed whether, and if so how, 
the law deters legitimate plaintiffs from seeking legal remedy for reputation and privacy 
harm and thus prevents the public from learning about the truth and deciding for itself 
whom to trust. Analysing plaintiffs’ motives is crucial to evaluate the extent to which 
they were able to attain their goals and therefore to what extent, the legal regime protected 
their rights from their viewpoint. On that basis, research can make judgments about the 
regime’s ability to safeguard the public’s interest in protection of reputation and privacy. 
2.3.1 Would-be Plaintiffs’ Cost-benefit Calculus 
The review of the literature suggests that would-be plaintiffs will decide to sue, if they 
see litigation as the least costly and simultaneously most effective instrument to achieve 
redress to the reputational and privacy harm suffered. The most comprehensive study of 
plaintiffs’ motives to date, the Iowa Libel Project (ILP) suggested that for defamation 
plaintiffs, the most important characteristics of alternatives to litigation were their 
promptness, fairness, resolution of underlying dispute concerning falsity and publication 
of the result (Bezanson 1986, 802). A fair and prompt reputational vindication and setting 
the record straight is also in the best interest of the public as they need to learn the truth, 
or hear the response of the injured party quickly. In the absence of effective alternative 
means to secure redress, would-be plaintiffs pursue litigation, unless the potential costs 
of doing so are prohibitive. In the latter instance, the injured party might be deterred from 
protecting their rights so leaving the public misinformed. 
2.3.1.1 Legal Considerations 
The plaintiffs’ cost-benefit calculus is expected to be shaped by legal considerations, in 
particular by the probability of success in obtaining the desired remedy speedily. 
According to the literature, the primary motive of defamation plaintiffs is to achieve quick 
vindication through publicly setting the record straight. In their proposal for reframing of 
defamation law in England and Wales, Mullis and Scott (2012a, 23) argued, ‘discursive 
remedies afforded quickly are often the primary outcome that claimants seek’. Similarly, 
the ILP concluded that because for most defamation plaintiffs, the key interest was in the 
underlying falsity of the impugned statement, they ‘desire[d] a prompt and fair process 
  57 
for publicly setting the record straight’ (Bezanson 1986, 806). Overly drawn-out 
proceedings are expected to impede the plaintiffs’ ability ‘to obtain adequate timely 
redress’ (Article 19 2000, 9), and might deter some plaintiffs from suing. 
While the legal process always suffers from a certain level of uncertainty, it should 
be predictable enough for the parties to be able to make an informed decision about the 
costs and benefits of their contemplated action. Vague and ambiguous defamation and 
privacy laws (Article 19 2000, 4, 2016, 6), jury trials (e.g., Barendt et al. 2013, 361) and 
ad-hoc approaches to balancing the protected values in judicial decision-making resting 
on such uncertain concepts as the public interest (Mullis and Scott 2012b, 55–56) have 
been observed to increase legal uncertainty within the system. This uncertainty, makes it 
inherently hard to predict with any degree of confidence the outcome of a dispute and 
might deter some deserving would-be plaintiffs from suing. Mullis (2010a, 11) 
forewarned that the uncertainty associated with the application of the ultimate balancing 
test necessitated by developments in ECtHR’s jurisprudence that recognised reputation 
as protected under Article 8 of the Convention, would ‘in all probability make it difficult 
for both claimant and defendant lawyers to predict the outcome of any case’. 
It has been suggested that low probability of success in judicial terms might not 
be decisive in some plaintiffs’ decision to sue. According to traditional legal assumptions, 
a media-friendly regime, which offers little opportunity to achieve legal remedy, might 
discourage would-be plaintiffs from bringing suit. The post-New York Times v. Sullivan 
US defamation law was designed to do this by introducing the actual malice clause. The 
Supreme Court sought to prevent a potential invidious chilling effect on legitimate 
journalistic speech on issues of public concern by discouraging (undeserving) public 
plaintiffs from suing (Anderson 1992; Schauer 1978). It has been suggested that in the 
1980s, only ten percent of plaintiffs were successful in US courts (Bezanson, Cranberg, 
and Soloski 1985, 215). Nonetheless, the ILP found that public plaintiffs continued to sue 
the media because litigation was perceived to be the most effective means to achieve 
reputational protection. 
2.3.1.2 Benefits 
Most plaintiffs are expected to use civil litigation because they perceive they have no 
effective alternative to redress reputational or privacy harm. The ILP found that those 
  58 
plaintiffs whose lawyers had suggested alternative non-legal remedies saw them as 
‘unsatisfactory means to restore their reputation when compared to litigation’ (Bezanson 
1986, 800). The ILP argued that the ‘complex calculus of plaintiffs’ motives’ goes far 
beyond the assumptions of the law, as the objectives plaintiffs seek need not necessarily 
be achieved through the final judicial result in their case. The researchers found that 
plaintiffs did not sue to vindicate their reputations through the formal judicial resolution 
of the dispute or to obtain monetary compensation for their harm with the exception of a 
relatively small group of largely private citizens and businesspeople. While desirable, 
ultimate judicial victory was not a necessary precondition to meet public plaintiffs’ 
objective of correcting what they perceived as falsehoods. In the light of the unlikelihood 
of formal victory, they saw the act of initiating suit, independent of its result, ‘as an 
effective and public form of reply or response’ (Bezanson, Cranberg, and Soloski 1985, 
228) that was more effective than a public statement refuting the contested statement 
(Bezanson 1986, 798). Public plaintiffs viewed litigation as ‘a means of self-help and 
legitimation of their claim’ of falsity (Ibid., 807) that effectively redressed their 
reputational harm. The other main objective of litigation pursued particularly by public 
plaintiffs who had contacted the media for alternative remedy before action, was 
vengeance or punishment of the media which was also largely attainable regardless of the 
judicial outcome.  
2.3.1.3 Costs 
The literature suggests that the financial costs of litigation are critical in many plaintiffs’ 
decision to sue, particularly in the common law system where they are generally much 
higher than in civil law jurisdictions. In the context of defamation law in England and 
Wales prior to the adoption of the 2013 Defamation Act, it was claimed that the cost of 
litigation was ‘prohibitive for many prospective claimants’ (Mullis and Scott 2012a, 10). 
Contingency fees arrangements (CFAs) and hence litigation were only open to those 
would-be plaintiffs who satisfied the lawyers’ risk management regimes (Ibid.). In the 
absence of legal aid, some injured parties were effectively denied access to justice to 
vindicate their reputations (Mullis and Scott 2014, 109). If some journalistic errors remain 
unchallenged, the public remains misinformed and the social interest in reputation, 
privacy and expression is badly served.  
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In contrast, it has been suggested that public plaintiffs in 1980s US used litigation 
to vindicate their reputations, because it was ‘cheap’ for them to sue. They experienced 
the lowest litigation costs and found it easier to engage lawyers on CFAs than private 
plaintiffs (Bezanson, Cranberg, and Soloski 1985, 228). Anderson (1992, 24) argued, 
‘[m]any if not most, private plaintiffs cannot afford to litigate unless they recover 
presumed damages’. In contrast, the ILP found that since the hourly fee basis tended to 
be modest, most private plaintiffs were able to pay litigation costs (Bezanson, Cranberg, 
and Soloski 1985, 228).  
Any investigation into the extent to which a defamation and privacy regime 
protects reputational and privacy interests, therefore needs to examine the procedural 
rules governing financial costs of litigation, the availability of fee waivers and lawyer fee 
arrangements. In addition to the rules, it has to explore the actual costs faced by would-
be plaintiffs before action, and how these influence their decision to sue and whether 
some plaintiffs might be denied access to justice.49  
Litigation experience has been described as ‘frustrating’ for many plaintiffs 
(Soloski and Bezanson 1992, viii). A US commentator argued that despite the fact that 
defamation law’s objective was to protect reputation ‘[t]he few plaintiffs who succeed 
resemble the remnants of an army platoon caught in an enemy crossfire’ (Sack 1980, 
xxvi). It might be expected that the risk of suffering further emotional harm might deter 
some potential plaintiffs from suing.  
When deciding to sue, would-be defamation plaintiffs have to consider the risk 
that the truth of the impugned statement will be confirmed during proceedings. The risk 
is highest in systems where legal action focuses on the truth of the challenged statements, 
and where judicial discovery is likely to be prompt. According to Bezanson et al. (1985, 
230), the prospect that the alleged falsity of the impugned statement cannot be established 
is ‘perhaps the greatest deterrent of an unwarranted libel claim’. However, such deterrents 
might not exist within defamation regimes that rarely address the truth of the challenged 
statements, or do it with great delay. The ILP found that such systems might encourage 
plaintiffs who seek to legitimate an unwarranted claim of falsity (Ibid. 230-33).  
 
 
 
49 Having reviewed the available evidence of the cost of defamation proceedings in England, Howarth 
(2011a) concluded ‘the reality is that we know little about the costs of libel cases’.  
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2.3.1.4 Contextual Factors 
The review of the literature showed that the plaintiff’s relationship with their lawyers and 
with the media might play an important role in their decision to sue. Lawyers may 
potentially play an important role in the plaintiff’s decision to file a suit as they advise on 
litigation risks, the probability of success and any available alternative remedies to civil 
action. They might overestimate or underestimate the claim’s chances of success and thus 
either deter or prompt a would-be plaintiff to sue (Anderson 1992, 32; also London 1993). 
The ILP found that, in contrast to private plaintiffs and businesspeople, with most public 
plaintiffs, the lawyer had ‘little influence on the ultimate decision to sue, other than to 
facilitate it’ (Bezanson 1985, 228).  
The ILP suggested that the media and their response to the plaintiff’s before-
action claim might play an important role in his/her decision to sue. The ILP described a 
‘a complex dynamic’ between public plaintiffs and media-defendants, where plaintiffs 
felt angry and upset by the media’s indifference, arrogance or insensitivity towards their 
claim (Bezanson 1986, 803). By reinforcing and sharpening their emotions and 
confirming their views that the lawsuit was the only available means to vindicate their 
reputation, public plaintiffs’ post-publication experience with the media provided ‘a 
powerful driving force’ in their decision to sue (Bezanson, Cranberg, and Soloski 1985, 
229). Instead of diverting complaints from litigation, the media’s reaction ‘propel[led] 
them to court’ (Bezanson, Cranberg, and Soloski 1987, 29).  
2.3.2 A Regime’s Ability to Protect Reputation and Privacy 
The ILP indicated that even a defendant-friendly regime might be able to effectively 
protect reputational interests of a large number of plaintiffs, as long as it safeguards their 
access to justice. Despite the fact that the overwhelming majority of ILP respondents lost 
and most felt frustrated by the judicial process, the majority believed that they achieved 
meaningful vindication. Moreover, virtually all claimed that, knowing what had 
happened, they would sue again if faced with a similar situation (Bezanson 1986, 799). 
Plaintiffs seemed most frustrated with the protracted nature, cost and unfairness of the 
judicial process, i.e. its failure to recognise their objectives and respond to them. For most 
losing plaintiffs, litigation achieved reputation-oriented objectives, including reputation 
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defence, deterrence of further defamatory publications, and the receiving of support from 
family and friends. Only a small minority of the losing plaintiffs who thought legal action 
attained something, mentioned vengeance (Bezanson, Cranberg, and Soloski 1987, 154–
56).  
The ILP suggested that the ability of a defamation and privacy regime to protect 
individual interests might differ between private and public plaintiffs. ILP’s private 
plaintiff-respondents reported the highest degree of dissatisfaction with their litigation 
experience, in particular with their lawyers and their ability to achieve judicial victory 
and monetary compensation. They were also most likely to pay for legal representation 
and least likely to consider litigation as an attractive means of obtaining redress for the 
harm suffered. According to the authors, private plaintiffs were ‘directly and effectively 
discouraged by the rules and results of the legal system’ (Bezanson 1986, 799). Public 
plaintiffs, in contrast, seemed generally satisfied with their lawyers, less frustrated by 
proceedings and more likely to be satisfied with litigation as an instrument of legitimating 
their claim of falsity, and thus vindicating their reputation. They did not seem 
significantly affected by the rules and results of proceedings, which were designed to 
discourage them from suing. The researchers thus concluded that in actual practice civil 
action ‘serve[d] different purposes than those set for it by the legal regime and apparently 
serve[d] those purposes effectively’ (Bezanson 1986, 800). 
2.4 The ‘Chilling’ Effects of Law 
The ‘chilling effect’ concept is crucial for our understanding of whether and how the law 
influences defendants’ behaviour in seeking an appropriate triangulation of the individual 
and public interests in reputation, privacy and expression. To be analytically useful, the 
differences in the meaning of the concept that are partly jurisdiction dependent, and the 
complexities and subjectivities behind it need to be unpacked.  
The ‘chilling effect’ metaphor, implying a mostly ‘negative deterrence of 
communication: that a person or [an] organisation is made physically colder by inhibiting 
the exercise of their right to free expression’ (Townend 2017, 73) has been widely used 
  62 
in various communication contexts.50 A leading commentator on US defamation law, 
Frederick Schauer (1978, 689) argued, ‘the very essence of a chilling effect is an act of 
deterrence’. An activity, e.g. publication of journalistic speech ‘is chilled if people are 
deterred from participating in that activity’. The chilling effect of law thus implies a 
restriction on a media organisation’s or an individual’s exercise of freedom of expression, 
which impacts the public’s right to receive information. Although a media organisation’s 
or an individual’s decision not to pursue certain behaviour may be influenced by a wide 
range of stimuli, ‘in law the acknowledged basis of deterrence is the fear of punishment’ 
and the uncertainty surrounding the legal process, which might lead to an erroneous 
punishment of a lawful action (Ibid., 698, 694). The risk of civil action for defamation or 
privacy intrusion for large damages is said to have the potential to deter a media 
organisation or a journalist from publishing a story (Barendt et al. 1997, 190). 
2.4.1 Benign and Invidious Chills 
The ‘chill’ on expression may mean an outright obstruction of the media’s or journalists’ 
right to freedom of expression. However, this is not always so as the media may decide 
to publish the information in an altered form rather than not at all. Townend (2017, 74) 
explained, ‘the metaphorical suggestion of temperature suggests a scale of deterrence 
from cool to freezing’. Academic discussions recognize typically a dual typology of 
chilling effects: benign and invidious chilling effects.   
 Although the concept is widely used pejoratively, the very purpose of defamation 
and privacy laws is to chill socially harmful expression. Such chill on media and 
journalists’ freedom is desirable for the protection of reputation and privacy and for the 
public interest in expression. Schauer (1978, 690) defined this desirable or benign 
chilling effect as ‘an effect caused by the intentional regulation of speech or other activity 
properly subject to governmental control’. This concept of chilling effect is applicable 
where speech is the regulated activity, but where that speech is not legally protected. The 
 
 
 
50 For an overview of the historical origins of the concept see Schauer (1978, 685–87) and Townend 
(2014, 48–49). For a discussion about its application in different communication contexts see 
Townend (2017, 74–77), for a discussion about its application by courts in various jurisdictions see 
Cheer (2008, 65–89). 
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potential imposition of civil damages as a remedy for reputational harm caused by 
malicious or negligent publication of defamatory falsehoods, is expected to deter media 
organisations or individuals from publishing such material. Any chilling effect on such 
illegitimate speech is permissible, and indeed, the intended result of the defamation and 
privacy regime. In her study of defamation in New Zealand, Cheer (2008, 3, 63) argued 
that all defamation laws are designed to chill speech to the extent that protecting 
reputation will at times necessitate prevention of publication or payment of damages and 
that therefore ‘some chilling effects are permissible and indeed, desirable’. The meaning 
of what constitutes a benign chill is dependent on the given jurisdiction’s understanding 
of the private and public interests in reputation, privacy and expression and the approach 
to balancing it takes. As discussed in Chapter 1, while under Convention law and most 
European jurisdictions, the aim of defamation and privacy law is to chill irresponsible 
journalism and the resulting harmful expression, the US law does not seek to prevent 
irresponsible journalism, only publication of known falsehoods. 
According to Schauer (1978, 690), law has an invidious chilling effect ‘when any 
behaviour safeguarded by the [US] Constitution is unduly discouraged’ by it, even if the 
law is ‘not specifically directed at that protected activity’ (Ibid., 693). In the context of 
US defamation law, the chill occurs if a ‘sanction aimed at punishing the publication of 
defamatory, factual falsehoods causes the suppression of truth or opinion’ (Ibid., 693). 
The danger of the invidious chill lies in the fact that truthful, important information on a 
matter of public interest will be withdrawn or, as Schauer claimed, ‘that something that 
“ought” to be expressed is not’. This is because some individuals or media organisations 
‘refrain from saying or publishing which they lawfully could, and indeed, should’, 
‘deterred by the fear of punishment’ (Ibid., 693). This is harmful not only for the 
organisations’ or individuals’ right to freedom of expression, but even more for society. 
While the distinction between invidious and benign chilling effects is vital for 
analytical purposes and for our understanding of the extent to which the defamation and 
privacy regime triangulates the competing interests, in the Convention law context, it is 
often difficult to determine where to draw the line between them. There is little agreement 
in academia or in jurisprudence. Cheer (2008, 64) observed, ‘most definitions of the 
chilling effect converge on the understanding that defamation law has the potential to 
produce both acceptable and unacceptable censorship of speech’. Yet, commentators 
disagree not only ‘on what might amount to unacceptable censorship’ but also on ‘the 
extent of unacceptable censorship in fact’.  
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Given the aims of post-New York Times v. Sullivan US law, Schauer draws the 
line based on the truth of factual statements and factual basis of opinion. Schauer’s 
analysis and the interpretation of the line between benign and invidious chilling effects 
of defamation law under US law is relatively straightforward. In contrast, according to 
the established Convention law suggests that there is no public interest in publication of 
all truthful information and the dividing line between benign and invidious chilling effects 
are based on the public interest and whether journalists acted in accordance with their 
duties and responsibilities (see Chapter 1). The ECtHR, Dent and Kenyon (2004) and 
Barendt et al. (1997, 189) understand undesirable chilling effects as those which hinder 
media reporting on stories of political or public interest. Yet, the interlinked concepts of 
public interest and responsible journalism are hazy, lacking universal understanding (see 
Chapter 1). Townend (2017, 75) pointed to the subjectivities of the chilling effect 
demonstrated in the House of Lords ruling in Jameel,51 where Lord Bingham held that 
‘the weight placed by the newspaper on the chilling effect’ was ‘exaggerated’. Referring 
to a ‘disproportionately chilling effect upon freedom of speech’, Baroness Hale, in 
contrast, was more understanding of the defendant’s argument. 
Cheer’s (2008) and Townend’s (2014) research confirmed that journalists, 
bloggers and lawyers themselves are often unsure about the desirability or undesirability 
of the law’s effects on expression. As a lawyer-respondent in Cheer’s study (2008, 63) 
stated, ‘[t]here is a chilling effect arising from our defamation laws in New Zealand. 
Whether it is inappropriate is another question. I am not totally convinced it is 
inappropriate...’. The perception of the desirability or undesirability of a chilling effect 
thus seems to depend on the person’s understanding of the relationship between the 
conflicting values at the heart of any defamation and privacy regime or their 
understanding of what is entailed in responsible journalism practices. However, as 
Kenyon and Marjoribanks (2008a, 372) observed, ‘[t]he concept of “responsible 
journalism” has had no stable or assured status, within journalistic, social and academic 
realms’. Justice Eady J also recognised in Jameel,52 that the terminology of ‘responsible 
 
 
 
51 Jameel v. Wall Street Journal Europe SPRL [2006] UKHL 44, at 21 and 154. 
52 Jameel v. Wall Street Journal Europe SPRL [2004] EWHC 37 (QB), at 17. 
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journalism’, on which the Reynolds defence was founded ‘is imprecise and suggests to 
some people that the test is … subjective’.  
2.4.2 Classification of the Chills by their Manifestations 
To be able to detect chilling effects empirically, researchers need to be aware of their 
various manifestations. Barendt et al. (1997, 191–94) provide a two-way classification 
that recognises ‘direct’ and ‘structural’ invidious chilling effects. The direct chill can be 
characterised as a ‘conscious inhibition or self-censorship within the organisation’ during 
the processes of editing and ‘legalling’. It occurs when media content is ‘specifically 
changed in light of legal consideration’. Most often, these changes take the form of 
‘omission of material the author believes to be true but cannot establish to the extent 
judged sufficient to avoid an unacceptable risk of legal action and an award of damages’. 
This type of chilling effect might consist of passages being ‘rewritten to alter meaning, 
remove an innuendo, or recast statements of fact into those of opinion’ (Barendt et al. 
1997, 192).  
The structural chilling effect does not involve alteration of a specific article or 
programme. It is ‘deeper, and subtler’ and operates in a ‘preventive manner: preventing 
the creation of certain material’, as ‘particular organisations and individuals become 
taboo due to defamation risk’, and ‘certain subjects are treated as off-limits, minefields 
into which it is too dangerous to stray’. The authors (1997, 192) explain, ‘[n]othing is 
edited because nothing is written in the first place’. Such ‘preventive self-censorship’ is 
harmful for the public interest in expression because it reduces the range of topics of vital 
importance available for public scrutiny. 
Barendt et al. (1997, 193) recognise a secondary type of the structural chilling 
effect which manifests itself in the nature of the language used, as it is ‘safer to write 
opaquely or make comment than to engage in clear and hard-edged investigative 
journalism’. According to the authors, writing in these terms is harmful for good 
journalism because it ‘interposes a greater distance between the writer and the particular 
state of affairs he purports to describe, and can only reduce the credibility of his 
expressions of opinion in the mind of a thoughtful reader’. They acknowledge, however, 
that the idea that the style of journalism has been moulded by legal consideration is 
‘empirically untestable’ (Ibid., 193).   
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A ready classification of benign chills that could inform the empirical 
investigation in this study is missing because previous research was predominantly 
dedicated to the undesirable chills. It can be expected that benign chills are also 
manifested during the editorial process with desirable implications for reputation, privacy 
and the public interest in expression. Barendt (1999, 112–13) suggested that the law 
‘encourages, or compels the media to be careful in its reporting’, ‘imposes a degree of 
discipline on the media’, and ‘civilises the standards of public discourse’, as outside 
Parliament and courts ‘we are not free simply to say or write what we might like about 
another person, unless we can prove the truth of our statements’. 
Explicitly or implicitly, studies of invidious chilling effects on news production 
identified certain benign chills of defamation law. Marjoribanks and Kenyon (2004, 10) 
argued in the Australian context that ‘defamation does figure in the minds of news 
producers, both in terms of journalistic practice and in terms of costs’ and that journalists 
and media lawyers sometimes recognised a positive effect of the law. Cheer concluded 
that New Zealand defamation law ‘does not produce excessive chilling effects although 
clearly it does produce some’ (2008, 231). These were manifested in the steps media took 
to ‘avoid carelessness where possible’ in the belief that care and responsibility could 
preclude most problems arising from defamation. Such steps included legal training and 
story vetting by senior editors and lawyers (Cheer 2008, 149). Weaver et al. (2006, 147) 
found that England’s defamation laws did ‘have one positive effect’ in encouraging media 
organisations ‘to make sure that their reporting was even-handed’.  
According to the existing research, the direct benign chill might be manifested in 
non-publication of unwarranted or truthful, but privacy intruding material in light of 
specific legal considerations,53 delaying publication until claims can be better supported 
(Weaver et al. 2006, 167), small alterations to material to ‘maintain accuracy and fairness’ 
and toning down opinion pieces without the loss of the message (Cheer 2008, 149), or 
rewriting articles to provide ‘balanced’ coverage (Weaver et al. 2006, 147, 166). Privacy 
laws are expected to produce a structural benign chilling effect in that media professionals 
 
 
 
53 A lawyer-respondent in Cheer’s study, who was ‘not totally convinced’ that the chilling effect 
arising from New Zealand defamation law was ‘inappropriate’, could not recall ‘an occasion when a 
newspaper or television did not publish if it had the evidence required to publish’, implying that 
nonpublication of unwarranted speech had indeed occurred.   
  67 
will not venture to certain topics that are not in the public interest, concerning, for 
instance, individuals’ private and family life. 
Marjoribanks and Kenyon’s research (2004; 2008a) also suggests that for 
journalists working for leading press outlets preserving journalistic standards and their 
and their organisation’s professional status might be reinforced by legal requirements. 
However, where professional values are strong, the law’s effect on news production might 
be secondary or non-existent. The authors observed about the Australian and US regimes, 
‘While the law plays a role in setting standards, and in shaping what is included and what 
is not included’, there was a strong ‘perception on the part of journalists, in particular, 
that it is their professional standards and their professional status that is more significant’ 
(2004, 18).  
2.4.3 Classification of the Chills by Their Harmfulness for Media Freedom 
Drawing on the conceptualisations developed by Schauer (1978) and Barendt et al. 
(1997), Townend (2017, 78) proposed a classification of manifestations of the law’s 
chilling effect on a scale rated by their harmfulness to the media’s freedom of expression. 
Townend recognised four types of chills: ‘direct benign’ (where ‘a specific threat of legal 
action deters illegitimate speech’); ‘indirect benign’ (‘where a broad concern about legal 
action deters illegitimate speech’); ‘direct invidious’ (where specific threat of legal action 
deters legitimate speech’); and ‘indirect invidious’ (‘where a broad concern about legal 
action deters legitimate speech’). According to Townend’s scale (Figure 2.1), an 
invidious and direct chill is the most harmful to a publisher’s freedom of expression, while 
an indirect benign chill is the least harmful in that respect. 
 
Figure 2.1 Harm to Freedom of Expression Caused by Different Types of ‘Chilling 
Effect’  
Source: Townend (2017, 78). 
Given that media freedom is understood in this study only as an instrumental 
freedom in as much as it serves the public good (see Chapter 1), a systematic classification 
Less harmful       More harmful  
 Benign/Indirect à Benign/Direct à Invidious/Indirect à Invidious/Direct  
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of chilling effects based on their harmfulness to the public interest in expression is vital 
for our understanding about the effects of defamation and privacy law and its ability to 
triangulate the conflicting interest in reputation, privacy and expression. This thesis 
strives to contribute to the efforts to create such a classification.  
2.4.4 The Mechanics of the Chilling Effect of Defamation and Privacy Laws 
Research has demonstrated that the chilling effect might be perceived with different 
intensity by different media organisations and individuals within the same defamation 
and privacy regime. Barendt et al. (1997, 183) found that while ‘all branches of the media’ 
were ‘concerned about the implications of libel law for their activities’, there were 
‘significant differences in the level of this impact’. Townend (2014, 289) argued, ‘the 
climate is not universally chilly for publishers in England and Wales; it can be more 
confidently described as hazy, with some people feeling the cold more than others’. 
According to Schauer (1978, 694), media professionals and publishers might be deterred 
from publishing speech because they fear the punishment or other detriment resulting 
from doing so. The larger the fear felt by the organisation or individual contemplating 
publication, and the smaller its perceived benefits, the more likely it is that publication 
will be deterred. The fear grows with the risk of incurring harm stemming from the 
operation of the defamation and privacy regime. However, the amount of fear generated 
within the given regime will be perceived to varying extent by different media 
organisations and professionals according to the benefits of publication and a number of 
contextual factors (Schauer 1978, 697). 
2.4.4.1 Harm Caused by Litigation and Litigation Threats 
It has been reported that the greatest harm media organisations and professionals face 
from litigation is material (Barendt et al. 1997, 190), and includes costs of potential 
damages, ongoing legal costs of vetting and costs of defending action. ILP observed, ‘[a] 
growing fear among the media is that large damages awards and extensive litigation costs 
will have a chilling effect on the media’s willingness to report controversial news stories’ 
that may result in ‘undesirable limits on the public’s ability to receive the news’ 
(Bezanson, Cranberg, and Soloski 1985, 217). 
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Commentators, campaigners and the media have argued that the potential of 
having to pay large damages awards is the greatest danger of defamation and privacy law 
(e.g. Soloski and Bezanson 1992, viii; Glanville and Heawood 2009, 5; Schauer 1978, 
696-697). The fear and deterrent effect is said to be largest in jurisdictions where the law 
allows for disproportionately large damages to be imposed by judge or jury, even if they 
are not a frequent occurrence (Article 19 2000, 15-17; Barendt et al. 2013, 361). Anderson 
(1992, 17) explained that the imposition of damages payment by a first instance court 
‘exact[s] a financial penalty’ because until overturned they represent ‘contingent 
liabilities on the defendant’s balance sheet’, jeopardising the defendant’s ability to secure 
financing or acquire or be acquired by another company. Moreover, ‘[e]ven a remote 
possibility of suffering a catastrophic loss is sobering’, and the apparent high stakes might 
have a stronger effect than the actual loss experience’. Media professionals might fear 
loss of employment or ‘forfeiture of future employment opportunity’ (Schauer 1978, 
697). The ongoing cost of legal advice might be another ‘major expense’ and a ‘big factor’ 
in organisational management (Marjoribanks and Kenyon 2004, 10). 
It has been suggested that in some common law jurisdictions, the costs of 
defending legal actions might exceed the potential damages awards and are thus the major 
source of the chilling effects. Soloski and Bezanson (1992, viii) argued that ‘the real 
economic impact’ of US defamation law on the media in the 1990s was ‘the high cost of 
defending seriously litigated suit’. Even if the plaintiff was unlikely to prevail, the costs 
were ‘deterring the media from pursuing or publishing controversial stories of public 
importance’. According to Anderson (1992, 18), for the majority of US media, ‘the 
prospect of having to pay the costs of defending’ was ‘the most relevant source of the 
chilling effect’. Several commentators suggested that the often prohibitive cost of 
defending legal action in England and Wales had a chilling effect on the media (Glanville 
and Heawood 2009, 5-10; Mullis and Scott 2012a, 10; Barendt et al. 2013, 363, footnote 
14). Because traditionally, publishing was seen as a profit-making venture, Schauer 
(1978, 698) argued that ‘a simple attack on the pocketbook will often be sufficient’ to 
chill journalistic expression. 
Being sued for defamation or privacy invasion poses a risk of reputational harm 
to the organisation or individual and might increase the fear of litigation. Schauer (1978, 
697) argued that the degree of potential harm caused by publication is significantly 
increased if reputational harm, loss of friendship or damage to one’s social standing is 
involved. According to Schauer (1978, 700), media professionals and organisations risk 
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the ‘harm that flows from the popular conception that one who is charged, even if 
acquitted, is not entirely free from culpability’. Glasser (2009, xi) suggested that even if 
vindicated, a reporter who was sued or whose article attracted a dispute might experience 
damage to his/her relationships with colleagues within the newsroom and damage to 
his/her professional standing. Glasser cited a reporter, claiming that ‘you don’t end up a 
hero’ because ‘[t]the way journalists look at you after being sued is never the same’.  
Media professionals face the risk of incurring other non-material costs involved 
in securing a successful judicial determination, including the time spent preparing and 
maintaining a defence (Schauer 1978, 700), and ‘the emotional toll’ of litigation (Glasser 
2009, xi). Marjoribanks and Kenyon (2004, 10) found that costs related to the 
involvement in preparing for a defamation action, which precluded media professionals 
from journalistic work might be perceived as ‘debilitating’. Glasser (2009, xi) claimed 
that participation in litigation is a ‘gruelling and abusive experience’, which can scare 
journalists, shake their confidence for a long time even if eventually successful. This is 
because during the trial, their competence and training as reporters is being questioned, 
which might make them feel ‘picked apart’ or ‘naked’. Schauer (1978, 700) observed that 
‘there is a heavy price to pay for simply being in the position to have to explain, or 
defend’, particularly if individuals have to demonstrate the lawfulness of their conduct 
publicly. 
2.4.4.2 The Risk of Incurring Harm 
The literature review suggests that when deciding whether to publish certain information 
or not, media organisations, media professionals and their lawyers consider the risks it 
poses. The risk analysis is based on the defendants’ and their lawyers’ perceptions about 
the operation of the defamation and privacy regime and focuses on the likelihood of a suit 
being brought; the likelihood of being found liable; and the likelihood of being embroiled 
in protracted proceedings. 
 
The likelihood of being sued 
It has been argued that media organisations and professionals assess the chances of being 
sued for the contemplated publication based on their perceptions of the subject of the 
story and his/her propensity and relative ability to litigate and succeed. Numerous studies 
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(Barendt et al. 1997, 174, 188; Weaver et al. 2006, 144–46, 169–71) indicate that ‘the 
local knowledge’ as coined by Marjoribanks and Kenyon (2004, 17; also 2008b), is a 
significant factor in the editorial decision. Media tend to be more careful when reporting 
serious allegations about litigious individuals or entities who have the financial resources 
to bring a successful legal action or tie the organisation up in lengthy proceedings. Some 
might even avoid reporting the activities of such individuals or entities altogether. 
Barendt et al. (1997, 174, 186) suggested that the Scottish media perceived lesser chilling 
effect than their English counterparts due to the ‘different attitude to defamation action 
and the absence of a large number of wealthy potential plaintiffs’. The traditionally 
plaintiff-friendly English defamation regime has been considered as allowing 
unmeritorious plaintiffs to abuse the law to intimidate the media by threatening lengthy 
and costly litigation (Weaver et al. 2006, 144–46; Barendt 1999, 112-113; Milo 2008, 2; 
Glanville and Heawood 2009, 4, 8). Barendt et al. (1997, 190) argued that the media 
might be ‘concerned by the legal cost of defending an action brought by a wealthy and 
persistent litigant’. 
In contrast, the media may be encouraged to publish unwarranted allegations 
about plaintiffs whom they perceive to be unlikely to sue. Weaver et al. (2006, 178) found 
that the UK and Commonwealth approach to litigation costs allowed the Australian 
‘media to run roughshod over impecunious defendants’ and turned them into ‘bullies in 
regard to small people’. According to Mullis and Scott (2012a, 10), before the availability 
of CFAs, many relatively impecunious plaintiffs were vulnerable to unwarranted attacks 
in the media as the ‘rule of thumb’ regarding evaluation of the legal risk of publication 
was based on the claimant’s means.  
The literature review implies that media-defendants assess the risk of being sued 
based on their experiences with and their perceptions about the rate and nature of pre-
publication notices, post-publication claims and lawsuits. The larger the number of claims 
and suits and the more serious their nature, the greater the risk of harm stemming from 
contemplated publication, and the higher the likelihood of the chill. Hansen (2000) found 
that US newspapers that had been sued or threatened with a defamation suit in the past 
five years scored significantly higher on the chilling effect scale than those who had not. 
The possibility of high damages awards as a result of jury trial or the availability of 
presumed, punitive or exemplary damages might encourage more litigation and thus risk 
higher costs (Barendt et al. 1997, 163–64; Weaver et al. 2006, 160). 
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The likelihood of being found liable 
When making their decision to publish, the media are said to consider the risk of being 
found liable and bearing the associated costs. The greater the risk, the greater the 
likelihood that publication will not take place. 
It has been argued that the traditionally plaintiff-friendly common law of 
defamation exercised a chilling effect because the defences of justification, fair comment, 
and privilege failed to ‘adequately safeguard the interests of the media (and the public) in 
freedom of expression’ (Barendt et al. 1997, 190). Schauer (1978, 695–98) explained that 
the uncertainty in the adjudicatory practice concerning freedom of expression stemmed 
from the ‘peculiar problems of vagueness’ of legal principles and the imperfections of the 
legal system, which posed a great risk that ‘[t]he facts may be incorrectly determined’ or 
applied. As a result, it was impossible to predict litigation outcomes with a high degree 
of certainty or to have confidence in the lawfulness of the contemplated speech. The 
uncertainty surrounding defamation and privacy regimes exacerbates the risk of incurring 
harm through litigation, which may make the media less willing to publish potentially 
defamatory information (see, e.g., Barendt et al. 2013, 362; Mullis and Scott 2012b, 26–
27). The resulting chill does not necessarily need to be invidious. Since borderline speech 
is most likely to be erroneously determined as unlawful, the invidious chill is most likely 
to occur in relation to such borderline expression (Schauer 1978, 696).  
Barendt et al.’s (1997, 186, 188) study documented the uncertainty perceived by 
media organisations and professionals, as virtually every respondent ‘emphasised the 
lottery aspect attached to this area of law’ and ‘[e]very media lawyer testified to the 
difficulty of justifying allegations in court, and their constant need to bring this point 
home to journalists and editors’. Another source of uncertainty for English media, 
according to Barendt (1999, 120), was ‘the absence of an agreed definition of what 
amounts to defamatory imputation’ as this made the application of the various legal tests 
‘unpredictable’ and to some extent limited the media’s ‘freedom to poke fun at celebrities 
and satirize politicians’. The ‘unpredictability of jury awards and their disproportionate 
size in relation to the level of compensation for personal injuries’ has also been a source 
of complaints from the media (Ibid.). 
The uncertainty stemming from the ultimate balancing test required when two 
constitutionally protected rights come into conflict has been acknowledged by other 
commentators as well as courts. Lord Nicholls admitted in Reynolds that the balancing 
principles introduced therein might lead to ‘unpredictability and uncertainty’, in 
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borderline cases as the outcome of a court decision ‘cannot always be predicted with 
certainty when the newspaper is deciding whether to publish a story’. ‘This uncertainty, 
coupled with the expense of court proceedings’, Lord Nicholls recognized, ‘may “chill” 
the publication of true statements of fact as well as those which are untrue’. However, 
Lord Nicholls also issued a number of guidelines on the basis of which journalists, and 
the court could determine whether the standards of ‘responsible journalism’ have been 
met. These should thus make any practical problems for the media ‘manageable’.54  
It has been suggested that media-friendly defamation and privacy regimes like the 
post-New York Times v. Sullivan US system tended to ‘create significant incentives for 
superficial journalism and disincentives for serious journalism’ (Marshall and Gilles 
1994, 171), encouraging the media to sensationalise and publish unwarranted claims 
about plaintiffs perceived as unlikely to prevail in a lawsuit (Anderson 1992, 30-31; 
London 1993, 10-11). Weaver et al. (2006, 257–58) also reported that among US editors 
and journalists ‘the perception of shoddy journalism’ was ‘relatively common’ and 
appeared ‘particularly evident when the media cover[ed] political campaigns’.  
It is, however, less clear from the literature how the inherent uncertainty within 
defamation and privacy regimes like those in Slovakia and England and Wales post-
Reynolds that employ the ad hoc balancing approach to adjudication might affect the 
perceptions of the benign chill and the law’s ability to promote responsible journalism. 
This issue will be investigated in this study. 
 
Likelihood of protracted proceedings 
Delays in proceedings can have an undesirable impact on freedom of expression by 
rendering it stale, according to the ECtHR (McGonagle 2016, 47). Unduly drawn-out 
cases increase the financial and emotional litigation costs and thus increase the probability 
of an invidious chilling effect (Article 19 2016, 16). 
 
 
 
54 Reynolds v. Times Newspapers Ltd [2001] 2 AC, at 202. 
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2.4.4.3 Benefits 
Schauer (1978, 697) argued that the ‘benefit of the contemplated conduct can outweigh 
the costs and reduce the fear’ of defamation. The benefits of publication might be both 
financial and non-financial.  
Visions of financial gains might outweigh the expected losses because of 
commercial considerations (Schauer 1978, 697). Barendt et al.’s (1997, 183) and Weaver 
et al.’s (2006, 146–47) findings seem to suggest that, at times, English tabloids knowingly 
published sensationalist articles carrying high liability risk because they had the potential 
to bring in so much additional revenue that profits increased even after defamation costs 
were paid. However, the tabloids in Weaver et al.’s study (2006, 147) rejected such claims 
as ‘ridiculous’ because litigation risks were too large and it was difficult to predict which 
articles would prompt significant circulation increases. Schauer (1992, 1335) similarly 
argued that ‘the economics of information are such that the production of most single 
items of news information bring, especially for a newspaper, small financial benefits’. 
Schauer claimed that publication of any information carries a much greater risk of harm 
than potential benefit because once published it cannot be monopolised and because each 
article ‘brings a miniscule economic benefit to the publisher’ but may nevertheless result 
in a legal liability (Ibid.).   
The literature suggests that publishers and media professionals might take 
litigation risk as part of doing business and the potential costs a price worth paying for 
higher principles or reputational reasons. Schauer (1992, footnote 24, 1329) suggested 
that the possible explanation for some editors’ proud denials that ‘the threat of libel 
actions has no effect on their editorial judgments’ might be explained by the publisher’s 
‘willing[ness] to pay for certain principles’ like editorial freedom. Publishers may also 
believe that ‘certain editorial aggressiveness sells more papers’ or for financial or non-
financial reasons highly value ‘a certain kind of newspaper reputation’. Weaver et al. 
(2006, 146) suggest that some English media might have considered defamation ‘as 
simply a cost of doing business, and therefore might have engaged in more robust 
reporting despite the threat of liability’. Media professionals and/or publishers may be 
‘personally committed to the transmission of a particular message’. While such intangible 
benefit is impossible to quantify, it might play an important role in their cost-benefit 
calculations (Schauer 1978, 698).  
  75 
2.4.4.4 Contextual Factors 
Schauer’s (1978, 698-701) ground-breaking conceptualisation of the chilling effect 
recognised that the perceptions of the chill depend on a myriad of contextual factors. 
Kenyon et al.’s and Townend’s research represent notable efforts to examine and 
systematise these factors. Nevertheless, there is scope for further research. This study 
responds to Townend’s (2014, 301–2) call for researchers to investigate the factors that 
contribute to or reduce media organisations’ or individual’s perceptions of the chill. There 
have been a number of contextual factors influencing the perception of the chilling effect 
discussed in the literature to date. 
 
Size and financial strength of organisation 
The deterrent effects of the law have been found to depend on the size and financial 
strength of media organisations. Even if publishers were willing to insulate their editorial 
departments from litigation pressures and implement measures to promote more 
responsible practices, they might not possess the necessary resources. Cheer (2008, 231–
33) concluded that defamation law did not produce excessive chilling effects on the New 
Zealand media backed by strong foreign ownership, as they were able to effectively 
manage defamation risks by implementing measures promoting responsibility. Cheer 
(2008, 209), however, acknowledged that the generally high costs of proceedings might 
lead to uncertainty and a chilling effect on small media enterprises. The Australian and 
American respondents in Marjoribanks and Kenyon’s study (2004, 11, 16), who denied 
any undesirable chilling effects, recognized that they worked for ‘resource rich 
organisations, and that libel law, and the costs associated with it, may be more of a 
consideration in smaller media organisations’. They had confidence in the ability of their 
organisation ‘to manage defamation, which they took to mean finding a way to get a story 
into print’. Barendt et al. (1997, 183–84) found that in contrast to the financially secure 
national press, smaller regional English papers’ editorial decisions were more likely to be 
influenced by litigation fear because even a modest amount paid in damages and/or legal 
costs would necessitate cuts to the editorial budget or even bankruptcy.  
 
Ownership and organisational culture  
The media organisation culture can influence the degree of fear felt by media 
professionals. Traditionally, Western media publishers tended to be ‘venerable 
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newspaper families’ who perceived publishing as a mission and valued editorial freedom 
above profits (Schauer 1992, 1331–32). As a result, they might have been willing to 
insulate the newsrooms from financial pressures of defamation and privacy litigation. In 
contrast, shareholders of media organisations under public corporate ownerships might 
be less interested in goals of journalistic integrity. Barendt et al. (1997, 184) suggested 
organisation culture prompted some media organisations, particularly broadcasters, to be 
more responsible in material preparation and lawyer involvement at an early stage of 
programme development. Marjoribanks and Kenyon (2004, 18) found that professional 
standards and organisational status might hinder or promote the law’s ability to uphold 
responsible journalism. Their experienced journalist-respondents employed by self-
defined quality print media saw it as ‘a professional obligation to their readership to 
uphold standards’. 
 
The ‘human factor’: personality traits and values 
While the theory of the chilling effect assumes that editorial decisions will, to a large 
extent, be a product of a rational cost-benefit analysis, Schauer acknowledges the 
importance of the ‘human factor’ or individual values and predispositions. ‘Assuming a 
given degree of fear, and a given quantum of benefit, certain individuals will in fact be 
deterred while others will not’. The varying amounts of deterrence in situations where all 
other factors are identical will be caused by the different degrees of risk-aversion in 
individuals (Schauer 1978, 698).  
 
Journalism culture, civil society and political opposition 
Kenyon (2010, 441) argued that when investigating chilling effects on public speech in 
non-democracies or young democracies, researchers should, among other legal and 
contextual factors, consider the influence of journalism practices, the style and level of 
civil society activism and political opposition. While ‘consensus-building media’ might 
refrain from pursuing investigative journalism, independent ‘adversarial media’ might, 
despite liability risks, be more willing to expose abuses of power (444-445). In the context 
of the very similar Malaysian and Singaporean defamation law and litigation practices, 
Kenyon suggested that the historical and current extent of civil society and political 
opposition were key to understanding the different influence on journalistic practices 
(445-446).  
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Role of lawyers  
Several studies suggested that the role of lawyers might be pivotal to explain the 
perceptions of the chilling effect. Townend (2014, 292) argued that ‘lawyers play an 
important enabling as well as inhibiting role’ within the editorial process. Barendt et al. 
(1997, 185) observed that while in-house lawyers tended to share the culture of their 
employer, deny acting as censors and emphasise the co-operative nature of their work 
with reporters, external lawyers may take a more legalistic stance and be perceived as 
restricting expression. Marjoribanks and Kenyon (2004, 16–17) found that the 
relationship between the newsroom and lawyers was predominantly one of partnership, 
striving to get information out, but also suggested that conflicts might arise when lawyers 
try to restrict publication. Challenging the conventional wisdom that the source of chilling 
effect was the financial cost of defamation, Hansen’s study (2000) of US newspapers 
found that frequency of lawyer review was ‘the best predictor of chilling effect’. 
 
Newsroom relationships 
Townend (2014, 299–300) suggested that in addition to direct and indirect legal threats, 
researchers should pay attention to other factors, including the relationships within the 
newsroom and the position and experience of the reporter, as the journalist’s track record 
may affect whether the editor has complete confidence in the report needed for a legal 
defence. 
 
International context 
Townend (2014, 282) found that ‘the national context was still key’ as media lawyers and 
online and print journalists remained largely ‘preoccupied by litigation and legal 
frameworks in England and Wales despite working for publications operating in a global 
publishing environment’. 
2.5 Conclusion  
This chapter presented an original conceptual framework to inform a study of a 
defamation and privacy regime’s triangulation of the private and public interests in 
reputation, privacy and freedom of expression. Most modern defamation and privacy 
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regimes strive to condition the behaviour of plaintiffs and defendants in achieving its 
three main, interconnected aims: protection of reputation and privacy, promotion of a 
benign and prevention of an invidious chilling effect. 
Drawing on Habermas’s theory of ‘discursive democracy’ and new 
institutionalism, the chapter advocated conceptualising the law as a social institution that 
strives to constrain and enable the behaviour of individuals and entities. Law is 
understood as being formulated, enacted, interpreted and applied in mutual, strategic 
interactions between social actors that take place in their structural, cultural and 
international contexts. Therefore, an investigation of the intended and unintended effects 
of a legal regime must pay attention not only to the law-on-the-books and its application 
by courts but also to the cost-benefit calculations of its principal protagonists when they 
operate within the regime. The examination of their cost-benefit calculi must focus on the 
mutual relationships between the principal protagonists and the structural, cultural and 
institutional contexts in which they occur. The conceptual framework is of particular 
value for this study because it provides focus for the research and identifies the principal 
protagonists among social actors, but is sufficiently flexible to permit the exploration of 
new contextual and legal factors that might shape the triangulation at the heart of 
defamation and privacy regimes.  
The chapter further scrutinised the concept of the chilling effect, exploring its 
different typologies and manifestations to assist in the empirical investigation. The 
literature review showed that the perceptions about the desirability or undesirability of 
the chill of defamation and privacy law under Convention law is subjective, depending 
on the understanding of responsible journalism and public interest. The chapter identified 
that there are gaps in our understanding of the practical manifestations of the benign 
chilling effect of the law and the harmfulness of the chill to the public interest in freedom 
of expression. This study seeks to address these limitations in our knowledge. 
The chapter reviewed previous empirical studies of the interplay between 
defamation and privacy laws and journalism and identified the legal and contextual 
factors that have been said to influence the cost-benefit calculi of plaintiffs and defendants 
when deciding whether to sue or publish, respectively. The literature review confirmed 
that when making their decisions that ultimately affect the triangulation of the conflicting 
interests at the heart of the regime, the principal protagonists are to a large extent 
influenced by legal considerations. Principal protagonists’ perceptions of what could be 
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called fairness, certainty and effectiveness of the given defamation and privacy regime 
seem of vital importance.  
The fairness of a defamation and privacy regime denotes that a fair balance is 
struck between the private and public interests in reputation or privacy and freedom of 
expression when these come into conflict. While none of the rights is absolute and will, 
under certain circumstances, have to give way to another right, a regime that is seen as 
overly plaintiff- or media-friendly will not be considered fair. A fair regime also has to 
preserve adequate access to justice for all parties (Mullis and Scott 2011, 17; 2014, 108-
109; Parkes et al. 2013, Chapter 1) and safeguard against abuses of law (Article 19 2000, 
2, 5-6; Mullis and Scott 2009, 180-181).  
The triangulation of the competing interests in the law-on-the-books and its 
interpretation and application by courts must also provide an appropriate level of certainty 
for the parties, both in terms of certainty about outcomes, levels of potential sanctions 
and certainty about the lawfulness of their contemplated conduct. High levels of 
uncertainty might, among other things, deter plaintiffs from pursuing an action and 
defendants from publishing legitimate speech in the public interest.  
The perceived effectiveness of a legal regime is also crucial. The speed with which 
disputes are resolved and the availability of different legal instruments are particularly 
influential.  
The design of any defamation and privacy regime is closely interconnected with 
the interpretation and application of the law by courts. While intimately interlinked, the 
law-on-the-books and judicial decision-making are not identical analytical categories. 
Statutes might remain virtually unchanged, but the balance in adjudicatory practice might 
shift towards one of the protected interests and away from another, as in England and 
Wales in the decade before the adoption of the Human Rights Act (see, e.g., Mullis and 
Scott 2012b, 26–28). Therefore, while it might seem artificial, the fairness and certainty 
anchored in the statute book and adjudicatory practice will be analysed separately in this 
study. 
The literature review suggested that the relationships between the parties and their 
lawyers, among parties and within newsrooms were influential factors affecting the 
intended and unintended effects of the law. Media political economy, organisational 
culture, journalism and political culture together with personal values and beliefs of 
media professionals were identified as contextual factors to which investigations of the 
  80 
chilling effects of defamation and privacy laws should pay particular attention. They will 
guide the empirical investigation in this study. 
Before examining the socio-political context in which the Slovak 
personality/goodwill protection regime operated during the studied period and 
introducing its principal protagonists in Chapter 4, the next chapter introduces the 
research strategy, design and data collection and analysis methods employed in this study.  
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 Research Strategy, Design and Methods  
3.1 Introduction 
This study investigates the interplay between the laws of defamation and privacy and 
journalism. It seeks to examine to what extent and how the Slovak defamation and privacy 
regime between 1996 and 2016 – as applied by courts – triangulated the individual and 
social interests in reputation, privacy and expression, from the viewpoint of the principal 
protagonists. This chapter outlines the research strategy, design and methods of data 
collection and analysis employed in this study and their implications for its findings. 
Drawing on new institutionalism and Habermas’s conceptualisation of ‘discursive 
democracy’ (1984, 1987, 1996), law is understood in this thesis as a dynamic social 
institution that constrains and enables the behaviour and mutual interactions between the 
principal protagonists within the given legal regime. The defamation and privacy regime 
seeks to regulate the behaviour of would-be plaintiffs, plaintiffs, defendants, including 
media organisations and media professionals, and their lawyers, in its effort to find an 
appropriate accommodation between the private and public interests in reputation, 
privacy and freedom of expression. Law is formulated, enacted and interpreted in mutual 
strategic interactions between the principal protagonists. These interactions take place in 
and are conditioned by their specific international, political and social contexts. Changes 
in the law-on-the-books, in the adjudicatory practice or the wider context in which 
defamation and privacy laws operate may lead to unintended consequences for any of the 
protected values. Investigation of a defamation and privacy regime thus conceptualised 
implies not only examination of the internal legal norms of the legal regime, or the law-
on-the-books, but also of the perceptions, experiences, motivations and mutual 
interactions of the principal participants within the regime in their particular international, 
social and political contexts.  
In order to answer the research question posed by this study, I adopted a socio-
legal approach and employing the historical institutionalism method conducted a multi-
method, qualitative, longitudinal case study of the operation and effects on reputation, 
privacy and freedom of expression of the Slovak defamation and privacy regime between 
1996 and 2016 in civil disputes involving traditional media-defendants.  
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The chapter presents the research approach and the elements of the case study 
research design. It explains the case selection, the focus on disputes involving traditional 
media-defendants and sets its temporal boundaries. Placing this study within past 
empirical socio-legal studies of the interplay between defamation and privacy laws and 
journalism, the chapter explicates how a combination of semi-structured interviews, 
documents and archival records is the most suitable combination to address the 
methodological issues inherent in investigating the effects of laws and answering the 
research question posed by this study. The chapter then describes how the data was 
collected and analysed through a combination of thematic, legal doctrinal and descriptive 
statistical analyses. It concludes with a reflection on the ethical, political and personal 
considerations involved in the study of the interplay between defamation and privacy 
laws and journalism and their ramifications for the findings of this thesis. 
3.2 Socio-legal Approach  
The understanding of law as a social institution that operates in a specific context 
necessitated the adoption of an empirical, socio-legal approach which combined social 
science methods with doctrinal legal analysis. Socio-legal studies have been characterised 
as ‘an approach to law’ that ‘covers empirical analysis of law as a social phenomenon’ 
(ESRC 1994; cited in Hunter 2012, 2; emphasis in original). It ‘embraces disciplines and 
subjects concerned with the law as a social institution, with the social effects of law, legal 
processes, institutions and services and with the influences of social, political and 
economic factors on the law and legal institutions’ (SLSA 2009, 1). It has been argued 
that a social-legal approach is indispensable for ‘revealing and explaining the practices 
and procedures of legal, regulatory, redress and dispute resolution systems and the impact 
of legal phenomena on a range of social institutions, on business and on citizens’ (Genn, 
Partington, and Wheeler 2009, 1). 
The socio-legal approach is not prescriptive but covers a wide range of empirical 
research methodologies (Hunter 2012, 1-2; Economides 2014, 261; Colson and Field 
2016, 286-87; SLSA 2009, 2). Acknowledging the limitations of any single methodology 
in explicating the operations of laws in context, the socio-legal approach often combines 
the methodologies of traditional legal doctrinal research with those of social science. 
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Practitioners of socio-legal work emphasise that an understanding of how laws regulate 
human behaviour requires a firm understanding of the ‘black letter law’ in that particular 
context (Cownie 2004, 55). On its own, doctrinal legal research, which involves an 
analysis and interpretation of the internal norms of a legal regime (Kroeze 2013, 47; van 
Hoecke 2011, 3) is unable to provide an adequate understanding of the intended and 
unintended effects of defamation and privacy laws on reputation, privacy and expression. 
A doctrinal legal analysis may, for instance, conclude that a defamation and privacy 
regime properly triangulates the competing interests, while the empirical analysis shows 
the reverse. Nonetheless, doctrinal legal research is key for providing context for the 
empirical analysis of the triangulation at the heart of the regime. It is employed in this 
study to underpin the findings of the systematic qualitative inquiry into the perceptions, 
motivations, experiences and interactions of the principal protagonists of the Slovak 
defamation and privacy regime. 
3.3 A ‘Longitudinal Deep Case Study’ 
The law in this study is conceptualised, following historical institutionalist approaches, 
as a social institution that operates in interactions between the principal protagonists of 
the legal regime over time and in particular international, political and social contexts. 
Historical institutionalism as a method involves tracing the interactions of institutions, 
ideas and agents (or interests) over time (Bannerman and Haggart 2015, 9), while 
simultaneously examining the mechanism and processes underlying institutional stability 
and change over time (Thelen 1999). In this context, a process is understood as ‘a 
sequence of individual and collective events, actions, and activities unfolding over time 
in context’ (Pettigrew 1997, 338), whilst mechanism denotes ‘a set of plausible 
hypotheses that could be the explanation for some social phenomenon … in terms of 
interactions between individuals and other individuals, or between individuals and some 
social aggregate’ (Schelling 1998, 32–33). When explaining human behaviour, focusing 
on mechanism means focusing on motives (Gerring 2001, 196). 
Historical institutionalist research usually employs ‘a qualitative, longitudinal, 
deep case study’ research design (Bannerman and Haggart 2015, 10). This involves 
selecting the case study and time period, identifying the institution and protagonists to be 
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studied, identifying mechanisms that strengthen or weaken the institutions, and 
establishing who gains and who loses during a period of change. Such change could 
include change in the law, adjudicatory practice, journalism and political culture, mutual 
relationships between different protagonists or the international, economic or political 
context, resulting in re-centring of the defamation and privacy regime and in intended and 
unintended consequences for any of the protected interests. 
To take account of such complex macro-, meso- and micro-processes, the 
researcher must take into account that a specific cause may produce divergent outcomes 
depending on the context, and that a single outcome may result from several different 
paths. The complexity of the operation of defamation and privacy regimes in the context 
of journalism requires sensitivity to ‘informal routines and formal institutions over time, 
attending to path dependency, as well as to the fact that institutions contain conflicting 
forces that can be a source of instability’ (Ibid., 2015, 15). This study is interested in 
investigating the extent to which the Slovak defamation and privacy regime triangulated 
the private and public interests in reputation, privacy and freedom of expression over time 
and it therefore pays particular attention to ‘the temporal dimension of social processes’ 
(Pierson 2004, 4). While the emphasis on historical contingency precludes broad 
generalisations, it is a powerful tool to use when learning how the legal regime interacts 
with contextual factors in a specific context and over time in producing effects on human 
behaviour and thus fulfilling the aim of this study.  
Case studies are ideal for illuminating relationships connecting a particular cause 
with an outcome. Given their sensitivity to data and theory, they can ‘provide the 
intensive empirical analysis that can find previously unnoticed causal factors and 
historical patterns’ (Achen and Snidal 1989, 167). Case studies are particularly suitable 
for research that requires sensitivity to contextual factors and inner complexities of 
phenomena. While contextualisation poses a risk of ‘descriptive excess’ (Lofland and 
Lofland 1995, 165), it is vital for explaining actors’ behaviour (Bryman 2004, 281), which 
lies at the heart of this investigation.  
The findings of my previous research (Belakova 2011, 2013), as discussed in 
Chapter 1, suggested that Slovakia represented an extreme case of the interplay between 
defamation and privacy laws and journalism. It has been argued in the literature that the 
underlying causal relationships, particularly in difficult-to-measure phenomena, as the 
effects of the law unquestionably are, are more easily identifiable in an extreme case 
(Gerring 2001, 217). The risk of a “vicious spiral” of deleterious consequences for all the 
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competing interests at the heart of the Slovak personality/goodwill protection regime, was 
striking in comparison to the apparently qualitatively different situation in the Czech 
jurisdiction. It implied Slovakia is a particularly revelatory case.  
The study focuses on civil personality/goodwill protection disputes involving 
traditional news media-defendants and their online portals as opposed to online media. 
The logic behind this selection was that during the studied period, traditional news media 
combined with their associated online portals were the main sources of political and 
economic news for the citizens.55 They also represented the majority of defendants in 
personality/goodwill protection disputes as plaintiffs took infringements in traditional 
news media much more seriously than those occurring in online media and blogs. 
Legal regimes operate over time and in changing contexts. The re-centring of the 
regime is expected to have intended and unintended consequences for the protection of 
the competing interests in reputation, privacy and freedom of expression. A diachronic 
research design, which examines the changing contexts, multiple levels of causation, as 
well as sequences and differences between one period of time and another, is best suited 
to capture these. By examining the developments in a single case over time and paying 
attention to variation within that case the researcher can often observe or simply intuit, a 
complex causal relationship at work (Gerring 2001, 215). 
The temporal boundaries of this study were chosen to minimise the risks posed by 
selecting too short or too long a period of investigation (Bannerman and Haggart 2015, 
10). The year 1996 was chosen because I reasoned that it would take around three years 
for the first personality/goodwill protection disputes filed after the founding of Slovakia 
to be completely resolved. The endpoint of the studied period was 1 July 2016 when a 
new procedural code – the Code of Civil Dispute Procedure (Act No. 160/2015 Coll., 
CCDP) – came into force. This Code had the potential to contribute to changes in the 
operation of the regime. A 20-year-long period appeared sufficiently long to permit the 
 
 
 
55 Throughout the studied period, television remained the main news source of Slovak citizens at above 
EU-average levels (e.g. European Commission 2002, 2003, 2011, 2012, 2015). Online media 
gradually overtook print and radio as a principal news source. Nevertheless, by 2015 only about a fifth 
of citizens used the Internet as their primary news source for national political affairs (European 
Commission 2015, 7). The finding of the 2017 Reuters Digital News Report survey (Kluknavska 2017, 
91) suggest that online media, including social media, overtook television as the main source of news 
for younger, educated Slovaks. As this was an online survey, the consumption habits of people who 
are not online might be underrepresented. 
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observation of trends in the regimes’ triangulation of the competing interests and the 
isolation of the key legal and contextual factors that shape the triangulation process.   
The research question posed by this study necessitates comparison. Within-case 
comparison and limited cross-case comparison are involved. The views of the principal 
protagonists are compared and contrasted throughout this study in order to provide a 
holistic picture of the personality/goodwill protection regime’s triangulation of 
reputation, privacy and freedom of expression. The effects of the law on different types 
of plaintiffs, defendants and speech are compared and contrasted. This approach has the 
potential to illuminate the factors and relationships that shape the interplay far better than 
using the viewpoint of only one of the parties to the disputes. Comparison across time is 
employed when examining participants’ views about the trends in the operation of the 
regime. The study involves cross-case comparison with comparing and contrasting the 
adjudicatory practice in Slovakia against ECtHR case-law. Cross-case comparison can be 
found in Chapters 7, 8 and 9 when protagonists draw comparisons concerning plaintiffs’ 
motivations to sue and the effects of the regime for freedom of expression with the 
situation in the Czech jurisdiction.  
3.4 Data Collection and Analysis Methods 
The focus of this thesis is to explain the processes and mechanisms through which the 
Slovak defamation and privacy regime conditioned the behaviour of the principal 
protagonists in trying to achieve its intended effects (see Chapter 1). This implies 
adoption of a largely qualitative approach, where researchers ‘study things in their natural 
settings, attempting to make sense of, or interpret, phenomena in terms of the meanings 
people bring to them’ (Denzin and Lincoln 2005, 3). Qualitative research has great 
empirical and analytical explanatory power concerning phenomena that are investigated 
‘through the eyes of the people being studied’, when the emphasis is on context and 
process and when the research objective requires flexibility regarding explanatory 
variables (Bryman 2004, 273–90). On the other hand, qualitative approaches often suffer 
from self-reporting bias (Kendrick 2013, 1679) or the inability of study participants to 
articulate their perceptions, motivations and specific experiences (Townend 2017, 77-8). 
Quantitative empirical research into effects of the law, in contrast, has very limited 
  87 
explanatory power and suffers from an inherent shortage of reliable defamation and 
privacy litigation data (Bezanson, Cranberg, and Soloski 1987, 237-240; Townend 2014, 
31-32; 2017, 77-78; Barendt et al. 1997, 36-38; Kendrick 2013, 1676-77). Observing 
trends in litigation rates, for instance, is unreliable as the number of disputes filed might 
bear little relation to the amount of expression that is actually chilled. Some disputes are 
never filed because publication never occurs. Low litigation levels can therefore signal a 
repressive regime as well as a permissive one (Kendrick 2013, 1676-77). Litigation rates 
also do not explain the effects of a regime on reputation and privacy protection. While 
quantitative content analysis of judicial decisions might offer valuable insights into 
adjudicatory practice and correlations between damages awards and litigation trends (see, 
e.g., Kitajima 2012), it is silent about the potential chilling effects and their nature. 
Comparative quantitative content analysis of news content is a crude proxy for the 
invidious chilling effect as the chill might be manifested in modification of journalistic 
content rather than outright suppression of publication (Kendrick 2013, 1678). 
Quantitative data and analysis is useful for context and to check on participants’ 
self-reported views even if its value is limited when viewed in isolation. Most past studies 
of the interplay between defamation law and journalism therefore employed mixed data 
collection and analysis methods. The Iowa Libel Project (Bezanson, Cranberg, and 
Soloski 1987, 240) employed quantitative content analysis of reported defamation and 
privacy cases, defamation insurer claims and questionnaire data. The findings drew on 
thematic analysis of in-depth interviews with media professionals and lawyers. In their 
seminal study of defamation and journalism in England and Wales, Barendt et al. (1997) 
combined defamation writ records with questionnaire data and evidence obtained though 
semi-structured interviews with editors, journalists and lawyers.  
Weaver et al.’s comparative investigation into the effects of defamation law on 
political speech in English, Australian and US media involved a combination of 
comparative doctrinal reading of case-law with analysis of semi-structured interviews 
with editors, journalists, producers and lawyers. In several studies of the interaction 
between news production and defamation, Kenyon and colleagues (Marjoribanks and 
Kenyon 2004; Kenyon and Marjoribanks 2005; Kenyon 2010; Kenyon and Richardson 
2006; Kenyon 2007) adopted a comparative approach combining doctrinal legal research 
and mixed empirical methods, including analysis of semi-structured interviews with 
editors, journalists and lawyers, observations and legally focused content analysis of court 
files and news articles.   
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Cheer (2008, 2006, 2005) examined the interplay between defamation and 
journalism in New Zealand through content analysis of two postal surveys of media 
professionals and lawyers combined with analysis of interviews with defamation 
practitioners. Having analysed the survey data through descriptive statistics, Cheer 
corroborated the findings through content analysis of archival court records. In her study 
of the interaction between journalistic practice and defamation and privacy laws in 
England and Wales, Townend (2014) analysed legal documents, news coverage, archival 
court records, conducted semi-structured interviews with media lawyers and administered 
online surveys to journalists and bloggers.  
This study also employs a combination of methods of data collection and analysis. 
It primarily draws on thematic analysis of fifty-three semi-structured elite interviews with 
media managers, journalists, senior editors, plaintiffs and lawyers. The findings of the 
qualitative interview analysis are contextualised and complemented by evidence gathered 
from a wide range of documents and archival records analysed using doctrinal legal 
methods, thematic analysis and descriptive statistics. 
3.4.1 Semi-Structured Elite Interviews 
This thesis seeks to understand the ways and extent to which the Slovak defamation and 
privacy regime, operating in its social, political and journalism environment contexts, 
conditioned the behaviour of plaintiffs, defendants and their lawyers in triangulating the 
private and public interests in reputation, privacy and freedom of expression. Semi-
structured interviews, defined as ‘a conversation with a purpose’ (Kahn and Cannell 1957, 
149) are a particularly suitable data collection method for this study because they allow 
the researcher to ‘get inside the heads’ of people, explore phenomena from ‘their point of 
view’ (Silverman 2013, 201) and ‘ensure that the relevant contexts are brought into focus 
so that situated knowledge can be produced’ (Mason 2002, 62).  
The interviews for this study can be characterised as elite interviews, that is, semi-
structured interviews with respondents belonging to an elite (see, e.g., Dexter 1970; 
Richards 1996; Tansey 2007; Morris 2009; Mikecz 2012). An elite denotes a ‘group in 
society considered to be superior because of the power, talent, privileges etc [sic] of its 
members’ (Welch et al. 2002, 613).  A definition of an elite is inherently relative (Welch 
et al. 2002, 613) because elites cannot be neatly defined as a homogenous group (Rice 
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2010, 71) and because elite status is embedded in time and place (Harvey 2010, 195). It 
ultimately depends on the research objectives. Following scholars who argued that elite 
interviews differ from non-elite interviews in that the respondent possess expertise (e.g. 
Dexter 1970, 5-7; Flick 2009, 165-66; Harvey 2011, 433), I use the term to describe 
participants on the basis of their privileged knowledge and ability to best answer the 
research question posed by this study rather than to describe elites per se. 
It has been suggested that elites prefer being interviewed, as opposed to 
responding to questionnaires, because interviewing signals their status and allows them 
to articulate and explain their views (Aberbach and Rockman 2002, 674). Elite interviews 
are a particularly valuable method when examining ‘dynamic, context-dependent and 
interactive phenomena’ (Welch et al. 2002, 612), which the interplay between defamation 
and privacy laws and journalism unquestionably is. This thesis investigates the 
motivations of plaintiffs, would-be plaintiffs and defendants in the context of the law. 
Elite interviews are the most appropriate data collection method because asking is the 
only way to learn about people’s motivations (Johnson 2001, 272). Elite interviews allow 
the researcher to elucidate the events and activities that occur outside of media coverage 
(Lilleker 2003, 208). The understanding that a defamation and privacy regime operates 
within mutual interactions between its principal protagonists underpins this study. Semi-
structured interviews provide the best data for understanding the relations between social 
actors and their situation (Gaskell 2000, 39), or among actors themselves.  
By allowing investigators to ask focused, theory-driven questions of key actors in 
the processes of interest (Tansey 2007, 767), elite interviews enable the gathering of 
highly specific, research objectives-relevant data. As interviews yield detailed data in 
quantity (Marshall 2006, 101), they enable the researcher to understand the context and 
establish the atmosphere of the area under investigation (Richards 1996, 200). Elite 
interviews can yield not only ‘the much needed context or color [sic]’ (Goldstein 2002, 
669) but also provide chronology and exclusive insider information, as has been the case 
for this study. Elite interviews facilitate data validity by offering interpretations of direct 
participants (Aberbach and Rockman 2002, 674). The method is flexible enough to 
explore novel explanations and to probe and clarify ambiguities within the data. 
Interviews offer potentially a novel analytical lens though which to understand the 
interplay between defamation and privacy laws and journalism.  
Data gathered from a particular social or professional group possesses collective 
explanatory power that is more than the sum of its parts. According to Gaskell (2000, 44), 
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‘It is in the accumulation of insights from a set of interviews that one comes to understand 
the life worlds within a group of respondents’. Similarly, Elliott (2005, 28) has argued 
that interviews with even a ‘relatively small sample of individuals may produce evidence 
that is considered to provide an understanding of the inter-subjective meanings shared by 
the whole of a community’. Semi-structured interviews are therefore the most suitable 
data collection method for this study that seeks to gain detailed understanding of 
perceptions, attitudes, values and motivations of social actors in particular contexts 
(Bryman 2004, 319). 
3.4.1.1 Limitations of Semi-Structured Interviews  
Interviews provide a great wealth of information, but risk data inconsistencies and 
inaccuracies caused by participants’ memory lapses (Tansey 2007, 767), mood on the 
day, inability to verbalize their views, or lack of time. Townend’s research (2014, 300) 
showed that influences on a decision not to publish ‘are not easily documented and even 
within one institution interpretation of the factors that deterred production or publication 
may vary dramatically between different individuals’. This is because ‘[d]eterrence may 
be connected to deeply buried legal and/or social concerns which are never even shared 
with colleagues, let alone documented formally’. Moreover, ‘journalists may not even be 
conscious of the reasons they were deterred from pursuing a story’.  
Individuals’ desire to ‘appear nobler and better than they actually are’ (Berger 2011, 
149) or “settle scores” with adversaries in disputes may also result in their reporting 
through ‘distorted lenses’ (Gaskell 2000, 44). Elite interviews are prone to (conscious or 
unconscious) manipulation on the part of interviewees who are adept at not answering 
questions and presenting themselves in the best possible light (Harvey 2011, 438). 
Townend (2017, 78) argued in relation to investigating chilling effects that ‘[t]he overall 
methodological challenge is that one is seeking to prove a negative – or a counterfactual 
– and looking for evidence that may reflect badly on those “chilled” or “chilling”’. The 
self-reporting or social desirability bias may thus be reflected in media professionals’ 
reluctance to admit that they sacrificed journalistic principles for fear of litigation. In 
contrast, they may wish to exaggerate the effect of the law with the aim of downplaying 
other less noble considerations that informed a decision to pull or revise a story (Kendrick 
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2013, 1679). Powerful plaintiffs may also be unwilling to reveal the actual motivations 
behind their decision to sue, where it may put them in a negative light. 
Interview data is further at risk from the unintended use of leading questions and 
letting the informants know too much about the research agenda and working hypotheses 
(e.g. Harvey 2011, 438). This particularly applies when the respondents are well-
informed, speaking in professional mode and are keen to establish for themselves the 
nature of the research at the start of the interview. 
I adopted several strategies to mitigate these methodological limitations. I set the 
interview length at one hour to allow for building trust and penetrating the respondents’ 
defences. The interview guides were designed to ensure that the research was conducted 
systematically and critically (see Patton 2002, 343–46). Four different topic guides were 
used in this study, covering questions and subject areas pertaining to media professionals 
and managers, defendant lawyers, plaintiff lawyers and plaintiffs (Appendix 3, 4, 5, 6). 
The interviews included open-ended and closed questions. They were flexible enough to 
provide room for probing and clarification, and facilitate an ‘extended conversation’ 
(Berger 1998, 55) in whatever order suited the respondent around key issues related to 
their experiences and perceptions of the law. Although based on the theoretical 
framework, the interview guides were designed to ensure that the questioning did not 
explicitly refer to key concepts informing this research. Therefore, journalists and editors 
were asked in general terms about the effects of legal considerations on their work rather 
than whether they experienced a chilling effect of the law. This also applied to the 
wording of the email invitation, the consent form and the preamble to the interviews. 
During the interviews I took care to remain neutral without disclosing my hypotheses 
(Ibid., 61). 
To minimise the risk of social desirability bias, I offered participants the option 
for their responses not to be attributed. This allowed plaintiffs and lawyers in particular 
to be more candid in their responses. Regarding issues that could reflect badly on the 
respondents, such as killing stories due to legal considerations, in addition to questions 
about their experience with such practices, I asked about their knowledge about 
prevalence of such practices in other newsrooms or in general. To mitigate the 
inconsistencies in respondents’ answers, I asked them to draw on specific disputes and 
examples to illustrate their points. The participants were thus less likely to make too 
general comments, invent material or deviate too far from the topic. Moreover, I assumed 
an active interviewing position (Holstein and Gubrium 1995) and asked for explanations, 
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probed and challenged the informants’ responses. While listening attentively to let the 
respondents know I valued their time and knowledge, I stayed alert, returned to important 
issues and politely questioned their responses (see, e.g., Britten 1995, 253). I confronted 
high-profile plaintiff lawyers with the views of defendants about the disproportionate 
damages claims of their clients.  
Rather than treating participants’ responses as the objective “truth” about the 
interplay between personality/goodwill protection law and journalism, I viewed them as 
social constructs that revealed their perceptions and opinions at the time of the interview 
in the way they wished to put them in the public domain. During the interpretation stage 
I was watchful not to take the responses at face value (Mason 2002, 64; Hennink 2011, 
132) but rather tried to reflect on all the known influences and limitations. To fill some 
of the gaps in interviewees’ accounts or to mitigate the consequences of inaccuracies due 
to memory lapses, where possible, I compared and contrasted interviewees’ responses 
against other participants’ answers, against media accounts, court decisions, statistical 
data obtained from official sources and internal media organisations’ records, and 
previous studies. The interviews with different sets of defendant actors also provided 
some correction against the social desirability bias, as journalists often provided contrary 
views on the chilling effects to media managers and editors. Conducting interviews with 
all the parties to the disputes and their lawyers also allowed for examination of some of 
the key concepts from diametrically opposed perspectives. 
3.4.1.2 Sampling 
Interview data was collected between March 2013 and March 2017. A phased approach 
to data collection was adopted. Initial background interviews with experts were followed 
by interviews with defendants and their lawyers. Interviews with plaintiffs and their 
lawyers were conducted in the final fieldwork phase. In total, this study draws on fifty-
three interviews with fifty-three respondents.56 Forty-eight were conducted in person, one 
 
 
 
56 In addition to the fifty-three interviews analysed in this thesis, I conducted ten brief interviews with 
judges who had experience with adjudication of personality/goodwill protection disputes involving 
media-defendants. These interviews provided context to the plaintiff and defendant interviews and 
were not thematically analysed or cited in the findings chapters. 
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over Skype and four by email. One was a joint interview with two respondents. I 
interviewed one participant twice. I had no prior personal or professional relationship 
with any of the interviewees. 
I employed purposive, non-probability sampling, in which ‘logic and power lies 
in selecting information-rich cases for in-depth study’ (Layder 1998, 46). This research 
studied the variety of principal protagonists’ views and experiences with the defamation 
and privacy regime and how these conditioned their behaviour. The selection process was 
thus essentially strategic (Bryman 2004, 134) as it identified persons deemed most 
appropriate to answer the research question. The sample is not representative of the whole 
population. The selection of respondents between media professionals and defamation 
lawyers ensured that the sample had experience of working for all the major national news 
media outlets (see Chapter 5). The increased risk of selection bias and reduced 
generalisability to other contexts of purposive sampling was taken into account at the 
interpretation stage.  
Expert interviews 
The purpose of conducting interviews with legal and media experts, some of whom were 
also practitioners, was to gain better understanding of the relevant statutes and the context 
in which the law was applied, and to identify the principal protagonists and the 
relationships between them. With the assistance of the completed literature review and 
colleagues, I identified participants in both the Slovak and Czech jurisdictions. I 
conducted ten interviews. Six of these provided the background, sourcing 
recommendations regarding documentary sources and respondents. Two of these 
interviews also served as pilots for later interviews with media professionals and 
defamation lawyers. None were thematically analysed or quoted in this study. I analysed 
the other four interviews and included the relevant finding in the empirical chapters of 
this thesis. The interviews are also recorded in Appendix 2.  
 
Defendant interviews 
Based on the theoretical framework, I identified two sets of defendant-respondents: media 
managers, including senior editorial staff, and journalists with experience of 
personality/goodwill protection litigation, either as defendants or authors of contested 
material. I also wanted to obtain the views of lawyers with experience of defendant work. 
Three initial target lists were drawn up after researching media coverage, national media 
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outlet’s websites and analysing media cases published on the Justice Ministry portal.57 
Invitations were sent to managers and/or senior editors at all national television 
broadcasters and newspapers (bar the Sports daily). I also invited editors-in-chief at 
magazines involved in investigative journalism. Invitations were sent to six highly 
experienced investigative journalists and political commentators and to five defendant 
lawyers. I also approached one of the experts previously interviewed. 
During the field visit I initiated snowball sampling (see, e.g., Atkinson and Flint 
2001, 3). I asked media managers, editors and journalists for details of their lawyers, and 
for suggestions of colleagues with experience of litigation. The snowballing technique 
helped to considerably extend the sample. One previously interviewed expert informant 
proved very helpful, providing access to some senior managers and investigative 
journalists.  
I conducted interviews with thirteen media managers and/or senior newsroom 
editors. One of the respondents had solely worked in the Czech Republic, eleven in 
Slovakia and one had experience in both jurisdictions. The interviewees included 
managers from each of the national television broadcasters, from the only national 
business daily, the leading broadsheet, the most popular daily tabloid, the only 
commercial news agency and a leading economics magazine (see Appendix 2). Managers 
and editors at Spoločnosť 7 Plus who published the second most popular daily Plus 1 deň 
and the most popular weekly Plus 7 dní, the editors-in-chief of broadsheet Pravda and 
magazine .týždeň declined to be interviewed. Ten interviews with some very prominent 
investigative journalists and political commentators were conducted. All the respondents 
had either direct experience with personality/goodwill protection disputes as defendants, 
co-defendants or witnesses in proceedings. All were practicing print press journalists with 
over five years’ journalistic experience. The sample included ten leading media lawyers. 
Six focused solely on defendant work; four also had experience with plaintiff work.  
 
Plaintiff interviews 
I compiled an initial list of plaintiffs and plaintiff lawyers after researching media 
coverage, court decisions published on the Justice Ministry website, and a sample of court 
 
 
 
57 https://obcan.justice.sk/infosud/-/infosud/zoznam/rozhodnutie. 
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decisions obtained from ordinary courts. I sent invitations to some of the most litigious 
high-profile plaintiffs, their lawyers and other plaintiff lawyers who, according to the 
available documentary data, represented clients in multiple disputes. In the field, I invited 
defendant lawyers to recommend fellow counsels whom they had repeatedly encountered 
in court. I asked plaintiff lawyer-informants to contact their clients on my behalf with an 
invitation to participate in the study. I also used my social networks to access a regional 
plaintiff lawyer whom I identified as a counsel in several disputes held at a district court 
which had adjudicated several personality protection judgments. I interviewed eleven 
plaintiff lawyers, two of whom also had experience of defendant work. One worked in 
the Czech jurisdiction. I conducted six interviews with plaintiffs.  
3.4.1.3 The Interviewing Process and Nature of Collected Data 
All participants were contacted by letter, email or over the phone. The formal invitation 
to interview fitted on a single sheet of paper, and included the LSE logo, a reference to 
my ESRC sponsorship and LSE profile, a brief description of the study and topics I would 
like to discuss. It made clear that the interview could be conducted anonymously if 
required, that it would last no longer than an hour, and that during the time I was in the 
field, I would meet the respondent whenever and wherever was most suitable for him/her. 
I further suggested that if they were unable to meet in person, I was willing to arrange an 
interview over the phone or Skype, or send them my questions via email (see Hay-Gibson 
2009). To those who requested it, I sent specific questions to be covered prior to the 
interview. 
At the outset of the interview, participants were presented with the informed 
consent form, which they were asked to sign, indicating whether they wished their 
contributions to be attributed (Appendix 1). I ascertained how much time the interviewee 
was able to spare to prioritise themes (Mangen 1999, 118). The interviews were 
conducted in Slovak (or Slovak and Czech). All the journalists, media managers and 
senior editors went on record. Given the sensitive nature of personality/goodwill 
protection litigation, all six plaintiffs preferred to remain anonymous. Nine of the twenty-
one lawyer-respondents did not wish to have their responses attributed. To maintain the 
conversation flow whilst capturing every detail so preventing loss of substantial pieces of 
information (Aberbach and Rockman 2002, 675; Mangen 1999, 117; Johnson 2001, 274; 
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Bryman 2004, 329), the Skype interview and face-to-face interviews were recorded 
unless the participants objected. One of the early expert interview recordings was lost due 
to a technological malfunction. I realised the issue at the end of the interview and 
immediately wrote down a summary, which the interviewee reviewed via email, adding 
extra notes of his own. I wrote de-briefing notes following each interview in order to 
reflect on the interview process and feed into the analysis (Wengraf 2001, 142-44). 
The face-to-face and/or Skype interviews lasted between 36 minutes and two 
hours and five minutes, and were between 6,050 and 20,000 words. The interviews 
provided rich accounts of the respondents’ perceptions, experiences, and the legal and 
contextual factors that combined in enabling and/or inhibiting the personality/goodwill 
protection regime to appropriately triangulate the conflicting interests. One of the 
plaintiffs – P06 – was originally interviewed for his expertise as a judge in 
personality/goodwill protection disputes. It transpired during the interview that he also 
figured as a plaintiff in one dispute. His views were included in the analysis. The data 
gathered from the non-recorded interviews was less voluminous, and contained few direct 
quotes. Nonetheless, the interviews corroborated the main themes emergent from the 
other interviews, providing unique examples. The email interview data was of varying 
quality. While some respondents provided very rich accounts, others were much more 
concise.  
3.4.2 Documents and Archival Records 
To mitigate the inaccuracies, gaps and potential biases within interview data, to identify 
litigation trends and to set the principal protagonists’ views and experiences in context, 
this study employed a wide range of primary and secondary documents and archival 
records. It has been acknowledged in the literature that the written record is particularly 
valuable for increasing research validity through verification of information collected via 
other methods, particularly interviews (McNabb 2010, 397; Yin 1994, 81). Documentary 
evidence provides access to subjects difficult or impossible to reach via direct, personal 
contact (Marshall 2006, 125), is of non-reactive nature and thus minimises the self-
reporting bias (Bryman 2004, 381). It is also well suited for analysis over time (Hakim 
2000, 39), and can provide valuable data on the background and historical context 
(Marshall 2006, 107) and frequency of phenomena (Scott 1990, 4; Johnson 2001, 237). 
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Documents played an important part in every phase of this study: contributing to 
the identification of the key problem, the selection of interview participants, the 
augmentation and triangulation of the data gathered from the interviews, and the 
illumination of the interview findings. Five main types of documents were collected: legal 
texts and commentaries, court decisions, official statistical records, internal media 
organisations’ records, media coverage and past studies.  
 
Legal texts and commentaries 
I read and re-read substantive and procedural rules under civil, criminal and media law, 
explanatory memoranda, legal commentaries and scholarly articles to understand the 
legal issues, identify legal expert-respondents, prepare for interviews, and investigate the 
extent to which the interests in reputation, privacy and expression were triangulated in 
the statute book. The legal commentaries were also used to complement the views of 
interview respondents on the adjudicatory practice of Slovak courts. 
 
Court decisions 
An extensive corpus of judicial decisions, including those of Slovak ordinary courts, the 
Supreme and Constitutional Courts and the ECtHR, was collected from multiple sources. 
In an early data collection phase, ordinary courts’ decisions in personality/goodwill 
protection disputes delivered in 2011 and 2012 and published on the Justice Ministry 
portal58 were used to identify the regime’s principal protagonists. The acquired data 
complemented interviewees’ perceptions about litigation trends in providing a 
quantifiable picture of the regime (see Chapter 5). Where possible, the decisions were 
used to identify specific defendants, plaintiffs and their representatives to be approached 
for interview.59  
I obtained a sample of final decisions in media personality/goodwill protection 
disputes by sending Freedom of Information (FOI) requests to all Slovak ordinary courts. 
 
 
 
58 From January 2012 all final decisions of Slovak ordinary courts were to be published at 
https://obcan.justice.sk/infosud/-/infosud/zoznam/rozhodnutie. This database is continuously being 
expanded with new and past decisions. 
59 The officially published judgments are anonymised. However, the degree of anonymization varies 
depending on the meticulousness of responsible court administrators. It was therefore possible to 
identify several defendants, plaintiffs and/or their lawyers. 
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However, the sample was insufficiently representative to permit inferences about 
litigation trends to be drawn due to archiving issues. The sample was used to identify 
interview participants, particularly plaintiff lawyers, and to complement interview data 
related to selected litigious plaintiffs’ decisions to sue and media-defendants’ arguments 
presented in court in selected controversial cases repeatedly mentioned by informants.  
Court decisions and petitions obtained from defendant lawyers, media 
organisations and judges were used to provide context and views of the parties to other 
high-profile disputes, unavailable through official channels. The corpus also included 
seminal decisions of the Supreme and Constitutional Courts, gathered from the courts’ 
websites, published case-law collections (Vozár and Zlocha 2014; Vozár et al. 2015), and 
a professional legal search engine (Aspi). Together with Article 10 case-law of the ECtHR 
involving Slovakia, these were analysed to complement the respondents’ views on the 
Slovak adjudicatory practice.  
 
Official statistical records 
To provide background for interviewees’ views about litigation trends and contribute to 
a quantifiable picture of the personality/goodwill protection regime, I collected official 
statistical records on the number of adjudicated personality/goodwill protection claims 
by ordinary Slovak and Czech courts between 1995 and 2016.60 The Justice Ministry did 
not keep records that distinguish between different types of personality/goodwill 
protection disputes or defendants, or on the number of submitted petitions or claims, the 
types of damages claimed or disputes’ outcomes. 
 
Internal media records 
In the absence of publicly available records on litigation rates, remedies, results and 
defendant and plaintiff types, I approached the newsrooms and/or publishers of all the 
major national dailies, weeklies and television broadcasters with requests to provide their 
internal records about personality/goodwill protection disputes. The majority of media 
organisations did not keep detailed records or were unwilling to disclose them, even on 
 
 
 
60 Only part of the Slovak statistics were published. I obtained the data over a longer period through a 
FOI request.  
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an anonymous basis. Trend and Petit Press provided their records for analysis. However, 
as the organisations had advised and as transpired during analysis, the records were 
incomplete. The quantitative data obtained was thus not taken at face value, but treated 
as complementary to official data and interviewees’ views. Some senior executives and 
editors had lists of disputes prepared by their lawyers for the interview and were able to 
cite some quantitative data. 
 
Media coverage and past studies 
Having studied the media coverage, non-governmental organisations’ reports and past 
studies of Slovak courts’ adjudicatory practice, I became well-versed in the defendants’ 
public accounts of the issues surrounding controversial personality/goodwill protection 
disputes and/or threats, became acquainted with the dynamics of the relationships 
between public officialdom and the media and gained an understanding of longitudinal 
developments in the regime. This allowed me to better interpret interviewees’ accounts 
and to extract from interviews the key themes and narratives. In the initial stages of the 
research, the media coverage and studies assisted with identification of the main 
protagonists, respondent selection and familiarisation with the most controversial 
disputes. 
3.4.3 Data Analysis 
The primary data analysis method was thematic analysis. Legal documents were analysed 
using doctrinal legal research techniques. Statistical records provided by the Justice 
Ministry and media organisations were content analysed, with findings presented using 
descriptive statistics. 
3.4.3.1 Thematic Analysis 
The focus of the analysis of elite interviews was on ‘the substantive content’ (Elliott 2005, 
20). Thematic analysis was therefore selected as the most suitable method. The analysis 
approach was hybrid, where deductive, theory-driven codes were combined with 
inductive, data-driven ones (Fereday and Muir-Cochrane 2008, 4). This approach allowed 
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the integration of codes and themes derived from the literature review, with themes 
emergent directly from the data.  
The interview guides were deductive as they incorporated the codes and themes 
originating from the literature review and conceptual framework (see Chapter 2). The 
interviews were semi-structured around these themes without being explicitly cited 
during interviews. The defendants’ and lawyers’ interview guides were devised first and 
gradually adapted as new topics emerged during the initial interviews. The plaintiff and 
plaintiff lawyer interview guides were then compiled utilising the post-interview notes 
and themes in the literature.  
Once data collection had been completed, all the interviews were transcribed. The 
interview transcripts and email interviews were uploaded into NVivo and divided into six 
sub-folders: experts, journalists, media managers/editors, plaintiffs, defendant lawyers 
and plaintiff lawyers. Each subfolder was coded separately using its own coding 
framework. The coding frames were similar. The journalist interviews were coded first. 
The first round of coding was predominantly deductive, based on the topics included in 
the interview guides. During the first round of reading and coding I made use of memos, 
recording potentially significant new codes, quotes etc. Some of these were later 
incorporated into the emerging themes and analysis.  
After all the interview transcript sub-groups underwent the first round of coding, 
the analysis became more inductive. The primary codes assigned were deliberately broad 
and their purpose was to signpost the parts of texts that dealt with certain topics. The 
second round of coding was inductive and rested on my re-reading the coded interviews 
and assigning new codes either by devising new ones, sub-dividing or merging existing 
ones. Among the new codes that appeared across all the interview sub-sets, was “media 
reluctant to admit mistakes”. I also assigned new codes related to often-mentioned 
controversial disputes to segments of texts, among others “Bonanno”, “Harabin v. Petit 
Press”. As the coding continued, three main themes relating to the adjudicatory practice 
emerged: “fairness”, “certainty” and “effectiveness”. These were consistently present 
among all the sub-sets, and during the interpretation and write-up stages became frame 
for the study findings. In light of the importance of these themes within the interview data 
and their high explanatory value, I revised the conceptual framework and revisited the 
preliminary doctrinal analysis of the law-on-the books. 
Among other themes that unexpectedly resonated in the interview data was the 
“between benign and invidious chill”, denoting the subjective nature of respondents’ 
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views on identical instances of non-publication. This was most clearly visible in the 
“Gorilla” case. The subjective nature of the chilling effect concept was highlighted in the 
literature by Cheer (2008, Chapter 4), but did not resonate as strongly as in my interviews. 
In a recent study of the relationship between defamation and privacy laws and journalism, 
which was published after the majority of the defendant interviews were conducted, 
Townend (2014, Chapter 2 and 301-302) also pointed out this issue. 
There were several codes and themes that did not appear as important as expected. 
Among these was “financial costs of litigation” in relation to plaintiffs’ decision to sue. 
The plaintiffs rarely mentioned the financial costs and it appeared infrequently in plaintiff 
lawyer data. While litigation costs in a civil law system are generally much lower than 
costs in a common law system, this was still a little surprising given the unavailability of 
CFAs or other no-win-no-fee arrangements combined with the high costs of proceedings 
in the 1990s and 2000s relative to average income (see Chapter 5).  
Once the interviews were coded and the main themes established, I conducted 
thematic analysis on selected court decisions in some of the most frequently mentioned 
cases in the interview data, which were used to illustrate some of the arguments made in 
the thesis. The analysis focused on the infringement, the harm plaintiffs’ claimed to have 
suffered, the plaintiffs’ views on the objectives pursued by the defendants and on 
defendants’ counter-arguments. 
3.4.3.2 Doctrinal Legal Analysis  
Doctrinal legal analysis techniques were applied to the statutory texts, scholarly legal 
writings and the case-law of Slovak courts and the ECtHR. The texts were read and re-
read in order to establish the meaning and value of personality rights, goodwill and the 
right to freedom of expression within the legal regime. Using deductive and inductive 
logic and analogical reasoning I analysed how the private and public interests in 
reputation, privacy and freedom of expression were balanced within black letter law. 
Where relevant, comparisons with standards entrenched in the ECtHR jurisprudence were 
made. 
This analysis set the interview thematic analysis findings in context. The analysis 
of the interview data suggested the concepts of fairness, certainty and effectiveness as 
related to the law-on-the-books and the adjudicatory practice were of high explanatory 
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value. The legal texts and commentaries were therefore re-read and interpreted focusing 
on the extent to which and how the internal legal norms safeguarded fairness, certainty 
and effectiveness in personality/goodwill protection disputes involving media-
defendants.  
Legal analysis of the case-law of Slovak Constitutional Court in freedom of 
expression matters and the ECtHR Article 10 judgments involving Slovakia was also 
conducted to complement the thematic analysis of interview data relating to the 
adjudicatory practice of ordinary courts. The analysis focused on the standards prescribed 
in the case-law as to the norms and the ultimate balancing test pertinent to defamation 
and privacy disputes, and the Constitutional and European Courts’ assessment of their 
application by ordinary Slovak courts.  
3.4.3.3 Analysis of Justice Ministry and Internal Media Records 
To set the participants’ perceptions about litigation rates and trends in context, Justice 
Ministry statistical records, selected court decisions and available internal media 
organisations’ records were analysed. The raw data obtained in differing formats was first 
inputted into Microsoft Excel datasets and coded. The datasets were then analysed using 
descriptive statistics, including frequency tables and diagrams. The analysis and 
interpretation of quantitative data within this essentially qualitative study allowed for 
visualisation of trends in litigation rates over a period of time. It helped to corroborate the 
thematic analysis findings and enabled inferences to be drawn about the effects of 
particular rule changes on the operation of the personality/goodwill protection regime. 
3.5 Reflections on the Personal, Political and Ethical Considerations 
during Interview Data Collection and Analysis 
The quality of data gathered through interviews is affected by the ethical, political and 
personal dimensions of the processes of material collection and its subsequent 
interpretation. The following section reflects on how they may have influenced the 
findings of this study. 
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3.5.1 Ethical Considerations 
The conducted interviews were straightforward and open. Many complex ethical 
decisions (e.g. Hopf 2004; Kvale 2007, 21–32) were therefore not applicable to this study. 
Nonetheless, interviews that invite respondents to explicate their perceptions and 
experiences related to a contested issue as was the case with personality/goodwill 
protection disputes, involve certain ethical and political dimensions that the researcher 
must take into account. Openly discussing a sensitive matter such as newsroom practices 
or self-censorship that are not usually publicly debated or controversial to admit is 
inherently exposing. Having to recollect the harm suffered as a result of a defamatory 
publication and talking about experience of legal proceedings might be distressing. The 
subject matter is also politically sensitive in Slovakia where personality protection 
disputes brought by high-profile public officials are portrayed as attacks on freedom of 
expression. Moreover, media organisations might fear unknown future consequences for 
disclosing sensitive information including litigation costs. When collecting and analysing 
data it was therefore necessary to consider the ‘broader implications of research in terms 
of the impact it may have on society or on specific subgroups within society’ (Elliott 
2005, 146). 
The primary ethical concern was obtaining informed consent from participants. 
The initial invitation and the interview preamble clearly explained to the respondents the 
purpose of the research and their right to withdraw at any time. I also reassured the 
participants that their responses would be used solely for the purposes of my research and 
would not appear in the media. I established whether the interviewees wished their 
responses to be attributed or remain anonymous and asked them to sign a consent form 
(Appendix 1). Several interviewees, predominantly those who responded via email, 
ignored the consent form or did not indicate whether they wished to remain anonymous 
or not. In those cases, their responses were anonymised. I also anonymised the responses 
from those participants who requested their answers to remain non-attributed. For that 
purpose, I used a combination of letters and numbers, which indicated the interviewee 
group and number. L01, for instance, denoted a lawyer-participant.  
During the interviews, particularly with plaintiffs and lawyers, I emphasised when 
asking about their experiences or the disputes and clients they represented that they need 
not disclose the information or might wish to talk in general terms, as my interest was in 
understanding the workings of the regime. While most interviewees were content to speak 
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openly about many potentially sensitive issues, several chose not to reveal certain details. 
One plaintiff-respondent chose not to disclose the amount of damages she requested. A 
lawyer representing a publishing house was reluctant to discuss in detail a particular 
controversial dispute when he learned that I was interested in interviewing the plaintiff. 
Another participant asked to go off record a couple of times during the interview when 
discussing certain figures and actions pertaining to a dispute he was involved in. One 
plaintiff and two plaintiff lawyers requested that the interviews should not be recorded.  
The contested nature of the issues under investigation was also evident in the 
responses or non-responses from the individuals and media organisations approached 
who declined to participate. While journalists and media lawyers were generally 
approachable and happy to discuss their experiences and views, managers and senior 
editors from several newsrooms did not want to be interviewed. Management at 
Spoločnosť 7 Plus, which according to some accounts, had been involved in the largest 
number of disputes among Slovak media, declined my invitations. The founding editor-
in-chief of Plus 1 deň advised ‘your questions concern internal and financial matters of 
the publishing house, which we do not present outwards. Similar requests in the past also 
received a negative response’.61 The editor-in-chief of Pravda did not have the requested 
information and was only willing to respond to general questions via email. Despite 
repeated approaches, the editor-in-chief at .týždeň failed to respond to my emails and 
messages, and refused to talk to me when I approached him at .týždeň offices, where I 
was interviewing another participant. .týždeň’s lawyer was unable to meet me and failed 
to respond to my questions sent via email. 
High-profile, litigious plaintiffs (see Chapter 5) and/or their lawyers were also 
reluctant to ‘go public’ with their views. I first invited Štefan Harabin to participate in 
2014, shortly before his term as Supreme Court President expired. Our meeting set up 
through the Court spokesman was cancelled at short notice. Harabin did not respond to 
my repeated email invitations or to my indirect invitation through his long-term lawyer, 
whom I interviewed in 2016. I contacted Robert Fico in 2014 and received a response 
from the prime minister’s office that his commitments did not allow him to participate. I 
contacted Fico indirectly, giving him a chance to participate, through his former lawyer, 
 
 
 
61 Email communication with Nancy Závodská, 25 March 2014. 
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whom I had interviewed in 2016. However, he did not respond. I was unable to contact 
Ján Slota as he was no longer active in public life. Neither of the three lawyers approached 
who represented him in media disputes were interested in participating in this study. I 
was in contact with Judge Polka’s wife, who acted as his solicitor in his personality 
protection disputes. Despite an original agreement to meet, due to clashing commitments, 
I was unable to interview her. She failed to respond to my questions sent upon her 
suggestion via email. She also advised that Judge Polka had suffered enough and would 
not be interested in discussing his experiences.  
Ethical issues may also arise when selecting and presenting participants’ 
responses or public statements because ‘the published account is not an objective 
rendering of “reality”, but it is the researcher’s interpretation of the facts that is published 
for public view’ (Morris 2009, 214). When thematically analysing the data and presenting 
the respondents’ views I tried to understand their accounts in context and be sensitive to 
their and my positionality (McDowell 1998, 2143). Conclusions of any research cannot 
be based on the recollections of a single respondent (Lilleker 2003, 212). I therefore tried 
to give voice to all participants, compared and contrasted the views of the different 
protagonists on the same issue, and, where possible, cross-referenced the information 
obtained with other interviews, documentary sources, media coverage or secondary 
literature (Davies 2001, 77). The ‘anxious defended subjectivity’ on the part of 
interviewees, particularly among plaintiffs who might find questions around their dispute 
distressing, was considered during data interpretation (Wengraf 2001, 59). Attention was 
paid to the significance of unanswered questions and inarticulate or limited responses. 
3.5.2 Personal Considerations: Positionality 
Data quality further depends on a sound working relationship with interviewees, which 
is influenced by personal considerations such as the “insider/outsider” status of the 
researcher,62 his/her age and gender, and the resulting possible power imbalances between 
 
 
 
62 According to Gair (2012, 137), the concept of “insider/outsider” status ‘is understood to mean the 
degree to which a researcher is located either within or outside a group being researched, because of 
her or his common lived experience or status as a member of that group’. 
  106 
the researcher and elite informants (e.g. Britten 1995, 252; Desmond 2004, 4-5; Smith 
2006; Harvey 2010, 194; Mikecz 2012, 483-85). It has been argued that overwhelmed by 
the seniority gap and grateful for being granted the interviewee’s time, researchers may 
become too deferential (Ostrander 1995, 143). Elites may attempt to dominate the 
interview by challenging the researcher’s statements or talking about other issues than 
those asked about (Lilleker 2003, 211). While this could unlock new perspectives and 
interpretations, it could also go too far, leaving the researcher trying to steer discussion 
back on course. The position of a young female researcher may be exacerbated by her 
being considered even more junior in status than a young male (Welch et al. 2002, 621-
22). The power imbalance, however, does not preclude the elite interview becoming a 
mutually enriching experience (Kvale and Brinkmann 2008, 31). 
I tried to combine the elements of being both an insider and an outsider to gain the 
best possible quality data (Harvey 2010, 198) and to mitigate the impact of the power 
imbalances through several strategies. I was happy to answer respondents’ questions 
about the research, and tried to establish common interests, academic or local allegiances 
and thus rapport (Richards 1996, 203). I was perceived as both an insider and an outsider 
during the interviews. As a Slovak national aware of the issues surrounding 
personality/goodwill protection, I was considered an insider. At the same time, as a 
doctoral researcher in media and communications at a UK university, I was an outsider 
as I was neither a media professional, a lawyer nor a plaintiff.  
I approached the interviews with defendants and plaintiffs from the position of 
neutrality, explaining that I did not side with either of the parties to personality/goodwill 
protection disputes, but wanted to tell both their stories. At the same time, I showed 
empathy to and understanding of the issues they faced. This was particularly important 
when interviewing plaintiffs, who in the context of the portrayal of the disputes as an 
attack on media freedom, were often apprehensive at the outset of the interview. The 
plaintiffs seemed to have valued the professional interest of a serious researcher in their 
side of the story and provided honest responses.  
All the interviews with journalists took place in informal settings outside their 
offices. This allowed for more conversational and reciprocal interviewing situations 
where I was able to probe and ask questions that potentially challenged their professional 
status without alienating them. I found the informants friendly, engaged and happy to 
help. Although the interviews with media managers and defamation lawyers mostly took 
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place in their offices, I also found the respondents open, supportive and their accounts 
very informative and candid.  
The power imbalances were most visible in the interviews with some senior 
plaintiff lawyers. These interviews took place in an atmosphere of respect and distance. 
The fact that I was not a lawyer, a female and the interviewee’s junior resulted in some 
patronising behaviour. However, as has been suggested in the literature (Harvey 2011, 
434; Richards 1996, 202), advance preparation is key for the researcher’s ability to project 
a positive impression in order to gain elite interviewees’ respect. I took preparation for 
the lawyer interviews very seriously, researching the relevant substantive and procedural 
rules, their professional background and publicised cases they represented. I was thus 
able to pose qualified questions, answer their queries competently and engage them in an 
intellectual dialogue (Welch et al. 2002, 625). The situation between me and the 
respondents became closer to one of equals and the interviewees provided a rich account 
of their and their clients’ experiences. Some even candidly disclosed specific borderline 
practices.  
3.6 Conclusion  
This chapter presented the socio-legal approach combining elements of doctrinal legal 
research with social science methods of data collection and analysis adopted in this study. 
It explained why this research strategy is well suited to answer the research question 
posed in this thesis. The chapter then outlined the qualitative, longitudinal deep case study 
research design used to address the research problem. The data collection and analysis 
methods using semi-structured elite interviews and documents were described. The 
limitations of the selected methods and the ways in which this study sought to address 
them were also presented. Lastly, I reflected on the ethical, political and personal 
consideration that affected collection and analysis of interview data and its quality. 
The next chapter sets the findings chapters into their socio-political context. After 
introducing Slovakia’s basic constitutional set-up, it explores the country’s turbulent road 
to democratic consolidation and beyond, linking it to the prevalence of clientelism, 
corruption and informality in society, and developments in the media system and 
journalism culture. The second part of the chapter sketches a picture of the defamation 
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and privacy regime between 1996 and 2016 in numbers, presenting the regime’s principal 
protagonists among defendants and plaintiffs.  
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 Slovakia 1996-2016: Politics, Society, Media and 
the Personality/Goodwill Protection Regime in Numbers 
4.1 Introduction 
The conceptual framework that underpins this study suggests that the interactions 
between the principal protagonists of a defamation and privacy regime, which ultimately 
affect to what extent and how the given regime is able to triangulate the private and public 
interests in reputation, privacy and expression, take place in context. The socio-political, 
legal and international contexts are key for understanding these interactions. This chapter 
seeks to set the empirical findings relating to the operation of the Slovak 
personality/goodwill protection regime63 between 1996 and 2016 (discussed in Chapters 
6, 7, 8 and 9) in their socio-political context. 
A small,64 ethnically heterogeneous65 Central and Eastern European 
parliamentary republic, Slovakia started its journey as an independent state in 1993 
following the peaceful split of Czechoslovakia. By the end of the studied period, Slovakia 
was considered a consolidated, pluralistic democracy and one of ‘the most obvious 
economic success stories in post-communist Europe’.66 Slovakia, however, represented a 
deviant example of democratic transition in Central Europe (Pridham 1999, 1222; 
Mihalikova 2006, 172). While the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary moved from 
‘transition’ to ‘consolidation of democracy’ in the early 1990s (Rupnik 2003, 17), 
Slovakia moved towards ‘a personal form of authoritarianism’ (Pridham 1999, 1226), 
 
 
 
63 Slovak legal system’s terminology for the defamation and privacy regime. See Chapter 5. 
64 In the studied period, Slovakia’s population remained stable at around 5.4 million inhabitants 
(Školkay 2017, 184). 
65 While statistics in this area are not overly reliable, it has been estimated that between 15 and 20% 
of Slovakia’s population belonged to an ethnic minority in the period under investigation. The 
Hungarian (estimated at around 500,000) and the Roma (estimated between 350,000 and 400,000) 
were the two most sizeable minorities (see https://slovak.statistics.sk; also Školkay 2011a, 13; Školkay 
et al. 2010, 5; Papp 2003, 161, footnote 87; Freedom House 2003). 
66 Slovakia’s national income (GDP) more than doubled between 1982 and 2014 and according to 
Eurostat, it was third in GDP per capita among CEE countries (Školkay 2017, 184, 202 footnote 38). 
In 2015, Slovakia was one of the fastest growing economies in the EU (Cunningham 2016, 2). 
  111 
defying the so-called transition paradigm (see, e.g., Carothers 2002; Gans-Morse 2004; 
Bunce 1995) or hopes for a continuous and linear unfolding of democracy (Mihalikova 
2006, 173). The country’s ‘chequered’ (Pridham 1999, 1226) or ‘zig-zag’ (Szomolányi 
1999) democratisation and the political elites’ attitude to concentration of power and 
acceptance of criticism in public discourse was one of the primary causes for the fact that 
‘corruption, cronyism and illiberal politics remain[ed] significant, if not dominant, 
features of status quo’, as one commentator put it (Cunningham 2016, 2). It also 
significantly shaped the media environment, journalism culture and the mutual 
relationships between politics, judiciary and the media which lie at the heart of the 
operation of the personality/goodwill protection regime in the studied period and can 
account for the prevalence of certain principal protagonists within the regime. 
After outlining Slovakia’s constitutional framework, the chapter discusses the 
country’s key socio-political events since the fall of communism in 1989. These are then 
linked to the developments in the media system and journalism culture as well as to the 
quantifiable picture of the Slovak personality/goodwill protection regime, including rates 
of litigation and the principal protagonists.  
4.2    The Constitutional Framework 
Slovakia is a parliamentary republic with a president at its helm. The government is led 
by the prime minister (PM) who is appointed by the president following elections to the 
National Council of the Slovak Republic (parliament). The government is accountable 
for the execution of its duties to the parliament (Školkay 2011b, 11), which has the right 
to recall it (Mesežnikov, Kollár, and Vašečka 2010, 480). Since 1999 the president is 
directly elected by popular vote, using a majority model with two rounds of voting 
(Mesežnikov, Kollár, and Vašečka 2009, 468). The President’s powers in the domestic 
arena remain relatively limited.  
The country's supreme legislative body, the parliament, is a unicameral chamber 
with 150 deputies elected by universal suffrage based on a proportional system for a four-
year-term (Malová 2001, 365). Governments are typically coalition-based (Školkay 2017, 
185) with single exception of the majority government led by Robert Fico in 2012-2016. 
Slovakia’s electoral legislation pertaining to parliamentary elections remained mostly 
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unchanged between 1990 and 2016 and commentators considered it ‘conducive to free 
and fair elections’ (Mesežnikov, Kollár, and Vašečka 2012, 497; also Freedom House 
2003). While citizens were relatively active in Slovakia’s political life, membership of 
political parties was low with a declining tendency.67 
Slovakia has a three-tiered judicial system of ordinary courts that consists of the 
Supreme Court, regional and district courts. It is administered jointly by the parliament, 
president, the Justice Ministry, the Supreme Court and since 2002 the Judicial Council – 
the principal body of self-governance within the judiciary. The Justice Ministry appoints 
the chairpersons and vice-chairpersons of ordinary courts (Školkay 2011b, 12–13; 
Mesežnikov, Kollár, and Vašečka 2010, 491). The Constitutional Court is an independent 
judicial organ protecting the Constitution. Its verdicts are legally binding. The right to 
appeal to the Constitutional Court regarding the unconstitutionality of laws and 
government regulations rests with parliamentary deputies (at least 30 are required to 
launch an appeal), the president, the cabinet, courts of justice, the State Prosecutor and 
the Public Defender of Human Rights (Ombudsman). Citizens and legal entities may turn 
to the Court if they believe their constitutional rights have been violated by a state organ.  
As a member of the Council of Europe Slovakia ratified all important international human 
rights documents. In the studied period, citizens were able to apply to the European Court 
of Human Rights if Slovak judicial institutions were unable to provide a remedy or take 
action (Mesežnikov, Kollár, and Vašečka 2009, 484, 492–93). Since 2004, the Slovak 
legal system recognised a specialist court to deal with cases of political and other serious 
corruption and organised crime. In 2009, the original Special Criminal Court was replaced 
by a weaker Specialised Criminal Court as the Constitutional Court declared it 
unconstitutional following an MP-led initiative (Školkay 2011b, 12). 
 
 
 
 
 
67 Membership of political parties was estimated at 100,000 out of 4.2 million eligible voters in 2007 
(Mesežnikov, Kollár, and Vašečka 2009, 487). Citizens who considered themselves members of 
parties represented in the parliament in 2011 numbered less than 50,000 (Mesežnikov, Kollár, and 
Bútora 2013, 522).  
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4.3 Slovakia’s Democratisation Journey 
Slovakia’s democratisation path unfolded in three distinct periods: 1989 – 1993, 1993 – 
1998 and 1998 onwards. 
4.3.1 The Transition Years as Part of Czechoslovakia (1989-1993) 
As part of the Czechoslovak federation Slovakia embarked on a complex transformation 
process, establishing the foundations of a democratic political regime and market 
economy. The process was directed from Prague and involved standard neoliberal 
reforms, including rapid liberalisation, restructuring and privatisation in the economic 
sphere, and transformation of institutions and procedures into organs of democratic state 
that would embody the principles of tolerance, compromise and plurality (Mihalikova 
2006, 178).  
The transformation posed serious challenges to the unity of Czechoslovakia as it 
impacted the Slovak economy much more negatively than the Czech one. Slovakia’s 
heavy industry was difficult to restructure and/or privatise, the level of foreign investment 
was lower and unemployment rose much faster than in the Czech Lands (Ibid.). The two 
societies also held different attitudes to the market economy and reliance on the state. The 
Slovaks were more inclined to tolerate state interventionism than the Czechs, as they 
associated heavy industrialisation and state planning with economic and social growth. 
In contrast, for the Czechs, interventionist economic policies correlated with a sharp 
decline in economic growth in comparison to the pre-communist period.68  
The differing ideological perceptions and interpretations of the birth of 
Czechoslovakia and the two totalitarian regimes in their shared history (fascist and 
communist) and the historical legacy of the two nations’ estrangement (Pridham 1999, 
1226) also made redefining the common state institutions and emergence of a shared 
democratic culture rather difficult. The Slovaks, for instance, evaluated the communist 
 
 
 
68 By the late 1980s, the country’s rank in GNP per capita fell from seventh place after the Second 
World War to the fortieth (Rupnik 2003, 20). 
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period much more positively than their Czech counterparts, as they experienced much 
milder political persecution during the normalisation period (Mihalikova 2006, 179).69 
Some also viewed the interwar Nazi puppet state with nostalgia as it constituted the first 
episode of Slovak independent nationhood. 
Opportunistic and populist politicians were able to exploit the tensions that 
surfaced during the first chaotic and difficult years of democratic transition to further their 
political ambitions (Rupnik 2003, 21; Mihalikova 2006, 178). The differences between 
the two peoples escalated in the June 1992 elections, that were won by parties in both 
parts of the federation that fought on national lines, were unwilling to compromise and 
agreed on dismantling the common state without letting the people decide in a 
referendum, as it allowed them to maximise their respective power. Czechoslovakia 
ceased to exist on 1 January 1993. 
4.3.2 The Authoritarian Turn (1993-1998) 
The 1992 election not only opened the way for the division of Czechoslovakia. In the 
Slovak case, it also represented a turning point away from the ‘Central European model 
of transition to democracy’ to one unambiguously moving towards ‘nationalist brand of 
authoritarianism which thrived on an adversarial concept of politics’ and emphasised 
alleged external and internal enemies (Rupnik 2003, 17, 36). Between 1993 and 1998 
Slovakia became increasingly characterised as a ‘tyranny of the majority’ (Bútora and 
Bútorová 1994, 84) or ‘illiberal’ democracy.70 The period was marked by an intense 
‘struggle over the rules of the democratic game’ (Rybář and Malová 2004, 38) and over 
‘the country's future democratic character’ (Freedom House 2005). 
Slovakia’s democratic consolidation was complicated by the concurrence of three 
types of transformation – political regime change, economic system transformation, and 
 
 
 
69 The period following Czechoslovakia’s invasion by the Warsaw Pact (1968-cca. 1987) characterised 
by dismantling of the liberal reforms of the so-called Prague Spring and restoration of the previous 
order. 
70 In his 1997 Foreign Affairs article, Fareed Zakaria (1997) included Mečiar’s Slovakia among the 
countries where free elections bring to power politicians who do not adequately respect the rule of 
law, the separation of powers and the protection of basic freedoms. 
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nation building (Pridham 1999, 1226). The transition to independent statehood proved to 
be relatively easy for the Czechs, as they inherited the federal institutions and could fall 
back on a pre-existing paradigm of liberal democracy and moderate politicians like the 
dissident president Havel. In contrast, the Slovaks had to build a new state and also form 
a national identity almost from scratch (Mihalikova 2006, 173; Papp 2003, 151). The task 
of nation building in an ethnically heterogeneous country further complicated the political 
transition since it raised issues and incited attitudes that did not easily accord with 
consensus formation and political pluralism. Therefore, whilst by 1993, Slovakia had all 
the necessary components of parliamentary democracy, the lack of elite consensus over 
the nature of Slovak nationhood and the democratic rules of the game created political 
instability (Pridham 1999, 1227; Papp 2003, 152). 
This period was closely linked to the charismatic populist leader of the Movement 
for Democratic Slovakia (HZDS), Vladimír Mečiar, who, except for a nine-month 
interruption in 1994, had been in power since the foundation of independent Slovakia.71 
While some concerns about the democratisation trajectory of Slovakia were raised in the 
first years of the country’s independence, it was only Mečiar’s victory in the 1994 election 
that started the era of Slovakia’s democratic backsliding (Malová and Rybář 2003, 98; 
Krause 2003, 58; Pridham 1999, 1226). HZDS, a broad clientelistic movement 
characterised by nationalism, populism, and authoritarianism with voters belonging to the 
older, less educated, rural, and less reform-minded section of the population, formed a 
ruling coalition with the right-wing nationalist Slovak National Party (SNS) and the 
populist radical left-wing movement, the Association of Workers of Slovakia (ZRS) 
(Bútora, Bútorová, and Mesežnikov 2003, 52). The new government of ‘unreconstructed 
former communists’ (Samson 2001, 370) immediately set off on an authoritarian path 
(Schimmelfennig, Engert, and Knobel 2003, 502).  
During the first parliamentary session the governing parliamentary majority took 
full advantage of its legal powers and legal loopholes to solidify its position within the 
parliament, semi-governmental control bodies and the civil service. Opposition parties 
were stripped of their membership of parliamentary committees with coalition party 
 
 
 
71 Mečiar held three prime ministerial posts since the fall of communism: June 1990 – May 1991, June 
1992 – March 1994, December 1994 – October 1998. 
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members placed in the maximum number of legislative, executive and public 
administration posts (Pridham 1999, 1227; Papp 2003, 152). While the exclusion of 
opposition parties from oversight of key executive institutions, including the intelligence 
service and the publicly-owned electronic media, was by and large within the remit of the 
law, the coalition went far beyond the still weakly embedded precedent defined by its 
predecessors to deliberately eliminate the potential for independent monitoring and 
horizontal accountability. By doing so, it changed the balance of power within the 
political system and, as Krause (2003, 60) put it, ‘edged across the line between effective 
administration and accountability violation’.  
The government also sought to eliminate the potential for independent monitoring 
by institutions outside its constitutional scope and tensions between the legislative, 
executive and judicial organs became a permanent feature of the mid-1990s (Mihalikova 
2006, 181). The coalition tried to remove president Michal Kováč, a former ally of Mečiar 
who dared to stand up to him. When it failed to get constitutional majority in parliament 
for his dismissal, the ruling parties used standard legislative means to limit his powers, 
and repeatedly ignored or personally and politically attacked Kováč to force his 
resignation. The conflict led to the abduction of the president’s son, allegedly perpetrated 
by the secret service, and the state authorities’ reluctance to investigate his disappearance 
(The Slovak Spectator 2002; Krause 2003, 61; Mihalikova 2006, 181; Rybář and Malová 
2004, 43–44).  
Mečiar’s government tried to discredit its opponents in parliament and civil 
society as ‘enemies’, ‘anti-Slovak’ or ‘anti-state’ elements (Bútora, Bútorová, and 
Mesežnikov 2003, 55). These efforts began with opposition parties and expanded to 
include deputies who decided to leave the parliamentary majority. They culminated when 
the governing parliamentary majority unlawfully deprived a defecting deputy of his 
mandate and refused to comply with the Constitutional Court’s ruling that declared its 
actions unconstitutional (Krause 2003, 61-61; Rybář and Malová 2004, 46-49). 
Numerous government-inspired attempts to subvert autonomous elements of civil society 
like NGOs and independent media were also recorded (Pridham 1999, 1227). After 
annulling several unconstitutional laws passed by the parliamentary majority the 
Constitutional Court became another subject of the government’s verbal attacks and 
questioning of its powers (Krause 2003, 61; Bútora, Bútorová, and Mesežnikov 2003, 
56). Between 1994 and 1997, Slovakia passed the highest proportion of laws in the region 
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that violated the Constitution (Rupnik 2003, 28). The ruling coalition kept ignoring the 
judiciary’s verdicts, pressurised and discredited judges in public. 
With a stable parliamentary majority and independent institutions providing 
constitutional checks and balances considerably weakened, the Mečiar government was 
free to misuse executive agencies to punish its opponents, reward supporters and increase 
cohesion and loyalty within the executive. The ruling parties took control of the 
privatisation process that gave them access to substantial sums of money, and allowed 
them to develop dubious ties with organised crime figure and establish a system of 
patronage from which the politically connected benefitted (Bútora, Bútorová, and 
Mesežnikov 2003, 55; Mihalikova 2006, 180).72 Control over the public service 
broadcaster provided a means for limiting criticism of the coalition and to reframe public 
discussion in its favour. The government was also able to misuse the secret service for 
surveillance and intimidation of its opponents within politics, independent media and 
civil society. While the dramatic increase in politically-related violence triggered a series 
of investigations, due to government interference and use of blanket amnesties, these 
failed to produce a single formal indictment (Krause 2003, 62), and contributed to 
Slovakia’s growing reputation as an illiberal democracy. 
The government was hostile to autonomous rights of ethnic minorities, with the 
prime minister openly encouraging xenophobes with his statements (Schimmelfennig, 
Engert, and Knobel 2003, 506; Rupnik 2003, 29; Bútora, Bútorová, and Mesežnikov 
2003, 55). Under Mečiar, Slovakia failed to pass language laws that would allow for dual 
names of towns and villages and bilingual school certificates. In 1997, Mečiar went so 
far in his rhetoric to propose a ‘population exchange’ to the Hungarian prime minister to 
‘facilitate the voluntary migration of ethnic Hungarians from Slovakia to Hungary and 
Hungary’s Slovak minority to Slovakia’ (cited in Kelley 2004, 117). The ruling elite’s 
confrontational stance towards the Hungarian minority cast further doubt on the prospects 
of democratic consolidation at the societal level (Pridham 1999, 1227).  
 
 
 
72 The government discontinued coupon privatisation launched by the federal government, 
redistributing property on the basis of direct sales to predetermined buyers (Mihalikova 2006). 
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The government slowed down the economic reforms initiated by the federal 
government. Its pursuit of ‘government-inspired clientelism’ and the political instability 
did not initially harm Slovakia’s economic performance (Pridham 1999, 1226), which 
improved between 1994 and 1997, with the years 1994 and 1995 characterised by a 
revival of macroeconomic stabilisation. The strict monetary policy adopted in 1997 as a 
result of the growing budget deficit and the lack of transparency and side-stepping of laws 
by the government in the privatisation process hindered foreign investment and economic 
growth and contributed to renewed macroeconomic instability and high unemployment 
rate (Mihalikova 2006, 182).    
The cabinet’s ‘corruption-based clasp on power’ (Kelley 2004, 135) gave rise to 
a permanent conflict between the government and its critics. By the mid-1990s a clear 
political polarisation based on different value-orientations emerged (Bútora, Bútorová, 
and Mesežnikov 2003, 55) dividing the society into two camps. The first one, represented 
by the ruling parties and its cronies, was a grouping of national-authoritarian parties that 
pursued politics in a confrontational manner and preferred unilateral decision-making and 
enforcement to compromise and agreement. The second camp, comprised of the 
opposition parties from both sides of the spectrum, civil society and most of the 
independent media, was antiauthoritarian in nature with a strong democratic and 
European orientation (Mihalikova 2006, 180–81; Pridham 1999, 1227).  
Mečiar government’s ‘majoritarian interpretation of democracy’ (Malová and 
Rybář 2003, 104) led to increasing criticism of international actors. Despite its notable 
macroeconomic performance and the existence of institutional framework corresponding 
with parliamentary democracy, Slovakia was excluded from the first wave of Central and 
Eastern European countries invited to join the EU and NATO. According to the EU, the 
main problems of Slovakia’s democracy were insufficient respect for the rule of law 
(including corruption and misuse of the secret service), treatment of ethnic minorities and 
political opposition, and instability of its institutions (Rupnik 2003, 28–29; Papp 2003, 
146–47; Rybář and Malová 2004, 43; Freedom House 2011; Samson 2001, 364). While 
the government representatives dismissed the criticism as misinformed, downplaying the 
issues, denunciating meddling in the country’s internal affairs and attacking the 
opposition for damaging Slovakia’s image abroad, the opposition parties increasingly 
used international criticism of Mečiar’s policies to internalise the democracy issue and 
mobilise electoral support (Pridham 2002, 213; Rupnik 2003, 30). 
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Mečiar’s ‘siege on Slovakia’s democracy’ (Krause 2003, 59) and its international 
criticism had also positive outcomes as citizens began to consider the issues of democracy 
with greater care, the understanding of the importance of political rights and the rule of 
law increased, and Slovakia recorded substantial growth of the non-governmental and 
media sectors. The media campaign and the NGO mobilisation activities were 
instrumental in increasing participation of first-time voters in the 1998 election. The fear 
of international isolation provided momentum for the public’s backing of the reformist 
coalition of opposition parties (Pridham 1999, 1228; 2002, 214; Bútora, Bútorová, and 
Mesežnikov 2003, 57-59; Malová and Rybář 2003, 105-106). 
4.3.3 Democratic Consolidation and Beyond (1998-2016) 
Slovakia’s political development changed dramatically following the 1998 parliamentary 
elections in which Slovak citizens rejected Mečiar’s authoritarian political tendencies, 
disrespect for the rule of law, confrontational nationalist policy towards ethnic minorities, 
nepotism, corruption and the intertwining of crime with politics (Bútora, Bútorová, and 
Mesežnikov 2003, 51). The election brought to power parties committed to democratic 
consolidation and integration to EU and NATO, considered as virtually identical goals 
(Mihalikova 2006, 183). Notwithstanding fluctuations in the quality of democracy and 
occasional re-emergence of illiberal trends, the execution of power in Slovakia had not 
since departed from the basic constitutional framework (Mesežnikov, Kollár, and 
Vašečka 2009, 484). Since around 2003 Slovakia has been considered a stable, 
consolidated democracy that respected the rule of law and human rights. 
 
Governments led by Mikuláš Dzurinda 
The new coalition government led by Mikuláš Dzurinda consisted of ten parties that, 
despite the diversity of their ideological profiles, were all committed to democratic 
principles and shared the foreign policy orientation towards the EU and NATO (Malová 
and Rybář 2003, 107; Bútora, Bútorová, and Mesežnikov 2003, 52). In contrast to 
Mečiar’s government, half of the cabinet members had never belonged to the Communist 
party. For the first time since the foundation of Czechoslovakia, members of Slovakia’s 
largest ethnic minority held ministerial posts (Ibid., 60). While not uncontroversial, the 
inclusion of Hungarian party representatives in the coalition was perceived vital for the 
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country’s political stability, the cabinet’s ability to carry out political reforms to 
consolidate the democratic regime, and enhancing Slovakia’s chances of EU accession 
(Rybář and Malová 2004, 53; Pridham 2002, 218). 
The new coalition took a conciliatory stance towards the opposition parties, 
offering them a parliamentary deputy speakership and proportional representation in the 
committees, and other key semi-governmental control organs. It largely refrained from 
personal and political attacks on rival institutions prevalent during “Mečiarism” (Bútora, 
Bútorová, and Mesežnikov 2003, 61; Rybář and Malová 2004, 54; Malová and Rybář 
2003, 108; Krause 2003, 63) and engaged in cooperation with civil society (Freedom 
House 2004; 2006). The government quickly undertook a diplomatic offensive abroad 
and the EU-Slovak cooperation regained momentum. The then European Parliament 
rapporteur on Slovakia commented on the changed atmosphere and ease of access to top 
government ministers: ‘before the [1998] elections I was considered an enemy of the 
government; afterwards a great friend of Slovakia’ (cited in Pridham 2002, 216).  
Dzurinda’s cabinet initially focused on those reforms that were key to the EU 
accession process (Malová and Rybář 2003, 108). Because Slovakia had been without a 
president for more than six months, the coalition parties agreed to amend the Constitution, 
and in 1999, the new head of state was elected in the first direct election. Rudolf Schuster, 
one of the ruling parties’ chairman, beat Mečiar in the run-off and ‘Slovakia’s institutional 
system found renewed stability’, as Rybář and Malová (2004, 54–55) put it. Further 
Constitution amendments created the institution of Public Human Rights Defender and 
strengthened the status of the Constitutional Court. A new judicial code and the Act on a 
Free Access to Information were adopted, and Slovakia’s progress in improving press 
freedom was praised by international organisations (Bútora, Bútorová, and Mesežnikov 
2003, 64). 
The adoption of new minority legislation, denied in the previous period, 
substantially improved conditions for implementing ethnic minority rights (see Pridham 
2002, 218; Malová and Rybář 2003, 108; Rybář and Malová 2004, 55; Bútora, Bútorová, 
and Mesežnikov 2003, 64; Mihalikova 2006, 184). Despite remaining residual tensions 
between ethnic Slovaks and Hungarians, which created scope for nationalist policies on 
both sides (Freedom House 2003), the new approach to minority rights and the inclusion 
of the Hungarian minority representatives in the government improved bilateral relations 
with the Hungarian government (Rupnik 2003, 42).  
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Dzurinda’s government succeeded in transforming Slovakia’s image abroad. The 
EU Commission concluded in October 1999 that the country fulfilled the basic political 
criteria for opening negotiations on EU accession, including institutional stability, the 
rule of law and respect for human and minority rights (Malová and Rybář 2003, 108). By 
mid-2001, Slovakia managed to catch up in the accession negotiations with its neighbours 
(Bútora, Bútorová, and Mesežnikov 2003, 64).  
The cabinet redefined Slovakia’s economic policy, reduced the external 
imbalance of the economy and stabilised public finances and the country’s economic 
performance (Rupnik 2003, 42; Bútora, Bútorová, and Mesežnikov 2003, 64–65), which, 
in the early 2000s was comparable to that of its neighbours, exceeding the pre-
transformation level by 1.5% (Mihalikova 2006, 184). 
The irreversibility of these reforms and Slovakia’s joining the EU and NATO 
depended on the ability of the political actors who initiated them to implement them after 
the 2002 election. Given the depth of the problems inherited from the Mečiar era, it soon 
became apparent that the post-1998 optimism relating to swift improvement in living 
standards was unrealistic. During Dzurinda’s first term as prime minister unemployment 
increased from 14.5% in 1998 to over 18% in 2002, peaking at 20% in 1999, the health 
care and education systems continued to be plagued with problems, the crime rate 
remained high, and attempts at social inclusion of the Roma proved unsatisfactory. The 
ruling parties’ constant disagreements, inability to combat corruption and an increasing 
number of reported cases of suspected new illegal or quasi-legal politico-economic 
relationships further undermined the government’s credibility (Bútora, Bútorová, and 
Mesežnikov 2003, 51, 65; Mihalikova 2006, 184). 
Despite the dissatisfaction with the government’s belt-tightening and anti-
corruption policies, public support for EU membership remained high (Bútora, Bútorová, 
and Mesežnikov 2003, 64). With Western actors openly signalling that Mečiar’s re-
election could jeopardise Slovakia’s chances of joining the Euro-Atlantic structures, 
voters returned to power a coalition government of four centre-right, pro-reform parties 
led by Dzurinda. The election results were interpreted as a sign of the maturity of 
Slovakia’s democracy (Mihalikova 2006, 185; Bútora, Bútorová, and Mesežnikov 2003, 
66–67). Dzurinda’s cabinet received a strong mandate to pursue extensive socio-
economic reforms of the taxation and banking system which boosted Slovakia’s 
attractiveness for foreign investors, increased its GDP and substantially reduced 
unemployment (Bútora, Bútorová, and Mesežnikov 2003, 65; Mesežnikov, Kollár, and 
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Vašečka 2009, 480). The government’s complex anticorruption programme included 
creation of the Special Criminal Court and the Special Prosecutor’s Office (Freedom 
House 2004; Mesežnikov, Kollár, and Vašečka 2009, 495). 
Dzurinda’s governments were characterised by a general respect for court rulings 
by public administration bodies, a lack of political pressures on judges and by 
considerable efforts to re-establish the rule of law. Dzurinda’s tenures saw the launch of 
reforms aiming to modernise the judiciary, increase its effectiveness and curb the 
potential for corruption, including the introduction of institutions of judicial self-
governance and a random computer case assignment (Freedom House 2003; 2004). 
Despite the regular questioning of the judiciary’s efficiency and independence in the 
media, the period of Dzurinda’s governments meant a considerable departure from 
Mečiar’s era (Rupnik 2003, 41–42). In the course of five years, the pro-democratic forces 
managed to sufficiently eliminate the democratic deficits and deformations inherent from 
Mečiar’s authoritarian rule and in 2004, together with other CEE countries, Slovakia 
joined the EU and became a full member of NATO.  
 
Robert Fico’s coalition government 
The harsh social impact of Dzurinda governments’ reforms, the public’s unfulfilled 
expectations of living standards levelling with those in the West and publicised suspicions 
of clientelism between the ruling parties and economic interest groups (Freedom House 
2004) reinvigorated nationalist, anti-reformist parties before the 2006 election 
(Mesežnikov, Kollár, and Bútora 2013, 516). The composition of the new governing 
coalition led by the populist Robert Fico, who was seen in Europe as “Mečiar-light” 
(Mihalikova 2006, 185), sparked vivid debates in Slovakia and abroad. The greatest 
outcry concerned the fact that Fico’s party Smer (Direction), self-declared social 
democrats that had openly criticised Dzurinda governments’ reforms, formed a coalition 
with the SNS and HZDS – the two parties directly responsible for the 1994-1998 semi-
authoritarian regime (Rupnik 2007, 18; Freedom House 2008; Mesežnikov, Kollár, and 
Vašečka 2009, 484–85). Observers questioned whether Slovakia’s democratic 
consolidation was sustainable and whether the country would continue along the reform 
path (Freedom House 2007). 
Declaring the goal of building a welfare (“social”) state, Fico’s coalition revised 
Slovakia’s economic policy, halted the process of neo-liberal economic reforms, 
suspended privatisation of remaining enterprises with government investment and 
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pursued a policy of increased state interventionism (Mesežnikov, Kollár, and Vašečka 
2010, 476). The government’s term was characterised by its efforts to concentrate power, 
clientelism in appointments to government and public institutions, hostility to the 
independent press and increased ethnocentrism (Freedom House 2008; 2011; 
Mesežnikov, Kollár, and Bútora 2013, 516). While state institutions were relatively 
effective and the political system remained stable throughout Fico’s first term in office, 
the government’s majoritarian interpretation of democracy, its propensity for party and 
personal interests over the public interest in filling top public institutions posts, attacks 
on media, independent control bodies, and the judiciary prompted commentators to talk 
about the ‘deteriorating quality of democracy’ (Mesežnikov, Kollár, and Vašečka 2010, 
480), a ‘populist backlash’ accompanied by ‘unscrupulous use of executive power’ 
(Rupnik 2007, 19, 20) and ‘persistent attacks on the legal institutions of liberal 
democracy’ (Bugaric 2008, 191). 
The coalition pursued policies that contradicted the spirit of modern liberal 
democracy, demonstrating an interest in excessive power concentration not present since 
1998. It adopted legislative measures aimed at strengthening its position in statutory 
organs of regulatory institutions, made extensive personnel changes at most ministries 
and other central state administration bodies. The majority of these changes were 
politically motivated, reflecting party loyalty or family ties rather than expertise, 
prompting commentators to claim that politicisation of civil service ‘reached a critical 
point’ (Bugaric 2008, 195). The ruling majority took steps to undermine parliamentary 
oversight of the executive by removing opposition representatives from parliamentary 
committees. It further marginalised the role of the opposition in the assembly by rejecting 
virtually all its legislative initiatives (see Freedom House 2007; 2008; 2011; Mesežnikov, 
Kollár, and Vašečka 2009; 2010). The coalition was aided in its efforts by President 
Gašparovič who against the constitutional principle of impartial governance described 
himself as an ‘informal’ member of Fico’s party Smer (Mesežnikov, Kollár, and Vašečka 
2010, 481). 
The government repeatedly clashed with the opposition, businesses, civic 
initiatives, NGOs and the media (Freedom House 2008; Mesežnikov, Kollár, and 
Vašečka 2009, 481). Political discourse grew increasingly confrontational as the ruling 
parties’ leaders called their critics ‘enemies of the state’ (Mesežnikov, Kollár, and 
Vašečka 2010, 481). Relations with ethnic minorities, particularly the Hungarians, 
suffered by the participation of the nationalistic SNS in cabinet (Freedom House 2007). 
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SNS’s leader, Ján Slota, who had been characterised as ‘an ultra-nationalist and right-
wing politician’, led a ‘campaign of racist hate speech directed against the Hungarian and 
Roma minorities in Slovakia’. He proposed, for instance, sending the leader of the 
Hungarian party to Mars “without a return ticket” (Bugaric 2008, 196). 
Rather than building on the anticorruption legislation of the preceding 
government, Fico’s cabinet lacked a relevant anticorruption strategy, attacked control 
institutions and by openly pursuing state interventionism and clientelist policies in 
allocation of public funds created new opportunities for corrupt practices (see Freedom 
House 2008; 2011; Mesežnikov, Kollár, and Vašečka 2009; 2010). Shortly after assuming 
office, the government launched a campaign to abolish the Special Court and the Office 
of Special Prosecutor just as they had become effective in that fight (Bugaric 2008, 196; 
Freedom House 2007). According to commentators, party clientelism became ‘the 
principal modus operandi’ of Fico’s coalition (Mesežnikov, Kollár, and Vašečka 2010, 
492), epitomised by the numerous corruption scandals involving high government 
representatives broken by the media. Fico publicly argued that privileging projects 
proposed by persons close to ruling parties was acceptable and that comparable practices 
operated everywhere in the world (Mesežnikov, Kollár, and Vašečka 2009, 485) and 
remained reluctant to demand personal and political responsibility from officials 
suspected of nepotism and clientelism (Mesežnikov, Kollár, and Vašečka 2010, 492–93). 
The government’s illiberal tendencies were perhaps most noticeable in the 
judiciary. The Constitutional Court, which was called ‘one of the success stories of the 
1990s’, found itself under pressure (Bugaric 2008, 194), as the appointment of politically 
loyal candidates put its impartiality in question (e.g. Mesežnikov, Kollár, and Vašečka 
2009, 482). The Justice Minister Štefan Harabin actively resisted judicial reforms and 
applied aggressive measures against judges who criticised his or the judiciary’s 
performance. Shortly upon his inauguration, for instance, Harabin removed several court 
chairpersons without satisfactory explanation. Judges and legal experts suggested that his 
decision was guided by political motives and grudges carried over from his earlier term 
as Supreme Court President (Freedom House 2007). As Supreme Court President and 
Judicial Council Chair between 2009 and 2014, Harabin continued to concentrate power 
and to adapt Slovakia’s judicial system to fit his political and personal ambitions. His 
actions prompted some judges to claim that ‘an atmosphere of fear had begun to settle 
over the judicial system’ (Mesežnikov, Kollár, and Vašečka 2010, 491). The persistence 
of clientelistic networks loyal to Harabin and preferential treatment accorded to high-
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profile politicians by judicial and government bodies were seen as undermining the 
principle of equality before the law (Ibid. 2010, 478, 492). 
 
Iveta Radičová’s government 
The direction of politics shifted dramatically following the 2010 election that brought to 
power a new centre-right coalition government led by Iveta Radičová, the first female 
prime minister in Slovakia’s history. In contrast to its predecessor that was considered by 
observers to have exploited rather than tacked corruption in public life (Mesežnikov, 
Kollár, and Vašečka 2012, 509), the cabinet’s declared top priority was combating 
corruption, increasing transparency of state institutions and strengthening public control 
over the administration of public funds. It further pledged to enhance Slovakia’s 
democratic character, fortify the operational stability of public institutions, increase the 
efficiency of public administration and reduce political pressures on independent media 
(Freedom House 2011, 9; Mesežnikov, Kollár, and Bútora 2013, 516). 
Radičová’s tenure was characterised by respect for constitutional checks and 
balances, upholding the principle of distribution of leading positions within parliamentary 
committees based on proportional representation, a markedly less confrontational 
political culture and a close cooperation with civil society. The government succeeded in 
changing the atmosphere within society and alleviating tensions in Slovak-Hungarian 
bilateral relations (Freedom House 2011; Mesežnikov, Kollár, and Vašečka 2012, 502). 
While the relations between the ruling coalition on one side and the parliamentary 
opposition and Harabin on the other remained confrontational, commentators observed 
signs of overall stabilisation and cooperation in the performance of democratic 
institutions (Mesežnikov, Kollár, and Vašečka 2010, 3, 13).  
Radičová’s government was commended for implementing ‘an impressive 
number of legislative and administrative measures designed to increase transparency and 
public oversight of government spending and crack down on corrupt activities’ 
(Mesežnikov, Kollár, and Bútora 2013, 529; 2014, 578). Shortly after taking office, it 
published information on all contracts completed by state administration organs under 
Fico’s term and terminated or revised existing unfavourable contracts (Freedom House 
2011). Public institutions became obliged to publish all public contracts online, hold 
tenders for high government public service positions. Electronic auctions for the purchase 
of goods and services for public administration were introduced (Mesežnikov, Kollár, 
and Vašečka 2012, 500). While the Radičová-led cabinet strived hard to reverse the 
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clientelist policies of its predecessor, reduce bureaucratic regulation to narrow the scope 
for corrupt opportunities, and pursued pro-market economic policy that precluded state 
involvement in the country’s economy, its anticorruption accomplishments were 
overshadowed by a number of high-level corruption scandals (Mesežnikov, Kollár, and 
Bútora 2013, 529).  
Despite fierce opposition from Harabin and president Gašparovič, the coalition 
succeeded in adopting a number of legislative and administrative measures aimed at 
increasing the judiciary’s transparency, professionalism and efficiency (Freedom House 
2011, 13; Mesežnikov, Kollár, and Vašečka 2012, 497, 508). These included the 
obligation to release all final court rulings for publication on a dedicated website (SME 
2012), introduction of open competition in selection of judges and court chairpersons, 
changes to appointment of Judicial Council members, more detailed asset declarations by 
judges (Terenzani 2012a) and a requirement for judges to pass a law exam every five 
years (Terenzani 2012b). Other actions aimed at improving the situation in the judiciary 
included the dismissal of district and regional court chairpersons regarded as Harabin’s 
close associates for non-compliance with random assignment of cases, their courts’ 
inadequate performance and their lack of trustworthiness (Vilikovská 2011). The 
government’s actions towards the Supreme Court under Harabin clearly signalled that it 
was not willing to tolerate a partial and inconsistent application of law by the country’s 
highest judicial authorities (Freedom House 2011, 13).  
Radičová’s government did not manage to see through all the envisaged reforms, 
as it collapsed in October 2011 after losing a no confidence vote in parliament after the 
coalition parties failed to reach consensus on the expansion of the European Financial 
Stability Facility.  
 
Robert Fico’s majority government (2012 – 2016) 
After a series of smaller corruption scandals, the already weak centre-right coalition 
parties were further damaged in voters’ eyes by the so-called ‘Gorilla’ corruption case 
which revolved around a purported intelligence service file. The file raised allegations of 
secret privatisation deals involving millions of euros in bribes paid to ruling politicians 
by the country’s largest private equity firm, Penta, between 2005 and 2006 during 
Dzurinda’s second government. The document’s publication online and subsequent 
media coverage resulted in public outrage and in early 2012 in the largest public protests 
Slovakia had seen since 1989 (Mesežnikov, Kollár, and Bútora 2013, 530). 
  127 
The March 2012 election brought to power a majority government under the 
premiership of Fico. The new cabinet swiftly began to reverse the liberal socio-economic 
policies of the previous centre-right coalition, strengthening the position of the state in 
the economy and tightening market regulation. It quickly moved to dismantle the reforms 
to the pension, health care, social welfare and judicial systems initiated during the 
previous two years (Mesežnikov, Kollár, and Bútora 2013, 516, 519). Initially, at least, 
the government continued dialogue with civil society organisations (Mesežnikov, Kollár, 
and Bútora 2013, 516) and cooperation remained satisfactory (Freedom House 2011, 
565). However, Smer deputies repeatedly showed disrespect to the Ombudswoman when 
she drew attention to Roma discrimination (Cunningham 2015, 605, 607, 611). The 
majority government demonstrated little willingness to cooperate with the parliamentary 
opposition. Instead, it strived to concentrate power in its hands, deliberately ignoring 
codified parliamentary procedures and sidelining independent institutions and the 
parliament. Smer deputies obstructed the work of parliamentary committees, blocked 
opposition-proposed legislation from discussion in the plenum and prevented 
extraordinary sessions convened by the opposition (see Mesežnikov, Kollár, and Bútora 
2013; 2014). 
In spite of proclaiming fighting corruption as one of its aims, Fico’s government 
failed to propose a comprehensive anti-corruption strategy. The government filled 
important posts in state administration with persons with track-record of unethical 
behaviour in office or business and personal ties to Smer functionaries (Mesežnikov, 
Kollár, and Bútora 2013, 519). Smer fortified the primacy of an already well-developed 
network of clientelist partners in business, healthcare, and the courts, allowing nepotism, 
cronyism and non-transparent practices to persist in business, judiciary and the public 
administration (Cunningham 2016, 2). Abundant corruption cases involving high-profile 
public officials attracted media attention during Fico’s second term (Cunningham 2015, 
619; Mesežnikov, Kollár, and Bútora 2014, 579). As the prime minister was reluctant to 
investigate high-profile corruption cases, the resignation of the parliamentary speaker 
alleged of involvement in a corruption scandal in late 2014 was a critical milestone.  
2014 saw other significant developments that contributed to the strengthening of 
the judiciary’s independence. Arguably driven by the calculation that negative public 
perception makes Smer’s log-term grip on power untenable (Cunningham 2017, 2), the 
government adopted a constitutional amendment that separated the posts of the Supreme 
Court President and Judicial Council Chair and sought to introduce new screening for 
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judges (Balogová 2014). Harabin, a long-standing ally of Fico’s party and critic of 
judiciary reforms, infamous for cronyism and intimidation of judges (Cunningham 2015, 
617), failed his bid for re-election for Supreme Court President and also lost his seat on 
the Judicial Council to a pro-reform candidate. Harabin’s removal from the helm of the 
judiciary by fellow judges was interpreted by his critics as ‘a clear yes for changes within 
the judiciary’ and a ‘positive signal for the public’ that would contribute to increasing the 
judiciary’s credibility (cited in Balogová 2014).   
Fico suffered a surprise defeat in the 2014 presidential election when he lost the 
run-off to an independent candidate and a political novice. The election of Andrej Kiska 
prevented Smer from consolidating power and introduced alternative viewpoints to the 
illiberal discourse of Fico and his party as Kiska spoke against the government’s policy 
regarding refugees, reiterated the importance of Slovakia’s commitments to the protection 
of human rights and to the EU and NATO, and used his powers to confirm and dismiss 
judges to accelerate changes in the judiciary (Cunningham 2016; 2017). 
 
2016: Signs of more changes on the horizon 
The results of the March 2016 election signalled the population’s dissatisfaction with the 
status quo, despite the fact that the country’s economy continued to be among the top 
performers in the EU. The endless corruption scandals and the authorities’ inability to 
successfully prosecute perceived wrongdoing saw ‘ideologically hollow populist parties’ 
and far-right extremists enter parliament (Cunningham 2017, 2). Smer’s share of vote 
considerably declined, forcing the party into a coalition government and hindering its 
efforts at further consolidation of power. While Slovakia was not immune to the global 
and regional trends such as rise of extremism, Euroscepticism and disinformation 
campaigns, in contrast to its neighbours Hungary and Poland, its democratic institutions 
were relatively strong and positive trends of strengthening the judiciary’s independence, 
the rising independence of the president’s office and the Constitutional Court seemed to 
have solidified. 
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4.4 Prevalence of Clientelism and Corruption in Society 
Corruption has been labelled as ‘one of the most critical problems of Slovakia’s overall 
post-communist transformation’ (Freedom House 2005). Corruption, clientelism and 
informal practices have deep roots and are tolerated by a large part of the Slovak public. 
Throughout the studied period, corruption, clientelism and cronyism in the public arena 
belonged to the most frequent topics of public discourse and fighting corruption had been 
a frequent focus of Slovak media, NGOs and international observers. Public opinion polls 
consistently ranked corruption as one of the most pressing social issues, trailing only 
unsatisfactory living standards, high unemployment (particularly in the 1990s and 2000s) 
and poor health care (e.g. Freedom House 2004; 2005; 2006; 2008; European 
Commission 2009a; 2014a; Transparency International Slovakia 2010b; Transparency 
International 2013; IVO 2014). 
Corruption in Slovakia had two basic dimensions – institutional, concerning 
legislative, judicial, executive and political party actors, and non-institutional, involving 
deeply ingrained behaviour, views, customs, experience and cultural stereotypes of the 
general public. The public consistently perceived the health service, the judiciary, law 
enforcement and central and regional public authorities and political parties as the most 
corrupt among public institutions.73 Giving and accepting bribes, nepotism, clientelism 
and giving and accepting gifts were considered the most frequent forms of corruption 
 
 
 
73 According to a 2004 opinion poll, Slovaks perceived corruption as especially widespread in health 
care, the judiciary, police, ministries, customs offices, schools, private firms and tax offices (Freedom 
House 2005). A 2006 survey conducted by the Public Opinion Research Institute of the Statistical 
Office of the Slovak Republic revealed that most citizens believed that corruption existed in health 
care (71%), the judiciary (38%), education system (31%), business (19%), the police (18%), district 
and regional authorities (16%), anf the privatisation process (14%) (cited in Freedom House 2006). 
Slovak respondents in the Transparency International’s 2010 Global Corruption Barometer survey 
perceived the judiciary as the most corrupt institution (45%), followed by public officials (38%), 
businesspeople (37%), political parties (36%), parliament and legislature (28%), media (17%) 
(Transparency International Slovakia 2010b). 69% of Slovak respondents in the 2013 Global 
Corruption Barometer survey felt that the judiciary were corrupt or extremely corrupt, followed by 
public officials and civil servants (66%), political parties (64%), the health service (63%) the 
parliament/legislature (61%), the police (60%), the education system (39%) and the media (38%) 
(Transparency International 2013). More than half of the respondents in the 2013 Corruption 
Eurobarometer (European Commission 2014a, 3) thought that the abuse of positions for personal gain 
and giving or taking bribes was widespread in courts, political parties and in the public health sector. 
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(Freedom House 2005). In the public’s view, corruption was a more pressing problem in 
the central government than at the local self-governance level (Freedom House 2006). 
The prevalence of corruption on the non-institutional or personal level and the 
reluctance to report it led some commentators to argue that social values of the majority 
of the population ‘seem to indicate problematic cultural traits in respect to rule of law’ 
(Školkay 2011b, 19; see also Transparency International Slovakia 2013). A relatively 
high proportion of Slovaks – around one fifth – admitted to paying bribes to public 
institutions throughout the studied period,74 most frequently in the healthcare sector, 
registry and permit services and the judiciary.75 Slovaks also belonged to the least willing 
citizens to report corruption, citing fear of retribution or lack of belief that reporting 
corrupt practices would have any practical impact.76  
While the third Mečiar government was accused of using clientelism and 
patronage as its main operating tools, Slovakia has been praised for having developed in 
the 2000s and early 2010s ‘a progressive institutional framework for fighting graft and 
improving transparency in the public sphere’ (Mesežnikov, Kollár, and Bútora 2014, 
577). Nonetheless, the discrepancy between the legislative framework and the measures 
adopted by the Fico-led governments, the numerous documented corruption scandals of 
all the Slovak governments and the lack of successful prosecution of high-profile figures 
 
 
 
74 In a 2007 opinion poll, one in five respondents admitted to have given a bribe (Tettinger 2007). 
According to the 2013 Global Corruption Barometer survey (Transparency International 2013) one in 
five Slovak households admitted to paying a bribe to public institutions between September 2011 and 
September 2012, which was the third highest proportion of all respondents among all EU countries 
(Transparency International Slovakia 2013). 
75 According to the Global Corruption Barometer, a quarter of households that had any engagement 
with healthcare services in 2009 paid a bribe, for instance, followed by land services (15.8%), registry 
and permit services (15.6%), and courts (14.8%) (Transparency International Slovakia 2010b). 28% 
of Slovak households were reported to have paid a bribe to the healthcare service in 2012, followed 
by the registry and permit services (19%), the police (12%), land services (11%), education services 
(9%) and the judiciary (8%) (Transparency International 2013). 
76 According to the 2010 Global Corruption Barometer Survey (Transparency International Slovakia 
2010b), only eight percent of Slovaks who were asked to pay a bribe in 2009 did report. The reasons 
for non-repotting corruption were the belief that it would solve nothing (31.5%) or fear of retaliation 
(25.9%). Slovak respondents in the 2013 Global Corruption Barometer were the third most reluctant 
among EU citizens to report corruption, trailing only the Hungarians and Latvians. Out of the over 
fifty percent of Slovaks who said that they would be unwilling to report corruption, 40% claimed that 
they were afraid of reporting it while 37% believed that it would have no impact (Transparency 
International Slovakia 2013). 
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investigated for corruption posed challenges to combating corruption.77 Despite some 
signs of improvement, for instance in Slovakia’s Corruption Perceptions Index (see 
Figure 4.1), corruption remained a serious problem according to commentators 
(Cunningham 2015), business people (Business Alliance of Slovakia 2015) as well as the 
public.78 Until the end of the studied period Slovakia remained ranked among the most 
corrupt countries in the EU.79 
 
Figure 4.1: Slovakia’s Scores in the Transparency International Corruption 
Perceptions Index 1996-2016 
Year 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 
Score 51 51 50 47 46 4.0 4.3 4.5 5.0 4.9 4.7 
Global rank 54 50 54 61 62 66 59 56 52 49 49 
            
Year 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 
Score 4.3 4.0 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.5 3.7 3.9 N/A  N/A 
Global rank 47 57  59  52 51 52 53 47   N/A  N/A 
 
Source: Transparency International Corruption Perception Index reports, 
https://www.transparency.org/research/cpi.  
Note: Between 2016 and 2012, the TIS CPI was measured on a scale of 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very 
clean). Between 2011 and 1996, the TIS CPI was measured on a scale of 0 (highly corrupt) to 10 (very 
clean). 
 
 
 
77 According to the 2010 and 2013 Global Corruption Barometer, only 12% and 9% of Slovak 
respondents respectively found the government’s actions in combating corruption effective 
(Transparency International Slovakia 2010a; Transparency International 2013). 
78 85% of Slovak respondents in the Corruption Eurobarometer considered corruption a major problem 
in the country in 2005, in 2007, 88% of Slovak were of that opinion, in 2009 the opinion was shared 
by 83% of Slovak respondents (European Commission 2009b; 2009a). In the last Corruption 
Eurobarometer conducted in the studied period, the proportion increased to 90% (European 
Commission 2014a, 3). According to a 2015 Transparency International Slovakia’s survey, corruption 
was considered the most pressing social problem after unemployment and low unsatisfactory living 
standards. In comparison to the 2012 survey, the public’s perceptions of corruption overall increased 
in all areas of public life (Transparency International Slovakia 2019). 
79 The 2016 Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, for instance, ranked only 
Croatia, Hungary, Greece, Romania, Italy and Belgium as more corrupt EU countries than Slovakia. 
See https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2016. 
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4.4.1 Public (Dis)trust in the Judiciary 
Despite constitutional guarantees, the judiciary reforms embarked on by the reformist 
governments and international observers’ reports of its satisfactory independence, the 
judiciary had been perceived as one of the most corrupt institutions. Public trust in the 
judiciary remained undermined throughout the studied period by the courts’ inefficiency, 
exacerbated by a slow-moving backlog of cases, and a widespread public belief that the 
judiciary was plagued by corruption and nepotism (Freedom House 2003; 2004; 2005; 
2006; 2007; Mesežnikov, Kollár, and Vašečka 2009; Mesežnikov, Kollár, and Bútora 
2014; Cunningham 2015). Trust in the judiciary was further weakened by investigations 
into judges for accepting bribes (Freedom House 2006) and suspicions of politically-
motivated decisions. Throughout the 2000s and early 2010s, Slovaks belonged to the EU 
citizens with the strongest belief that giving and accepting bribes and the abuse of power 
for personal gain was widespread in the country’s courts (See Figure 4.2). 
 
Figure 4.2: Slovaks’ Beliefs in the Prevalence of Corruption in the Judiciary in the 
EU Context  
Year 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 
% believe corruption 
in judiciary 
widespread 
70 65 61 60   56 
Countries with higher 
citizens’ belief in 
widespread corruption 
in the judiciary 
Greece 
Lithuania  
Greece Bulgaria 
Greece 
Lithuania 
Slovenia  
Bulgaria 
Lithuania 
Slovenia 
Bulgaria 
Slovenia  
Source: Special Eurobarometer surveys No. 245, 291, 325 and 397 (European Commission 2006; 
2008; 2009b; 2012b; 2014b). 
 
The judiciary under Harabin became target of harsh criticism from the media, 
NGOs and judges. Harabin who served as Justice Minister between 2006 and 2009 and 
as Supreme Court President and Judicial Council Chair between 2009 and 2014 has been 
an extremely controversial figure in Slovak politics and judiciary (Mesežnikov, Kollár, 
and Bútora 2013, 527; 2014, 576). Harabin wielded enormous personal influence in the 
judiciary and had been accused of directly influencing high-profile rulings and 
concentrating power through manipulation of nominations and disciplinary proceedings 
to promote the career prospects of judges loyal to him and punishment of those who 
criticised his leadership and the problems in the judiciary (Mesežnikov, Kollár, and 
Bútora 2013, 528; European Commission 2014a, 4–5; Cunningham 2016, 8). In the late 
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2000s, suspicions and accusations of political bias and deliberate delays to adjudication 
by some judges of certain motions filed by opposition MPs and other critics of the ruling 
coalition led by Fico appeared (Mesežnikov, Kollár, and Vašečka 2009, 493; Freedom 
House 2011, 12). It was suggested, for instance, that the Constitutional Court’s reluctance 
to adjudicate on a controversial law regulating highway construction might have been 
linked to the personal ties between the judge-reporter and Harabin.80 
According to commentators, the nepotistic selection of new judges was one of the 
key problems undermining public trust in the judiciary since Harabin took control of the 
Judicial Council (Mesežnikov, Kollár, and Bútora 2014, 576). A study by Transparency 
International Slovakia found that in 2013, every fifth Slovak judge had a close relative 
employed in the judiciary (either in the court system or at the Justice Ministry), with 
judges in Eastern Slovakia having close family ties in the judiciary even more frequently 
(Šipoš and Spáč 2013).81  
In 2010, 21 judges launched an initiative called For an Open Judiciary which 
advocated for improved transparency within the judiciary and criticised political 
meddling with judicial power, nepotism, deliberate delays in adjudication, unwarranted 
disciplinary actions, violations of ethical principles and diminished transparency in the 
judicial system (Freedom House 2011, 12). Throughout the early 2010s, the initiative 
attributed much of the personal and political responsibility for the judiciary’s existing 
problems to Harabin and identified his resistance to reforms as a major reason for the 
judiciary’s credibility crisis (Mesežnikov, Kollár, and Bútora 2014, 576). 
The judiciary’s credibility crisis in the 2010s had been well documented in public 
opinion polls which consistently indicated that less than a third of Slovak citizens trusted 
the courts,82 with only one in five Slovaks trusting the judiciary in 2015 (Via Iuris 2015). 
 
 
 
80 The judge-reporter, Milan Ľalík, was former colleague of Hrabbin from the Supreme Court. The 
two were notorious for their concurrent views and friendly relations (Mesežnikov, Kollár, and Vašečka 
2009, 493). Ľalík is also the husband of Harabin’s lawyer who represented him in his numerous 
disputes with the media and was interviewed for this study. 
81 Almost a third of judges working at the regional court in the metropolis of Eastern Slovakia, Košice, 
had a close relative working at a court in Eastern Slovakia. 20% of the Košice regional court judges 
had close relatives working at the same court. 
82 According to polls conducted by the Institute of Public affairs, 26% of respondents had trust in the 
judiciary in 2011, compared to 28% in 2012 (IVO 2012). 31% of respondents in a Via Iuris poll trusted 
the judiciary in 2013 (SITA 2013), 22% did so in 2015 (Via Iuris 2015).  
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According to a 2012 survey by the Institute of Public Affairs, only 29% of experts 
expressed trust in courts and the judiciary, while 39% of judges reported lack of trust 
therein (IVO 2012, 3). Studies also revealed a link between the low trust in the judiciary 
and Harabin’s performance,83 high levels of corruption, length of proceedings and 
decisions’ lack of fairness.84 
The ousting of Harabin from the helm of the judicial system by fellow judges 
meant a symbolic victory for those in politics and the judiciary who were working to 
assert judicial independence and rid it of politically motivated actors (Cunningham 2015, 
604; 2016, 8). Following Harabin’s departure and efforts to implement a more transparent 
judicial selection process, the public’s confidence in the judiciary recorded a noticeable 
year-on-year increase in 2016.85 However, problems with independence, inefficiency and 
nepotism remained a challenge for Slovak courts and the overall trust in the judiciary was 
still relatively low (Cunningham 2017, 8).86  
4.5 Media System Developments 
Slovakia’s turbulent democratisation also shaped the media system and journalism 
culture. This section presents the key developments and characteristics of the Slovak 
media market and journalism culture and introduces the lead media organisations in each 
segment. 
 
 
 
83 According to a 2013 survey, 69% of respondents did not trust the judiciary and 58% believed that 
Harabin’s performance as Supreme Court President contributed to the lack of trust in the judiciary 
(SITA 2013).  
84 According to a 2016 survey, 85.6% of respondents thought that the level of corruption contributed 
to public’s distrust in the judiciary, with 80.7% citing the length of proceedings, 78.4% the lack of 
fairness of decisions and 68.4% the judge himself or herself as reasons (Klobucký 2016, 2). 
85 A poll by Via Iuris (2016b) recorded an 11% increase in public trust in the judiciary between 2015, 
when 22% of respondents claimed they trusted the courts, and 2016, when 33% of respondents 
reported trust in the judiciary. 
86 According to survey by Via Iuris (2016a), a third of newly appointed judges between 2015 and 2016 
had a close relative already active in the judiciary. 
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4.5.1 Media Market 1996 – 2016 
Slovakia’s media market was characterised by its small size, 87 a high penetration of 
foreign-language media and a high concentration of ownership. Since the late 1990s, all 
media, bar the public service Radio and Television of Slovakia (RTVS)88 and the News 
Agency of the Slovak Republic (TASR), were in private hands. There was no nationwide 
system of press subsidies with the exception of some support for publications for resident 
ethnic and cultural minorities (Štětka 2012, 6; Školkay et al. 2010, 28). After the market 
entry of foreign media owners, partisan press disappeared (Brečka 2010, 11–12; see also 
Gross 2002, 64; Štětka 2013, 19–21). 
Television and radio were historically the most popular media (Školkay et al. 
2010, 6), followed by the printed press.89 Throughout this period, radio remained the most 
trustworthy medium and television the main news source for the public (Cunningham 
2015, 613–14). Newspaper circulation declined sharply following the global economic 
crisis of 2008-9. From 2012, online media has challenged radio and the printed press as 
the dominant information providers and public agenda setters (European Commission 
2012a, 2015) for the younger and more educated Slovaks (IAB Slovakia 2017; 
Kluknavska 2017, 90). The major commercial television, TV Markíza, the public service 
RTVS and key dailies and weeklies, particularly SME and Trend, have claimed the largest 
societal and political impact on the public sphere in terms of breaking and reporting on 
stories of public interest (Čikovský 2015; Galmišová 2015; Kernová 2013; Šípoš 2009). 
Citizen journalism had a limited societal impact unless its findings were further 
disseminated by some of the key legacy media, or opposition politicians (Školkay 2017, 
189).  
 
 
 
 
 
87 The market size was limited by the size and composition of the population. 
88 In 2011, the former public service broadcasters Slovenská televízia (Slovak Television - STV) and 
Slovenský rozhlas (Slovak Radio – SRo) were merged into one public service institution, Rádio a 
televízia Slovenska (Radio and Television of Slovakia – RTVS). 
89 In 2015, 80% of respondents of the Eurobarometer 84 survey watched television daily or almost 
daily; 56% listened to radio daily or almost daily; and less than one fifth read the press on a daily or 
almost daily basis (European Commission 2015, 6). 
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Broadcast media 
The commercial television TV Markíza (Marquis) remained the market leader in terms of 
audience share since its inception in 1996. The other commercial station TV JOJ 
(established 2002), the public service television channels Jednotka (One) and Dvojka 
(Two), and the news-only channel TA3 were the other available major channels. Markíza 
also continuously attracted the greatest share of advertising. Together with JOJ and RTVS 
it belonged to the principal offline news sources. The role of radio as an important news 
source declined after 2003, as commercial broadcasters adopted the music only format 
(Ondrášik 2010a, 122). The public service Slovak Radio with nine channels became the 
only network to offer any substantive public affairs and political discussion 
programming. The number of commercial radio stations fluctuated between twenty-five 
and thirty. Slovak Radio remained the most popular network, whilst the commercial Radio 
Express was the market leader among radio stations (Medialne.sk 2017; Kluknavska 
2017, 91).  
 
Printed press 
The deregulation of print press publishing following the fall of communism led to an 
exponential growth in the number of titles (Brečka 2002, 50). Having peaked in 2000s, 
the number of national newspapers began to decline and for the majority of the period 
under consideration remained stable at seven. Late 2015 saw the number of newspaper 
titles increase to eight. While there were several attempts to establish party press in the 
1990s, all established dailies claimed independence from political parties (Školkay et al. 
2010, 9). The tabloid daily Nový Čas (New Time), with its focus on entertainment and 
sensationalism remained the most popular national daily since its inception in 1991 
(Brečka 2002, 50; StratégieOnline 2016).90 Its main rival was the tabloid daily Plus 1 deň 
(Plus 1 day) that entered the market in 2006. In 2011, the two tabloid dailies had between 
them double the circulation of the two quality dailies (Štětka 2012, 9) – the centre-left 
 
 
 
90 In the 2017 Digital News Report, for instance, 27% of respondents stated they used Nový Čas as 
their source of news, followed by SME (18%), Plus 7 dní (16%), regional or local newspapers  (16%), 
Pravda (16%), Plus 1 deň (10%), Hospodárske noviny (7%), Korzár (7%) and Denník N (5%) 
(Kluknavska 2017, 91). 
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Pravda (Truth)91 and the centre-right liberal SME (We Are), which in the 2000s were 
characterised as ‘leaders of watchdog journalism in Slovakia’ (Školkay et al. 2010, 10). 
The national daily market further comprised the sport daily Šport, the financial daily 
Hospodárske noviny (Economy News, HN) and the Hungarian-language Új Szó (New 
Word). The quality centre-right liberal Denník N started publication in 2015.92 The 
regional print press was dominated by the publisher of daily SME – Petit Press – which 
published one of the two regional dailies Korzár (Corsair) and MY, a strong network of 
regional weeklies. There were only three weeklies to publish investigative stories – the 
long-term market leader, general interest/tabloid Plus 7 dní (Plus 7 days), the economic 
weekly Trend and the conservative magazine .týždeň (Week). 
 
Online media 
Growing Internet penetration prompted people to use online media as one of their main 
information sources. Slovaks predominantly used free news portals or newspapers’ 
websites. Since its 1996 inception, SME’s online version Sme.sk belonged to the online 
news media market leaders (Ondrášik 2010b, 31). Digital-born news portals Topky.sk and 
Aktuality.sk, outlets that provide diametrically different news – sensationalist, showbiz 
and crime news versus more serious news, commentaries as well as investigative stories 
– were the other leading online news media outlets (Kluknavska 2017, 91).  
4.5.2 Journalism Culture 1996 – 2016  
Slovak news media, like most of their CEE counterparts, never achieved complete 
independence from the constraining forces of the political and economic subsystems 
(Stetka 2012, 434-35). Given the high levels of politicisation in society during the 
transformation period, various political and business actors tried to instrumentalise news 
 
 
 
91 Pravda began as a social democratic paper. Its editorial line became more mainstream following 
acquisition by foreign owners. It returned to its populist, left-leaning editorial line after another 
ownership change in 2010 (Šípoš 2010a). 
92 Although I did not conduct any new interviews with journalists after 2014, the views of many 
Denník N reporters will be discussed in the following chapters as I interviewed them in 2014 whilst 
they worked for SME. 
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media in order to promote their particular interests.93 The weakness, volatility and low 
levels of party loyalty and discipline characteristic of political parties in CEE grants the 
news media enormous power and importance being the key means to reach voters 
(Mancini 2015, 28-29; Bajomi-Lázár 2015, 6-7). Efforts of various political and business 
actors to manage the information disseminated by the media in order to shape public 
opinion by delivering desired and deterring undesired messages to voters thus remained, 
with varying degrees of intensity, a commonplace during the studied period. These efforts 
included media capture and colonisation (Bajomi-Lázár 2015, 2013), limiting access to 
official information, discrediting media organisations and professionals in the eyes of 
citizens, withdrawing advertisement, and instrumental use of personality/goodwill 
protection litigation.  
Such attempts were most acutely felt by media professionals when the country 
was headed by nationalist-populist politicians like Mečiar and Fico who, according to 
Milan Kruml, ‘considered media as their enemies’ rather than legitimate watchdogs and 
whose political style was based on power politics rather than consensus seeking (Ondrášik 
and Škop 2011, 121). Political pressure on the media considerably subsided during the 
period in office of Dzurinda and Radičová and in the first half of Fico’s majority 
government. 
The experience of political pressures shaped the emergent journalistic culture, 
which could be characterised as a hybrid of the ‘critical change agent’ and the ‘popular 
disseminator’ model according to the Worlds of Journalism Project classification (e.g. 
Hanitzsch 2011). While some journalists served as agents of the nation-building project 
pursued by Mečiar’s government, the majority of the profession preferred a more 
inclusive and democratic vision of the country, and became united in the fight for freedom 
of expression and the future of Slovak democracy (Kollár 2013a; Johnson 2012, 154-56; 
Gazda and Kulla 2011, 137-41). As one reporter put it, journalists became ‘political 
figures’ (cited in Metyková and Waschková Císařová 2009, 730) actively participating in 
the 1998 election campaign, which eventually helped to depose Mečiar. Having 
 
 
 
93 Hallin and Mancini (2004, 37) define instrumentalisation of the media as ‘the control of the media 
by outside actors – parties, politicians, social groups, or economic actors seeking political influence, 
who use them to intervene in the world of politics’. 
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discovered their power, some journalists, ‘started doing politics’ (Múdry 2013), striving 
to fashion the political and social reality (Múdry 2017; Kollár 2013a; Gazda and Kulla 
2011, 139-41). The formative collective experience of the fight against Mečiar also led 
to a distinct bias towards neo-liberal ideas among journalists, or a ‘love affair with the 
right’, as Šimečka (2009, 3) dubbed it (also Ondrášik and Škop 2011, 121; Štětka 2012, 
15; Múdry 2017), as young journalists became fixated on the false paradigm that equated 
freedom and civil liberties with neoliberalism. The post-1998 generation of journalists 
found a new enemy in the left-wing populist Fico who formed a government coalition 
with HZDS and SNS (Šimečka 2009, 3) that adopted the controversial 2008 Press Act 
and was suspected of clientelism and cronyism in allocation of public funds and running 
the judiciary. This love-affair lasted at least until the 2010 editorial line change at Pravda. 
Proclaimed watchdogs in the press thus turned into campaigners (Mocek 2015, 
114) who found a permanent enemy in the governing elites (Múdry 2017). This led to 
reporting on most political, judicial and business elites’ conduct that at times bordered on 
vicious, ‘boundless criticism’ (Múdry 2017, also 2013; Kollár 2013b) and conveyed the 
message that all politicians and most judges were corrupt and thus could not be trusted. 
Therefore, more often than not, the relationship between news media and political and 
economic subsystems was characterised by mutual animosity and open conflicts 
(Radičová 2013).  
The other strand of Slovak journalism culture is the so-called ‘popular 
disseminator’, which emerged in the 2000s. Following the entry of foreign owners into 
the market in the late 1990s, in order to attract the largest number of consumers and 
advertisers, commercial media switched from potentially polarising political content to 
lighter infotainment genres, producing news that emphasised scandals, personalities, and 
verged on exaggeration, populism and scaremongering (Šípoš 2007b; Školkay et al. 2010, 
6-7). In the light of the threat serious press faced from online news portals, they also 
succumbed to tabloidization and sensationalism (Kollár 2013a) as their websites started 
featuring clickbait.94 Citing high costs and public’s lack of interest in the format,95 by 
 
 
 
94 Sensationalised headlines which tempt the reader to click on the link to the story but turn out to be 
misleading (Frampton 2015).  
95 The perceived impact of personality/goodwill protection on investigative journalism is discussed in 
Chapter 9. 
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2010, all commercial televisions had axed their investigative programmes (Glovíčko 
2010), instead launching special news formats informing exclusively about crime or show 
business (Školkay et al. 2010, 15). Until 2015, when a new investigative team started 
work as part of the Aktuality.sk editorial room (Vagovič 2015), investigative journalism 
remained the exclusive domain of a handful of print press outlets and RTVS. 
4.6 Quantifiable Picture of the Personality/Goodwill Regime 
It proved impossible to present an objective, quantifiable picture about 
personality/goodwill protection litigation and success rates given the absence of a 
centrally-held statistical database containing the numbers and outcomes of disputes 
involving media-defendants. The statistics compiled by the Justice Ministry suggested 
that actions for violations of personality rights through publication in the media were 
relatively rare. Data on the number of petitions filed in personality/goodwill protection 
disputes were unavailable. However, the number of claims in these cases adjudicated by 
ordinary courts each year did not suggest unduly high rates of litigation (Figure 4.3). 
Between 1995 and 2016, the number of annually adjudicated claims ranged between 197 
(in 1995) and 829 (in 2016).96 To set these figures in context, in 2012 ordinary courts 
adjudicated 80,887 civil law cases that comprised 108,568 claims. In the same year, the 
courts decided 321 claims in civil personality protection disputes. The number of petitions 
filed annually might, of course, be higher than the number of adjudicated claims, as some 
petitions might never reach a final verdict. It should be noted that the data comprised 
absolutely all personality protection disputes, including disputes for personality rights’ 
violations resulting from medical malpractice. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
96 The number of claims does not denote the number of disputes, which is generally lower, as each 
petition in civil personality/goodwill protection dispute might include several claims, including actio 
prohibitoria, action for restoration, and action for satisfaction (moral and/or monetary).  
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Figure 4.3: Civil Personality Protection Claims Adjudicated by Slovak Courts 
1995-2016 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data provided by the Ministry of Justice of the Slovak Republic 
and the Ministry’s Statistical Yearbooks found at https://www.justice.gov.sk/stat/statr.htm.  
 
Of the 2011 and 2012 decisions published on the Justice Ministry information 
portal under the category “personality protection”, only 17.5% and 20% respectively 
involved media-defendants, including web portals not directly associated with traditional 
media.97 While it is impossible to generalise solely from these figures, it would seem 
reasonable to conclude that media-defendants did not face undue levels of 
personality/goodwill protection litigation between 1996 and 2016. As observed by Rudolf 
Adamčík, one of the most experienced personality protection lawyers, the sharp rise in 
the number of adjudicated claims since 2014 can possibly be attributed to ordinary 
plaintiffs increasingly bringing cases involving medical malpractice. Some interviewees 
among defendants and their lawyers also believed that ordinary plaintiffs started to 
perceive litigation as a road to personal riches, encouraged by the significant damages 
awarded to politicians and judges (discussed in Chapter 6). Other interviewees suggested 
that the 2011 Press Act Amendment, which removed the option of claiming monetary 
compensation for unjustified rejection of corrections and replies, might have prompted 
 
 
 
97 Figures correct at of 25 January 2013. Since then, further court decisions might have been published 
on the portal. The dataset included 143 decisions made in 2011 under the “personality protection” 
category. Out of these, 25 involved media-defendants in 23 disputes for civil personality protection 
and two disputes for press correction or reply. The portal included a total of 250 decisions made in 
2012 under the category “personality protection”. I identified media-defendants in 48 disputes, of 
which 41 were civil personality protection actions, six were press law actions and one was 
broadcasting law action. See https://obcan.justice.sk/infosud/-/infosud/zoznam/rozhodnutie. 
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unsuccessful claimants to file civil actions for defamation rather than actions for 
publication of a correction or reply.  
The number of claims adjudicated by Slovak courts did not seem excessive in 
comparison with the Czech Republic, where until 31 December 2013 
personality/goodwill protection disputes were governed by identical provisions of the 
1964 Civil Code. With approximately half the population of the Czech Republic, the 
numbers of adjudicated claims for most of the period did not exceed much above 50% of 
those in the Czech jurisdiction (Figure 4.4). 
 
Figure 4.4: Civil Personality Protection Claims Adjudicated by Slovak and Czech 
Courts 1995-2013 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data provided by the Ministry of Justice of the Slovak 
Republic, the Slovak Ministry’s Statistical Yearbooks found at 
https://www.justice.gov.sk/stat/statr.htm and the Statistical Yearbooks of the Ministry of Justice of 
the Czech Republic https://cslav.justice.cz/InfoData/statisticke-rocenky.html. 
 
The available official statistical data further seemed to suggest that between 2006 
and 2012 goodwill protection litigation was much rarer than personality protection 
actions, with the numbers of adjudicated claims peaking at a mere 32 in 2008 (Figure 
4.5).98 It was impossible to distinguish what proportion of the defendants in those disputes 
belonged to media organisations. 
 
 
 
 
 
98 The Justice Ministry’s statistical records on adjudicated goodwill protection claims only went back 
to 2006. 
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Figure 4.5: Goodwill Protection Claims Adjudicated by Slovak Courts 2006-2012 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data provided by the Ministry of Justice of the Slovak 
Republic. 
4.6.1 The Defendants 
It is impossible to state who the most frequent media-defendants in personality/goodwill 
protection cases in Slovakia were due to the absence of reliable official data. The analysis 
of cases adjudicated by ordinary courts in 2011 and 2012 suggested a predominance of 
national print media outlets among defendants. Ninety-five percent of the decisions in 
civil personality protection disputes against traditional media organisations (including 
their online versions), concerned national media organisations. Sixty-eight percent of the 
disputes involved print outlets, and 32% television broadcasters. Tabloid dailies and 
weeklies (42%) were the largest single category of defendants, followed by commercial 
television stations (32%) and women’s magazines (11%). Eighty-one percent of the civil 
personality protection actions against media-defendants adjudicated in 2012 involved 
national outlets. Seventy-four percent of all lawsuits adjudicated in 2012 were brought 
against print media outlets, 23% against a television broadcaster and 3% against a radio 
broadcaster. The largest category of defendants were broadsheet dailies (32%), followed 
by tabloids (26%), and commercial television stations (13%). 
4.6.1.1 Numbers of Disputes faced by Media Organisations 
To corroborate the preliminary findings of the official data analysis, interviewees were 
asked about typical defendants. Media managers and professionals were also invited to 
comment on the approximate numbers of personality/goodwill protection disputes faced 
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by their outlet. Media executives, journalists, and their lawyers generally did not perceive 
the rate of litigation as excessive. However, the disputes actually resulting in a final 
judicial resolution, were ‘only the tip of the libel iceberg’ for Slovak media organisations 
and professionals, as Barendt et al. (1997, 46) put it in relation to national newspapers in 
England and Wales. It is also important to note that the respondents rarely distinguished 
between the different types of actions involving reputation and privacy protection, 
including civil action for personality protection, civil action for goodwill protection, 
actions for publication of correction or reply (under press or broadcasting law). As Zuzana 
Zlámalová, the former legal counsel at Markíza, explained, ‘it is very similar in terms of 
defence. … Therefore, we used to take it all as personality protection disputes’. The 
numbers referring to claims and disputes cited below thus might include instances 
regulated by legal provisions other than civil personality/goodwill protection provisions. 
The number of disputes filed against media organisations varied greatly and 
seemed to be directly connected to the nature and editorial character of the outlet. The 
interviews confirmed the preliminary findings of the above-discussed analysis. 
According to respondents, national media outlets attracted the overwhelming majority of 
personality protection actions given their reach and the weight plaintiffs ascribed to 
information published therein. The interviewees further suggested that despite 
diminishing circulation rates, print media outlets figured as defendants in 
personality/goodwill protection disputes more frequently than television or radio 
broadcasters. Five out of the six plaintiffs I interviewed also pursued legal action against 
national print publications – including a serious daily, a tabloid daily, and a tabloid 
weekly, with only one plaintiff suing a national television broadcaster. The interviewed 
plaintiff lawyers also predominantly mentioned cases against the press – particularly the 
tabloids and the leading daily SME. They also recollected disputes against RTVS and two 
serious magazines.  
Given the more stringent impartiality and objectivity rules relating to broadcast 
news and public affairs programmes, the adoption of the all-music radio format by 
commercial radio broadcasters, and gradual withdrawal of investigative and citizen 
affairs programmes by commercial television stations, the apparent prevalence of 
lawsuits against the national press seemed unremarkable. The sensationalist focus of the 
tabloid press on the one hand, and the emphasis on investigative and exposure journalism 
retained by a handful of dailies, on the other, might further account for the national press’s 
seeming dominance among defendants.  
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Business press 
The business press had the lowest litigation levels. According to HN’s deputy editor-in-
chief, Filip Obradovič, the daily received a few – up to two press correction/reply requests 
per month – whereby the claimant made clear that legal action might follow, if rejected. 
Obradovič remembered three actual lawsuits during his seven years at the paper, all of 
which concerned commentaries because news items were ‘usually played out to the 
mutual benefit of both sides’. The editor-in-chief and co-owner of Trend, Oliver 
Brunovský, argued that articles ‘fortunately, do not very often’ lead to disputes, with 
Trend having had ‘a bare minimum of those disputes’. According to the list of Trend’s 
past personality protection disputes99 I examined, the weekly was involved in ten actions, 
including civil and press law provisions. Out of these, five were personality protection 
actions, three goodwill protection actions and two were filed under press law. Trend also 
received solicitors’ letters requesting corrections, replies, withdrawal of photographs or 
impugned information from the web, or publication of supplementary information. At the 
time of the interview, Trend had no active or pending personality protection disputes.  
 
Tabloid press 
Several respondents suggested that given their sensationalist agendas violating 
individuals’ privacy, and the relatively low standards of journalism, the tabloid press 
attracted more lawsuits than all other outlets. According to one of the most experienced 
plaintiff lawyers, František Sedlačko, the most popular magazine Plus 7 dní probably had 
the most personality protection disputes because ‘they know how to do tabloid 
journalism, they do it well and therefore they automatically have the largest number of 
lawsuits’. Representatives of Spoločnosť 7 plus, the publisher of tabloids Plus 1 deň and 
Plus 7 dní, did not want to be interviewed. Nevertheless, Rudolf Adamčík, Spoločnosť 7 
plus’s former legal counsel, and Andrej Schwarz, the lawyer for News and Media Holding 
(NMH),100 confirmed that the outlets received numerous before-action letters, 
 
 
 
99 As Brunovský admitted there might be some cases missing as he was searching Trend’s records 
primarily for civil disputes for personality protection rather than goodwill protection.  
100 NMH acquired Spoločnosť 7 plus’s print outlet portfolio in late 2014. 
  146 
reply/correction requests and complaints. Neither lawyer commented on the numbers of 
lawsuits.  
Ringier Axel Springer’s (Ringier) CFO, Martin Mihálik, and its legal counsel, 
Marek Benedik, confirmed that the most popular tabloid daily Nový Čas received 
numerous requests for press correction/reply. Unsuccessful claimants tended to file civil 
actions. Mihálik could recollect only some tens of disputes filed against Ringier in the 
years preceding the interview and believed that the number of active cases was falling 
year on year. Benedik similarly dismissed ‘the legends about the number of disputes 
against Ringier’, which were allegedly in their hundreds.  
 
Leading political broadsheets 
The interviews suggested that the leading political daily SME, which retained 
investigative and exposure journalism throughout the 2000s and 2010s, received 
relatively large numbers of post-publication complaints and was also exposed to 
comparably high litigation levels. Some respondents suggested that this was also true for 
daily Pravda before its editorial line change in 2010. In 2017, SME’s editor-in-chief, 
Beata Balogová believed she had to deal with at least one before-action request (including 
correction/reply requests) every week, with two to three requests received during some 
weeks. According to Lukáš Fila, SME’s deputy editor-in-chief until 2014, senior editors 
and reporters received various types of complaints over the phone or solicitor’s letters, 
requesting alternative remedies for alleged violations of personality or goodwill rights.  
Although press correction/reply requests were common – tens of them every year 
– Fila believed that ‘not just anyone sends a before-action letter’, estimating that SME 
received up to two per annum. In Fila’s words, on average, the claims that led to ‘actual 
disputes constitute small numbers – those that reach the proceedings stage are in single 
digit numbers each year’. Tomáš Kamenec, one of the leading defendant lawyers who 
represented Petit Press and other media organisations, similarly, did not think that the 
majority of the before-action requests shown to lawyers would end up in court. According 
to Petit Press’s CEO, Alexej Fulmek, SME was involved in fifty to fifty-five active 
personality protection disputes at any given time. In early 2017, Balogová, confirmed the 
number of pending disputes as fifty (inclusive of civil personality/goodwill protection 
and press law actions).  
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Petit Press’s disputes 
Petit Press provided the most comprehensive, albeit still incomplete, record of actions 
involving reputation and privacy protection initiated against the publishing house. As of 
26 May 2014, Petit Press had faced 172 disputes. Almost two thirds of these concerned 
civil action for personality protection (109), 19 (11%) involved civil goodwill protection 
and 44 (26%) involved press law disputes (Figure 4.6). 
 
Figure 4.6: Disputes involving Petit Press by Type 
 
SME and its online version, www.Sme.sk, attracted over three fifths of all 
disputes, followed by the regional daily Korzár, involved in almost a quarter of all 
actions. Petit Press’s regional weeklies MY were party to six percent (10), and the 
Hungarian daily Uj Szó to three percent (5) of all disputes. Two disputes involved 
preliminary measures to prevent publication of a book, one concerned a no-longer-
existing outlet. In nine cases the outlet could not be identified (Figure 4.7). 
 
Figure 4.7: Petit Press’s Disputes by Outlet 
 
 
According to the available data, the numbers of actions filed against Petit Press 
varied considerably between 1998 and 2014 (Figure 4.8). Petitions for personality 
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protection peaked in 2010 (the last year of Robert Fico’s first government), declined the 
following year, and picked up again in 2012 and 2013. Goodwill protection actions 
peaked in 2009, declining again in subsequent years. Press law petitions became more 
frequent from 2007 as the controversial Press Act strongly featured in public debate, 
peaking in 2010 and declining from 2011 following the Act’s amendments affecting the 
availability of monetary compensation. While the incompleteness of the data does not 
allow for generalisation, it would seem that just over fifty percent of actions against Petit 
Press between 1998 and May 2014 originated in the period of Fico’s first government 
(2006 – 2010). This increase in claims recoded between 2008 and 2010 is unsurprising, 
given the hostile relationship between the governing political elite and the neo-liberal, 
right-leaning press in the second half of the 2000s. 
 
Figure 4.8: Petitions filed against Petit Press 1998-May 2014  
 
 
Television broadcasters 
Television stations faced varying amounts of litigation. The market leader Markíza was 
subject to most lawsuits. According to Zlámalová, the television station received 
numerous complaints and claims, typically requesting an apology and monetary 
compensation. Markíza’s head of news, Henrich Krejča, estimated that roughly ten 
percent of all before-action claims ended up in court. Zlámalová believed that around half 
of all claims forwarded to lawyers led to litigation. As confirmed by Zlámalová, in early 
2014, Markíza had around sixty active disputes, half of which involved broadcasting law 
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corrections. Acknowledging that the public service broadcaster commonly received 
correction requests and before-action notices, Lukáš Diko, head of news at RTVS, argued 
that personality protection litigation was ‘very rare’. According to a list of disputes 
prepared by RTVS’s legal department, only one civil action was filed against RTVS 
between 2013 and 2014.  
JOJ’s legal counsel, Peter Lukášek, admitted that the newsroom received 
complaints in emails or solicitors’ letters ‘relatively often’. However, he believed that 
within the news programmes of commercial televisions where the main ‘focus [was] not 
on serious information’, ‘a conflict between personality rights’ and freedom of speech 
was not apparent. As stated by TA3’s director for external affairs, Igor Čekirda, the news 
channel did not have ‘any fundamental number of these lawsuits’. According to a list of 
disputes prepared by TA3’s lawyers, the broadcaster most frequently faced actions under 
broadcasting law. TA3 was involved in seven personality and one goodwill protection 
actions. Čekirda was also under the impression that the rate of litigation against the news 
channel had reduced in comparison to the past, or at least the organisation did not sense 
any increase. As Čekirda suggested, the relatively small number of disputes involving 
TA3 and JOJ, might also be related to the withdrawal of the so-called ‘citizen affairs’ 
programmes which were particularly prone to attracting litigation. Recognising that this 
type of programming attracted complaints, albeit not necessarily lawsuits, Krejča 
confirmed that in late 2013, Markíza also withdrew its citizen public affairs Lampáreň as 
a self-standing programme. By 2010, all commercial televisions had axed their 
investigative programmes (Glovíčko 2010). 
 
Other news media outlets 
Other news media segments seemed to have a rather limited exposure to litigation. Pavol 
Múdry (2014) argued that as CEO of SITA news agency he received fairly often over-the-
phone complaints from high-level politicians. The agency was usually able to withstand 
the various before-action requests. Múdry (2014) estimated that during his fifteen years 
at SITA, only ten lawsuits were filed or were impending. According to Tomáš Langer, 
whose law firm represented several media outlets, commercial radio broadcasters were 
minimally exposed to litigation throughout the 2010s. 
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4.6.1.2 Journalists’ Exposure to Litigation and Pre-Publication Threats  
Since the interviewed journalists were among the most prominent investigative reporters 
and political commentators, each experienced personality/goodwill protection litigation, 
either as a witness in proceedings or as defendant in the second-order. The most 
experienced and, arguably, daring Slovak investigative journalist of British origin, Tom 
Nicholson, for instance, recollected being involved in civil litigation at least ten times. 
Four journalists (Júlia Mikolášiková, Marek Vagovič, Nicholson and Zuzana Petková) 
were also involved in criminal defamation proceedings.  
All interviewed journalists received warnings from subjects of stories approached 
for comment about potential civil action in case falsehoods were published about them. 
Such notices came from private persons and companies as well as from pubic officials 
and state institutions. Journalists argued that such warnings, or ‘threats’ in their parlance, 
happened routinely. According to some journalists, in the 2010s, threats of impending 
criminal defamation complaints became ‘the latest fashion’, as Petková put it. In contrast 
to the 1990s, threats of physical violence were much rarer. In freelancer Nicholson’s 
words, ‘it is common that they contact you or inform you in one way or another that they 
will file a criminal complaint or civil action. To call and threaten physical assault is quite 
rare’. Reporters were subjected to such threats over the phone, via email or in person.  
Senior managers and media organisations’ lawyers also, albeit less frequently, 
came across such pre-publication notifications. Krejča claimed that he encountered such 
complaints ‘million times’ from respondents ‘over the phone, email [and] meetings in 
person’. Diko received such notices for investigative and citizen public affairs ‘on 
average twice a month’. Brunovský confirmed that ‘it occurs rather often’ – once a month 
or once every two months – that the newsroom encounters ‘such a conflict’ with persons 
or businesses subject to reporting in Trend. 
4.6.2 The Plaintiffs 
Plaintiffs in personality protection disputes against the media tended to hold positions 
that placed them in the public eye, be more affluent than the average, be highly educated 
and aware of their rights and responsibilities of the media. Most of them could, under 
certain circumstances, be, according to Slovak and ECtHR’s case law, characterised as 
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public figures or relatively public figures whose conduct was subject to legitimate 
reporting in the public interest. Only a minority belonged to private figures whose 
reputation was granted high levels of protection by law. Plaintiffs in goodwill protection 
cases also belonged to those legal entities that ought to bear more public scrutiny, 
including public institutions and state-owned firms as well as private companies, typically 
involved in public procurement or contracts with the state. 
4.6.2.1 The Interviewed Plaintiffs  
Three of the six plaintiffs interviewed were active judges at the time of the impugned 
publication; two of them had been known to the public through their appearances in the 
media. One had previously acted as a court chairman. The others were recognised in their 
professional and local communities and at the time of the alleged infringement had been 
employed in law enforcement, the legal profession and in journalism.  
4.6.2.2 Client Portfolio of Plaintiff Lawyers 
The interviewed lawyers represented public figures or relatively public figures primarily, 
particularly politicians or former politicians (national and local) and/or their relatives. 
Half of the lawyers also had extensive experience representing active judges and/or other 
legal professionals, including lawyers (advokát/ka), prosecutors, notaries and distrainers. 
Several lawyers worked on behalf of actors, sportsmen, TV presenters and/or their 
relatives. Others represented public officials or candidates for public office, 
businesspeople, and one firm represented a senior church dignitary. Only four lawyers 
had been involved in work for private individuals, including a victim of mistaken identity. 
Work for legal entities did not constitute a substantial part of the lawyers’ work – only 
three reported representing a private company or a public institution.   
4.6.2.3 Plaintiffs in Cases Involving Different Types of Media 
The following section introduces the most frequent plaintiffs involved in disputes with 
different types of media. 
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Business papers 
Unsurprisingly, claimants and plaintiffs in cases involving business publications such as 
HN and Trend were most commonly associated with private companies, businesspeople 
and public officials with links to public procurement and economic, monetary and/or 
social policy. According to Trend’s records, half of plaintiffs in all disputes involving the 
weekly (including press law disputes) were private companies. The plaintiffs in 
personality protection disputes included two cabinet members and private persons who 
in light of their actions became relatively public figures. 
 
Tabloids 
Tabloid publications were sued by public figures like celebrities, actors, singers, 
politicians, judges and other public officials, as well as by private individuals, including 
ordinary persons, healthcare professionals accused of malpractice or businesspeople. 
According to Benedik, given the editorial focus of Nový Čas, which strived ‘to document 
ordinary life not just high politics’, the overwhelming majority of disputes involving 
Ringier came from ordinary people. Other cases involved businesspeople, and a few high-
profile politicians and judges. Mikolášiková also maintained that ordinary people and 
legal entities sued; ‘it just doesn’t get out that much – one is not informed about that … 
to such an extent as when a politician or a public figure’ files a lawsuit. According to 
Adamčík, politicians and other public officials belonged to the most frequent plaintiffs in 
disputes against Plus 1 deň and Plus 7 dní. As the papers’ editorial focus evolved, lawsuits 
and/or claims from various celebrities, healthcare professionals and ordinary people 
became more frequent. The interviews confirmed that legal entities tended to litigate 
against tabloids in any case type, relatively rarely. Schwarz estimated that legal entities 
filed roughly fifteen percent of lawsuits against the NMH outlets he represented.  
 
Commercial broadcasters 
Commercial broadcasters attracted complaints and lawsuits from private individuals, 
public figures as well as legal entities. JOJ, according to Lukášek and Kubina, was sued 
by ordinary citizens, and public officials, including civil servants, police functionaries 
and distrainers. JOJ was not involved in any legal action with a politician because 
politicians tended to file unrelated complaints anonymously with the Broadcasting 
Council, according to Kubina, rather than suing, to punish the television. While Kubina 
mentioned handling complaints by large companies, Lukášek could not recollect an active 
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case involving an alleged breach of goodwill rights. According to the records provided 
by TA3, the broadcaster was sued by one work agency, three judges, a police functionary, 
a murder suspect, and an electoral bribery suspect. The largest commercial television, 
Markíza, which withdrew its investigative and citizens’ public affairs programmes later 
than its competitors, had disputes with public figures, including politicians, judges, 
prosecutors and police officials, ordinary persons, businesspeople, healthcare 
professionals as well as commercial subjects. According to Zlámalová, politicians 
predominated among Markíza’s claimants and plaintiffs in the 1990s and 2000s. From 
around 2009 ordinary people and business entities started to litigate more frequently. 
 
Leading political papers, PSB and news agencies 
Political dailies SME and Pravda, public service broadcaster RTVS and SITA news agency 
most frequently received before-action claims and/or lawsuits from politicians, judges, 
prosecutors, lawyers and, often high-ranking, police officials and/or investigators. Other 
public officials such as university heads, civil servants and distrainers featured among 
plaintiffs to a lesser extent. Politics-focused press also received before-action letters and 
lawsuits from businesspeople and private companies. Ordinary individuals litigated very 
rarely against political papers. According to Pravda’s lawyer, Marek Ogurčák, the daily 
was sued by a mix of different plaintiffs, including criminal suspects, politicians and 
judges. Ogurčák could recollect less than a handful of lawsuits involving business 
corporations, and a few correction/reply requests from ministries. Fila similarly claimed 
that in the case of SME, plaintiffs were ‘almost exclusively public figures’ and that ‘the 
absolute majority of all plaintiffs were found among ‘politicians, judges or 
businesspeople linked to public [procurement] scandals’. Due to SME’s editorial focus, 
disputes with private individuals who could not be characterised as relatively public 
figures were very rare. SME’s Benedikovčová similarly argued that she had ‘never 
encountered a dispute where an ordinary person or citizen who was not publicly active 
would file a lawsuit against the publishing house’.  
 
Plaintiffs in disputes involving Petit Press 
According to Petit Press’s records, public figures, including national and regional 
politicians, police officers, judges, lawyers, prosecutors and other public officials 
(including town mayors or public institutions leaders) comprised the majority (53%) of 
plaintiffs in civil personality protection disputes involving the publisher. Just over a third 
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of all plaintiffs were not active in public life and were thus considered private individuals 
for analytical purposes. Twelve percent of all plaintiffs came from business (Figure 4.9). 
Such a relatively large proportion of private individuals among plaintiffs was 
unsurprising, in the light of the ownership by the publishing house of a network of 
regional outlets reporting on local issues. However, since the analysed data did not 
provide information about the impugned articles, it can be presumed that plaintiffs 
considered in the analysis as private individual and businesspeople were actually 
relatively public figures or local public figures under the law. 
 
Figure 4.9: Plaintiffs in Personality Protection Disputes involving Petit Press 
 
 
Plaintiffs in goodwill protection cases mostly belonged to private companies and 
other non-business entities, such as church organisations, professional organisations and 
NGOs. Private companies also comprised the single largest category of plaintiffs (37%), 
followed by public institutions or companies (32%). Petit Press also faced lawsuits from 
two municipalities and a political party (Figure 4.10). 
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Figure 4.10: Plaintiffs in Goodwill Protection Disputes involving Petit Press 
 
 
In line with the perceptions of interviewees, the single largest groups of plaintiffs 
in personality protection disputes against SME were politicians (20%) and other public 
officials (20%), followed by businesspeople (15%), judges (13%), private individuals 
(13%), lawyers (12%), police officers (5%) and prosecutors (2%). Plaintiffs who could 
be characterised as public figures were thus involved in seventy-two percent of 
personality protection actions against SME (Figure 4.11). In contrast, sixty-nine percent 
of plaintiffs in personality protection disputes against the regional daily Korzár were 
private individuals and businesspeople. SME was also a defendant in eleven goodwill 
protection disputes, involving five public institutions or companies, four private 
companies, and two non-business entities. 
 
Figure 4.11: Plaintiffs in Personality Protection Disputes involving SME 
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4.6.2.4 Particularly Litigious Plaintiffs 
The perception of respondents was that there were certain particularly litigious persons 
among high-profile politicians and senior judges. The interviewed plaintiffs could not be 
characterised as particularly litigious, as only one of them had pursued multiple legal 
actions following repeated infringements. The mere presence of prolific plaintiffs may 
result in undesirable chilling effects on speech but do not allow for drawing conclusions 
about their motivations or effects on editorial autonomy and the information the public 
received about them. 
Robert Fico, who had served as an MP since 1992 and as prime minister for three 
terms, was, between 2005 and 2009, probably the most notorious plaintiff in civil 
personality protection disputes with the media. His former lawyer, L01 estimated that 
Fico filed around fifteen defamation lawsuits against media-defendants. Cases against 
Trend Holding, Petit Press and multiple disputes with Spoločnosť 7 Plus101  had been 
widely publicised.  
Štefan Harabin, the Supreme Court President (1998-2006, 2009-2014) and 
Judicial Council Chair (2009-2014) and Justice Minister in Fico’s first government 
(2006-2009), was repeatedly mentioned by respondents. Widely believed to be one of the 
most sensitive and litigious plaintiffs, between 2003 and 2012, Harabin sued media 
organisations for publications related to his professional activities in at least five separate 
cases. Harabin also successfully sued Slovakia before the ECtHR for violations of his 
right to a fair hearing by an impartial tribunal (Harabin v. Slovakia). On behalf of the 
Supreme Court, Harabin also filed goodwill protection actions against two media 
organizations (TASR 2010; SITA 2010). Harabin was also infamous for recurrently 
sending before-action letters, requesting monetary compensation of 200,000 euro for 
reputational harm caused by reporting about an alleged transcript of a friendly phone call 
between Harabin and an alleged (and later convicted) Albanian mafia boss (Balogová 
2013b; Minarechová 2013; Balogová 2009). In his capacity as Supreme Court President, 
Harabin also proposed out-of-court settlement of 200,000 euro to Trend for providing 
 
 
 
101 Fico was involved in around ten disputes with Spoločnosť 7 Plus, according to some estimates 
(Košíček 2009b). 
  157 
readers with ‘a false and highly distorted picture’ about the Court’s case allocation system 
(Trend 2010). Prior to commencing legal action against P. and RTVS, Harabin also 
requested an apology and monetary compensation of 400,000 euro in total (Kostelanský 
2012). 
Ján Slota, the former chairman of the nationalist Slovak National Party and 
mayor of a regional city (1990-2006), was, according to interviewees, another high-
profile figure prone to sue the media. Between 1999 and 2009, Slota figured as a plaintiff 
in at least seven separate defamation disputes with various media organisations, including 
Ringier, the owner of TV Markíza, Petit Press, and Spoločnosť 7 plus.  
Pavol Polka, a district court chair in the late 1990s, was mentioned as another 
prolific plaintiff. It was estimated that between 2000 and 2004, Polka filed fifty different 
personality protection lawsuits against various entities, including media organisations, 
Slovak Justice and Interior Ministries, the Slovak Republic, the Association of Slovak 
Judges and the Czech Republic, claiming between 3,319 and 663,878 euro in damages 
(SME 2002b; StratégieOnline 2002; Leško 2004). The media disputes concerned 
reporting about allegations of corruption and involvement in bribery of a Czech judge, 
for which criminal proceedings were initiated against Polka. Polka sued at least eight 
different media outlets, both before and after the criminal case against him was halted 
(Nicholson 2002). Múdry (2014) suspected that ‘Polka sued the entire media community 
in Slovakia … He didn’t care – [he sued] one after another … everyone who mentioned 
his name in the bribery case’.  
Another judge, Jozef Soročina, was repeatedly cited by interviewees as 
particularly litigious. Between 2006 and 2008, Soročina filed at least ten different 
personality protection lawsuits against various media outlets and state institutions, 
including the Interior and Justice Ministries and the General Prosecutor’s Office 
(Jesenský 2008). All the disputes concerned allegations of fraud against Soročina, about 
which the then Justice and Interior Ministers briefed at a press conference (Lesná 2008). 
Having been acquitted by the courts, the judge sued at least five media organisations in 
at least seven different disputes for reputation rights violations, claiming damages of 
663,878 euro against Petit Press alone (Tódová 2008a). 
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4.6.2.5 Public v. Private Plaintiffs 
The apparent prevalence of public plaintiffs among my respondents, the interviewed 
lawyers’ clients and parties to disputes with media-defendants is hardly surprising. It 
could be explained by the sampling method used and the awareness of rights and 
perceptions of harm caused by publication held by private and public plaintiffs. The 
composition of plaintiffs also largely reflected the topics and subjects the media found 
newsworthy. Lastly, the mutual relationship between political and judiciary elites on one 
side and the media on the other during the studied period could also account for the 
predominance of public officials among plaintiffs and claimants. 
 
Interviewees selection 
I conducted interviews with experienced lawyers based in the capital who had been 
involved in high-profile, widely publicised cases. I approached the lawyers whose names 
appeared in media coverage of high-profile cases. I also selected plaintiff lawyers based 
on an analysis of a sample of judgments heard before several district and regional courts 
I obtained following FOI requests. Respondents among plaintiffs were also selected based 
on media coverage of high-profile disputes or upon recommendation from interviewed 
lawyers.  
 
Awareness of personality/goodwill rights and perception of harm 
Legal respondents suggested that in contrast to public plaintiffs, ordinary citizens were 
typically unaware of their rights or not interested in defending their reputation and 
privacy. According to Lukášek, ‘people are very little aware of their rights and the duties 
others have’. Therefore, ‘they let unlawful infringements go unnoticed even if they could 
speak out’. Ivan Ikrényi, a plaintiff lawyer, believed that private individuals were often 
‘not even interested’ in defending their rights. Ikrényi maintained that honour, dignity 
and a good name were ‘perceived differently by people who already ha[d] a [certain] 
status from other people’ because ‘the latter first ha[d] to satisfy their other needs’. ‘If 
your basic needs are not met’, he argued, ‘you are not interested in questions of your 
honour or dignity’. As will further be discussed in Chapter 7, most plaintiff lawyers did 
not consider that ordinary, relatively impecunious plaintiffs would face difficulties in 
accessing justice in relation to personality protection disputes. Several respondents 
believed that private individuals (and their lawyers) had increasingly become aware of 
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their personality rights and strived to protect them. This could partially explain the 
increase in claims adjudicated by ordinary courts recorded from 2014. In part, it could 
also account for the above-discussed change in claimants’ composition seen by Markíza.  
In contrast, persons who were highly recognisable in their communities and 
whose ability to succeed in their job depended on reputation, honour and good name such 
as politicians, public officials, judges, lawyers, sportspeople and artists, perceived the 
need to protect their personality more acutely than most private individuals. Many 
individuals and legal entities among plaintiffs had also invested a lot of resources into 
building their good name and naturally felt the need to protest their carefully-crafted 
public image. Legal professionals, businesspeople and entities, who were frequent 
plaintiffs in personality protection cases, also possessed the necessary legal knowledge 
or had large legal teams at their disposal to successfully protect their reputation and 
privacy against illegitimate interferences. 
 
Newsworthiness and tabloidisation 
The composition of plaintiffs largely reflected the subjects that the media were interested 
in. As explained by Sedlačko, ‘ordinary citizens do not typically come into contact with 
the media’. While there had been cases of actual violation of private individuals’ 
personality rights in the past, they remained ‘really rare’. Therefore, according to 
Sedlačko, plaintiffs in personality protection disputes were ‘either politicians or other 
public figures – judges, local politicians, [and] public institutions’. Similarly, according 
to Adamčík, a lawsuit from an ordinary person was ‘a literal exception because the media 
are not that interested in ordinary citizens’, unless involved in a tragic car accident, being 
a party to a dispute, implicated in alleged corruption or in a relationship with a public 
figure.  
As discussed above, some tabloid publications and commercial broadcasters 
experienced an increase in the frequency of claims received from ordinary plaintiffs and 
a simultaneous decrease in litigiousness of public figures in the early 2010s. This trend 
could be explained by the increased tabloidization, introduction of news formats focusing 
on everyday crime, including car accidents, and a shift away from serious investigative 
journalism that took place during the 2000s.  
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Antagonistic Relationship between the Press and Public Officials 
The mutual animosity between political elites (and their patrons between businessmen) 
and judges on the one side and the media on the other, resulting from media professionals’ 
experience of political pressures and politicians’ and businesspersons’ perceptions of 
unfair treatment in the media can also explain the prevalence of politicians, other public 
figures, including judges, and businesspeople among plaintiffs, particularly before 2010.  
4.7 Conclusion 
This chapter drew on the conceptual framework developed in Chapter 2, which argued 
that the law is a social institution the operation of which depends on the mutual 
interactions among the principal protagonists operating in the legal regime. These 
interactions need to be examined in its structural, cultural and international contexts. The 
uncertainties of democratic transition were expected to give rise to conflict that would 
affect the legal regime’s ability to shape the principal protagonists’ behaviour. In this 
chapter, I explored the socio-political context in Slovakia during the twenty-year-period 
under study, with a focus on the country’s democratisation path, its power struggles and 
legacies for the developments in the country’s media political economy, journalism 
culture and the mutual relationship between the principal protagonists. A quantifiable 
picture of the personality/goodwill protection regime in disputes involving media-
defendants between 1996 and 2016 was presented and the regime’s principal protagonists 
were introduced. 
The chapter revealed an almost constant struggle for the rules of the democratic 
game among different state institutions, political elites and, with notable interruptions, 
the political and judicial elites on the one hand and the independent media on the other. 
These power struggles led to deep polarisation within the Slovak society, which had not 
been completely healed during the studied period. Its other legacy had been the 
prevalence of corruption and clientelism in society and the judiciary. It also shaped the 
developments in the media system. Most palpably it contributed to the hybrid ‘critical 
change agent’ and ‘popular disseminator’ journalism culture and adversarial relationship 
between political, business and judicial elites on the one hand and media professionals on 
the other, and, at times, instrumental use of the media by the owners. 
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Virtually all media organisations and professionals had experience of legal action 
or threat thereof. While the number of disputes outlets had been involved in varied, the 
rate of litigation in the studied period did not appear disproportionate. This was also true 
in comparison to the Czech Republic. On the example of the changes to eligibility for 
monetary compensation for non-publication of statutory discursive remedies, the analysis 
demonstrated the expectation of the conceptualisation of law used in this thesis that even 
a minor modification in legal rules can impact principal protagonists’ behaviour.  
Despite diminishing circulation and the rise of online media, national press, 
particularly the sensationalist, tabloid papers, and broadsheets, attracted the majority of 
legal actions. This was in line with the findings of past research (Barendt et al. 1997; 
Weaver et al. 2006; Cheer 2008). It was partly a factor of the more stringent impartiality 
and objectivity rules relating to broadcast news and public affairs. As commercial 
broadcasters gradually withdrew investigative journalism, the genre, which arguably 
attracted a large proportion of lawsuits, remained limited to the serious political and 
business press. The increasingly sensationalist character of the tabloid press accounted 
for the tabloid’s frequent presence among defendants.  
In line with the findings of the ILP (e.g., Bezanson, Cranberg, and Soloski 1985), 
the plaintiffs and would-be plaintiffs tended to be persons who most commonly appeared 
as subjects of media coverage, held positions reliant on having a good reputation, were 
relatively affluent, educated and possessed above-average legal knowledge. As suggested 
by the conceptual framework, the plaintiffs largely belonged to politicians, judges, public 
prosecutors, law enforcement officers, lawyers, businesspersons involved in state 
contracts or receiving public funds and other public officials. Only a minority of plaintiffs 
were private figures or legal entities. Goodwill protection plaintiffs largely belonged to 
public institutions, state-owned firms and private companies, typically involved in public 
procurement – all legal entities that ought to bear more intense public scrutiny.  
A handful of high-profile, particularly litigious plaintiffs operated in the regime. 
They belonged to top politicians and judges who had a confrontational stance towards 
independent media that had been critical of their actions, style of governing and alleged 
clientelist practices. As suggested by previous research (Barendt et al. 1997; Weaver et 
al. 2006), the existence of particularly litigious persons might suggest a defamation and 
privacy regime actively discouraging speech on matters of public interest as journalists 
and media organisations wish to avoid litigation. This is to be explored in the findings 
chapters. 
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The composition of plaintiffs and the apparent prevalence of public figures among 
them during the studied period is consistent with findings of empirical studies conducted 
in the US and common law countries (Bezanson, Cranberg, and Soloski 1987; Barendt et 
al. 1997; Weaver et al. 2006). The chapter revealed an increase of disputes and press law 
claims towards the end of Fico’s first government, suggesting the importance of the 
existing journalism culture and the mutual relationship between political, legal and 
economic sub-systemic actors and media actors for explaining the trends in the operation 
of defamation and privacy regimes. What did not transpire in other studies, was the large 
proportion of judges among plaintiffs. Given the perceived pervasive clientelism and 
political pressures within the judiciary during the studied period, the findings raised 
questions about the ability of judges to interpret and apply the law in a fair, certain and 
efficient way that would prevent abuses by powerful plaintiffs in the political, legal and 
economic subsystems. 
Before exploring the adjudicatory practice of the Constitutional Court, ECtHR and 
ordinary courts, and the experiences of plaintiffs, media-defendants and their respective 
lawyers with the judicial process in personality/goodwill protection disputes in Chapter 
6, the next chapter will examine the fairness, certainty and effectiveness of Slovak 
personality/goodwill protection regime on the statute book in the studied period. 
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 Fairness, Certainty and Effectiveness on the 
Statute Book 
5.1 Introduction 
In both the academic literature on the interplay between defamation and privacy law with 
journalistic speech and the public pronouncements of human rights organisations, stress 
is placed on the need for an appropriate triangulation of the competing private and public 
interests in reputation or privacy and freedom of expression in statutes and in adjudicatory 
practice (see Chapter 1). The conceptual framework that informs this study (see Chapter 
2) suggests that, when making their decisions that ultimately affect the triangulation of 
the conflicting interests at the heart of the regime, the main protagonists are to a large 
extent influenced by their perceptions of the fairness, certainty and effectiveness the given 
defamation and privacy regime strives to safeguard in the law-on-the-books and in 
adjudicatory practice. 
This chapter examines the constitutional and statutory protections of reputation, 
privacy and freedom of expression, and the extent to which the interests are triangulated 
in key substantial and procedural rules in civil defamation or privacy intrusion disputes 
through the lens of fairness, certainty and effectiveness. It provides context for the later 
investigation of the main protagonists’ experiences and perceptions of judicial decision-
making in Chapter 6.  
The extent to which the law-on-the-books is perceived as fair depends on the 
importance and protection it affords to the competing values, for instance, whether each 
value enjoys a constitutional guarantee. This, in turn influences the approach to 
‘balancing’ that is taken. The fairness of any defamation and privacy regime is also 
embedded in the way the competing interests are triangulated in statutory rules related to 
the standing of the parties, liability rules, the burden of proof, defences and the remedies 
available. Safeguards against abuse of law typically comprise substantive rules governing 
the requirements to establish a cause of action, the standing of plaintiffs, and the 
availability and level of damages. Procedural rules on court jurisdiction, fees and costs of 
litigation also play a key role in safeguarding against abuses of the law. Perhaps most 
importantly, the fairness of a defamation and privacy regime rests on its ability to provide 
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access to justice to all parties, particularly through procedural provisions regulating court 
jurisdiction and fees, the costs of litigation and the availability of legal aid.  
Legal certainty stems primarily from a proper understanding by courts and the 
main protagonists of the protected conflicting values in disputes involving media-
defendants. Without this, there is a risk that elements of law designed to defend an interest 
may in time prove misconceived and lead to unintended consequences and lesser 
protection for either of the fundamental rights (Article 19 2016, 6). Moreover, in order to 
enable publishers and reporters to predict with reasonable certainty the legality or 
otherwise of a particular action, the law must be unambiguous and clear, particularly in 
relation to the available defences. The rules should further provide reasonable certainty 
for all parties to be able to predict the outcome of litigation and the level of any potential 
sanction (Article 19 2000, 4). 
The effectiveness of dispute resolution might be improved by statutes of limitation 
to file action or adduce evidence. The availability of discursive remedies like 
press/broadcasting correction, reply or apology is often also discussed in relation to 
making the defamation and privacy regime more effective in vindicating reputations and 
publicly correcting misrepresentations in the media (Mullis and Scott 2012a, 17-21; 2014, 
107-08; Drgonec 2013, 112-16; 2008, 280-281; Koltay 2007; Youm 2007). 
The chapter first outlines the constitutional and statutory protections of reputation, 
privacy and freedom of expression, examining their history and objectives. It then turns 
to explore the general principles applicable to balancing the private and public interests 
in reputation, privacy and expression when they come into conflict in civil disputes. A 
substantial part of the chapter analyses the key substantive and procedural rules intended 
to achieve fairness, certainty and effectiveness of the Slovak defamation and privacy 
regime in disputes involving media-defendants. Before setting out conclusions, the 
chapter briefly introduces the criminal personality protection and the discursive remedies 
available under media law. 
5.2 Protection of Reputation and Privacy 
Legal protection of the rights to reputation and privacy is anchored in the Constitution 
and the international treaties to which Slovakia is party. The Constitution and the Charter 
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of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms adopted by the former Czechoslovakia, constitute 
the ultimate basis for the protection of reputational and privacy rights of individuals and 
reputational rights of legal entities.102 Article 16 of the Constitution guarantees ‘the right 
of every individual to integrity and privacy’ that ‘may be limited only in cases provided 
for by law’. The rights of every person ‘to maintain and protect his or her dignity, honour, 
reputation and good name’; ‘to be free from unjustified interference in his or her private 
and family life’; and ‘to be protected against unjustified collection, disclosure and other 
misuse of his or her personal data’ are afforded in Article 19. Property rights, including 
goodwill, are guaranteed in Article 20. Reputation and privacy rights are also anchored 
in the European Convention on Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
(CFR), all of which are part of the Slovak legal order with precedence over laws.103 While 
the rights to honour and dignity are, under certain circumstances, protected under the right 
to the protection of private and family life under Article 8 ECHR,104 in Slovak 
constitutional law they are understood as separate fundamental rights that pursue different 
aims. These different rights have roots in the concept of general personality rights, 
recognised in the legal order since 1964. Goodwill rights, which safeguard reputation of 
legal entities, fall under property rights. 
To defend their personality, natural persons may choose between provisions of 
civil and criminal law. Legal entities’ goodwill is only protected by civil law provisions. 
Natural persons and legal entities may also use statutory discursive remedies for 
infringements in the media under broadcasting and press law. Depending on the 
characteristics and severity of the infringement, the injured party is free to use several 
provisions simultaneously (Kerecman 2003, 21; Cirák 1994, 62).  
The (un)intended consequences of civil personality/goodwill protection actions 
involving media-defendants are the focus of this study. The following paragraphs 
examine how the private and public interests in reputation, privacy and expression are 
 
 
 
102 There are only minor differences in the wording of the two documents. Therefore, only the 
stipulations of the Constitution will be discussed in this thesis.  
103 Since 1991, 1993 and 2009, respectively. 
104 For a discussion of the developments in ECtHR Article 8 case-law see Barendt et al. (2013, 363-
68), Mullis (2010b, 18-20). 
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triangulated in substantive and procedural rules pertaining to these disputes.105 The 
chapter also briefly discusses the relevant criminal and media law provisions as they may 
also influence the ability of the legal regime to triangulate the competing interests. The 
availability of statutory discursive remedies, for instance, might contribute to effective 
protection of individual and public interests in reputation and privacy as well as advance 
the public interest in expression (see, e.g., Mullis and Scott 2012a, 17-18). Unless 
narrowly stipulated, criminal law protections, on the other hand, might have a detrimental 
effect on the individual and public interests in expression. 
5.2.1 General Personality Rights 
Explicit provisions protecting citizens from defamatory statements and privacy 
infringements were first introduced into Slovak civil law with the adoption of the 1964 
Civil Code (Act No. 40/1964 Coll.). That measure remained in force throughout the 
studied period.106 In the relatively relaxed economic and political atmosphere of the 
1960s, rather unusually, the communist legislators drew on the concept of general 
personality rights anchored in the Swiss and West German legal orders (Vondracek 1975, 
281–82). Personality rights, which a priori belong to every natural person (Knap et al. 
2004, 17; Vondracek 1988, 24), denote the rights protecting the various immaterial facets 
of a natural person’s personality in its bodily and moral unity, such as his/her physical 
integrity, personal freedom, honour, dignity, reputation and privacy. The scope of 
personality protection as stipulated in Section 11 of the Civil Code is rather broad (see 
Appendix 9), extending to a natural person’s i) life, health and body; ii) honour, 
reputation, dignity, and esteem in the eyes of fellow citizens; iii) name; iv) freedom of 
movement; v) image; vi) personal writings; vii) oral expressions; and viii) privacy, i.e. 
 
 
 
105 Between 1996 and 2016, actions for personality protection were governed by Sections 11-13 of the 
Civil Code and actions for goodwill protection by Section 19(b). The procedure in personality and 
goodwill protection disputes was governed by the 1963 Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 99/1963 
Coll., CCP). In matters of personality/goodwill protection, the CCP was replaced by the Code of Civil 
Dispute Procedure (CCDP) in July 2016 (Futej and Hric 2015). 
106 Since their introduction, the provisions were subject only to minor changes in the early 1990s, 
when obsolete sections were repealed and the right to monetary compensation for non-material loss 
was included. 
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his/her intimate domain, including inner feelings and thoughts (Vondracek 1988, 23; 
Knap and Švestka 1989, 69-71; Kratochvíl 1965, 56–63). The media are most frequently 
involved in civil disputes concerning protection of civic honour and dignity, protection 
of privacy or protection of one’s image, writings and recordings of personal nature. 
5.2.1.1 The Right to Honour and Dignity 
Legal theory distinguishes between (civic) honour and human dignity, as they give rise 
to two separate fundamental human rights (Drgonec 2013, 186). A natural person acquires 
his/her honour when he/she becomes part of society and keeps it through his/her socially 
and morally appropriate life and behaviour. The meaning of one’s honour changes and 
develops during one’s life and varies between different professions and sections of society 
(Cirák 1994, 78). Human dignity, in contrast, belongs to every human being irrespective 
of his/her standing in society. However, honour, dignity and societal esteem are often 
subsumed within a single category in scholarly writings (Knap et al. 2004, 309) and 
judicial practice (Drgonec 2013, 187). Both legal theory and jurisprudence recognise the 
social value of civic honour and dignity and regard them as crucial for an individual’s 
standing, self-assertion in society, and ability to create and maintain relationships with 
other members of society (Cirák 1994, 78; Fekete 2011, Volume 1:101). The law thus 
protects a person’s personality only against such acts that violate his/her moral integrity 
by lowering his/her honour, dignity and esteem in his/her relations with other members 
of society, including social and professional relations, and therefore threaten his/her 
position and self-assertion in society (Vondracek 1988, 26; Kratochvíl 1965, 57-58). 
5.2.1.2 The Right to Privacy 
The primary purpose of the right to (personal) privacy is to preserve the private sphere of 
an individual’s life that enables the individual to assert themselves in society (Fekete 
2011, Volume 1:105; Knap et al. 2004, 334). The right offers protection to the inner 
intimate sphere of an individual, including his/her family life and close relationships with 
others (Cirák 1994, 97; Knap et al. 2004, 334). The private sphere covers an individual’s 
life in the midst of his family and his friends. The intimate sphere comprises an 
individual’s inner range of thoughts and feelings (Luby 1968, 781). Fekete (2011, 
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Volume 1:105) thus argued that protection of privacy subsumes ‘past and present 
experiences and affairs of a natural person, personal communications and 
correspondence, contacts, and protection of the intimate life and residence of a natural 
person (including a ban on taking photographs of a residence while simultaneously 
identifying its owner)’. The right protects a person against intrusions of his/her privacy 
irrespective of the manner in which they occur (Vondracek 1988, 30).  
5.2.1.3 The Rights to One’s Image, Writings and Recordings of Personal Nature 
Civil law guarantees a person the right to decide whether his/her image, video and audio 
recordings can be captured. As long as the person’s identity is unquestionable, protection 
is afforded to any image; the technology used, whether the image is a faithful depiction 
or a caricature, or whether it harmed the person’s honour or civic esteem is irrelevant 
(Drgonec 2013, 188). The law also explicitly states that a person’s portraits, photos, video 
and audio recordings of personal nature can only be produced and used with his/her prior 
consent (Kratochvíl 1965, 61; Doley and Mullis 2010, 1331).  
5.2.2 Goodwill  
Civil law has recognised legal entities’ right to their name and good reputation since 1992. 
Because the provisions bear many similarities with personality protection, some scholars 
regard goodwill as a pseudo-personality right. Yet, the law considers goodwill as a form 
of property as incorporated into Protocol No. 1 to the Convention (Drgonec 2013, 195) 
and constitutionally protects it as a property right. Goodwill subsumes certain moral and 
qualitative characteristics of a legal entity by which society evaluates it, including its 
trustworthiness, decency, esteem, reliability, professionalism, confidence in keeping 
trade secrets and obligations. Goodwill also comprises the moral profile and honesty of a 
legal entity’s statutory representatives and employees. Given that many legal entities rely 
on hard-won reputations to attract employees, investors and customers, and given the 
importance of corporate entities for the economy of most modern democracies, it seems 
appropriate for the law to allow them a remedy for serious reputational damage and for 
the public to learn about false allegations made against them (see, e.g., Mullis and Scott 
2009, 179). 
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While the individual and societal values protected by goodwill are distinct from 
those protected by personality rights, largely the same rules apply concerning elements 
of a claim. The following paragraphs will thus, in general, refer to both types of action, 
explicitly stating if different provisions apply. 
5.3 Protection of Freedom of Expression  
The protection of personality and goodwill rights often clashes with the rights to freedom 
of expression and to receive information, which are entrenched in Article 26 of the 
Constitution and Article 17 of the Charter. Everyone has the right to express his or her 
opinion in words, writing, print, images or by other means and also seek to receive and 
disseminate ideas and information freely, regardless of state borders. No approval process 
for press publishing is required and censorship is prohibited. Freedom of expression is 
further guaranteed by Article 10 of the ECHR, Article 19 of the ICCPR and Article 11 of 
the CFR.107 The Constitution enumerates a number of grounds, based on which freedom 
of expression and the right to information may legitimately be restricted. An admissible 
interference must be prescribed by law, pursue one of the listed legitimate aims, namely 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others, national security, public order, public 
health or public morals, and be necessary in a democratic society. In contrast to the 
Convention, the Constitution does not explicitly link the permissibility of restrictions to 
the existence of “duties and responsibilities” that govern the exercise of freedom of 
expression. Nonetheless, such a link must be presumed under an interpretation of the 
Constitution in accordance with Slovakia’s international obligations (Drgonec 2013, 54). 
Slovakia’s legal order thus complies with the internationally recognised constitutional 
principles concerning freedom of expression, whose importance in relation to defamation 
law has been emphasised by free speech campaigners (Article 19 2000, 3–4). 
In contrast to the protection of reputation and privacy rights, at least in relation to 
natural persons, meaningful safeguards for freedom of expression have a much shorter 
 
 
 
107 The text of Article 26 of the Constitution is essentially a word-for-word translation of Article 19 
of the Covenant. 
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history. Although freedom of expression has been constitutionally guaranteed since 1920, 
the geopolitical situation in the interwar period and the later establishment of two 
different totalitarian regimes meant that until 1989 freedom of expression was not 
respected in practice (Školkay 1996, 62-66; Vozár, Valko, and Lapšanský 2009, 11; 
Vozár 2015, 18). As key changes establishing guarantees to freedom of expression were 
made in the early 1990s, it ceased to be of interest to lawmakers, who became pre-
occupied with more pressing policy issues. It took the legislators fifteen years to adopt a 
modern press law, delineating the duties and responsibilities of the press. During the 
studied period, Slovakia thus lacked a coherent conception of the right to freedom of 
expression and its limits (Drgonec 2013, 386). Between the early 1990s and 2016, policy-
makers and the Constitutional Court introduced into the legal order, on an ad hoc basis, 
various, and often contradictory, legal principles pertaining to freedom of expression that 
had been developed first in other jurisdictions. While there is no single justification for 
freedom of expression (see Chapter 1), without an appropriate understanding of the 
individual and societal interest in expression, there is a danger that its importance will not 
be inadequately appreciated by courts when it comes into conflict with reputation and 
privacy. 
5.4 General Principles for Balancing the Conflicting Interests in 
Civil Personality/Goodwill Protection Disputes 
In case of conflict between the constitutionally guaranteed fundamental human rights to 
reputation and/or privacy on the one hand and freedom of expression on the other, courts 
must strike a fair balance between all the protected values based on the circumstances of 
each individual case. The first two conditions pertaining to restrictions on freedom of 
expression stipulated by the Constitution – prescription by law and pursuit of a legitimate 
aim – are fulfilled in virtually all cases of conflict between the above rights. According 
to one of the most prominent constitutional legal scholars and a former Constitutional 
Court judge, Ján Drgonec, courts thus have to consider particularly carefully the third 
condition of “necessity in a democratic society”. A violation of the constitutional right to 
freedom of expression occurs when the interference is not necessary, regardless of the 
extent to which the conflictual protected interest was threatened or harmed (Drgonec 
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2013, 148–49). Drawing on the ECtHR case law, the Constitutional Court interpreted the 
condition of “necessity in a democratic society” as ‘the existence of a “pressing social 
need”’108 when it stated that ‘the term “necessary in a democratic society” may be 
interpreted as a pressing social need to adopt a restriction on a fundamental right or 
freedom’. The Court added that a restriction is necessary if ‘the aim of the restriction 
cannot be achieved in any other way’ (PL. ÚS 15/1998, 40). The necessity of adopting a 
restriction on freedom of expression cannot merely be presumed, but must be proven. 
Mere negligence when establishing the actual presence of the necessity to restrict freedom 
of expression in the interest of other protected value constitutes a violation of the 
Constitution (Drgonec 2013, 153) and entitles the defendant to submit a constitutional 
complaint. Therefore, the courts must focus on the comparative importance of the specific 
rights that clash in each specific case, the justification for restricting each right must be 
taken into account and the proportionality test must be applied to each.109 While none of 
the rights has precedence over the other, under the balancing formula of the German 
Constitutional Court, adopted by its Slovak counterpart (see Chapter 6), in case of doubts 
or equal weight of the competing rights, there should be presumption in favour of freedom 
of expression (Barendt 2005, 226).110  
The following section examines how the competing interests are triangulated in 
substantive and procedural rules pertaining to civil personality/goodwill protection 
disputes. 
 
 
 
108 Observer and Guardian v. the United Kingdom, 26 November 1991, Series A No. 216, §59c. 
109 This is akin to the two-way balancing test applied by English courts in matters of conflict between 
rights protected under Articles 8 and 10 of the Convention. In Re S (FC) (a child) [2004] UKHL 47 
(§17), Lord Steyn described ‘the ultimate balancing test’ as follows: ‘First, neither article has as such 
precedence over the other. Secondly, where the values under the two articles are in conflict, an intense 
focus on the comparative importance of the specific rights being claimed in the individual case is 
necessary. Thirdly, the justifications for interfering with or restricting each right must be taken into 
account. Finally, the proportionality test must be applied to each’.  
110 In contrast there is no presumptive priority in English law when Articles 8 and 10 of the Convention 
come into conflict. 
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5.4.1 Standing, Liability and Requirements of Action 
The following section examines the rules governing standing, liability, the elements of a 
claim requirements and the statute of limitations to bring action. 
5.4.1.1 Standing 
The law offers protection to an individual’s personality, regardless of his/her race, 
nationality or social status. The right cannot be inherited; it ceases to exist upon death of 
each person. However, the law grants the spouse and children, or parents of a deceased 
person the right to protection of his/her personality. Civil law does not offer any special 
standing to public officials, the state or state symbols. While ministers cannot exercise 
the right to personality protection in relation to statements directed against the 
government (MCdo 46/2000), as individuals they and other public officials are entitled 
to defend their personality against unlawful publication without any limits on their legal 
standing. 
The law also grants protection to a legal entity’s reputation. According to Drgonec 
(2008, 281–83), public authorities such as the government, the president, parliament and 
local administration authorities are not entitled to file an action for goodwill protection. 
It could thus be argued that the law recognises the vital importance of freedom of 
expression and open criticism of government and public authorities, entities which have 
sufficient means available to defend themselves from criticism (Article 19 2000, 6–7).  
While identification by name is not necessary, the person or legal entity whose 
rights were violated can submit a civil claim as long as they can be clearly identified from 
the impugned statements (Kerecman 2009, 40; Vojčík 2010, 84). The law does not 
distinguish between libel and slander as the form of the infringement is irrelevant 
(Vondracek 1975, 285). Apparent anonymization of the subjects of stories published in 
the media through the use of initials instead of a full name does not remove liability as 
long as the injured party can be identified either from the context or pictures (Drgonec 
2013, 194). In cases where the rights of several persons/entities were violated by the same 
statement, each of the injured parties can exercise their right to personality/goodwill 
protection independently of the others (Kratochvíl 1965, 64). 
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5.4.1.2 Liability 
Liability falls on the media organisation as long as the statement’s author was in its 
employment and (demonstrably) acted under instruction within his/her duties. If the 
author is a third party, possessing no legal relationship with the media organisation, legal 
action can be aimed directly against him/her (Kerecman 2009, 35, 106) or against both 
him/her and the media organisation (Cirák 1994, 68).  
5.4.1.3 Elements of a Claim 
To establish a cause of action, the plaintiff is obliged to prove that the impugned statement 
concerned him/her and that the defendant was responsible for making it. In case of 
statements made in the media, it is sufficient to submit a copy of the impugned article or 
broadcast. The plaintiff also must prove that the defendant’s statement was objectively 
capable of posing a threat to his/her status within his/her family, at work or in society, 
regardless of whether they were made intentionally or unintentionally, knowingly or 
unknowingly (Kerecman 2009, 108–9; Doley and Mullis 2010, 1331). Personality and 
goodwill rights postulate strict liability (Vojčík 2010, 84). Fault need not be proved nor 
mentioned in the petition or pleadings (Kratochvíl 1965, 57). The rationale for the 
absence of fault requirement is that the interference, even if done in good faith or 
innocently, still impairs personality/goodwill rights. Given the potential debilitating 
consequences, through strict liability the law aims to provide the injured party with a 
means to restore reputation or intimate sphere in all cases where they have been violated 
(Vondracek 1975, 285, 1988, 24). Strict liability also enables the public to learn about the 
true state of affairs. It might become an issue for free speech interests if no public interest 
defence is available for journalists. 
Subjective perceptions are not decisive for determination of the meaning of the 
interference (Vondracek 1988, 27). An interference objectively capable of causing 
damage to one’s personality/goodwill has to be of such intensity that every reasonable 
person in the plaintiff’s situation would perceive it as a violation of his/her rights. While 
the law does not extend protection against trivial verbal insults, infringements in the 
media are generally considered to be objectively capable of causing considerable harm to 
one’s personality/goodwill (Kerecman 2003, 36).  
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As prevention is one of the purposes of civil personality/goodwill protection 
(Cirák 1994, 66), to establish a cause of action, the mere fact that the impugned statement 
threatened a person’s personality/goodwill rights is sufficient (Doley and Mullis 2010, 
1330). The plaintiff does not need to prove the falsity or actual damage suffered. 
According to judicial practice, a threat to an individual’s civic honour and dignity or an 
entity’s goodwill is only present if the interference threatens the injured party’s esteem 
and reputation in the eyes of other people (Cirák 1994, 65) and thus his/her relations with 
fellow citizens, standing and ‘self-assertion’ in society (Vondracek 1975, 288) or the legal 
entity’s trustworthiness. An unlawful use of one’s image or violation of privacy is able to 
cause non-material loss by itself.  
For an interference to be actionable a causal link (nexus) between the infringement 
and the threat or damage caused to the injured party’s personality/goodwill must exist. If 
damage to personality/goodwill does not occur, or one’s personality or a legal entity’s 
goodwill has not even been threatened as a result of publication, an unlawful infringement 
did not occur. This condition might be of particular importance if several media outlets 
simultaneously disseminate information about a person or entity, but if the information is 
treated differently by each outlet (Kerecman 2009, 42). 
Actionable violations in the media thus usually belong to statements aimed at the 
personal and moral integrity of a natural person, capable of causing objective damage to 
his/her dignity and civic honour. Publication of untruthful statements regarding a person 
that diminish his/her moral profile, characteristics and actions in the eyes of society 
qualify as unlawful. According to the Supreme Court, unless proved by a court verdict 
convicting someone of a criminal offence, a public statement labelling someone a 
criminal represents a serious violation of personality protection that usually entitles the 
injured party to seek damages for non-material loss (R 45/2000). Disproportionate 
criticism – publication of value judgments that lack factual basis and objectively pose a 
threat to one’s civic honour and dignity is also actionable (Doley and Mullis 2010, 1330–
1; Kerecman 2003, 35). Public disclosure of truthful statements relating to a person’s 
intimate or family life without prior consent is also unlawful. Production and use of 
photographs, illustrations, and audio or video recordings of an individual without prior 
consent – or unless used under the newsgathering licence and made in an appropriate 
manner – is equally unlawful. Recording and disclosure of one’s personal conversations 
is also actionable.  
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5.4.1.4 Statute of Limitation to Bring Action 
Actions relating to personality rights are not subject to a statute of limitation (Kerecman 
2009, 109; Doley and Mullis 2010, 1331; Vondracek 1975, 294). The law allows the 
injured party protection against each new infringement caused by repeat publication, 
because regardless of the time that has passed since the original publication, or between 
the original and repeat publication, it can still be dreadfully damaging for a person’s 
reputation. Simultaneously, the law recognises the concept of laches (Vondracek 1975, 
294). Unreasonable delay in asserting one’s claim may result in its dismissal. The time to 
bring an action for monetary compensation is limited to three years after the day the right 
could first have been exercised (Doley and Mullis 2010, 1331; Kerecman 2009, 109; 
Vozár 2015, 196). The law prevents actions being filed with undue delay. However, it is 
debatable whether after three years, the defendants would be able effectively to defend 
the claim as relevant evidence may no longer be available and the author might no longer 
be employed by the organisation. Indeed, most campaigners suggest that a year represents 
a more suitable period of limitation (Article 19 2000, 9; Glanville and Heawood 2009, 8-
9). 
5.4.2 Defences 
The following paragraphs examine the defences available to the media and journalists. 
As a general rule, an interference made with the consent of the injured party, carried out 
while fulfilling one’s legal duty or exercising one’s statutory right, or permitted by law is 
considered justified and non-actionable.  
5.4.2.1 Consent 
The defendant is not liable if he/she can prove that the plaintiff gave prior consent to the 
contested statement or action.  
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5.4.2.2 Employee Acting beyond His/Her Duties 
A publisher may avoid liability on the ground that the author of the defamatory or privacy 
violating statement acted beyond the scope of those duties vested in him/her by his/her 
contract of employment. In such a case, the journalist becomes liable for the impugned 
statement. 
5.4.2.3 Fulfilment of One’s Legal Duties 
A person is not liable for expression of a subjective opinion concerning the plaintiff stated 
in the course of a judicial or administrative hearing in the role of a witness or expert, or 
submitted within a criminal complaint (Cirák 1994, 65–6; Doley and Mullis 2010, 1332). 
5.4.2.4 Information Provided by Public Authorities 
From 2008 when the new Press Act was adopted, publishers and news agencies have not 
been liable for the content of information provided by public authorities as long as its 
original content remained unchanged. 
5.4.2.5 Statutory Newsgathering Licence 
The use, without prior consent, of images, pictorial, and sound recordings for purposes 
of scientific research, artistic application and for purposes of newsgathering and reporting 
is allowed insofar as it does not impinge the legitimate interests of the person concerned. 
What represents legitimate interests is to be established by reference to reasonable 
standards, taking the circumstances of the individual case into account (Vondracek 1988, 
31). The purpose of the statutory newsgathering licence is to promote speedy 
dissemination of news in accordance with the watchdog role of the media. Since 
journalistic products other than news are not privileged, any of the protected materials 
may be used within a different journalistic genre, such as current affairs, only with the 
concerned person’s prior consent. Since the lines between news reports and other 
journalistic genres are blurred, however, it is not always easy to identify whether the 
media have acted within the statutory licence (see Drgonec 2013, 155–57). 
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The newsgathering licence does not apply to images and video recordings of 
judges. With the aim of safeguarding proper functioning of the judiciary, the Act on 
Judges and Lay Judges (Act No. 385/2000 Coll.) stipulates that ‘without the judge’s 
consent, it is not permitted to publish his/her face and residence’. The same applies to 
family members of the judge, if ‘required for an effective protection of the judge and his 
family, and if his family members agree’. A judge also has ‘the right for appropriate 
confidentiality of information about his/her person and his/her family’. 
5.4.2.6 Truth 
A defendant can avoid liability for the publication of defamatory factual statements by 
using the defence of truth. The placement of the burden of proof in relation to defamatory 
facts in personality/goodwill protection on the defendant is an expression of the 
importance attributed to personality rights. Nevertheless, some legal scholars have 
challenged the principle of the presumption of falsity in relation to disputes involving the 
media as being an incorrect interpretation of the law. In the interest of freedom of 
expression and of the press, they argue for reallocation of the burden of proof from the 
defendant to the plaintiff, or for sharing of the burden between the two parties (Holländer, 
1993; Drgonec 2013, 293–95).  
Even if founded on an incorrect interpretation of the law, the presumption of 
falsity in defamation disputes is an established standard in civil and common law 
jurisdictions around the world. The major exception to this standard is the US law. 
However, even there, the majority of states retain the presumption of falsity in cases 
involving private plaintiffs suing non-media defendants on matters of private concern. 
Australia, which conducted a major modernisation of defamation law in the 2000s, for 
instance, retained the presumption of falsity (Mullis and Scott 2009, 177). The ECtHR 
has also stated on several occasions that to place the burden of proof on the defendants 
was not a violation of Article 10 (see McGonagle 2016, 48). In line with the principle of 
responsible journalism, the rationale behind the presumption of falsity in defamation 
cases is that it is incumbent upon the defendant as the publisher of the allegedly 
defamatory statements to have verified the facts before publishing. The rule thus forces 
the publisher, when deciding whether or not to publish, to focus on whether the statement 
can be justified. If a potentially harmful claim cannot be justified, the unequivocal public 
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interest permitting its publication is difficult to identify. If such an allegation can only 
partly be justified or if provable facts support only an appeal for further investigation, 
then no statements that jump to wider conclusions should be published. As Mullis and 
Scott (2009, 177) have argued, ‘[w]ithout such a legal responsibility, speech would 
become cheap and the proper restraints placed on the media, or indeed any person, when 
making serious allegations would be undesirably loosened’ While it might be difficult for 
the defendant to prove the truth of some allegations in court, particularly against powerful 
public plaintiffs, it is hardly the case –  as proponents of the reallocation of burden of 
proof claim – that the plaintiff will always be better placed to demonstrate the falsity of 
the impugned statements (Ibid., 177).  
What seems to be of more significance for a proper accommodation of the private 
and public interests in reputation, privacy and freedom of expression, is whether courts 
apply too rigid a standard of proof in relation to the truthfulness of published facts, 
particularly on matters of public interest.111 The standard of proof required by ordinary 
courts and its effects on freedom of expression is examined in Chapter 6.  
The fact that Slovak civil law poses strict liability and that a defence of good faith 
or reasonable publication is not recognised even when concerning publication on issues 
of public interest (Kerecman 2009, 35) might also disproportionately tilt the balance 
against free speech interests. On the other hand, as noted above, in the case of conflict 
between two constitutionally protected interests, the courts need to apply the 
proportionality test on the circumstances of the given case. They also must not act 
incompatibly with the Convention and, in reaching their decision, must take account of 
relevant ECtHR jurisprudence. The ECtHR, in contrast to Slovak civil law, has repeatedly 
affirmed that the media, when pursuing their watchdog function, should be able to apply 
a defence of reasonable publication on matters of public interest. The defence is available 
when information was published in good faith in the belief that it was in the public interest 
to do so and reasonable steps were taken to verify the information and, where suitable, to 
give the concerned person an opportunity to express his/her position (McGonagle 2016, 
46). 
 
 
 
111 E.g. Kasabova v. Bulgaria, No. 22385/03, 19 April 2011, §61-62. 
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5.4.2.7 Lawful Criticism 
Drawing on the ECtHR’s case-law, Slovak legal order distinguishes between value 
judgments and factual statements. In Lingens v. Austria,112 the ECtHR argued that while 
the existence of facts can be demonstrated, the truth of value judgments is not susceptible 
of proof. The Court held that the requirement that the defendant prove the truth of an 
allegedly defamatory opinion violates his right to impart ideas as well as the public’s right 
to receive ideas guaranteed by Article 10 of the Convention. As the Court has reiterated 
on numerous occasions, ‘even a value judgment without any factual basis to support it 
may be excessive’.113 While the existence of the factual basis for a value judgment is a 
crucial consideration, the proportionality of a value judgment also depends on its nature 
and the circumstance of the case (McGonagle 2016, 26).  
To prove the proportionality and thus lawfulness of impugned value judgments, 
the defendant can use the defence of permissible or truthful criticism. The primary 
criterion for the success of the defence is for the value judgment to possess a ‘factual 
basis’. The defendant thus needs to prove that the criticism was sound and based on 
ascertained facts (Kerecman 2009, 109). The manner in which the value judgment was 
made is also of importance. Courts have found that criticism is allowed only if it does not 
overstep the limits of sound and fair comment and does not needlessly inflict distress, i.e., 
it must be proportionate. The concept of ‘sound and fair comment’ was developed long 
before any meaningful guarantees of freedom of expression existed, and it rather diverges 
from the established ECtHR case-law principles. Even criticism in the public interest 
must contain true and concrete facts in such a way that the reader or viewer can form his 
own opinion. Opinions which are not supported by facts, as well as opinions that contain 
abusive words, are inadmissible. Expressions like ‘rogue’, ‘hypocrite’, and ‘unprincipled’ 
cannot be considered sound and fair comment (Vondracek 1975, 287–89). In contrast, the 
ECtHR has repeatedly stated that in ‘the interest of democratic society in enabling the 
press to exercise its vital role of “public watchdog” in imparting information of serious 
public concern’, journalists may resort to ‘a degree of exaggeration, or even 
 
 
 
112 Lingens v. Austria, 8 July 1986, Series A No. 103, § 46. 
113 Jerusalem v. Austria, No. 26958/95, ECHR 2001-II, § 43. 
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provocation’.114 Such exaggeration or provocation, however, must not exceed the 
boundaries of Article 10.115 Nonetheless, as with the defence of reasonable publication, 
courts are required to find a fair balance in disputes that involve conflict between the 
private and public interests in reputation, privacy and freedom of speech and thus cannot 
apply the Civil Code provisions in isolation. Equally, they need to take account of 
established ECtHR law.  
5.4.2.8 Publication did not Concern Plaintiff’s Intimate Sphere 
The defences of truth and permissible criticism cannot be applied in relation to factual 
statements or value judgments that concern the plaintiff’s intimate or family life. To 
exonerate himself/herself of liability in respect of such statements (whether facts or value 
judgments), the defendant needs to prove that they did not impinge on the plaintiff’s 
intimate sphere (Holländer, 1993; cited in Drgonec 2013, 293). Given the devastating 
consequences that disclosure of intimate details might have on the injured party and the 
fact that the public typically has little interest in learning about such details, the stringency 
of the law in this respect seems appropriate. 
5.4.2.9 Public Figure Defence 
The Civil Code does not recognise exemptions in relation to the rights to the protection 
of honour, dignity and privacy of public figures. In 2001, the Constitutional Court 
introduced a distinction between public and private figures when it stated that when 
reaching an appropriate balance between the right to information and right to privacy, it 
was ‘accepted that public figures are subject to limits upon their private sphere, as a result 
of which the level of protection of their personality rights is proportionately reduced’ (II. 
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ÚS 44/2000, 8). The Court also found that public figures ‘must be aware that they will be 
subject to greater public scrutiny and will have to accept the exercise of the public’s right 
to information at least within the extent of the conduct of their constitutional or lawful 
powers in public, or in contact with the public’ (Ibid.). In their decision-making, ordinary 
courts thus ought to take into account the fact that the protection of honour, dignity and 
privacy of public figures is narrower than that of private individuals. 
5.4.3 Remedies 
Remedies are of crucial importance for properly balancing the individual and public 
interests in reputation, privacy and expression. Remedies available to plaintiffs for 
infringements with their rights should provide effective vindication to their reputations. 
They should also provide adequate compensation for the damage suffered by the injured 
party. This is established on a case by case basis. At the same time, remedies should not 
serve as a means of personal enrichment, as this could produce an undesirable chill on 
matters of public interest. Moreover, remedies should ensure that the public learns the 
truth. 
Several different types of remedies for non-material loss (non-pecuniary damage), 
as well as monetary compensation for material loss (pecuniary damages) suffered as a 
result of the unlawful infringement are available to plaintiffs in personality and goodwill 
protection disputes. Plaintiffs may be awarded a combination of remedies. In reaching its 
decision in relation to remedies, the court must take into consideration the circumstances 
under which the infringement occurred (Vojčík 2010, 84).  
5.4.3.1 Preliminary Measures 
Courts may grant preliminary measures prior to trial upon application ‘if the situation of 
the parties must be temporarily adjusted or if it fears that the execution of the judicial 
decision could be endangered’ (CCP, Section 74). Courts are obliged to interpret all laws 
in accordance with the Constitution, including Article 26 (3-4) which stipulates that 
censorship shall be prohibited and that the right to freedom of expression may be 
restricted by a law only if necessary in a democratic society. In practice, due to the lack 
of a binding definition of censorship, courts do not dismiss motions for preliminary 
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measures on the grounds of incompatibility with Article 26(3), which, according to some 
legal scholars, is the only option a court has (Drgonec 2013, 81).  
5.4.3.2 Actio Prohibitoria 
The court may order the defendant immediately to refrain from unlawfully interfering 
with the plaintiff’s rights. The plaintiff may claim not only the cessation of an action in 
progress but also interdiction of an action which the defendant threatens or attempts to 
commit (Vondracek 1988, 32). Since the court order is preventive in nature, the primary 
requirement for this type of action is that the interference is still occurring, that it has been 
repeated, or that there is evidence suggesting the risk of recurrence (Cirák 1994, 68; Doley 
and Mullis 2010, 1332).  
5.4.3.3 Action for Restoration 
The plaintiff may request the removal of the consequences of an unlawful infringement 
or the restoration to the previous state of affairs. The redress is to be carried out in a 
manner intended to match the form in which the violation occurred. The action is 
enforceable only if the consequences of the violation still exist and their removal is 
possible (Doley and Mullis 2010, 1332). Examples include an order for the return of a 
photograph or to retract untrue statements (Cirák 1994, 69; Vondracek 1988, 32).  
5.4.3.4 Declaration of Falsity 
The plaintiff may also seek an official judicial declaration as to the falsity of the 
defendant’s defamatory statements (Doley and Mullis 2010, 1332). 
5.4.3.5 Action for Satisfaction 
If the above remedies are found insufficient given the gravity of the infringement, the 
plaintiff may also seek an award of appropriate compensation, or ‘satisfaction’ in the 
Slovak legal parlance. In an action for moral satisfaction, the defendant may be ordered 
  183 
to publish an apology, a retraction or the court’s judgment free of charge. As long as the 
defendant is unable to prove the lawful nature of the infringement, no further examination 
of evidence is necessary for the court to oblige him/her to apologise to the plaintiff 
(Kerecman 2009, 109), or to grant any of the above remedies. 
A plaintiff may seek monetary compensation for non-material loss if moral 
satisfaction is deemed insufficient given the extent of the harm suffered by the plaintiff, 
particularly because his/her dignity and position in society has been considerably 
diminished, or if an award of moral satisfaction risked further diminishing the plaintiff’s 
civic esteem (Cirák 1994, 70). There are no limits on the award. The plaintiff, however, 
must prove that moral satisfaction does not suffice due to the severity of the harm 
suffered. The harm does not need to consist of lowering of the plaintiff’s civic esteem, 
particularly if caused by invasion of privacy or unlawful publication of a photograph of 
personal nature (3 Cdo 137/2008, 12-13). 
To substantiate his/her claim, the plaintiff must submit evidence, including 
documentary evidence or witness testimony, that establishes the circumstances of the 
infringement, the seriousness of the damage suffered, and the existence of a causal link 
between the violation and the consequences. In practice, the plaintiff may face difficulties 
when proving the consequences, particularly if witness statements are the only source of 
evidence because friends and associates of the plaintiff who are knowledgeable about the 
infringement are unlikely to claim convincingly that their opinion about the plaintiff had 
changed as a consequence (Kerecman 2009, 109). The defendant may challenge the 
plaintiff’s evidence and question the credibility of his/her witnesses by drawing attention 
to inaccuracies and conflicts in their statements. The defendant may also submit evidence 
to prove that the consequences claimed by the plaintiff have not occurred. If the plaintiff 
fails to satisfy the burden of proof, the court will dismiss his/her claim for monetary 
compensation.   
Should the court find that the plaintiff has only partially proved the severity of the 
consequences of the infringement, it can award lower damages. The court is not allowed 
to go ultra petitum and exceed the amount sought by the plaintiff (Kerecman 2009, 109). 
The level of non-pecuniary damages is entirely determined upon the court’s discretion, 
but must be based on logical and legitimate arguments. The law is silent on the conditions 
under which non-material loss qualifies as considerable. Doctrine suggests that relevant 
factors which the court must take into consideration include the intensity of the 
defamatory statement or invasive action and the duration and scope of its negative effects 
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on the plaintiff’s intimate sphere and position in society. Contrary to occasional 
arguments of free speech campaigners, the unlimited nature of non-pecuniary award itself 
does not necessarily disproportionately tilt the balance towards personality/goodwill 
protection. While astronomical damages awards might undoubtedly produce an invidious 
chilling effect as media organisations and professionals will want to avoid the risk of 
litigation, setting the limits too low might bar plaintiffs from adequate compensation and 
jeopardise the law’s function of discouraging irresponsible journalism (Mullis and Scott 
2009, 178). 
5.4.3.6 Pecuniary Damages 
Liability for pecuniary loss exists when the defendant acted intentionally or recklessly. 
The plaintiff is required to prove that the impugned statement caused a calculable damage 
to his/her personal income or tangible or intangible property. The mere existence of a 
threat of damage is insufficient.  
5.4.4 Process and Costs Rules  
The areas of process – particularly insofar as it can result in attenuated and protracted 
proceedings – and costs are often key problems of defamation and privacy regimes, and 
can have undesirable consequences for the private and public interests in reputation, 
privacy and expression. Any legal regime that seeks appropriately to triangulate the 
competing interests must have procedural rules in place to guard against unwarranted or 
inordinate delays in court proceedings and to secure access to justice for all parties. 
5.4.4.1 Safeguards against Inordinate Delays 
Between 1995 and 1997, lawmakers obliged defendants in personality (not goodwill) 
protection disputes to comment on the petition and adduce evidence of truth within thirty 
days from the day the petition was served. If he/she failed to do so, the court decided 
based on the plaintiff’s statements contained within the petition. While it was presumably 
intended to speed up proceedings, this obligation significantly worsened the defendant’s 
procedural standing, not least because evidence of truth is inadmissible in case of value 
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judgments (Drgonec 2013, 301). The requirement was shortly declared in breach of the 
Constitution (PL. ÚS 9/96). 
Drawing on an earlier procedural innovation of the Czech legal system (MS SR 
2008), in 2008, Slovak legislators anchored the principle of concentration of proceedings 
in relation to personality (not goodwill) protection that obliges parties to describe decisive 
circumstances regarding the merit of the matter and adduce evidence by the end of the 
first hearing. The court is not required to assess later submitted or adduced evidence, 
unless it only becomes apparent after the first hearing and simultaneously challenges the 
credibility of previously examined evidence. The court is obliged to instruct the parties 
about their obligations and the consequences of non-compliance no later than in the 
summons to the first hearing. The court may also request each party to pay a security on 
evidence adduced by the party or ordered by the court to ascertain the facts put forward 
by the party, which might limit the number of unnecessary procedural acts adduced and 
increase the speed and effectiveness of proceedings (Mazák 2002, 318). 
For the most part of the studied period, no statutory limits to adjudication time 
applied. The now repealed Section 200i of the CCP, obliged courts to start personality 
protection proceedings within thirty days and adjudicate within one year from the 
submission of the petition. The provision created practical difficulties for courts and in 
2002 was found in violation of the right to a fair trial by the Constitutional Court (PL. ÚS 
25/01) and was subsequently repealed.  
Another rule partially aimed at addressing delays in proceedings was adopted in 
2013. It concerned restrictions on legal representation in personality protection (not 
goodwill protection) disputes, whereby parties were no longer to entrust their 
representation to another citizen having legal capacity, but could only represent 
themselves or employ a qualified lawyer (MS SR 2012). 
5.4.4.2 Court Jurisdiction 
Rules determining court jurisdiction, or ‘court competence’ in the Slovak legal parlance, 
can be very influential in the balancing of freedom of expression with reputational and 
privacy rights, as they affect the ability of the parties to access justice. Lax jurisdictional 
rules might lead to the abusive practice of ‘libel tourism’. 
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The system of ordinary courts in Slovakia consists of the Supreme Court, which 
is the highest judicial authority in the country, of regional courts and district courts. The 
Constitutional Court oversees compliance with the constitution. During the studied 
period, goodwill protection matters were heard before the district court in the defendant’s 
domicile like most other civil disputes. Jurisdiction in personality protection disputes, 
however, changed multiple times. Between 1983 and 1994, regional courts in the 
defendant’s domicile had substantive competence to decide personality protection 
disputes, thereafter the competence shifted to the defendant’s district court. Between 
December 1995 and August 2003 and then again between July 2007 and December 2011 
personality protection disputes were held before the plaintiff’s court of general 
jurisdiction. Since January 2012, all personality and goodwill protection disputes were 
heard before the district court in the defendant’s domicile.  
Changing court competence in personality protection cases to the plaintiff’s court 
might increase individuals’ access to justice. Since defendants usually belong to large 
media organisations, it should not put a disproportionate burden on their access to justice. 
The shift might, however, affect the balancing exercise as judges in the plaintiff’s local 
court might exhibit an – albeit unconscious – bias in his/her favour, or even allow for 
abuses of the law by plaintiffs who are able to use their informal local networks to tilt the 
litigation outcome in their favour. Keeping jurisdiction at the defendant’s domicile court 
might further the quality of reasoning and thus reduce perceptions of arbitrariness of 
decisions because judges in seats of large media organisations will be better able to gain 
more expertise in this area of law.  
Unsuccessful parties at first instance may appeal the decision at regional level, 
where the risk of judicial bias is arguably much reduced. The Supreme Court decides 
appeals against the decisions of regional courts acting as first-instance courts, and acts as 
court of cassation for appeals to appellate court decisions. The appeal court upholds the 
decision of the first-instance court if substantively correct. The appeal court can set the 
decision aside if the court of first-instance assessed the matter wrongly because it applied 
an incorrect provision and insufficiently established the facts of the case. If the appeal 
court sets aside the decision, it may return the case to the first-instance court for further 
proceedings, interrupt, discontinue the proceedings or submit the case to a body under the 
competence of which the case falls. If the conditions for upholding or setting aside are 
not met, the appeal court can change the first-instance decision. Having exhausted all 
possibilities of appeal in ordinary courts after the decision has become final, if the 
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unsuccessful party has reasons to believe that her fundamental rights or freedoms have 
been infringed by the decisions of ordinary courts, it can lodge a complaint before the 
Constitutional Court. If the Constitutional Court accepts the complaint, it will rule that 
the rights and freedoms were infringed, and cancels the decision. The Court may also 
return the matter for further proceedings or award an adequate financial satisfaction. 
5.4.4.3 Costs of Proceedings 
Costs in personality/goodwill protection disputes include court fees, lawyer’s fees, costs 
of furnishing evidence, translation/interpretation fees and the parties’ and lawyers’ out-
of-pocket/cash expenses. Parties cover their own costs during proceedings. The court 
typically orders the losing party to reimburse the winning side’s costs on top of non-
pecuniary damages.116 In case of settlement, no party is entitled to costs reimbursement, 
but the parties are allowed to reach a different arrangement among themselves. The costs 
regime thus tries to motivate the parties to agree on an early settlement.  
Only the court fee covered by the plaintiff is paid before the commencement of 
proceedings. Generally, court fees are set as a percentage of the value of the dispute. Since 
July 2007 plaintiffs in personality protection proceedings (not goodwill) have been 
required to pay only half of the percentage applicable in other disputes.117 As their upfront 
costs were considerably reduced, the plaintiffs’ access to justice undoubtedly improved. 
Upon a motion filed by the party, the court may exempt the party in material need from 
all or part of court fees as long as the petition does not constitute an arbitrary or manifestly 
unfounded attempt at exercising or defending his/her rights. The party who meets the 
 
 
 
116 In personality protection disputes, the court may still award full costs reimbursement if the 
infringement was unlawful, but the plaintiff was only partially successful in his/her claim for non-
pecuniary damages (Vozár et al. 2015, 201–4). 
117 In 2017, unless exempt, a plaintiff was required to pay 66 Euro in personality protection disputes 
for moral satisfaction or 66 euro plus 3% of the amount of non-pecuniary damages claimed in 
proceedings before district and regional courts. The percentage increased to 6% for Supreme Court 
proceedings. The maximum court fee payable was 16, 596.50 euro. In December 2005, the court fee 
in personality protection dispute for non-pecuniary damages heard at first instance was 66 euro plus 
5% of the claimed damages amount. 
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waiver criteria may upon request also be appointed a lawyer, whereby the costs of 
representation and his/her expenses are born by the state.118  
Lawyer’s fees are typically determined by agreement with the client. There are 
four categories of contract fees: hourly-based fees, retainer fees, a success fee no higher 
than 20% of the final compensation won, and a tariff rate agreed at a different level than 
the basic tariff rate stipulated by law. A success fee arrangement is rather unusual in 
personality protection cases against the media. Most lawyers prefer to charge fees on an 
hourly basis (significantly higher than the basic tariff fee), because personality/goodwill 
protection involves considerable time and resources. Some firms providing legal counsel 
for large media companies, including vetting, work on the basis of a retainer fee. This 
does not mean that private plaintiffs would not be able to access justice as many lawyers 
determine their fees on a case by case basis and even sizeable commercial law firms might 
be willing to charge plaintiffs based on the statutory basic tariff. 
If the parties fail to reach an agreement on a contractual basis, the amount is 
determined by multiplying the basic tariff rate by the number of acts or legal services the 
lawyer has provided. On average, a personality protection dispute at the first instance 
could entail five legal acts (accepting legal representation, filing a motion to commence 
proceedings and attendance at three hearings). It is important to note that in these disputes, 
final decision is rarely reached at the first instance, as parties tend to appeal.  
The basic tariff relating to personality protection (but not goodwill protection) has 
been subject to several amendments. Until 2006 it was set as a percentage of the value of 
the dispute, i.e. the amount of non-pecuniary damages claimed. This practice was 
criticised by legal scholars because, given its nature, it was impossible to express the 
value of personality rights in monetary terms (Kerecman 2009, 110). In December 2005, 
lawyer’s fees were set at 16.60 euro for each legal act in personality protection disputes 
for moral satisfaction only. For non-pecuniary damages claim of 33,194 euro,119 the tariff 
fee was 486.29 euro. Between January 2006 and May 2009, the basic tariff was set at 
 
 
 
118 In 2017, a natural person was eligible for legal aid if his/her monthly income was lower than 277.33 
euro and if he/she could not afford to pay for legal services with his/her assets. A natural person with 
income between 277.33 and 316.94 euro unable to pay for legal services with his/her assets was 
eligible for legal aid covering 80% of the costs. 
119 Equivalent to 1 million Slovak crowns. 
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371.94 and 663.88 euro respectively, depending on whether non-pecuniary damages were 
claimed or not, but irrespective of their amount. If unsuccessful, the parties faced 
reimbursing the other party’s court and lawyer’s fees in thousands of euro. As a result, 
individual plaintiffs on average income were effectively barred from access to justice in 
personality protection cases.120  
In June 2009, the basic tariff in personality protection disputes was significantly 
reduced to 61.41 euro for moral satisfaction claims and 91.29 euro for non-pecuniary 
damages claims, thus improving actual access to justice for ordinary plaintiffs and 
reducing the chill of high costs reimbursement for media defendants.121  
5.5 Criminal Personality Protection 
Reputation and privacy protection is anchored in several provisions of the Criminal Code 
(Act No. 300/2005 Coll.). Criminal law protection is only afforded to natural persons 
(Čentéš 2015, 159-60). Liability falls on natural persons. Journalists thus may become 
personally liable for criminal defamation. Special provisions protecting the reputation of 
national or foreign public officials, heads of states, or the state and its symbols were 
gradually revoked during the early 2000s (Drgonec 2013, 381–83).122 The most 
frequently invoked by plaintiffs are the provisions in Section 373 (1-3) concerning 
criminal defamation that state: ‘Any person who communicates a false information about 
another likely to considerably damage the respect of fellow citizens for such a person, 
damage his career and business, disturb his family relations, or cause him other serious 
harm’ commits a crime of defamation, and ‘shall be liable to a term of imprisonment of 
up to two years.’ In case the offence is committed in public, i.e. in the media, or causes 
 
 
 
120 Average monthly income in Slovakia in 2006 was 622.75 euro. See 
http://archiv.statistics.sk/html/showdoc.dodocid=8123.html. Lawyers’ fees in a personality protection 
case held before a district court that entailed three hearings were expected to reach 2,422 euro if 
commenced in December 2005 and 3,330 euro if commenced between 2006 and May 2009. 
121 Lawyers’ fees in a personality protection case held before a district court that entailed three hearings 
and commenced in 2017 were expected at 456 euro. 
122 Slovakia retains a provision protecting the honour and reputation of parliamentarians during war 
time.   
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the injured party substantial damage (2,660 euro), the offender faces a term of 
imprisonment of one to five years. If communication of the defamatory information 
causes the injured party large-scale damage (133,000 euro), loss of job, collapse of his/her 
business or divorce, the offender is liable to imprisonment between three and eight years 
(Čentéš 2015, 162). In contrast to provisions valid until 2005, defamation committed 
through the media does not fall into a special category and fines or professional 
disqualification of journalists are no longer applicable (CDMSI 2012, 100). Besides 
criminal sanctions, courts may oblige the offender to pay pecuniary damages or apologise 
to the plaintiff.  
For establishing criminal liability, it is irrelevant whether the defamed person was 
aware of the act of defamation, realized the potential harm to his/her civic esteem or 
wished to initiate proceedings (Kerecman 2009, 52), or whether any considerable harm 
actually occurred (Čentéš 2015, 161). Law enforcement authorities must prove that the 
impugned information was communicated to at least one person other than the injured 
party; that it was false;123 capable of causing considerable damage to the defamed 
individual’s civic esteem, to his/her career and business, disturb his/her family relations, 
or cause him/her other serious harm; and that there was a causal link between 
communicating the information and the potential damage (Kerecman 2009, 52; Čentéš 
2015, 160-62). Proving that the offender acted with ‘actual malice’ is also crucial for 
establishing the criminal nature of the impugned statement (Doley and Mullis 2010, 1334) 
as criminal defamation needs to be committed with intent, as opposed to mere negligence.  
5.6 Discursive Remedies under Media Law 
The 2008 Press Act (Act No. 167/2008) introduced the rights of correction and reply.124 
The rights can be exercised in relation to factual statements by all natural persons (Vozár, 
 
 
 
123 Čentéš argued that criminal liability only applies to factual statements because value judgments are 
not subject to proof (2015, 161). 
124 Under the 1961 press law, citizens, scientific and cultural institutions, and state organs whose 
honour was impinged upon by false or truth-distorting information published in the media could 
request a correction free of charge. 
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Valko, and Lapšanský 2009, 87) and legal entities identifiable from the disputed 
statement within 30 days of publication. Since the Act’s 2011 amendment, public 
functionaries and legal entities such as political parties lost the right of reply in relation 
to factual statements concerning their, or their leaders’ political activities.   
The right of correction strives to protect individual rights injured by the 
publication of untrue statements and to safeguard the public’s right to receive ‘truthful 
information’ (MK SR 2008, 9). The claimant is entitled to demand publication of a 
correction of false factual statement about him/her, even if the latter is not damaging to 
his/her honour, dignity, privacy or good name. In the text of the correction, the claimant 
presents the true state of affairs, without including the publisher’s apology or value 
judgments about the impugned statements (Ibid., 10). After the 2011 amendment, the 
right ceased to exist in relation to a statement for which a reply has been published.  
The right of reply purports to secure an equal footing for persons whose 
reputational and privacy rights have been violated and afford them the right to express 
their own viewpoint in an equivalent space and length (Ibid., 11). The right is granted in 
relation to a false, incomplete or truth-distorting statement that impinges on the honour, 
dignity or privacy, or good name of the claimant.125 The text of a reply must be limited 
to factual statements that deny, complement, add detail or explain the impugned 
statement, and be proportionate in length to the original article (Ibid., 12; Vozár, Valko, 
and Lapšanský 2009, 88).  
The publisher is obliged to print the reply or correction free of charge with no 
interpolations or omissions, in the same periodical in an equivalent position and the same 
format as the impugned statement. Replies must be published within three, corrections 
within eight days of the request’s receipt. The publisher is not entitled to print any related 
text containing his/her value judgment. The publisher may reject requests that fail to 
comply with the formal requirements (Vozár, Valko, and Lapšanský 2009, 78) or if he/she 
has already published a related correction, reply or supplementary information. The 
publisher is not obliged to print a correction if he/she can demonstrate the truth of the 
impugned statement. Replies and corrections contrary to law and good morals, injurious 
 
 
 
125 Before the 2011 amendment, the truthfulness of the statement was irrelevant for the publisher’s 
liability.  
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to lawful rights and interests of third parties do not have to be published. The publisher 
is not obliged to let the claimant know about his/her decision. If the publisher rejects 
publication or fails to comply with any of the statutory conditions, the claimant can file 
civil action for publication. Until the 2011 amendment, the claimant was entitled to 
demand proportionate monetary compensation between 1,660 and 4, 979 euro.  
The right of correction under the Broadcasting Act (Act No. 308/2000 Coll.) is 
broader than under press law. This difference can arguably be justified by the much wider 
reach of electronic media and thus the potentially much more severe reputational damage. 
Every legal entity or natural person is afforded the right to request a correction to any 
broadcast that included false or distorted information concerning him/her. Commentators 
disagree whether the right applies only to false and truth-distorting factual statements 
(Kerecman 2009, 104) or whether it also extends to truth-distorting value judgments 
(Drgonec 2013, 135).  
The broadcaster is obliged to broadcast justified corrections within eight days of 
receipt of the request in a proportionate form and extent as part of the same programme 
or in an equally valuable airtime. The broadcaster may reject a request if broadcasting the 
correction would constitute a crime or another administrative offence, if its text is 
contrary to good morals or infringes the rights and legally protected interests of a third 
party, or if the broadcaster has aired a correction on their own initiative. The broadcaster 
also does not have to satisfy the claimant’s request if able to prove the truthfulness of the 
impugned information. The broadcaster is not bound to inform the claimants of his 
decision. If the broadcaster fails to broadcast the correction, the claimant may file action 
for publication, without any entitlement for monetary compensation in case of unlawful 
rejection of his/her request (Ibid., 133-34).  
5.7 Conclusion 
This chapter examined the constitutional and statutory protections of reputation, privacy 
and freedom of expression in force during the studied period. The chapter also analysed 
the extent to which the rights are triangulated in key substantial and procedural rules in 
civil defamation or privacy intrusion disputes. The analysis was done through the optics 
of fairness, certainty and effectiveness of the triangulation within the statutes. 
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Fairness 
Reputation, privacy and freedom of expression all enjoy protection under international 
and constitutional law. Since the 1960s, the Slovak legal order has recognised the 
monistic concept of personality rights, which include the rights to civic honour, human 
dignity and privacy. The concept of goodwill in the meaning of property has been 
recognised in civil and constitutional law since the early 1990s. The rights to freedom of 
expression and information have equally been guaranteed in the Constitution and 
international law since the early 1990s. In case of a conflict, none of the rights has 
precedence over another. The private and public interests need to be fairly balanced 
through the proportionality test based on the circumstances of the given case. If the weight 
assigned to the need to protect personality/goodwill rights is on the same level as the need 
to protect freedom of expression, the presumption should be in favour of the latter. Such 
constitutional design seems to fairly triangulate the conflicting interests. 
On balance, the substantive and procedural rules governing legal standing, 
liability, burden of proof and remedies allow for fair triangulation of the competing 
interests. The wide range of available remedies allows for reputational vindication, 
correction of misinformation and provides monetary compensation for non-material loss, 
which, however, is not presumed but must be proved by the plaintiff. The law forces the 
media towards responsible conduct as they face financial sanctions for unlawful 
publication. The absence of a statutory reasonable publication defence by itself might not 
be an issue for the private and public interests in expression, as long as the civil provisions 
are interpreted and applied in accordance with the Constitution and the Convention. 
According to academic research and higher courts, as discussed in Chapter 2, 
judges’ personal attitudes might taint their legal judgement in cases that require ad hoc 
balancing. The lack of a clear conception of freedom of expression in the Slovak legal 
system, the fact that its meaningful guarantees were only anchored decades after 
personality protection was introduced and the perceived prevalence of clientelism in the 
judiciary posed questions whether Slovak courts would be able to fairly balance the 
competing interests rather than overemphasising the need to protect reputation and 
privacy rights at the expense of freedom of expression. However, because the balancing 
by courts might change over time and the legal system offers safeguards against judicial 
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bias, including recusals, expectation of fully reasoned judgments and the availability of 
judicial appeal for dissatisfied parties, one cannot draw sweeping conclusions at this 
point. 
Some of the provisions potentially open the regime to abuse, particularly on the 
part of plaintiffs. The non-existent cap on non-pecuniary damages awards, coupled with 
the relatively easily complied with requirements to establish a cause of action and 
lowering of the court fee, might incentivise plaintiffs seeking personal riches or 
intimidation of the media to file actions for large damages for defamatory but legitimate 
publications. At the same time, the absence of limits on damages forces the media towards 
greater responsibility, as too low a cap might lead to sensationalist journalism at the 
expense of the interests in reputation and privacy and the public’s ability to receive 
accurate information on issues of general interest. Lastly, setting court jurisdiction at the 
plaintiff’s court of domicile, might encourage some plaintiffs to bring cases with little 
merit in the hope they can rely on the influence of their local informal networks. 
Following the amendments in the 2000s, the procedural rules seem to safeguard 
access to justice to all parties. The reduction in the court fees and in the basic tariff rate 
which serves as a basis for determining the prevailing party’s costs reimbursement, 
coupled with the availability of legal aid allows even impecunious plaintiffs to sue for 
personality protection. However, given the demanding nature of personality protection 
work, it is questionable, whether private plaintiffs, unable to pay for representation on an 
hourly basis, are able to secure qualified legal representation. This would not preclude 
them from representing themselves but would drastically reduce their chances at success 
in the dispute. The change in jurisdiction rules to the defendant’s court does not seem 
overly disadvantaging plaintiffs as it is the standard in most civil disputes. The reduction 
in the court fee and basic tariff rate for legal fees meant that media defendants did not 
face reimbursing the prevailing party’s legal fees that could exceed the damages award. 
As a consequence, the publishers’ right to freedom of expression and the public’s right to 
information would seem better protected. 
 
Certainty 
The fact that all the competing interests are constitutionally protected renders no other 
approach to balancing than weighing up the interest against each other on an ad hoc basis. 
As has been widely recognised in the academic literature (Barendt 2005, 205; Mullis 
2010a, 10-11) and as discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, regardless of the presumption in 
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favour of freedom of expression, this undoubtedly brings considerable uncertainty for 
parties who are unable to predict the outcome of litigation with a high level of confidence. 
The lack of a clear conception of the individual and societal values behind the right to 
freedom of expression increases the unpredictability of judicial decision-making as it is 
not clear which types of speech are protected and which are not. Coupled with the absence 
of statutory defence of reasonable publication, this provides very little clarity for 
publishers about the legality of their contemplated conduct and might deter them from 
expressing as they otherwise would have wanted, and might deprive the public from 
receiving valuable information.  
 
Effectiveness 
The procedural rules governing the statute of limitations for adducing evidence and legal 
representation adopted in the late 2000s and early 2010s might potentially reduce delays 
in proceedings. The change in jurisdiction rules bringing proceedings to the defendant’s 
domicile court might also contribute to the efficiency of proceedings. The changes to 
rules governing court jurisdiction might have affected the effectiveness of the 
personality/goodwill protection regime. In the absence of jurisdictional rules promoting 
specialisation of judges, given the potential for district court judges to gain expertise, 
keeping the jurisdiction at the domicile court of the defendant would seem optimal. The 
regime also provides individuals and entities with inexpensive discursive remedies under 
press and broadcasting law. While the provisions allow for a timely vindication of 
reputation and rectification of false or misleading statements, their rather stringent formal 
requirements might prevent ordinary plaintiffs without legal representation from 
effectively exercising their rights. At the same time, the absence and – in case of press 
corrections/replies – removal of entitlement for monetary compensation for unlawful 
rejection of publishing a reply/correction arguably reduced the level of protection for 
reputation and privacy as well as the public interest in freedom of expression, as media 
organisations face suboptimal sanctions. The withdrawal of the right of reply from public 
functionaries, aimed at eliminating its past abuse, might deprive the public from 
information essential for exercising their electoral rights. 
  
The above analysis has shown that the fairness, certainty and effectiveness seem to be 
reasonably anchored in the statute book pertaining to personality/goodwill protection 
disputes involving media-defendants. However, it has also been revealed that there is a 
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considerable risk that if the law-on-the-books is not properly interpreted and applied, the 
regime might be perceived as highly unfair and ineffective and liable to create undue legal 
uncertainty for the parties and thus unintended consequences for the protection of the 
private and public interest in reputation, privacy and freedom of expression. The principal 
protagonists’ experiences with and perceptions about the interpretation and application 
of the law by courts is discussed in the next chapter. 
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Section 3: Findings  
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 Fairness, Certainty and Effectiveness of 
Adjudication 
6.1 Introduction 
The previous two chapters outlined the context in which the personality/goodwill 
protection regime operated during the studied period. Chapter 4 set the operation of the 
personality/goodwill regime in the key socio-legal and media system developments, 
presented a quantifiable picture of the regime and introduced the principal protagonists 
on both the plaintiff and defendant sides. Chapter 5 examined the extent to which the 
private and public interests in reputation, privacy and freedom of expression were 
triangulated on the statute book. It concluded that the substantial and procedural rules 
provided adequate protection for the competing conflicting interests and that the 
personality/goodwill protection regime provided sufficient safeguards for a fair, 
predictable and efficient operation in disputes involving media-defendants. However, the 
chapter also found that the operation of the regime could be perceived as largely unfair, 
ineffective and unpredictable where the statutes were not interpreted and applied properly 
by courts. This could have detrimental consequences for any of the protected interests.  
This chapter explores the experiences and perceptions of judicial decision-making 
by plaintiffs, media managers and professionals and personality/goodwill protection 
lawyers. As seen in Chapter 2, academic literature suggests that fairness, certainty and 
effectiveness are the crucial attributes of adjudicatory practice affecting the plaintiffs’ 
decision to sue, and thus their ability to vindicate their reputations and put the record 
straight, and the defendants’ editorial decisions and thus for the quality of public 
discussion. In terms of fairness, the chapter investigates whether a clear bias in favour 
either of the protected interests or parties existed or whether the adjudicatory practice 
motivated parties to abuse the law.126 The views of the main stakeholders relating to the 
 
 
 
126 The issue of access to justice as perceived by the plaintiffs and defendants is discussed in the 
following chapter. 
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predictability of decision-making and what certainty it provided for the parties to allow 
them to make informed decisions about litigation and, in the case of defendants, about 
contemplated publication, will also be examined. The chapter also looks at the actors’ 
experiences with the length of personality/goodwill protection proceedings.  
Adopting a longitudinal perspective (see Chapter 2 and 3), it takes into account 
that adjudicatory practice changes over time, that traditional defamation and privacy 
regime that fails to properly reflect the importance of freedom of expression might 
become “constitutionalised” under the influence of international and domestic higher 
judicial authorities (see, e.g. Mullis and Scott 2012, 25-26). Recognising that operation 
of laws might be path dependent (Bannerman and Haggart 2015, 10; Pierson 2004, 4; 
Thelen 1999), it pays particular attention to watershed Constitutional Court and ECtHR 
decisions and their perceived impact on the adjudicatory practice of ordinary courts. The 
chapter seeks to answer the following overarching question: To what extent had, from the 
main protagonists’ perspective, the courts managed to fairly, predictably and promptly 
balance the competing rights in personality/goodwill protection disputes between 1996 
and 2016? 
Overall, the chapter paints a picture of a biased, unfair, arbitrary and unpredictable 
personality/goodwill protection regime riddled with delays in proceedings. It also 
investigates the reasons for the apparent malfunctioning of the regime, as suggested by 
the main protagonists in order to assist potential future policy initiatives aimed at 
improving the experience of all parties to a dispute. It finds a strong link between the 
prevalence of clientelism, corruption and informal practices within the society and the 
judiciary and the adversarial relationship between certain high-profile figures within the 
judiciary and media professional – the legacies of Slovakia’s democratisation path – and 
the apparent malfunctioning of the regime. 
6.2 Historically Unfair and Arbitrary Adjudication Practice 
Most lawyers, experts and editors interviewed argued that the domestic and international 
statutes provided appropriate instruments for triangulating private and public interests in 
reputation, privacy and expression. Ringier’s lawyer Benedik, who also represented 
plaintiffs, believed that ‘personality protection provisions stipulated in the Civil Code are 
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sufficient’. Jozef Vozár, a prominent legal scholar specialising in personality/goodwill 
protection law, who actively used to represent plaintiffs and defendants, also argued that 
‘we do not have a problem with legislation’ either on the domestic or international level. 
The overwhelming sentiment, however, was that the interpretation and application 
of the relevant principles by ordinary courts was lagging, particularly in comparison to 
the Czech jurisdiction, where identical substantive and comparable procedural rules were 
in force until 2014. SME’s Fila argued that the problem with personality protection law 
for the press was ‘definitely in the application of [the law] … the way [disputes] get 
adjudicated’. The IPI Slovakia chair, Múdry (2013), summarised the issues concerning 
freedom of expression similarly, claiming that ‘legislation is relatively well set in 
Slovakia – media [legislation] in particular. Application is a problem – and that is in 
peoples’ minds, especially [minds of] judges’. Kamenec, one of the most experienced 
media lawyers, argued that ‘the issue doesn’t lie in legislation’ because the Czechs 
operated under the same legal setting but ‘[litigation] results were different’ there. 
The respondents on both sides perceived the adjudicatory practice in 
personality/goodwill protection disputes involving the media as biased and poorly 
justified and thus arbitrary and unfair with varying degrees of intensity at different times. 
Vozár explained that it was vital to ‘properly apply’ the aim and the spirit of the law ‘as 
envisaged in jurisprudence’, when balancing the conflicting interests in judicial decision-
making. Vozár also argued that the aim and spirit of the law tended to be applied by 
ordinary courts ‘in an instrumental way’ whereby ‘[the goddess] Justice did not have her 
eyes closed’ but looked at the identity of the plaintiff and defendant ‘applying the law 
accordingly’. 
The interviews revealed that inconsistent, highly unpredictable adjudicatory 
practices led to undue legal uncertainty for both plaintiffs and defendants. Lukášek, JOJ’s 
lawyer with plaintiff experience, explained that while the law-on-the-books was 
‘relatively well stipulated’ and the ECtHR case-law dealt with matters ‘to perfection’, the 
problem was with its ‘application – a systematic … [and] uniform application of the law’, 
which was missing. 
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6.2.1 Pro-plaintiff Bias 
It was impossible to independently ascertain a clear bias in adjudication outcomes without 
reliable official statistical data. The interviews gave a mixed picture. Of the six plaintiff-
respondents, one won, two settled out-of-court after proceedings commenced, another 
settled one dispute and won another, and two plaintiffs’ cases were pending at the time 
of the interviews. The highly experienced plaintiff lawyers I interviewed professed 
success in most cases, while noting that given their wealth of experience they were able 
to judge the potential for success in advance and only took on cases they believed they 
could win. At the same time, they acknowledged that many, particularly, private plaintiffs 
might be unsuccessful solely due to absence of qualified legal representation.  
The interviews with media managers indicated that, in the 2010s at least, media 
tended to lose only a fraction of personality/goodwill protection disputes. Čekirda 
believed that, bar one lawsuit, TA3 won or settled all lawsuits that reached the proceedings 
stage. According to TA3’s lawyers’ statement ‘the television is typically successful in 
legal disputes in which proceedings took place’. JOJ’s Kubina argued that while the 
television tended to win the majority of lawsuits, it often lost complaint proceedings 
before the Broadcasting Council. Similarly, Mihálik claimed that Ringier tended to win 
most disputes. Admitting that he did not keep the statistics in his head, NMH lawyer 
Schwarz believed that publishers managed to win just about fifty percent of lawsuits. 
According to its CEO, Petit Press lost, on average, just ten percent of personality/goodwill 
protection disputes. Fulmek’s estimate was confirmed by the incomplete Petit Press 
records that were made available to me. Petit Press lost only twelve percent (11) of all the 
disputes involving reputation and privacy protection (including civil personality/goodwill 
protection disputes and press law disputes) that reached a final conclusion. The publisher 
won thirty-seven percent (34) of disputes and settled eleven percent (10) out-of-court. 
The proceedings were stayed by judicial decision in twelve percent of cases (11), and 
twenty-seven percent (25) of motions were withdrawn by plaintiffs. It should be noted 
that of all the recorded cases against Petit Press since 1998, forty-seven percent were still 
pending as of May 2014. 
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Figure 6.1: Outcomes of Closed Disputes Involving Petit Press 
  
 
Independent statistical data on litigation results whilst useful, are not essential for 
this study, which starts from the premise that the motivations of actors and consequences 
for the competing interests at the heart of defamation and privacy disputes involving the 
media, are largely a factor of the actors’ perceptions of the risks of litigation. These are 
in turn shaped to some extent by the actors’ experiences and perceptions about the 
fairness, certainty and delays in judicial decision-making in these disputes, not by the 
objective reality (see Chapters 2 and 3).  
Lawyers on both sides largely agreed that Slovak adjudicatory practice 
historically (and at least until the early 2010s) tended to favour personality/goodwill 
protection. L20 explained ‘from the historical viewpoint a person’s personality is better 
protected than freedom of expression’. In Benedik’s experience, ordinary courts’ ‘default 
position’ was ‘one-sided in favour of personality protection’. Kamenec found that Slovak 
ordinary courts were much more legally conservative than their Czech counterparts with 
decisions in personality/goodwill protection matters in the two jurisdictions being 
‘incomparable’. The difference was, according to Kamenec ‘not about how we apply the 
law’ but ‘about how we apply values, [about] what freedom of expression means for 
whom, what freedom of the press means, [and] what the courts see behind it’.  
A prominent constitutional lawyer argued similarly that ‘the fundamental problem 
of judicial protection of freedom of expression’ lay in ‘the underappreciation of [its] 
importance’ and in ‘the simultaneous overestimation of the conflicting protected value’ 
(Drgonec 2013, 317). According to Drgonec (2013, 165), judicial practice had for long 
‘considered personality rights as a sacrosanct sphere restricting freedom of expression’. 
11
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In 1993, the Supreme Court expressed the opinion, which was quickly adopted by 
ordinary courts, that freedom of expression (dissemination of information) had to end 
where the freedom of others – citizens – began (1Co 19/93). Drgonec (2013, 387) thus 
argued that ‘rather than considering the purpose of freedom of expression as compared to 
purpose of personality rights’ protection’, ordinary courts ‘typically only consider 
personality rights’, evaluating ‘each infringement into personality rights, regardless of its 
intensity, as so serious that responsibility for it need be enforced’. Drgonec (2013, 387) 
thought judicial practice ‘crush[ed] the extensive constitutional standards of freedom of 
expression, chain[ed] it to the ground, restrict[ed] and disavow[ed] it’ through its failure 
to ensure that any interference with freedom of expression pursuing personality/goodwill 
protection was “necessary in a democratic society”.  
Media professionals and managers also overwhelmingly believed that ordinary 
courts failed to fully appreciate the role of the media as watchdogs and favoured 
personality/goodwill protection over freedom of expression. Vagovič thought ‘the courts 
side with the other party and not the media’. Leško believed that ‘in general, rather than 
freedom of expression, Slovak courts take into account the right to personal honour’ and 
that ‘hardly any court at district or regional level does the balancing’, seeking to establish 
which of the two rights ‘must have priority in the given case’. Many judges ‘mentally 
remained in those times when these matters were decided absolutely unequivocally, when 
it sufficed to document the harm and everything was clear – harm occurred, satisfaction 
[was] simply obligatory without mercy’, so tended to ignore whether the harm ‘was 
caused through a legal and legitimate exercise of freedom of expression’. Múdry (2013) 
also believed that judges were only ‘interested in the Civil and Criminal Code – as long 
as you are able to quantify and prove that they caused you harm … [you] can liquidate 
the medium’.  
Other respondents suggested similarly that the judges’ personal prejudices often 
tainted decision-making. Kubina described a lost dispute concerning a follow-up 
broadcast to a story covering a Slovak citizen’s murder abroad, which reported that the 
body had never been repatriated contrary to the deceased family’s claims and a funeral 
paid for by the taxpayer. The ruling was ‘a huge disappointment’ for Kubina because he 
believed that ‘from the legal viewpoint’ JOJ was supposed to win as ‘there simply was 
no fault; there was nothing’ and JOJ ‘really wanted to help’ and ‘did help, investing time 
and money’. Nevertheless, ‘it turned against [it]’. Šimečka, editor of the Czech weekly 
Respect and a former SME editor-in-chief, was convinced that in the 1990s and 2000s, 
  204 
‘judges often sided with [the plaintiffs] because they felt that they were less powerful and 
that we actually harmed them even though, often, we only wrote the truth’. Šimečka ‘felt 
that the judges were against us and positioned themselves on the side of the quasi injured’, 
rarely ‘having attempted to consider that the media provide a public service’. Šimečka’s 
experience of working in the Czech Republic showed up the stark contrast of the Slovak 
adjudicatory practice to that in the neighbouring jurisdiction.  
Fila argued that the bias towards personality protection was a manifestation of ‘an 
ideological problem’ within the judiciary as many judges held ‘a not completely modern 
perception of personality protection’ and believed that ‘everything should be so formal 
and decorous’ or even that ‘newspapers shouldn’t write about anything’. Fila was 
convinced that in contrast to their Czech counterparts, Slovak judges’ understanding of 
the media’s duty to inform the public remained ‘anchored in the 1970s’. Milan, an 
investigative reporter at Plus 7 dní, similarly perceived the courts as ‘unprogressive’ 
because they were ‘unwilling, unable or incapable of appreciating the high added value 
of what society had to go through to achieve freedom of opinion [and] expression’.  
According to defendants and their lawyers, the pro-plaintiff bias in adjudicatory 
practice was clearly manifested in the narrow application of the doctrine of 
“truthfulness of information” or almost absolute insistence on the truthfulness of all 
published facts and not allowing a defence of reasonable publication.127 Instead of 
assessing the necessity of restricting freedom of expression and seeking a fair balance 
between reputation or privacy and freedom of expression, Slovak judicial practice 
insisted on examining evidence under the doctrine of ‘truthfulness of information’. The 
doctrine, which was developed during the communist regime in the 1970s, did not provide 
the option of absolving the defendant of liability for publishing inaccurate facts, for 
instance, by demonstrating that the journalist had made every effort to verify the truth of 
the allegations (Holländer, 1993; cited in Drgonec 2013, 293). Benedik advised 
‘personality protection is [still] absolute, i.e. [courts] insist on absolute truthfulness of all 
 
 
 
127 In the early 1990s, the Supreme Court confirmed the pre-1989 interpretation of strict liability of 
civil personality protection, according to which ‘unlawfulness of an infringement’ could ‘never be 
excluded only because that who infringed the honour of another through a defamatory factual 
statement acted in good faith that the given statement was true’ (1 Co 19/93, cited in Drgonec 2013, 
166).  
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information’ and ‘one can lose a dispute’ if the journalistic content comprised ‘anything 
that is not true’, even if it is ‘an irrelevant matter’.  
Benedik believed that ordinary courts were ‘reluctant or unable’ to accept and 
duly apply the general principles developed in Article 10 case-law, which stated that ‘the 
interference [with freedom of expression] needs to be necessary in a democratic society, 
that journalists have a right to exaggerate [and] provoke’ and that ‘one simply cannot 
insist on absolute truthfulness of information, but that the priority is to consider whether 
journalists acted in good faith with the aim of publishing truthful information’. Lukášek 
found that ordinary courts often failed ‘to consider the whole context of a reportage’ and 
accept slight inaccuracies, as established in Convention case-law. Several media 
organisations were previously found liable for violating a plaintiff’s presumption of 
innocence having published information supplied at a state authority press conference, 
according to Zlámalová. 
Media professionals also believed that ordinary courts tended to put undue 
emphasis on the truthfulness of information and require standards of proof that went 
contrary to Convention law, while ignoring the context, public interest or whether 
publishers and journalists acted responsibly. This is in contrast to the ECtHR, which held 
in McVicar v. United Kingdom, that a requirement to prove that imputations made in a 
newspaper article were ‘substantially true on the balance of probabilities’ was a justified 
restriction on freedom of expression in the interests of the protection of plaintiffs’ 
rights.128 Slovak ordinary courts tended to require absolute proof of the truth of all 
impugned statements.129 Mihálik argued that ‘the court naturally decides [in favour of the 
plaintiff]’ once the impugned information is established to be untrue, without considering 
whether it was published in good faith using all information available at the time in 
contrast to Czech courts. Šimečka felt similarly that judges were ‘totally not interested’ 
 
 
 
128 McVicar v. the United Kingdom, No. 46311/99, ECHR 2002-III, §87.  
129 The Czech Constitutional Court also argued for reducing the standard of proof in personality 
protection disputes involving media-defendants, when it held that it was ‘necessary to respect certain 
particularities of ordinary press designated to inform the broadest public’ such as the need to make 
certain simplifications. According to the Court, it is not a given ‘that each simplification (or distortion) 
must necessarily lead to an infringement of personality rights’. One can therefore hardly ‘insist on 
complete accuracy of factual statements’, which would, in certain circumstances, impose ‘impossible 
demands’ on journalists. Therefore, in the Court’s opinion ‘it must always be of significance whether 
the overall meaning of a certain information corresponded with the truth’ (I. ÚS 156/99). 
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in the context of the journalistic text, what aims its publication pursued or whether the 
impugned information was of public interest. They tended to strictly look at ‘formal 
errors’ and blindly accept plaintiffs’ testimonies about the alleged harm. Šimečka advised 
that in contrast, their Czech counterparts considered the defendant’s aim and as long as it 
‘was to write the truth and seek it’ did not rule against the publisher even if small 
inaccuracies were present, Slovak district judges did not reflect that ‘in principle, the 
journalist doesn’t want to lie [but] simply wants to write the truth’.  
Defendant lawyers further suggested that courts sometimes failed to distinguish 
between value judgments and factual statements. Even when considering a statement to 
be a value judgment, they often paid little regard to the role of criticism on matters of 
public interest. Drawing on the interpretation of the permissibility of criticism in the pre-
1989 case-law, courts tended to put undue emphasis on the form and civility of 
criticism.130 According to an early judgment, qualifications such as “protector of 
thievery” and “thief” represented an unjustified infringement of plaintiffs’ rights because 
the criminal investigation, on which they were founded, was later discontinued 
(Vondracek 1975, 288–89). In probably the most controversial and most widely 
publicised court decision in Slovak history, a district court imposed a preliminary 
measure on publication of an unfinished book based on a purported secret service file, 
which in the meantime had been anonymously published online.131 The court held that 
publishing allegations of potential criminal conduct (corruption within the highest 
 
 
 
130 In 2001, the Supreme Court reiterated that ‘permissible or lawful criticism must be factual, concrete 
and proportionate in its content and form and must not exceed the limits necessary to achieve the 
pursued aim’, whereby factual denoted criticism ‘based on real or factual foundations from which it 
subsequently draws corresponding conclusions for the value judgment’, and concrete criticism meant 
that is was ‘based on concrete facts without drawing general conclusions’. The Court acknowledged 
that ‘criticism of societal phenomena is not only permitted but is desirable’, and that ‘it is possible to 
admit certain degree of exaggeration [and] irony or use of relatively expressive words’, which could 
be considered as insulting. However, unless founded on the circumstances described in the article, 
exaggerated and ironic statement was not to be regarded as permissible criticism but a claim devoid 
of factual basis. The decisive criterion for examining the permissibility of criticism was thus the 
‘truthful description’ of the facts on which it rested. A description of circumstances stating some facts 
corresponding with reality while omitting others in such a way that prevented the reader from forming 
his/her own opinion could not be considered ‘truthful depiction of factual circumstances’ (3 Cdo 
61/2000, published in ‘Zo súdnej praxe’ [From Judicial Practice], 2001, Vol 2:27, cited in Drgonec 
2013, 176) 
131 The book Gorilla and the endeavours of its author to verify the information contained within are 
discussed in Chapter 9. 
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echelons of politics and business) would be unlawful except where their veracity has been 
separately established through criminal investigation or conviction.132 
Most interviewed lawyers perceived strict adherence to such interpretation as 
contrary to the ECtHR case-law, which emphasised the importance of criticism, 
particularly as part of political discussion, and held that requiring journalists to prove 
allegations that someone committed a criminal offence by presenting evidence that the 
suspect was guilty of it was ‘plainly unreasonable’ in the context of a defamation lawsuit. 
According to the ECtHR, ‘[a]llegations in the press cannot be put on an equal footing 
with those made in criminal proceedings’. The ECtHR found that courts cannot expect 
‘defendants to act like public prosecutors, or make their fate dependent on whether the 
prosecuting authorities choose to pursue criminal charges against, and manage to secure 
the conviction of, the person against whom they have made allegations’.133 The Court 
also held that ‘the degree of precision for establishing the well-foundedness of a criminal 
charge by a competent court can hardly be compared to that which ought to be observed 
by a journalist when expressing his opinion on a matter of public concern’.134 
In Benedik’s opinion, the above case was ‘a precise example of the classic 
personality protection [approach]’. Benedik believed that it was not always optimal ‘to 
force it [the interpretation] in this way’. According to Benedik, Slovak judges tended to 
‘turn on its head’ the condition of “necessity in a democratic society”. Instead of 
considering whether an interference with freedom of expression was necessary in a 
democratic society, courts examined whether the content and form of criticism was 
necessary to achieve the legitimate aim of informing the public. Benedik argued that using 
such an interpretation, ‘the judge substitutes the author [and his/her] way of producing 
and article’ and ‘rather than legal considerations, he/she brings into it his/her subjective 
ideas’.  
 
 
 
132 ‘Until it becomes clear (established in a way prescribed by law – e.g. conclusions of a criminal 
investigation, decisions of competent authorities, particularly because it concerns serious allegations 
of serious criminal conduct) which of the information is truthful and which is not, it is impossible to 
publish details of the concrete actions, be it in the form of factual statements or value judgments, 
because they would undoubtedly unlawfully infringe the personality rights of the injured parties’ 
(11C6/2012-546, 16). 
133 Kasabova v. Bulgaria, No. 22385/03, 19 April 2011, §62. 
134 Scharsach and News Verlagsgesellschaft GmbH v. Austria, NO 39394/98, ECHR 2003-XI, § 43. 
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Benedik thought judges’ ideas about appropriate form of criticism would always 
differ from those of the journalist because judges were inherently ‘conservative’. Drgonec 
(2013, 178) similarly concluded that in their adjudicatory practice ‘courts placed their 
thesis about the civility of the form in which criticism is made on a pedestal before one 
needs to kneel’. Lukášek also disagreed with the opinion held by many judges that only 
the impugned content was to be considered when balancing the competing rights because 
‘the way information was gathered is also important – it proves whether my value 
judgments stemmed from a factual basis’, which cannot always be included within 
journalistic content due to space limitations. 
6.2.2 Undue Protection of Powerful Public Figures’ Personality Rights 
Respondents across the spectrum reported an enormous inconsistency between 
adjudicatory practice in matters involving high-profile public plaintiffs – especially 
politicians and senior judges – who tended to be awarded non-pecuniary damages in 
millions of Slovak crowns for questionable infringements, and those involving other 
public or private plaintiffs. Many media professionals and plaintiffs felt these 
controversial cases demonstrated gross injustice. 
Lawyers and media professionals argued that ordinary courts tended to disregard 
the public figure doctrine, which stipulated that public officials had to tolerate more 
intense scrutiny of their conduct than private persons (see also Drgonec 2013, 165). 
Balogová, saw ‘the problem’ with editorial decisions concerning contentious speech on 
matters of public interest in that ‘in cases of politicians’ courts had ‘the tendency to tilt 
towards personality protection’. Petková believed that ordinary courts mostly adjudicated 
‘contrary to the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights’ as the decisions were 
‘unbalanced [and] personality protection, particularly of important persons [and] 
politicians’, had ‘the upper hand’. By 2013, defendant lawyers ‘were really getting a bit 
desperate’ regarding domestic adjudicatory practice in cases of politicians, because 
contrary to the Europe-wide recognition that ‘politicians should have a lowered level of 
protection’, ‘Slovak courts, as if in defiance, [went] towards Belarus’, according to 
Kamenec. L20 argued that ordinary courts sometimes had difficulties acknowledging that 
public figures should tolerate more intense scrutiny and ‘accept that they have to consider 
personality protection through the optics of freedom of expression and the duty to inform 
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about matters of public interest’. Lukášek believed that ‘each of the politicians [in the 
widely publicised cases] most probably ought to have tolerated public criticism and it 
should never have been decided in their favour’. 
Media professionals mentioned numerous disputes in which, they believed, they 
were unjustly punished by the courts in spite of acting in the public interest and in line 
with journalistic “duties and responsibilities”. Maintaining ‘we were hundred percent 
right; we did what we ought to have done’, Brunovský was convinced that in Fico v. 
Trend, ‘the courts punished [Trend] … disgustingly’. Brunovský believed that referring 
to Fico as a ‘thief of future pensions’ on the cover and in two separate commentaries 
constituted ‘a justified critique’ of the then PM’s actions. Brunovský thought the ‘essence 
of the article was justified’ and ‘even the phrase [itself] was okay’. Had the judges 
considered the context, the article’s aim, and Fico’s long-term actions and political 
agenda, they ‘would have [had] to side with [Trend]’. Convinced that Trend ‘should have 
won’, Brunovský argued that ‘the fundamental problem of Slovak judiciary’ was that 
courts failed to examine the sanction’s effects on freedom of expression and the public 
interest in being informed about the potential impact of government action on their living 
standards.  
Tódová (nee Žemlová) asserted that ‘in spite of caution’ she ‘experienced several 
absurd decisions, wrong court decisions, which did not respect press freedom’, including 
ordinary courts’ decisions in Slota v. Petit Press, Harabin v. Petit Press and Stiffel v. Petit 
Press. Tódová did not expect the title “Slota stole on the run” ‘to end up in court’ and let 
alone be decided in favour of the plaintiff-politician because the article made clear that 
the claims were based on ‘documents from the era of communism’, which proved the 
claims, so ‘the context was explained’. She characterised ordinary courts’ judgments in 
Harabin v. Petit Press, involving claims that in the 1980s Harabin sentenced a priest for 
faith manifestations, as ‘absurd and unjust’ and considered them ‘a serious injustice and 
a price for living in a young democracy’. The courts did not accept Petit Press’s argument 
that the article was ‘part of a public discussion concerning an urgent question of denial 
of religious freedom’ and that no unjustified infringement occurred as ‘no part of the 
impugned text even marginally concerned the plaintiff’s intimate sphere and no false 
information was published’, and awarded Harabin 33,000 euro in damages.  
Fulmek believed that in Stiffel v. Petit Press ordinary courts erroneously 
sanctioned the publisher for writing that as a Supreme Court judge, Stiffel ‘sentenced …  
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priest J. to prison’.135 Fulmek found ‘absurd’ Stiffel’s arguments  that he was a member 
of a three member senate whose decisions were confidential, that he simply applied valid 
laws and that the senate merely produced a binding legal statement, but the decision was 
actually made by a different court. Fulmek thought that it was ‘simply a normal, 
acceptable [journalistic] shortcut everywhere in the world’ for which he did not even 
reproach the reporters ‘because [to say] sentenced, sent to prison is absolutely okay – 
absolutely, absolutely okay from the viewpoint of the priest’s fate’. Fulmek found it 
ridiculous that ’such a person, based on such a case [could] win 100,000 euro’.  
Fulmek was convinced that judges ‘did not respect the legal standing of the 
independent press as a guardian of democratic principles, or the public’s right to free 
information’ the counterpart of which should be the ‘tolerable error or tolerable 
inaccuracy’ defence. Fulmek argued that readers and ‘journalists were not lawyers or 
experts who could see the difference between [stating] that Stiffel sentenced someone and 
that he belonged to a three-member-strong senate that obliged a lower court by its 
opinion’. Fulmek believed the fact that judges ‘were not willing to tolerate’ this was ‘a 
key’ issue for freedom of expression.136 Vagovič mentioned a similar, unjustified in his 
opinion, case brought by another Supreme Court judge for his article concerning a 1970’s 
re-trial of a political prisoner, which resulted in a prolonged sentence for the latter. The 
article alluded to the prolonging of the sentence being ‘simply improper’. Vagovič 
asserted that he ‘gave the judge absolutely identical space to the former prisoner to 
express his views in the article. Despite that he sued us and we lost’.137  
 
 
 
135 One of the impugned articles stated, ‘Judges who in the past sentenced people to years in prison 
according to communist laws merely for expressing their opinions are still in high positions. … At the 
Supreme Court work also judges Harald Stiffel and ..., ‘who at the beginning of the 1980s sentenced 
priest J.L. to one-and-a-half years’ (Žemlová 2002a).  
136 Šimečka also branded this dispute as the ‘most dramatic’ of his career. Petit Press repeatedly 
contested the claim’s merit before the Supreme and Constitutional Courts, arguing that ‘the limits of 
freedom of expression were not exceeded as the information … concerned [Stiffel] as public figure, 
was correct and embodied the right to [lawful] criticism’ (cited in III. ÚS 238/08-20). Petit Press 
further maintained that ‘the circumstances and value judgments were based on factual findings’ and 
‘concerned a critical evaluation of the conduct of several judges in the pre-1989 era and their role in 
political processes with opponents of the communist regime’. While ‘the published claims were 
unpleasant to [Stiffel]’, ‘in their content and form, they did not deviate from the limits of appropriate, 
factual and concrete criticism’ as Stiffel’s role in the trial described in the article was ‘incontestable’ 
(I. ÚS 452/2016-21, 9-10). 
137 .týždeň’s editor-in-chief also found the judgment unfair as the plaintiff had been approached for 
comment, which was published on the same page as the former political prisoner’s views (Hríb 2009). 
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Respondents were convinced that when a court established that a judge’s or 
politician’s personality rights were violated, the awarded damages tended to be arbitrary 
and disproportionate – not only to the actual reputational harm but also to awards received 
by less prominent plaintiffs. This, according to interviewees, went against the ECtHR’s 
case-law, which repeatedly stated that disproportionately and unpredictably large civil 
damages could have a chilling effect on freedom of expression.138 The rather vague 
provisions governing remedies for non-material loss and the absence of ex lege limits to 
monetary compensation in personality/goodwill protection disputes conferred the 
decision on the appropriateness and potential amount of non-pecuniary damages upon the 
court. Typical damages awards to high-ranking public functionaries ranged between 
16,000 and 100,000 euro. Respondents identified the 166,000-euro awarded in Slota v. 
Ringier No. 1 (12C844/99) as the largest historically.  
Interviewees overwhelmingly argued that ordinary courts often failed to establish 
that harm, justifying the given award, had actually occurred.139 Adamčík claimed that 
courts frequently concluded that ‘harm was surely suffered by politicians’ even though 
plaintiffs did not even bother submit evidence to prove it. Similarly, Šimečka ‘was 
horrified by the levels of non-pecuniary damages’ for which, he believed, there was 
‘absolutely no justification’. In Harabin v. Petit Press, according to Šimečka, the judges 
failed ‘to consider the pure logics of the matter’ that Harabin’s professional honour could 
not have suffered considerable harm given that soon after the publication he was re-
elected Supreme Court President.  
Zlámalová characterised the adjudicatory practice regarding damages for public 
 
 
 
138 For instance, Cumpănă and Mazăre v. Romania, [GC], No. 33348/96, ECHR 2004-XI, §111; 
Tolstoy Miloslavsky v. the United Kingdom, 13 July 1995, Series A No. 316-B, §49; Independent News 
and Media and Independent Newspapers Ireland Limited v. Ireland, No. 55120/00, ECHR 2005-V, 
§114; Bladet Tromsø and Stensaas v. Norway [GC], No. 21980/93, ECHR 1999-III, § 64.   
139 A study of decision-making of ordinary courts in selected cases involving public plaintiffs found 
similarly that judges tended to assume that the broadly publicised infringement automatically resulted 
in serious reputational injury, warranting monetary compensation. Moreover, since the plaintiff was 
known to the public, publication concerning such public plaintiffs attracted a larger audience than that 
concerning unknown persons, rendering the reputational harm of public plaintiffs more serious 
(Wilfling and Kováčechová 2011, 34).  In Fico v. Spoločnosť 7 Plus No.1 (39C-234-2005, 12) the 
court found that since the plaintiff was a public figure at the time of the unlawful infringement, ‘his 
societal esteem was notably lowered through the unlawful infringement, his expert standing 
dishonoured, his trustworthiness and authority questioned, his further performance in this area 
threatened’. 
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functionaries as ‘brutal’ and ‘really sad’ because she believed that compensation should 
be ‘proportionate to the violation’ and reflect that public functionaries should enjoy 
considerably lower protection. Sedlačko similarly dubbed the 1990s and early 2000s as a 
‘crazy’ period of judicial decision-making, which was the ‘heritage of an unhealthy era’ 
prior to 1989. Ikrényi found past court decisions in which ‘damages in hundreds of 
thousands [of euros] were awarded, while [it was] doubtful whether an infringement 
occurred at all’ as ‘rather controversial’. Ikrényi also considered judicial decisions as 
‘arbitrary’ because they rarely included persuasive ‘reasoning for awarding the specific 
amount’. According to some respondents, instead of following criteria developed in case-
law and rational legal arguments, district judges often identified with ludicrous, 
emotionally-charged witness statements and let sympathy with the plaintiff affect the 
damages award (Ikrényi, Lukášek).  
Most respondents believed that damages awarded to high-profile plaintiffs were 
disproportionate to the awards received by less prominent plaintiffs. Schwarz estimated 
that the upper limit of non-pecuniary damages for reputational harm suffered by private 
plaintiffs was 20,000 euro, with 10,000 to 15,000 euro being ‘a magical limit’ for serious 
infringements involving malicious intent. The median in NMH’s disputes was 5,000 euro, 
with typical damages of between 2,000 and 3,000 euro. According to Zlámalová, Markíza 
was typically obliged to pay private plaintiffs between 10,000 and 20,000 euro. Plaintiff 
lawyers found such awards as ‘appallingly low’ (Lukášek) and ‘nothing miraculous’ 
(Sedlačko) given the harm suffered and the time litigation took.  
Many plaintiff lawyers and some plaintiffs perceived the adjudicatory practice as 
deeply unfair, leading them to believe that equality before justice was not guaranteed in 
personality protection disputes. Lukášek found such decision-making practice as ‘very 
unfortunate’ and one of the most problematic aspects of the law’s application. Praising 
the courage of Slovak judges for not being afraid to award damages in excess of 39,000 
euro (seen as the limit in the Czech jurisdiction), L21 found damages in excess of 66,000 
euro granted to Fico ‘unbelievable’.  
Among plaintiffs, P01 was perplexed by the extreme difference in damages 
awards for ordinary persons as compared to members of the political class. She found it 
‘outrageous’ that in contrast to an infamous politician – a ‘generally-known sot’ in P01’s 
words – she would not have been able to claim hundreds-of-thousands of euro in 
damages. Defendants and their lawyers naturally did not admit that the awards to ordinary 
persons were excessively low. However, they did recognise the disproportionate, unfair 
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amounts of damages granted to prominent plaintiffs. Fulmek perceived ‘an abyss of tens-
of-thousands of euro’ between damages awarded to ordinary plaintiffs – like firms and 
private citizens – and plaintiffs from the judiciary, politics or procuracy’. Benedik 
described the discrepancy in damages awards as follows: ‘while judges lick the cream, 
something perhaps falls to politicians and then ordinary persons stand no chance of 
achieving such amounts’.  
The disproportionate, unfair damages awarded to public functionaries for harm 
resulting from publication was more striking in contrast to compensation granted for harm 
suffered by victims of violent crime. The latter was limited ex lege to fifty-fold of the 
minimum monthly wage.140 In a case widely mentioned by respondents, a mother of a 
murder victim was awarded a mere 3,300 euro as compensation for harm she suffered 
and 6,600 euro for the harm suffered by her deceased son,141 despite the fact the murder 
was motivated ‘by despicable motives’, ‘executed in a brutal manner’ and had ‘agonising 
consequences’ (17Co/421/04, cited in Wilfling and Kováčechová 2011, 38).142 ‘While 
the ECtHR unequivocally concluded that when determining the level of damages for 
personality violations, the level of compensation awarded for bodily harm or to victims 
of violent crimes should be taken into consideration and should not be exceeded unless 
serious, sufficient reasons exist’, ordinary courts, according to L20, tended to award 
larger amounts for reputational injury than for violent crimes. Kamenec found it 
inexplicable and ‘totally disproportionate’ that a rape victim received around 16,000 euro 
in compensation but a public official received 100,000 euro for verbal injury. Schwarz 
thought it was ‘absurd for a judge at whom a journalist leers to get 60,000 euro, while … 
a raped underage girl … gets 10,000 euro’. Milan thought it was ‘sick’ that Harabin 
secured damages payments in hundreds-of-thousands of euro for harm to his dignity while 
‘compensation for murder [or] rape’ was in ‘laughable sums’. Fila similarly believed 
there was enormous disproportion in the amounts achievable for car accident victims and 
 
 
 
140 6,900 euro in 2013. 
141 She claimed 8,300 euro in both instances. 
142 The defendant, a neo-Nazi supporter, poured petrol over the victim of Roma origin, and set him 
alight. 
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those ‘Harabin is able to achieve because someone informed about how he had his 
bathroom tiled’.143 
6.3 The Shift in the Constitutional Court’s Jurisprudence  
Several respondents (Múdry, Leško, Langer, L19) suggested that the pro-personality 
protection bias of ordinary courts, which the Constitutional Court failed to rectify in a 
timely manner (Fila), was demonstrated by the fact that the ECtHR found a violation of 
Article 10 in all but one case brought against Slovakia (for a similar argument see 
Drgonec 2013, 232). In the eleven cases filed between 1995 and 2012, which resulted in 
an ECtHR decision on the merits of the case (Table 6.1), Slovakia was found in breach 
of the Convention in ten instances.  
Table 6.1: ECtHR Judgments in Article 10 Cases against Slovakia  
Case of Appl. No. Date Proceedings type  Result 
Feldek v. Slovakia 29032/95 12/07/2001 Civil defamation Violation  
Marônek v. 
Slovakia 
32686/96 19/04/2001 Civil defamation Violation  
Lešník v. Slovakia 35640/97 11/03/2003 Criminal 
defamation 
No violation  
Hrico v. Slovakia 49418/99 20/07/2004 Civil defamation Violation  
Radio Twist, a.s. 
v. Slovakia 
62202/00 19/12/2006 Civil defamation Violation  
Klein v. Slovakia 72208/01 31/10/2006 Criminal 
defamation 
Violation  
Ringier Axel 
Springer, a.s. v. 
Slovakia 
41262/05 26/07/2011 Civil defamation Violation  
Soltész v. Slovakia 11867/09 22/102013 Civil defamation Violation  
Ringier Axel 
Springer, a.s. v. 
Slovakia (No. 2) 
21666/09 07/01/2014 Civil defamation Violation  
Ringier Axel 
Springer, a.s. v. 
Slovakia (No. 3) 
37986/09 07/01/2014 Civil defamation Violation  
MAC TV, s.r.o. v. 
Slovakia 
13466/12 28/11/2017 Proceedings before 
Broadcasting 
Council  
Violation  
 
 
 
143 In 2010, Harabin as Supreme Court President filed action for goodwill protection against Pravda 
and Radio Express for allegedly maliciously and incorrectly reporting the refurbishment costs of a 
bathroom in his offices (TASR 2010; SITA 2010). 
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The ECtHR criticised Slovak courts for strictly adhering to the narrow 
“truthfulness of information” doctrine, taking an overly formalistic approach to criticism, 
failing to appreciate the importance of public debate, and overlooking to examine whether 
reporters and publishers acted in accordance with their duties and responsibilities within 
the meaning of Article 10(2). For a more detailed discussion of the most important ECtHR 
findings in cases brought by authors, journalists and publishers see Appendix 10. 
From the late 2000s the Constitutional Court started to emphasise the need to seek 
a fair balance between reputation or privacy protection and freedom of expression, 
possibly influenced by the early ECtHR judgments in cases involving Slovakia. The 
Court first explicitly invoked the need to balance the conflicting interests and conduct the 
proportionality test in 2009 (II. ÚS 152/08). Characterising freedom of expression as ‘a 
fundamental pillar of a democratic society, in which everyone is allowed to express their 
views about matters of public interest and make value judgments about them’ (§24), the 
Court emphasised ‘the need to carefully protect freedom of expression in a transitional 
country’ (§27). Acknowledging that in certain instances, freedom of expression needed 
to give way, the Court stressed that such interferences were strictly limited and had to be 
‘in accordance with the democratic character of society (“measures necessary in a 
democratic society”)’ (§25).  
The Court found that the civil personality protection provisions ‘mustn’t be 
applied in isolation, but need to be interpreted in line with the Constitution’ (§27). While 
this required consideration of freedom of expression, it did not mean abandoning 
personality protection. Freedom of expression had to be favoured in certain cases, ‘even 
if the given expression may have certain defects from the viewpoint of classic, statutory 
personality protection’ (§27). The Court argued (§38) that in a case of conflict between 
the right to personality protection and freedom of expression, it was crucial to conduct a 
proportionality test, using the so-called Alexy’s formula (Alexy 2005, 574–75). 
The test proposed by the Court involved establishing for the given case the 
intensity of interference to freedom of expression and the importance of protecting the 
competing personality rights. The intensity of infringement of freedom of expression and 
the importance of satisfying the right to personality protection were assigned values on a 
triadic scale: “light”, “moderate” and “serious”.  The values were to be weighed against 
each other in order to establish whether the importance of satisfying personality rights 
protection justified the detriment to freedom of expression. The Court argued that the 
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following questions about the impugned publication should guide the court in assigning 
the values to the competing interests: Who, about whom, what, where, when and how 
was being said? (§38). Between 2009 and 2016, the Court ruled on many of the most 
controversial personality protection disputes involving public figures, including Polka v. 
Spoločnosť 7 Plus (II. ÚS 152/08), Harabin v. Petit Press (I. ÚS 408/2010 and II. ÚS 
213/2014), Harabin v. Spoločnosť 7 Plus No. 1 (II. ÚS 340/2009), Slota v. Ringier No. 2 
(IV. ÚS 448/2012), Soročina v. Rádio Viva (II. ÚS 326/09), Fico v. Spoločnosť 7 Plus 
No. 1 (IV. ÚS 492/2012), P03 v. Petit Press (II. ÚS 184/2015). The Court found 
violations of publishers’ right to freedom of expression, quashed the original decision and 
sent the dispute back for further adjudication in most cases. While doing so, it also 
introduced binding legal opinions on a multitude of crucial issues relating to freedom of 
expression.  
The Court acknowledged that ‘from the viewpoint of freedom of expression the 
media and journalists enjoy a privileged position, particularly when informing about 
matters of public interest’ (IV. ÚS 302/2010, §1; also II. ÚS 191/2015). The Court 
considered the press ‘a public watchdog’ that ‘plays an important role in states governed 
by the rule of law because it allows free political discussion’ (II. ÚS 152/08, §32). 
Journalists thus ‘have a (social) duty to provide information and ideas about matters of 
general interest and the public has the right to receive such information’. Journalists are 
‘allowed to use a certain degree of exaggeration and provocation’ (IV. ÚS 448/2012, 22, 
also IV. ÚS 492/2012). The Court emphasized that ‘the limits of acceptable criticism are 
widest in relation to politicians and narrowest in relation to “ordinary” citizens’ (II. ÚS 
152/08, §31). According to the Court, national144 and regional politicians (II. ÚS 
558/2012), judges,145 lawyers (IV. ÚS 302/2010), and civil servants acting in official 
 
 
 
144 The Court stated that the personality protection of prime minister could be discussed with the 
exception of ‘the viewpoint of the inner circle of his privacy’ and ‘probably just blatant, nominal 
falsehoods’ (II. ÚS 191/2015, §59).  
145 The Court accepted ‘the trend towards shifting the position of judges, who stand somewhere in the 
middle of the range, in the direction of politicians’ (II. ÚS 152/08, §10). It found that ‘a judge as a 
representative of public authority must be aware that his conduct may be subject to criticism and thus 
[in relation to judges] a larger degree of tolerance and open-mindedness than in relation to ordinary 
persons must be assumed’. The degree of acceptable criticism was ‘even larger in relation to Supreme 
Court judges’ (I. ÚS 408/2010, 19). According to the Court, ‘in terms of intensity of privacy protection 
it is important to differentiate between a court chairperson and other judges of that court, who 
undeniably enjoy a greater degree of privacy protection than the court chairperson who symbolizes 
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capacity (IV. ÚS 302/2010) all had public figure status. The Court found that politicians 
were required to accept more criticism than other people because they had ‘a greater 
ability to promptly and effectively react’ to public criticism and to ‘get their viewpoints 
across to the public’ (IV. ÚS 492/2012, 21). 
The Court confirmed that seeking and disseminating information and ideas on 
matters of public (general) interest enjoyed the highest level of constitutional protection. 
State authorities’ conduct and the persons representing them, including politicians (IV. 
ÚS 492/2012) and public officials (IV. ÚS 302/2010), legislation and the adjudicatory 
practice of courts (II. ÚS 152/08) and its circumstances (I. ÚS 408/2010), as well as the 
private sphere and leisure activities of judges (II. ÚS 184/2015) could be subject to 
legitimate criticism in the media. The Court acknowledged that whether the speech in 
question was a matter of public interest ‘may in certain instances depend on the passage 
of time’ (IV. ÚS 492/2012, 15). The Court found that the general principle ‘the larger the 
degree of publicity, the larger the degree of protection of personality rights’ needed to ‘be 
assessed in relation to the criterion of the author’ (IV. ÚS 492/2012, 15, also IV. ÚS 
139/2010, I. ÚS 416/2011). If the author of the impugned statements was a journalist, 
his/her privileged status might, to a certain extent, neutralise the place criterion.  
The Court emphasised that when examining the limits of freedom of expression, 
there was a need to distinguish between factual statements and value judgments, as they 
enjoyed different levels of constitutional protection (e.g. II. ÚS 326/09, IV. ÚS 302/2010, 
II. ÚS 558/2012, I. ÚS 390/2011). Drawing on an earlier Czech Constitutional Court 
ruling (I. ÚS 453/03) that cited the House of Lords’ Reynolds decision146, in IV. ÚS 
302/2010, the Court introduced the need to consider whether journalists acted 
responsibly, in line with their “duties and responsibilities”. In the Court’s opinion, 
publication of defamatory information (factual statements) could not be considered 
legitimate unless the publisher proved that he/she ‘had good reasons to count on [their] 
truthfulness’, that he/she ‘took independent steps to verify the information to such an 
extent and intensity that was at his/her disposal’, and unless s/he ‘had a reason not to trust 
 
 
 
and represents the court outside’. A court chair candidate ‘must be aware that he/she will face 
increased attention from the print and electronic media’ (II. ÚS 184/2015, 28). 
146 Reynolds v. Times Newspapers Ltd [2001] 2 AC. 
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that [it] was false’. Publication of defamatory information, could ‘not be considered 
sensible unless the disseminator verifie[d] its truthfulness by asking the person concerned 
to comment and … publishe[d] the latter’s statement, with the exception when it’s 
impossible or unnecessary to do so’ (IV. ÚS 302/2010, 17). To establish the legitimacy 
of the impugned information, ‘the aim pursued by the publisher equally needs to be 
examined’. Publication was illegitimate if its ‘aim was to harm the person with 
information the disseminator him/herself did not believe’ or if published ‘recklessly 
without caring whether it was truthful or not’ (IV. ÚS 302/2010, 17).   
Stressing the need ‘to assess the whole expression’, ‘never only a statement or 
sentence without context’, the Court held that only criticism of a public figure ‘devoid of 
factual basis and for which there is no justification’ was to be considered disproportionate 
criticism (IV. ÚS 302/2010, 17). According to the Court, reporters had constitutionally 
guaranteed rights to express even ‘sharp’ criticism if it concerned a matter of public 
interest and was based on truthful facts (II. ÚS 558/2012, 24). The Court recognised 
‘journalists’ right to publish certain simplifications or even inaccuracies’, but emphasised 
‘that published information ha[d] to, at the relevant time, correspond with actual facts’ (I. 
ÚS 408/2010, 23-24). 
The Court repeatedly emphasised that adjudication was non-compliant with the 
condition of objective and fair assessment of the case’s factual circumstances ‘if the 
presiding court fails to consider, or insufficiently considers, the organic bond between an 
article’s headline, its graphic execution in connection with the photographic material, and 
the factual context of the article’ (II. ÚS 340/09, 23; also IV. ÚS 448/2012). Adjudication 
needed to take into consideration the function fulfilled by the headline, i.e. ‘to attract the 
reader and capture his/her attention in order to read the article, and only on this basis to 
clarify the information provided by the press and form his/her own opinion’. The Court 
concluded that ‘it is generally possible also from the viewpoint of privacy protection to 
accept and tolerate that more expressive, provocative or exaggerating expressions appear 
in a headline, particularly if a medium of a tabloid character is concerned’ (II. ÚS 340/09, 
19). ‘In case of “isolated” consideration most headlines published in the press would have 
to be classified as factual statements, even though the real aim of their authors is only to 
attract readers’ attention to the article, which provides the impugned information in the 
form of value judgments’ (II. ÚS 340/09, 23-24). ‘Without sufficiently taking into 
consideration the organic bond between the headline of a certain article and its factual 
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content’ one ‘cannot reach the conclusion whether a statement comprised [in the headline] 
was true or false’ (II. ÚS 184/2015, 35).  
The Court addressed the question of damages awards, arguing that the reliance on 
judicial discretion did not provide ‘space for wilfulness and arbitrariness’ (IV. ÚS 
492/2012, 23). Regarding ‘legal disputes in which a judge claims personality protection, 
even more so [if he/she claims] considerable monetary compensation’, the Court noted 
that ‘a legitimate problem of “a judge judges a judge” arises’ and with it ‘an increased 
risk of potential client behaviour by members of the judiciary, which in case of recurrent 
questionable and insufficiently justified conclusions could jeopardize the legitimacy of 
the whole judiciary’ (I. ÚS 408/2010, 30). In a watershed decision the Court criticised 
ordinary courts for failing to follow the established Convention case-law, according to 
which ‘monetary compensation for non-material loss needs to be proportionate to the 
reputational loss suffered …, whereby one needs to determine the level of damages based 
on evidence proving the level of harm’ (IV. ÚS 302/2010, 24). The Court found that 
ordinary courts based their conclusions ‘primarily on witness statements and the 
“extensive publicity of the unlawful infringement”, without considering other important 
circumstances’ (IV. ÚS 302/2010, 23), which could undermine their conclusion about the 
harm inflicted. The Court stated that the decision on damages ‘must take account of the 
level of damages awarded by domestic courts in other cases relating to reputational harm’, 
as well as the level of compensation awarded for physical injuries or to victims of violent 
crimes. The Court emphasized that compensation for reputational harm ‘should, without 
the existence of serious and sufficient reasons, not exceed the maximum available 
compensation for physical injuries or to violent crimes’ (IV. ÚS 302/2010, 24), and that 
‘its level mustn’t be “liquidating” for the media’ (IV. ÚS 492/2012, 24). 
The Court criticised ordinary courts for assuming that ‘public authorities and their 
representatives’ needed increased protection and that every fault on the part of the media 
caused such serious violation to the rights of public officials that could only be 
proportionately compensated with large damages, which ‘considerably exceed[ed] the 
amounts conceivable in cases of other (“ordinary”) citizens or other types of personality 
rights violations’. The Court warned that such practices represented ‘a serious 
phenomenon capable of leading to future significant reduction of freedom of expression 
protection standards’. The Court’s aim was not to ‘deny these persons protection’ or to 
endorse ‘tabloid practices that often disrespect not only the limits of human privacy but 
also dignity’. Nevertheless, the Court reiterated that ‘from the constitutional viewpoint’, 
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it was ‘non-acceptable for ordinary courts, when determining the level of compensation 
for non-material loss, to privilege public functionaries before other (“ordinary”) citizens 
with the justification that the harm caused to the former is (automatically) more serious’ 
(IV. ÚS 492/2012, 25).  
6.4 Bias, Arbitrariness and Uncertainty Remain 
It is unsurprising that the different types of respondents interpreted the shift in the 
constitutional doctrine and its consequences for the protection of the competing interests 
in different ways.  
6.4.1 Plaintiffs: ‘Media Can Now Write Everything’ 
The plaintiffs and plaintiff lawyers saw the developments as harmful to personality rights. 
They believed that by mid-2010s it was increasingly difficult for plaintiffs to succeed in 
personality protection disputes against the press and for the public to learn the truth as 
ordinary courts’ adjudicatory practice became markedly media-friendly. L13 argued that 
‘the media are those that always win’. L09 claimed that it was ‘possible to win in some 
cases’ but success was ‘increasingly rare’ due to the ‘perverse’ pro-media bias of the 
ECtHR and Slovak judicial authorities. L09 thought this was in stark contrast to the past 
when case-law ‘was built on the premise that everyone was liable for what they wrote’. 
Some of the most successful high-profile litigants’ lawyers also expressed perceptions of 
prejudice against their clients. L01 observed during some proceedings, a clear bias against 
Fico and his policies from the reasoning in the judgments and how the judges posed 
questions and their willingness to admit evidence. Ľalíková believed that judges often 
decided in media’s favour because ‘they are under public pressure’ and ‘indirect pressure’ 
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of journalists covering the proceedings.147 They ‘fear for their position’ should the 
decision be criticised in the media.  
P03 – a judge by profession – perceived the Constitutional Court’s decision in his 
case as ‘scandalous’ and as ‘a demonstration of arrogance’ because it elevated ‘the right 
to freedom of information’ above his right to personality protection and failed to take into 
consideration that false information was published. As P03 put it, ‘once [ordinary] courts 
said that [journalists] had lied’ and did not prove the truthfulness of the published 
statements, ‘the Constitutional Court cannot ignore that [finding] and declare that 
nonetheless [journalists] have a right to publish what they want’. P03 asked ‘whether the 
media have the right to write any sort of lies’ and whether the Constitutional Court can 
declare ‘“Well, they lied about you but tough luck because we are convinced that they 
can write whatever they want”’.  
P03’s lawyer, Sedlačko was similarly convinced that the shift in constitutional 
doctrine made it extremely difficult for plaintiffs to gain adequate compensation because 
district courts became unwilling to award large damages for fear that the Constitutional 
Court would overturn their decisions. Sedlačko maintained that ‘thanks to freedom of 
expression media can write anything nowadays’. Nevertheless, Sedlačko considered the 
developments in judicial decision-making to be an integral part of the law’s natural 
evolution. Adjudication needed to reach extremes on both sides of the spectrum at first 
prior to stabilising in the centre. Using the metaphor of “childhood illnesses”, without 
which no child can develop, Sedlačko asserted: ‘before 1991 personality protection 
litigation did not exist here and automatically as the process evolves, one will find 
extremes on both sides until a reasonable midpoint is found’. According to Sedlačko, the 
media’s defence against adjudication in the 1990s and 2000s, which ‘intensely’ favoured 
the plaintiffs, led to the other extreme, where ‘freedom of expression is unduly glorified’. 
Such ‘glorification’ was natural given Slovakia’s fascist and communist past, and vital 
for the protection of the press’s watchdog function, ‘otherwise journalists might become 
too afraid to write’.  
 
 
 
147 In the late 2000s media and various media-watch organisations started reporting on the above-
discussed controversial decisions, portraying the lawsuits as profit-making endeavours or attempts at 
muzzling the press. 
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6.4.2 Defendants: Cautious Optimism that Worst Abuses Are Matter of the Past 
Media lawyers and editors were cautiously optimistic about the effects of the 
constitutional shift on freedom of expression. Adamčík argued that with the influence of 
the Constitutional Court’s rulings, ‘ordinary courts started to perceive the balancing 
between freedom of expression and personality/goodwill rights differently’. Encouraged 
by media lawyers who tended to cite the relevant constitutional doctrine, by 2016, 
ordinary courts had started to apply the test of proportionality and other principles 
emphasised by the Court. Adamčík explained, ‘the ECtHR seems to be too far for our 
judges’; the ‘Constitutional Court … seems closer to them’ and they take its ‘legal 
opinions into account’, even if they perhaps do not fully accept them. Hence, ‘the 
situation [wa]s improving’, according to Adamčík, as younger judges particularly were 
able to better ‘perceive the ethics and morals of the issues concerning the legal 
relationships’ and some became ‘really well able to balance’ the competing interests.  
Media lawyers believed that, as Benedik put it, ‘a certain degree of sensibility was 
enforced’ in damages awards for reputational harm as the compensation awarded ex lege 
for health impairment and/or to victims of violent crimes became the benchmark in 
adjudicatory practice. Schwarz observed, ‘in contrast to the past, when large non-
pecuniary damages were awarded without justification, there has been a shift towards 
greater predictability, particularly concerning the upper and lower limits of awards’. 
Moreover, as Adamčík argued, media organisations ‘realised that … [liquidating 
damages awards] no longer threaten[ed] them’ in disputes with public figures.  
Some senior editors and experts also noticed the positive developments in 
adjudicatory practice, hoping that no court would in the future be able to make an 
arbitrary, unjust judgment against a media organisation or professional, as long as they 
acted in accordance with their duties and responsibilities. Cautious not to brand the 
developments as ‘evidence of a systematic change in the approach [of courts]’, the co-
author of several Nations in Transit reports, Miroslav Kollár believed that ‘at the 
minimum they signal that it is no longer a homogenous environment’ in which following 
a petition media were ‘fined’. Múdry (2013) claimed that ‘the argumentation that the 
public’s right to information is above privacy protection’ started to ‘gain weight’. Múdry 
(2014) also expressed hope that as wheels ‘started to slowly turn at the Constitutional 
Court’, ordinary judges would ‘not dare decide in a biased way anymore’. Similarly, 
Šimečka hoped that Slovak judiciary had ‘understood’ and that ‘the huge fines in millions 
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[of Slovak crowns] would not be repeated’. By 2017, Balogová observed ‘a certain 
development’ in ordinary courts’ adjudicatory practice where judges began ‘to accept that 
politicians should bear greater criticism than ordinary people’. 
6.4.3 Unpredictability, Arbitrariness and Legal Uncertainty for all Parties 
In spite of the doctrinal developments towards fairer triangulation of the competing 
interests at the heart of personality/goodwill protection disputes involving the media, 
media professionals and lawyers on both sides found that litigation outcomes were still 
unpredictable, particularly in cases involving influential public plaintiffs. Most 
respondents acknowledged instances of qualified, professional adjudication and evidence 
of the ability of some judges to fairly balance the competing interests. Nevertheless, the 
overwhelming majority perceived the adjudicatory practice as highly inconsistent, not 
least because the Constitutional Court had failed to unequivocally answer many crucial 
questions relating to the balancing act. Moreover, the approach towards the limits of 
journalistic work in conflict with reputation and privacy rights varied among the different 
Constitutional Court senates. There was also a perceived disjunction in the willingness of 
the Supreme Court senates towards admissibility of cassation proceedings in the disputes. 
Therefore, it was unsurprising that the Supreme Court failed to effectively facilitate 
ordinary courts’ case-law unification.148 
Respondents argued that in the mid-2010s, ordinary judges were still reluctant or 
unable to properly apply the proportionality test, thus potentially creating unintended 
consequences for private and public interests in freedom of expression and equality before 
justice.149 As the Constitutional Court observed, the questions encompassed in the 
proportionality test ‘need not always provide an unequivocal answer’ and the test 
 
 
 
148 It is the Supreme Court’s role to promote the uniform interpretation and consistent application of 
all laws by way of its own decision-making; adopting opinions aimed at unifying the interpretation of 
laws and other legislation of general application; publishing final court decisions of primary 
importance in the Collection of opinions of the Supreme Court and Decisions of the Courts of the 
Slovak Republic.  
149 Drgonec (2013, 301) similarly argued that in spite of the extensive binding case-law to the contrary, 
adjudicatory practice, particularly, in relation to evidence examination and standard of proof remained 
largely unchanged taking inadequate account of freedom of expression interests. 
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therefore offered ‘only one of the instruments’ for balancing the two competing rights 
(IV. ÚS 492/2012, 16). The balancing exercise therefore still largely depended on the 
personal prejudices of the judges. Kamenec observed that while the test of proportionality 
constituted ‘a way of making an issue, which is impossible to objectify, objective’, how 
judges applied it and whether they were able to strike a fair balance depended on ‘the 
values they profess[ed]’. Kubina also believed that litigation results were ‘always about 
the judge’ and his/her ‘sense for justice’. Recognising a ‘certain progress … at [ordinary] 
courts’ and higher judicial authorities, L19 believed that adjudication was still rather 
unpredictable and ‘dependent on judges’ and their subjective assessment. Acknowledging 
instances of fair balancing, Fila believed there had been too many cases in which 
decisions threatening freedom of expression were made. According to Leško, the 
precedential judgments of Slovak higher judicial authorities demonstrated that judges 
were ‘able to decide in line with modern times’. However, it was ‘always only an 
individual achievement’ rather than ‘the standard’. Leško found it ‘quite depressing’ that 
contrary to his earlier hope that ‘following several precedential cases in Strasbourg it 
wouldn’t be that easy to carry on with the present practice’ of arbitrary adjudication, it 
continued without any consequences for the judges. 
Respondents also acknowledged that the Constitutional Court’s watershed 
decisions regarding damages awards ‘did not mean absolute liberation [for the media]’, 
as Adamčík put it, because arbitrary, astronomical damages awards for reputational injury 
were still possible. Zlámalová, argued that ‘some judges still hold the strange view that 
… the plaintiff doesn’t have to prove … that the infringement had occurred and caused 
harm’, if monetary compensation was claimed. L20 found it desirable for courts to set 
clear criteria for calculating non-pecuniary damages, follow them and ‘transpose their 
considerations into the reasoning section of their decisions’.  
Several interviewees cited the blatant disregard of Constitutional Court’s binding 
legal opinion by the Bratislava regional court in Harabin v. Petit Press as a prime example 
of the threat faced by the media. In its original ruling, the Constitutional Court found that 
in relation to the 33,000 euro damages award, the appellate court’s decision was ‘prima 
facie arbitrary and evidently unfounded (in abstracto), disproportionately harsh, 
unbalanced, [and] disregarding the arguments of the complainant as well as the 
circumstances of the case at hand (in concreto)’ (I. ÚS 408/2010, 28). The Constitutional 
Court criticised the regional court for solely basing the damages’ amount on testimonies 
of Harabin’s relatives, friends and colleagues, while failing to consider that Harabin’s 
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widely known career progression had not caused significant harm to his professional 
reputation and societal esteem. The Constitutional Court thus ordered the presiding senate 
to again ‘consider whether under the circumstances a non-pecuniary damages award is 
necessary’ and, if so, to ‘re-evaluate … its amount’ and ‘to disprove all the doubts and 
reservations raised … in a persuasive and constitutionally compliant way’ (I. ÚS 
408/2010, 31). In its subsequent decision (3Co 334/2011-534), the regional court 
explicitly disputed part of the Constitutional Court’s legal opinion and awarded Harabin 
an identical sum in damages. In its repeated ruling in the case, the Constitutional Court 
held that the appellate court failed to respect its ‘sufficiently clearly stated’ legal opinion. 
Since the regional court’s decision remained ‘arbitrary and unpersuasive in the part 
concerning compensation for non-material loss’, the Constitutional Court again ruled that 
the publisher’s freedom of expression had been violated (II. ÚS 213/2014, 29). 
The perceived arbitrariness and bias of decisions resulted in frequent appeals, 
unpredictable litigation results and undue legal uncertainty for both plaintiffs and 
defendants. L09 argued that ‘courts do not provide judicial or legal certainty’ because the 
Supreme Court repeatedly changed or set decisions of appellate courts aside even after 
the payment of compensation. Moreover, according to respondents, in the mid-2010s, 
first instance courts were still deciding comparable cases diametrically differently. 
Schwarz stated, while ‘certain predictability exists, it doesn’t mean that the moment of 
surprise is absolutely absent’. Due to the ‘vague’ principles pertaining to the disputes, 
judicial decision-making was very subjective, making it possible for two judges to 
consider an identical case ‘diametrically differently’. L13 similarly believed that the 
inconsistencies and failure of adjudicatory practice to reflect that ECtHR case-law was a 
binding part of the Slovak legal order, caused legal uncertainty. Leško observed that it 
was ‘absolutely unpredictable’ how a dispute would end because one could ‘be unlucky 
and the judge may see only the harm caused to honour’, disregarding other circumstances. 
Personality/goodwill protection disputes involving media-defendants were not the only 
area characterised by legal uncertainty, which represented ‘a fundamental problem for the 
functioning of the rule of law’, according to Kamenec. The rule of law necessitated 
‘predictability of law, respect for legitimate expectations [and] basically constant and 
systematic interpretation of legal rules’, denoting that the result ‘cannot be different every 
time’. Sedlačko similarly argued that despite the recurrent emphasis in Constitutional 
Court case-law on the undesirability of varying decisions in similar circumstances, ‘the 
predictability of adjudication is not at such a level that would, in the interest of legal 
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certainty, perhaps be desirable’.  
6.4.4 Reasons for the Unfairness and Unpredictability of Adjudicatory Practice  
While most respondents did not feel qualified to comment on the reasons for the 
arbitrariness and unfairness of the adjudicatory practice in personality/goodwill 
protection disputes involving the media, some were able to offer potentially valuable 
insights for future policy change.  
6.4.4.1 Lack of Expertise, Time and Vanity of Judges 
Benedik, believed that most ordinary judges either did not understand or were ‘simply 
unable to digest’ the importance of freedom of expression emphasised by higher judicial 
authorities and tended to decide ‘in the same way as years and years ago’. In Benedik’s 
experience, courts often either dismissed established principles as non-applicable to the 
case or ‘turned them on their head’. He mentioned a 2016 judgment that cited all the 
relevant constitutional and ECtHR principles but nevertheless concluded that the 
qualifications used were too strong and thus disproportionate and unlawful. L12 likewise 
argued that appropriate triangulation of the conflicting interests should stem from the 
erudition and expertise of judges, which he believed they often lacked and were thus 
unable to decide justly. Other interviewees similarly recognised that experience was 
crucial in relation to the competent adjudication of these disputes (L01, L04, L09, Ikrényi, 
Sedlačko, Langer). Judges who encountered a personality protection case against the 
media for the first time tended to struggle with triangulating the competing interests.  
Several respondents (L01, Ľalíková, L12) indicated that the relatively frequent 
changes to court jurisdiction in these matters (see Chapter 4) had contributed to the low 
quality of decision-making as it prevented judges from building solid expertise. Adamčík 
argued that when heard before the plaintiff’s local court, the disputes were adjudicated 
by judges ‘who were usually confronted with these issues for the first time and thus rose 
to the occasion with different level of competence’. Some were able to decide in a fair, 
well-reasoned way. However, given their workload, they largely had ‘no chance to 
improve [their expertise] to the same extent as judges at [Bratislava district courts] five, 
two and four’ where large media organisation had their domiciles. Ogurčák was similarly 
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convinced that the predictability of decision-making in the regions tended to be lower as 
most judges ‘absolutely fumble around in the dark’ and ‘have no idea what they are 
talking about’. Schwarz argued that the relative improvement in adjudication 
predictability, particularly in terms of damages award levels, was largely due to the fact 
that since 2012 judges at large media houses’ domicile courts were able to gain expertise.  
While lawyers might play a pivotal role in directing overloaded judges towards 
the relevant case-law, many respondents recognised that judges were frequently too vain 
to follow the guidance or case-law of higher judicial authorities. L01, who in the late 
1990s co-led a judicial training programme regarding Convention case-law claimed that 
initially there was a lot of resistance to ‘tak[ing] instructions from Strasbourg’. Langer 
experienced a regional court characterising the proportionality test as ‘an absurd institute’ 
which ‘it will not apply’. According to Langer this approach was typical of many ordinary 
judges who ‘see their own truth’ and ‘feel that they know best how to decide’, yet ‘don’t 
go into depth and are superficial’. In certain cases, e.g. when Plus 7 dní was ordered by 
courts to publish an apology that covered 54 pages of the weekly (Terenzani 2014), 
Múdry (2014) complained about the ‘arrogance of judges’ unwilling to listen to 
explanations about how the media and production processes worked ‘because they have 
their own ideas’.  
6.4.4.2 Lack of Independence, Tribalism and Informal Networks 
The perceived arbitrariness, unpredictability and unfairness of the adjudicatory practice, 
particularly in cases involving high-profile plaintiffs, led respondents across the spectrum 
to question the independence of the judiciary. While ‘the predictability of these decisions 
is improving all the time’, Adamčík argued, ‘there are still some cases that occur as a 
flash in a clear sky, where you feel that the decision was not independent’. Maintaining 
that ‘any sensitive text must be written in a way that you can prove before a just court 
that you are in the right’, Tódová was adamant that ‘when you stand before an unjust one 
you can have any evidence you want, you will not succeed’. Similarly, Petková was 
convinced that ‘the courts are not absolutely independent’, and Benedikovičová perceived 
adjudication in cases involving politicians as ‘lacking independence’. According to 
Fulmek, ‘the largest problem’ for the press was the ‘definitely not impartial’ adjudicatory 
practice in cases concerning a narrow and ‘relatively clearly distinguishable circle of 
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people’, including judges, state prosecutors and certain politicians, whereby the presiding 
judges clearly ‘look[ed] for arguments against’ defendants. Fulmek found it ‘absolutely 
unbelievable’, that in Stiffel v. Petit Press, the regional court repeatedly decided in 
Stiffel’s favour, confirming the original damages award despite a Supreme Court decision 
that had identified numerous deficiencies in the former’s original judgment.150 
Some interviewees acknowledged that judges might find it hard to remain 
impartial when deciding cases involving criticism of members of their own social group. 
Diko suggested that where the presiding judges might ‘see themselves’ in the plaintiff’s 
place, they become incapable of looking at the case from the viewpoint of freedom of 
expression and importance of public discussion. Balogová believed that the judiciary was 
‘very closed and uncritical [towards its members]’ – ‘very collegiate in the negative sense 
of the word’. Milan similarly claimed that because judges perceived a judge-plaintiff as 
‘one of us’, they simply felt ‘the need to stand behind him/her’ thinking ‘in their sub-
consciousness “What if the same happened to me?”’ Múdry (2013) thought internal 
loyalties explained the propensity of ordinary courts to award large damages to judge-
plaintiffs. Using a football metaphor, he stated, ‘a judge always passes the ball to another 
judge’. L12 argued that there was a sharp difference in adjudication of disputes involving 
judges and public officials, not to mention ordinary citizens. L12 described a case where 
‘solidarity among judges’ manifested itself, in which a court chairperson successfully 
sued several outlets for violating his right to innocence presumption, receiving millions 
of Slovak crowns in damages.151 L12 considered ordinary courts far from fair and 
independent. He believed that judges ‘always succeed in defamation disputes’ due to 
nepotism, corruption and prevalent informal practices. Vozár himself also represented a 
case where he believed ‘solidarity among judges’ was the driver for the large damages 
award. 
Some respondents were convinced that the perceived pro-public plaintiff bias of 
ordinary courts was exacerbated by the ambivalent relationship many judges developed 
 
 
 
150 In 7 Cdo 192/2013 from 10 December 2014, the Supreme Court found that the deficiencies in 
adjudication had not been resolved and again set the case aside, returning it to the regional court for 
further adjudication. 
151 It would appear from L12’s description that he was referring to the disputes brought by Judge 
Polka. 
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towards the media based on their reporting on the judiciary in the 2000s. Adamčík 
explained, that from his conversations with judges it was apparent that the ‘totally unfair’ 
adjudicatory practice stemmed from the fact that many within the judiciary ‘started to 
perceive the media as enemies because they tended to write negatively about their 
colleagues’. Moreover, there were certain personalities in the judiciary, including Harabin 
and Polka, who led others by example in ‘an evident attempt to intimidate the media’. 
Šimečka similarly argued that a decision in a dispute where ‘a judge from your tribe 
stands against the media’, which you considered your enemy, was ‘totally simple’. 
Šimečka believed that judges like Polka and Harabin realised that defamation litigation 
was ‘a good method’ to ‘silence the media’ and considered the damages awarded to senior 
judges as a ‘malicious attempt to harm [the media] on the part of presiding judges’. 
Soltész suggested that as ‘members of a certain estate which the media criticise on a daily 
basis’, given the lack of public trust in the judicial system, judges ‘naturally feel hostility’ 
towards the media. As a consequence, ‘if the slightest opportunity exists for the publisher 
to lose, he/she will lose with a hundred-percent guarantee’. 
Media professionals and lawyers were overwhelmingly convinced that 
clientelism, fear and pressures from superiors played a role in the adjudicatory practice 
favouring high-profile plaintiffs. Prušová speculated that judges’ subconscious desire to 
secure politicians’ protection might have played a role in adjudication of the latter’s cases. 
Brunovský felt that in Fico v. Trend judges ‘took into consideration that [Fico] is a high-
profile politician with influence over the judiciary’. Fico’s former lawyer, L01, also 
admitted that in some instances the ‘power of the PM’s personality’ might have worked 
to his advantage. Vozár was convinced that the incidence of large damages awards for 
high-profile politicians ‘was no coincidence’, suggesting that presiding judges were 
‘either afraid or pressured’. Vozár demonstrated the influence of informal networks with 
an anecdotal story heard from a judge who was present when a court chairperson was 
phoned by another judge to ask whether he/she knew anyone at a regional court because 
a high-profile politician ‘has a dispute there’. According to Vozár, the existence and 
influence of such ‘inner corruption’, as he called it, illustrated the difference in the quality 
of democracy between Slovakia and well-established democracies.  
Adamčík also believed that there were cases when ‘politicians in Slovakia were 
able to arrange [favourable] court decisions’ at ordinary courts either as a result of 
‘favours in exchange for favours’ or ‘direct influences inside the judiciary’. Adamčík ‘felt 
a strong influence’ on adjudication in some of the high-profile disputes he worked on: 
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‘The influence was there. What tools were employed to achieve it, I don’t know. 
Nevertheless, I felt it – and very, very significantly’. He recollected a dispute, in which a 
judge different to the one appointed as shown on the court work schedule delivered the 
result ‘absolutely without problems … laughing in my face’. Nicholson was threatened 
by a plaintiff – a former state prosecutor – during a break during a hearing that he would 
‘lose at the district level, regional level and see at the Supreme Court’ because the plaintiff 
‘had the influence’ to arrange it. 
Several respondents directly or indirectly implied that between the mid-2000s and 
mid-2010s when Harabin held leading posts within the judiciary, judges’ considerations 
of their career prospects might have played a part in their adjudication of media disputes 
involving him and/or his close allies. It should be noted that, Harabin’s lawyer, Ľalíková, 
suggested in contrast, that under political influence or pressure from their superiors some 
judges might decide against a high-profile party which was in the right. Ikrényi implied 
that some of the controversial decisions might have stemmed from ‘the state of the justice 
system’. As an illustration, he described a judge pronouncing a judgment in the plaintiff’s 
favour ‘with her back towards [the parties] as ‘her voice trembled because she could not 
identify with what she was delivering’.  
Fulmek suggested that many of the decisions that disregarded freedom of 
expression principles were down to the pressures within the judiciary and the bonds that 
‘are insurmountable within the generation’ of judges, prosecutors and politicians in 
leading positions. Fulmek imagined that in many decisions involving “Harabin’s people” 
the fact that ‘all judges here are scared of Harabin’ played a crucial role. Similarly, 
Vagovič believed that .týždeň unjustly lost the above-discussed case with the Supreme 
Court judge because Harabin testified at the hearing and ‘his presence influenced the 
presiding judge’. ‘Just as [Harabin] entered the room and the judge noticed him, the 
atmosphere changed completely’, resulting in an ‘absolutely ludicrous’ verdict, Vagovič 
said. 
The pressures within the judiciary were discussed publicly in relation to appellate 
proceeding in Harabin v. Petit Press when the originally appointed presiding judge was 
removed for the newly-appointed senate to confirm the original decision in Harabin’s 
favour. Tódová, was convinced that Petit Press would have ‘won were it not for the 
change of senate at the regional court under suspicious circumstances’. The veteran judge, 
Anna Benešová, was removed following Harabin’s objection to her bias, based on 
disciplinary proceedings initiated against her. Benešová, who was found guilty and 
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demoted to a lower court publicly argued that the disciplinary initiative served as a 
punishment for her approach towards the adjudication of Harabin’s defamation dispute 
(Vilikovská 2010a; SME 2009; The Slovak Spectator 2009). Benešová accused the court 
of pressurising her to prioritise the then Justice Minister’s disputes and of instructing her 
how to rule: ‘I was told by the management how to decide, which offended and outraged 
me. No one will tell me how to rule’ (Benešová 2009).  
Benešová claimed that the regional court chair, who initiated the proceedings, had 
privately admitted that she had to file the disciplinary complaint otherwise she would 
have faced dismissal (Vilikovská 2010a). Benešová publicly proclaimed that ‘in the 
judiciary the [new] trend is fear’ in the sense that every judge ‘will carefully consider 
how to rule because even I was suspended from one day to the next’ (cited in SME 2009). 
Benešová was backed by observers and colleagues among judges, fifty-one of whom 
launched a petition against the decision to demote her, claiming that the proceedings were 
orchestrated to keep Benešová from adjudicating in Harabin’s defamation disputes and 
amounted to nothing less than bullying (Vilikovská 2010b).152  
Interviewees further suggested that some judges might have been motivated ‘by 
the vision of promotion’ as Tódová put it. Following the above-discussed repeat judgment 
of the regional court in Harabin’s favour, which was criticised by the Constitutional Court 
for ignoring its binding legal opinion, the presiding judge was promoted to the Supreme 
Court. Prušová thus believed that this case was ‘not about truth and justice’ suggesting 
that decisions ‘based on motives other than truth and justice’ were easily recognizable as 
they lacked persuasive reasoning.   
According to lawyers and media professionals, when proceedings were held in the 
domicile court of the plaintiff, local informal networks often contributed to the pro-
plaintiff bias in personality protection decisions. Branding the switch to a plaintiff’s 
general court that came into force in July 2007 ‘Fico’s and Harabin’s work’, Adamčík 
was convinced that it represented ‘an evident attempt to subjugate matters to local bonds’. 
As also indicated by the discussions about nepotism in the judiciary in Chapter 4, the 
influence of informal, local bonds was perceived particularly strongly in Eastern 
 
 
 
152 Following a Constitutional Court ruling that Benešová’s right to a fair trial was violated (Petková 
2011), the disciplinary case closed in 2015 after the submission was withdrawn (SITA 2015). 
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Slovakia. Balogová explained, ‘certain complainants drag cases to the East of Slovakia 
in particular because they have the judges more under control’ than in the capital. 
Zlámalová characterised the local relationships in Eastern Slovakia, as ‘impenetrable’ for 
media defendants. 
Benedik indicated that the propensity of courts to award higher damages was 
partially explained by the various ‘local bonds [and] relationships’ that ‘were in 
operation’ if the proceedings took place before the plaintiff’s local court because ‘as a 
rule, people who were someone in the concrete [geographic] area sued’, and ‘whether the 
judges wanted it or not, it simply influenced them’. Ogurčák argued that ‘local bonds’ 
played ‘a very important role in personality protection disputes’, particularly in cases of 
local politicians, sportsmen, celebrities and other well-known local people. Several 
defendant lawyers argued that it was not uncommon to learn about local bonds between 
the presiding judge and the plaintiff. While convinced that such bonds or corruption 
prejudiced the proceedings, they were usually unable to prove them to the standard 
required for filing a complaint of bias. Langer illustrated his point with a case in which 
the plaintiff won on appeal before the regional court led by his uncle and received 
damages of 100,000 euro instead of the original 10,000 euro. Zlámalová also claimed that 
‘it was a big problem when court local competence was [set] pursuant to plaintiff’s 
domicile’ because one could ‘feel at district courts away from Bratislava that everyone 
knows everyone and that [plaintiffs] have fixed [the result]’. Soltész similarly declared: 
‘for five seconds I did not think that there was a judge who was impartial’ at the district 
court in Eastern Slovakia where proceedings in his defamation dispute were held. Soltész 
also admitted that he was only able to achieve a reduction in the damages award on appeal 
by utilising his informal networks and ‘influencing the court’.  
Lawyers perceived that the 2012 jurisdictional rules change helped to cut the 
bonds, increasing the fairness of the proceedings as plaintiffs lost ‘their sway over the 
judges’, as described by Ogurčák. Benedik observed that since proceedings were lodged 
in the capital and judges were ‘not bound by a local milieu’, proceedings became ‘about 
something else’ and damages levels were reduced. Unless proceedings were ‘manipulated 
so that a concrete judge gets [the case]’, Zlámalová also perceived Bratislava judges as 
‘more professional’ and better able to distance themselves from the disputes. 
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6.5 Adjudicatory Practice Effectiveness 
Respondents across the spectrum agreed that personality/goodwill disputes took too long, 
particularly when concerning high-profile plaintiffs. L09 characterised ‘the time 
dimension’ of personality protection disputes as ‘crazy’. Lukášek believed that ‘as a rule, 
proceedings in personality protection last too long’ and that ‘in order to fulfil their aim, 
they should really be shorter’. According to interviewees, it was not unusual for 
personality/goodwill protection cases to last five, ten or even fifteen years. Many of the 
causes célèbres filed in the early 2000s were still pending on (repeated) appeal or before 
the Constitutional Court at the time of the interviews. The delays were to a large extent 
the result of the general case overload at ordinary courts as discussed in Chapter 4.153  
Several plaintiff lawyers suggested that proceedings at first instance tended to take 
longer than most civil disputes due to the relative inexperience of judges in this area of 
law and its procedural specificities, which required the court to evaluate many legal 
arguments and much evidence in order to establish the facts of the case. Ľalíková and L09 
also believed that the delays and the low quality of reasoning within decisions partially 
stemmed from the perceived nepotism in selection of judges and the resulting missing 
key qualities within the judiciary. Ľalíková’s said ‘judges are insufficiently erudite… they 
are unable to decide quickly. Having reviewed a case, they are unable to adopt a position. 
Therefore, hearings get adjourned until … the judge “becomes enlightened” to conclude 
the matter’. 
Lawyers recognised that the parties themselves might sometimes advertently or 
inadvertently delay proceedings. L01 and Sedlačko argued that a deliberate failure of 
witnesses to turn up forced judges to adjourn hearings. Some believed that defendants 
might deliberately prolong the proceedings, by, for instance, suggesting ‘nonsensical 
 
 
 
153 In 2013 district courts received 1,485,747 new cases, translating to 1,736 cases per judge. In 2013, 
the average length of proceedings in civil law matters at Bratislava district courts, which since 2012 
heard most of the personality/goodwill protection cases against the media, was almost fourteen 
months, and over twenty-three months at the Bratislava I district court, which, according to some 
interviewees, adjudicated most of the disputes (MS SR 2016). In 2012, the Bratislava Regional Court, 
which decided most personality/goodwill protection disputes on appeal, received 27,726 new cases – 
370 for each judge. According to some respondents, the average length of appellate proceedings before 
the court lasted 2 – 3 years. 
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evidence’, as P03 put it, in the hope that the plaintiff would abandon the action. Lukášek, 
in contrast, argued that the delays might be down to plaintiffs’ tactical thinking 
concerning their ability to bear their burden of proof. Lukášek explained, ‘I recommend 
to my clients, if they want to prove the harm … they suffered, to wait because … after a 
week one can hardly prove that one’s social relations have been damaged’. Zlámalová 
further argued that delays were often caused by the plaintiff’s request for court fees 
waivers, which defendants naturally appealed. Due to the sensitive nature of the issues at 
the centre of personality/goodwill protection disputes and the strenuous relationship 
between some public plaintiffs and the media, litigation tended to go through several 
levels of judicial action (sometimes several times) before a final decision was reached.  
The situation had improved following the adoption of the principle of 
concentration of proceedings in personality protection disputes (see Chapter 5), even 
though the policymakers’ motivation was seen as questionable by some media 
representatives. Since the principle was adopted when Harabin – one of the most prolific 
plaintiffs at the time – was Justice Minister, they felt that the purpose was rather 
instrumental. Kamenec said, ‘politicians who tend to sue always want to regulate the 
proceedings for themselves so that it is easier to litigate’. Nonetheless, most lawyers 
believed that ‘the introduction of the concentration principle has helped to accelerate 
these proceedings’, as L20 put it. Adamčík explained that, once judges got accustomed 
to the rules particularly concerning their obligation to instruct parties in the summons to 
the first hearing, it enabled them to expedite the proceedings by rejecting late adduced 
evidence without any risk of being reproached on appeal. Zlámalová advised that 
litigation involving private plaintiffs tended to be finally concluded within four years 
from the early 2010s instead of the seven to eight years previously. 
6.6  Conclusion 
The chapter investigated the adjudicatory practice of Slovak courts in 
personality/goodwill protection matters, an aspect of the operation of defamation and 
privacy regimes largely ignored in previous studies. The analysis revealed an inability of 
ordinary courts to interpret and apply the law-on-the-books in a fair, certain and effective 
manner. This raised serious questions for its ability to achieve adequate protection of the 
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private and public interests in reputation, privacy as well as freedom of expression with 
the potentially dire consequences for freedom of express in particular. 
 
Fairness 
Through most of the studied period, the adjudicatory practice was viewed as biased 
towards personality protection, failing to adequately value political speech and criticism 
on matters of public interest. The unfairness was particularly stark in disputes involving 
powerful public officials, including politicians, senior judges and prosecutors, whom 
ordinary courts tended to award disproportionate damages. The clear disjunction between 
the awards received by high-profile plaintiffs for questionable reputation or privacy harm 
and those achievable by ordinary persons led to wide-spread perceptions of inequality 
before justice. This had the potential to seriously affect private plaintiffs’ interests in 
personality protection as well as the veracity of public debate about matters of general 
concern. The “costitutionalisation” of personality/goodwill protection in the 
Constitutional Court’s case-law in the late 2000s and early 2010s shifted the balance 
towards protection of expression, increasing the ‘fairness’ of the regime, with hopes that 
the past gross abuses of the law by powerful plaintiffs would not be repeated. However, 
its impact on adjudication practice of ordinary courts was not felt uniformly. 
 
Certainty 
The adjudicatory practice of ordinary courts remained unpredictable and arbitrary, 
particularly in disputes brought by high-profile plaintiffs. The Constitutional Court’s 
inconsistency in adjudicating personality/goodwill protection cases and the inability or 
reluctance of ordinary courts to properly apply the general principles the Court and the 
ECtHR developed left all parties with undue uncertainty about litigation outcomes and 
the defendants about the lawfulness of contemplated speech. 
 
Effectiveness 
Personality/goodwill protection litigation was protracted and plagued by delays, in some 
cases lasting up to fifteen years. Although the introduction of the principle of 
concentration of proceedings in personality protection disputes visibly expedited 
decision-making, the civil regime remained unable to provide plaintiffs with efficient 
reputational vindication and the public with corrected information.  
 
  236 
The analysis suggested that the inability of ordinary courts to triangulate the 
interests in reputation, privacy and expression in a fair, certain and effective way was a 
consequence of a multitude of interlinked factors. These included the lacking resources 
and capability of judges, exacerbated by changes to court jurisdiction rules and nepotism 
in their selection, the parties’ actions and most markedly judges’ personal prejudices, 
their adversarial attitudes to the media and the prevalence of corruption, clientelism and 
informal networks in the judiciary – all legacies Slovakia’s democratisation period 
(discussed in Chapter 4). 
While previous socio-legal studies of the interplay between defamation and 
journalism in mature Western democracies documented the perceptions among 
defendants and their lawyers of the pro-plaintiff bias and uncertainty of defamation and 
privacy regimes (most notably Barendt et al. 1997, 186-190), the underlying causes were 
largely related to the vagueness or stringency or legal rules and unpredictability of jury 
awards (see Chapter 2) and thus differed markedly from those highlighted in this study. 
The findings of this thesis demonstrate that, as suggested by Habermas’s theory of 
‘discursive democracy’ and American legal scholarship, when studying the operation of 
legal regimes in immature democracies, researchers have to pay particular attention to 
judges’ values, interests and cultural norms prevalent in society, journalism and the 
judiciary. In addition, the operation of legal regimes needs to be researched in the context 
of the mutual relationships between the principal protagonists including judges. For if 
corruption, clientelism and political pressures prevail in the judiciary and if the society is 
polarised to that extent that judges perceive the media as their enemies, however well-
balanced, the law-on-the-books, the legal regime will not be able to achieve its aims in 
optimally triangulating reputation, privacy and expression. 
In line with expectations of historical institutionalism (Bannerman and Haggart 
2015, 10; Pierson 2004, 4; Thelen 1999), the findings underlined the value of taking 
account of path dependence when studying the operation of legal regimes. The failure of 
the Slovak Constitutional Court, in contrast to its Czech counterpart, to correct the unfair 
personality protection adjudication practice of ordinary courts favouring high-profile 
plaintiffs allowed for bias and uncertainty in the regime to prevail even after its attempts 
at re-centring the system in the late 2000s. On the other hand, the effects of changes to 
procedural rules – in the Slovak case the jurisdictional rules and the principle of 
concentration of proceedings – were demonstrated to have hindered or contributed to the 
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ability of a defamation and privacy regime to achieve an optimal balance between the 
competing interests. 
Lastly, by depicting the role played by the ECtHR, the chapter highlighted the 
importance of considering the international legal context when studying a legal regime’s 
triangulation of reputation, privacy and expression, as also suggested by the conceptual 
framework and Townend (2014) for instance. The key, albeit indirect, contribution of the 
ECtHR’s rulings in Article 10 disputes against Slovakia to the shift in the Constitutional 
Court’s personality protection case-law and thus the gradual re-centring of the regime 
between the late 2000s and early 2010s was clearly demonstrated. The principal 
protagonists also viewed the Strasbourg Court’s case-law as a benchmark of fairness in 
decision-making against which they measured the Slovak adjudicatory practice. 
The next chapter explores the consequences of the operation of the regime on the 
private and public interests in protection of reputation and privacy. It takes the perspective 
of plaintiffs who sued the media for personality protection and plaintiff lawyers. Focusing 
on the ‘complex calculus of plaintiff motives’ (Bezanson 1986, 806), it examines to what 
extent the law, as interpreted and applied by courts, was able to safeguard the plaintiffs’ 
and the public’s interests in personality protection.  
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 Protection of Reputation and Privacy Interests 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the extent to which the personality protection regime safeguarded 
the private and social interests in reputation and privacy when triangulating the competing 
rights at its core.154 Drawing on the conceptual framework developed in Chapter 2, to 
gain a better understanding of the law’s ability to protect these interests, research needs 
to explore who actually sues for personality protection, why they sue and what objectives 
they pursue through litigation. According to the reviewed literature, injured parties decide 
to sue if they perceive litigation to be the most effective means of achieving their 
objectives at the lowest possible cost. They may select other statutory or non-statutory 
means, if they deem them to be more effective to attain their reputation and privacy 
objectives. If alternative remedies are unavailable and litigation costs too high, injured 
parties might be left with no means to defend their rights. The would-be plaintiff is 
expected to do the costs-benefit calculation with their perceptions of legal factors, namely 
the fairness, certainty and effectiveness inherent in the law and adjudication practice, in 
mind. Contextual factors such as would-be plaintiffs’ interactions with lawyers and/or the 
media might prove important when explaining why they choose legal means to defend 
their legitimate interests.  
The ability of the regime to protect individual reputation and privacy rights, and 
by extension the public interests in protecting the values, will be reflected in the plaintiffs’ 
satisfaction with their litigation experience and their opinion on whether they achieved 
their objectives. According to previous empirical research (e.g., Bezanson 1986), despite 
frustration with the judicial system workings, even public plaintiffs in media-friendly 
systems might feel that through litigation they attained some or most of their objectives 
in restoring their reputation and privacy and that the law protected their interests.  
 
 
 
154 The examination in this chapter is limited to protection of natural persons’ personality rights as 
opposed to legal entities’ goodwill rights. 
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Chapter 4 found that plaintiffs in personality protection disputes with the media 
tended to be relatively affluent, well-educated public figures with above-average legal 
knowledge, holding positions dependent on a good reputation. Private plaintiffs 
constituted the minority not only because they rarely appeared in the media but also 
because they were less aware of and interested in protecting their reputation and privacy. 
The most frequent plaintiffs were politicians, judges, prosecutors, law enforcement 
officers, lawyers and businesspeople. There were some high-profile plaintiffs who were 
considered particularly litigious. 
Chapters 5 and 6 examined the legal factors that are expected to play a role in 
would-be plaintiffs’ cost-benefit calculations regarding to litigation. It was concluded that 
in the context of journalistic speech the law-on-the-books sought to protect natural 
persons’ honour and dignity against publication of false factual statements or unfounded 
value judgments objectively capable of lowering the individual’s civic esteem. The law 
also granted protection against dissemination of true facts and images about a person’s 
private life without consent. The law sought to deter unlawful infringements and, if they 
occurred, to provide individuals with various forms of redress, including cessation of the 
infringement, restoration of consequences, judicial declaration of falsity, and moral 
(apology, retraction and admittance of fault) and/or monetary satisfaction for the non-
material loss suffered. The personality protection regime also provided individuals with 
discursive remedies under press and broadcasting law and with criminal protection for 
the most serious instances of defamation. The regime was seen as unpredictable, arbitrary 
and ineffective at providing swift redress by plaintiffs and their lawyers. They largely 
believed that the re-centring of the regime following the shift in the Constitutional Court’s 
doctrine in the early 2010s weakened the available protection of reputation and privacy 
as succeeding in civil actions against the media became harder. They also perceived an 
inherent unfairness and inequality in court decision-making in terms of achievable 
damages for powerful, high-profile plaintiffs and others.  
Drawing on these findings, this chapter seeks to investigate what the Iowa Libel 
Project (ILP) called the ‘complex calculus of plaintiffs’ motives’ (Bezanson 1986, 806) 
involved in their decision to defend their reputation and privacy rights. It first explores 
why plaintiffs felt the need to sue, whether they pursued alternative remedies and what 
they sought to achieve through litigation. It examines how their calculus was influenced 
by their perceptions of the legal regime’s operation and contextual factors, including the 
would-be plaintiffs’ interactions with their lawyers and/or the media and their 
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understanding of the media’s role in a democracy. The chapter then investigates the extent 
to which the plaintiffs felt their reputational and privacy interests were protected. It looks 
at the plaintiffs’ level of satisfaction with their litigation experience and results and 
whether they would sue again. The chapter lastly explores the extent to which the 
personality protection regime was able to protect the public’s interest in quickly receiving 
corrected information or the injured party’s response and deterring unwarranted attacks.  
The chapter is primarily based on the retrospective views and perceptions of six 
plaintiffs who sued the media. The interviewed plaintiffs’ cases either generated a final 
judicial decision, were pending on appeal, or settled out-of-court after the start of 
proceedings. The chapter also presents the views of plaintiff lawyers, in order to better 
understand the extent to which the personality protection regime safeguarded individual 
and social reputation and privacy interests. In addition, the views of three of the most 
litigious public plaintiffs: Robert Fico, Štefan Harabin and Ján Slota, expressed during 
proceedings and in public statements, together with the views of the lawyers of the former 
two, are explored.  
7.2 The Decision to Sue 
In contrast to assumptions in UK scholarly literature (e.g. Mullis and Scott 2012b, 55-56; 
Mullis 2010a, 11), in line with ILP’s findings (e.g. Bezanson, Cranberg, and Soloski 
1985), legal considerations featured little in plaintiffs’ cost-benefit calculations to sue. 
While the plaintiff-interviewees were aware of the financial, emotional and reputational 
costs of litigation and its protracted nature, they believed that civil action was their sole 
means to defend their personality rights and to redress the harm or threat to their 
professional career, social relations or family life suffered as a result of unlawful 
publication. Their perception of the media’s conduct post publication was also a major 
driving factor in their decision. The interviews revealed other key contextual factors that 
featured less prominently in previous research, as the plaintiffs’ interactions with their 
lawyer, or not at all, as the plaintiffs’ perception of the media’s behaviour before 
publication, their understanding of the role of the media in a democratic society and 
support of their employer (Figure 7.1).   
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Figure 7.1: Plaintiffs’ Decision to Sue – A Cost-benefit Calculus  
 
 
7.2.1 The infringement and harm suffered 
The interviewed lawyers suggested that personality protection disputes with the media 
typically involved reports of wrongdoing or unethical conduct or publication of 
allegations by third parties. The encompassing allegations and/or value judgments were, 
in the plaintiffs’ opinion, unfounded, misleading, incomplete or truth-distorting. Since 
the impugned stories often covered important matters of public interest, a clear conflict 
between the public and private interests in reputation and expression was involved. P04 
objected to a broadcast of ‘several incorrect facts, from which the reporter drew his 
subjective opinion, including a suggestion of “a lawyer suspected of unlawful conduct”’. 
P03 – a candidate for re-election as a court chairman at the time of publication – brought 
action for an article concerning his leisure activities. Acknowledging his public figure 
status, P03 objected to the spurious and misleading nature of the published information: 
‘I am a public figure. Let them write what they want, as long as they write the truth’. P03 
found the ‘infringement was absolutely inadequate’, as he was depicted ‘as a person who 
misuses his post and goes hunting for free in a state hunting reserve’. P02, an economic 
crimes police investigator, believed he was defamed in a magazine article that ‘impressed 
  242 
false facts on to the public’ and alluded to corruption on his part in relation to a criminal 
prosecution case he had halted. 
Another type of dispute involved primarily the tabloid press and sensationalist 
defamatory publications or intrusions into individuals’ privacy. Since such ‘canards’, as 
Vozár called them, were rarely factually based, they were clearly not serving the public 
interest. Acknowledging the difficulties with delineating the limits of justifiable criticism, 
P01, a magazine editor-in-chief, sued for a commentary containing ‘insults’ based ‘on 
absolutely nothing’. As P01 put it, ‘[a]lthough I work in the media and know that it is not 
easy, certain standards were violated and it was beyond the limits ... of what can appear 
in the media under freedom of expression’.  
A distinct type of action, pursued by two judge-plaintiffs, concerned privacy 
infringements and violations of the Judges Act, which protected the personal details and 
images of judges in order to safeguard judiciary independence. P06 objected to the 
publication of his address within a moderated online discussion under a newspaper article. 
P05 sued a tabloid for publishing her personal details, including marital status and the age 
of her juvenile daughter, and intrusions into her private and family life in a ‘contrived’ 
story based on a photograph showing P05 and her future husband, a former high-profile 
politician.  P05 sued another tabloid for publishing her daughter’s name and clandestinely 
taking photographs depicting them in front of their house.  
The respondents expressed the harm suffered as a result of the contested 
publication in terms of non-material loss in line with the legal assumptions. However, the 
harm was, as Sedlačko pointed out, ‘hard to grasp, illusory, [and] impossible to measure’ 
because it proved impossible to gauge what effect the publication had on their social 
status. Harm was perceived differently, depending on the individual’s disposition – some 
might shrug it off, others might dread going to public places for fear of being recognised. 
Nonetheless, in light of the country’s small size, low media literacy levels, high internet 
penetration, according to lawyer-respondents, defamatory or privacy-intruding 
publication often had serious consequences for the injured party’s emotional well-being, 
family life, social relations, security or career prospects.  
It was not uncommon for the defamed person to lose his/her job and/or become 
unable to find a new post in a relevant field. Ikrényi's client lost his ministerial contract 
following publication of unfounded allegations even though the minister’s office was 
aware of his innocence. According to Ikrényi, ‘the media are decisive nowadays’. Public 
institutions ‘often simply give in even if they know [the media] are not right, because 
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they fear further confrontation or defamation’. P03 claimed that his professional honour 
suffered as the public was misled to believe he was yet ‘another fat cat who goes hunting 
in state grounds for free … [and] is also arrogant and proscribes journalists to write about 
him’. P03 was convinced that the publication thwarted his re-election chances, as a 
selection committee member testified that while he considered P03 to be ‘the best 
candidate’, after the publication ‘he wanted peace’ and placed P03 in second place. P02, 
who characterised the publication’s aftermath as ‘a traumatic’ experience, lived through 
a communication breakdown at work and was eventually dismissed from his job. Unable 
to find clients locally, he was forced to set up an accountant’s practice elsewhere.  
Several plaintiff-respondents and their families suffered considerable emotional 
distress as a result of their perceived civic esteem damage. P01 believed that defamatory 
publications threaten one’s societal status as people ‘see one in a different light. One’s 
authority is questioned. One’s moral integrity is questioned’. While the publication did 
not impact on P01’s job, she and her family suffered emotional harm: ‘what distressed 
me, despite being a strong person, was, above all, that my children were forced to deal 
with it’, as ‘their friends started asking questions regarding their mother. And that is … 
something every parent finds difficult to bear’. P05 ‘felt very bad’ after the first 
publication came out because she believed that many people, including the parties to 
proceedings that she adjudicated, started to see her in ‘a very negative light’. P05 ‘almost 
physically felt’ condemnation by colleagues and found herself indirectly reprimanded by 
a superior who publicly stated that ‘he disapproved of judges appearing on front pages’.  
Other plaintiffs’ social and family relations suffered. P04 started receiving 
anonymous threats and described a complete break-down in neighbour relations. Her 
relationship with family suffered as she became subject of ‘derogatory slurs’. While P04 
first ‘did not want to admit the extent of the consequences’, following verbal attacks in 
presence of her young daughter, she decided to move home and office and to revoke the 
power of attorney she held in relation to her neighbours’ disputes – which were the 
broadcast’s focus. P04 also felt under pressure from clients who did not want to be 
publicly associated with her, prompting her practice to lose money. P05’s relationship 
with her adolescent daughter became strained after she learned from the press about her 
parents’ divorce and refused to attend school following taunts from classmates. In the 
light of previous attacks on her car, P05 believed that the disclosure of her personal 
information posed a real threat to her and her family’s security. 
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The high-profile, litigious plaintiffs also maintained repeatedly that the impugned 
publications caused them and their families emotional distress, damaging their family and 
social relationships, and threatening their professional honour. Slota, claimed that 
published allegations ‘had an impact on his, his wife’s and parents’ mental state’, leading 
‘to the tragic death of his parents’ and ‘confusion’ in Slota’s marriage. Slota’s social and 
professional life suffered as ‘friends and acquaintances began to avoid him’ and in politics 
he was ‘continuously attacked with questions and allegations’ (Slota v. Spoločnosť 7 Plus 
No. 3, 6; also Slota v. Petit Press; Slota v. Ringier No. 2). Harabin maintained that one 
could not ‘describe in words’ the consequences on his ‘personal, professional and social 
life’ (Medialne 2013) of publication of the impugned statements in Harabin v. RTVS.155  
Following the publication of ‘the apparently false’ accusation in Harabin v. Petit Press, 
2 he ‘experienced personal psychological trauma’ and ‘had an open wound in his soul’ 
when confronted with ‘words of disappointment’ and questions from family, colleagues 
and acquaintances. The publication led to family tensions and change in colleagues’ 
behaviour, leading to his isolation, and diminishing his credibility as a judge. Fico ‘felt 
very uncomfortable’ when alerted to a ‘defamatory statement’. It even caught the 
attention of his adolescent son ‘who was negatively impacted’ by it (Petition to 
commence proceedings in Fico v. Trend Holding, 5). Fico’s relatives ‘reacted negatively 
to the accusations’ that he called journalists ‘dirty bastards’. His mother telephoned 
demanding to know whether he had used those words because ‘one doesn’t talk like that 
in their family’ (Fico v. Petit Press No. 1, 4). Fico claimed that by publishing a caricature 
depicting him without a backbone, Petit Press failed to ‘respect such an intimate matter 
as pain’156 and caused him ‘very intensive harm’, which he and ‘every ill person in his 
place’ would perceive as serious (Fico v. Petit Press No. 2, 3). 
Several lawyers argued that a defamatory publication seriously threatened their 
political careers. Sedlačko considered news media as the fourth estate that won elections, 
 
 
 
155 The dispute involved the following comment broadcast by RTVS: ‘As a doctor I can say that 
sometimes disease is infectious. And our judiciary is ill. Dr M. also fell ill. And Dr L., who died of 
stark persecution by Dr Harabin, fell ill’ (cited in Kostelanský 2012). It was made during a public 
discussion on the conditions within the judiciary by a psychologist who had treated Harabin’s two late 
critics. 
156 Following the cancellation of Fico’s official engagements due to acute neck pain, SME published 
a caricature depicting a doctor examining Fico’s x-ray picture, stating: ‘I was not mistaken. Your 
backbone pain is purely a phantom sensation’.  
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set trends in society, and represented the only communication channel between public life 
and citizens, whose only knowledge of politics originated with the media. He believed it 
was ‘completely unrealistic’ to expect that following unsubstantiated accusations in the 
press a person could clear his/her name in the eyes of fellow citizens. Since some voters 
might decide based on ‘the crazy stuff written in the media’, L01 – Fico’s former lawyer 
– was convinced that politicians did not have the luxury not to care about defamation. 
L01 claimed that falsehoods published about Fico ‘might not only have caused harm to 
his private life but harmed him in terms of voter preferences’. Fico repeatedly claimed 
that the contested statements ‘threatened, damaged and to a considerable extent lowered 
[his] esteem, professional honour and dignity’ because ‘the public had no reason not to 
believe the artificially created media reality’ (Fico v. Spoločnosť 7 Plus No. 3, 3).  
Fico frequently argued that publishers ‘turned the public against him’. The public 
trust he had enjoyed ‘had been seriously damaged and the public had been misinformed’ 
(Petition to commence proceedings in Fico v. Trend Holding, 2; also Fico v. Spoločnosť 
7 Plus No. 3; Fico v. Petit Press No.1, Fico v. Spoločnosť 7 Plus No. 4). Slota asserted 
that the impugned statements ‘unequivocally politically disparaged him’ because a 
politician’s impeccability ‘can be of key importance for voters’ decisions’ (Slota v. Petit 
Press, 4); they ‘had a hugely negative impact on his political standing’ because ‘some 
readers might appropriate the false and truth-distorting information’ (Slota v. Ringier No. 
2, 3); or were ‘capable of prompting a decline in voter preferences in national as well as 
regional elections’ (Slota v. Spoločnosť 7 Plus No. 1, 4).  
7.2.2 Civil Litigation as the Sole Means to Obtain Redress 
Plaintiff-respondents perceived the alleged defamatory statements as a direct threat to 
their social and/or professional standing, political career or security. They decided to sue 
because they believed it to be the sole means open to them to achieve personality 
protection. Most the findings about benefits of litigation replicated the assumptions of 
academic literature or findings of previous research (e.g. Mullis and Scott 2012b; 
Bezanson, Cranberg, and Soloski 1985). The interviewed plaintiffs argued to have sued 
to vindicate their reputation, stop the infringement, receive moral and/or monetary 
satisfaction and punish the media for the harm suffered. The previously little explored 
aims or benefits of standing up to injustice and preventing future unlawful infringements 
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stood out. Plaintiffs felt that civil action was the only available avenue to obtain redress 
because they either perceived malicious intent on the part of the media, suffered such 
extensive harm that could not be remedied through alternative means, or because the 
media rejected or ignored their before-action claim.  
In line with legal and scholarly assumptions, the interview data suggested that the 
primary aim of most defamed persons was to achieve immediate cessation of the 
infringement and/or obtain fast reputational vindication and moral satisfaction in the form 
of a public apology. The responses indicated that most plaintiffs wanted an admission of 
guilt from the media. Following legal consultation, many would-be plaintiffs or their 
lawyers, contacted the media with a before-action request of redress. Ikrényi argued that 
he did not ‘like to initiate lawsuits’ but advised clients to forfeit damages and request an 
apology first. Ikrényi was convinced that a promptly published apology, even if watered-
down, was more valuable to vindicate one’s reputation than any monetary compensation. 
Ikrényi’s firm had managed to settle some eighty percent of cases involving broadsheets 
at the before-action stage with an apology.  
L04 cited a case where a news portal amended an article following a before-action 
letter. The client decided not to pursue litigation as the reputational harm was very short 
and further damage was avoided. Ľalíková recommended clients to first request an 
apology, and in case of ‘more serious infringements’, i.e. concerning a party with high 
social standing, also monetary compensation. Harabin, Ľalíková’s most high-profile 
client, was infamous for sending before-action claims for substantial monetary 
compensation. P03, P04 and P06 contacted the respective media organisations, requesting 
an apology (and in P06’s case the removal of his personal data). For P03, a public apology 
was the only effective means of vindicating his reputation: ‘Given that very many lies, 
half-truths and falsehoods were published and since I, in fact, don’t have any other option 
to defend myself, I requested an apology from the publisher’.  
Despite the availability of corrections and/or replies under broadcasting and press 
law, and the option to submit complaints to the Press Council such alternative remedies 
were, according to lawyers, rarely requested as they did not provide adequate redress. 
Most lawyers argued that press corrections were of limited value to the claimant because 
they applied solely to incorrect facts, excluding any misleading or truth-distorting value 
judgments. Corrections and replies provided little moral satisfaction to the claimant since 
they did not involve any admittance of fault or apology by the publisher. In contrast, L01 
repeatedly emphasised that Fico had a rule to ‘always go for press corrections’, unless the 
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publication concerned such ‘a glaring issue that there was no point in publishing one’ or 
if the violation could only be compensated through damages. If published, L01 considered 
corrections an effective instrument to restore reputation because they permitted the public 
to learn the truth quickly. According to L01, requesting a correction prior to litigation 
might also benefit the client because some judges considered all the plaintiff’s efforts to 
achieve redress when deciding on damages. Apart from P02, none of the interviewed 
plaintiffs requested a correction/reply. Although not permitted under press law, P02’s 
correction request also included a publisher’s apology, suggesting that admission of fault 
was crucial for many plaintiffs. 
7.2.2.1 Media’s Reluctance to Settle before Action 
Even if Slovak media outlets’ reluctance to admit mistakes in public (Múdry 2017; Šípoš 
2007b) stemmed from other reasons than that described by previous research (Bezanson, 
Cranberg, and Soloski 1987, Chapter 4), the interviews suggested that the behaviour of 
the media when plaintiffs approach them for alternative remedies before litigation is key 
to many plaintiffs’ decision to sue. Given the media ignored or rejected their before-action 
claims, none of the interviewed plaintiffs were able to obtain fast redress through 
alternative remedies.  
 
Plaintiff lawyers’ views 
Lawyers acting for plaintiffs argued that despite the potential savings of increasingly 
scarce resources, media organisations tended to reject or completely ignore before-action 
requests. As Sedlačko explained, the media tend not to ‘accept the first “shot” or effort to 
settle or publish an apology or correction’. According to L13, the Press Council decisions 
were largely ignored. Lukášek claimed that press and broadcasting law provisions were 
‘little respected’. While tabloids tended to ignore all requests, serious outlets were more 
willing to provide redress or at least provide justification for the claim’s rejection. 
Sedlačko advised, some outlets ‘will out of principle discuss nothing. Nothing at all. “Sue 
us if you don’t like it!” [they say]. The more tabloid the paper, the more arrogant the 
attitude; the more serious the daily [or] weekly, the more open they are to discussion’.  
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Media-defendants’ views 
The interviews with media managers, professionals and lawyers painted a more nuanced 
picture of the media’s attitude towards before-action requests. They largely confirmed the 
reluctance to publicly admit fault, especially in the instance of public claimants. Most 
respondents acknowledged that news media were not invincible, that given the work pace 
and amount of content produced, mistakes occurred, and incorrect facts were published. 
Senior editors, however, suggested that only a fraction of before-action requests received 
by broadcasters and serious print outlets ended up in court, as media organisations tried 
to settle meritorious claims. Whilst maintaining that, ‘we always try to settle somehow’, 
Krejča estimated that around ten percent of all requests received by Markíza led to 
litigation. HN did not have to ‘deal with disputes too often’ because, according to 
Obradovič, claims which typically involved ‘a tiny mistake’ were resolved in a 
subsequent publication. Kubina argued that the majority of before-action requests did not 
end up in court because genuine claimants were willing to settle using alternative 
remedies. SME’s Fila argued that ‘ninety percent of problems that arise from actual 
mistakes are resolved prior to getting to court’.  
Newsrooms’ willingness to settle depended on the assessment of the claim’s merit 
and compliance with formal requirements. Given the courts’ emphasis on the truthfulness 
of information, the primary focus was on establishing whether incorrect facts, or 
unfounded opinions had been published, and if so, how to remedy the situation. As Fila 
explained, ‘our first concern is to assess whether we have made a mistake to which we 
quickly have to react’.  
Editors and lawyers recognised that most private individuals and businesses were 
genuinely outraged and/or believed their reputation to be threatened by what they viewed 
as false allegations. They thus sought fast redress, primarily through discursive remedies. 
Kamenec argued that these claimants were ‘not interested in spending years in courts but 
genuinely fe[lt] the need to deal with the issue’ and ‘above all’ wanted ‘moral satisfaction, 
whether an apology, setting the record straight, correction, [or] reply, which might 
potentially mitigate the infringement’s impact’. Brunovský believed that companies and 
businesspeople who had painstakingly cultivated their public image naturally strived to 
defend themselves in the face of a perceived unfair depiction of their actions. Fila held 
that most corporations did ‘not want to get into disputes’ as they ‘correctly understood’ 
that infringements were unintentional or that the harm suffered would not generate a large 
sum in compensation. Therefore, they usually requested corrections or putting the record 
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straight in a follow-up article. Fulmek acknowledged there were ‘normal disputes’, 
involving private individuals who felt ‘genuinely outraged with something we wrote that 
they considered not to be true’ and requested moral satisfaction, or relatively low non-
pecuniary damages.157  
Most respondents claimed that they immediately tried to offer redress concerning 
factual mistakes on their own initiative or following a request complying fully with 
procedural rules. Mikolášiková claimed that Nový Čas published a correction or 
clarification the following day, if a mistake had been made. Brunovský maintained, ‘we 
don’t have a problem with publishing corrections’ and ‘even publish them on our own 
initiative’ because ‘it is fair’. Kubina himself contacted meritorious claimants, arguing he 
was ready to swiftly and publicly put the record straight because he regretted having 
harmed them and because effective redress had to come immediately. Admitting that 
provision of instant correction was a mitigating circumstance in court, Kubina asserted 
that eighty percent of claimants were satisfied with an apology, which, in many cases did 
not need to be public. Diko believed that most claimants were satisfied with partial 
admission of fault and that public correction of factual mistakes allowed RTVS to avoid 
litigation in most cases. However, Diko also acknowledged that such practice ‘perhaps 
hadn’t always been customary’.  
Newsrooms preferred to provide meritorious claimants with an opportunity to 
comment on the contested statements in a follow-up feature or letter to the editor rather 
than publishing corrections or apologies, which were deemed to undermine the outlet’s 
credibility. Such a settlement was considered simultaneously beneficial to the 
organisation, and to the individual, and the public. As Milan explained, where untrue facts 
obtained from a malicious source, his publisher strived to settle to avoid litigation because 
adjudication was ‘unpredictable’ and ‘no one gain[ed] anything by [going to] court’. 
Milan admitted that to avoid credibility damage the media tried to maintain the pretence 
of infallibility so tended ‘not to advertise’ their faults when providing redress. Instead, 
they offered to put the record straight in another article or to write an unrelated, ‘nice 
article about the person’ and, if requested withdraw the impugned item from the web 
 
 
 
157 According to Petit Press’s records, private individuals were the single largest group to request 
damages under 10,000 euro. 
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archive. Milan believed that this was ‘the fastest and best solution’ because courts were 
unable to decide personality/goodwill protection disputes fast enough to provide efficient 
redress.  
Offering additional editorial content to subjects of stories who had previously 
been reluctant to comment was also in the readers’ interests. According to Brunovský, 
Trend often complemented contested articles with interviews or follow-up articles 
capturing the views of the stories’ subjects because ‘of interest’ and ‘of value for readers’. 
Some outlets tried to remedy personality/goodwill violations by offering complimentary 
advertising. Ringier settled several justified before-action claims in return for free 
advertising rather than a ‘puff piece’, which could unduly interfere with the newsroom’s 
independence (Mihálik).   
Several editors openly admitted that they sometimes offered complementary 
content, even to shaky claimants, to avoid litigation costs. Obradovič claimed that in order 
to avoid ‘suddenly having to publish three corrections within a month, [which] reduces 
the daily’s relevance’, HN offered follow-up content even if the contested article was 
factually correct. Once initial emotions cooled, claimants were, according to Obradovič, 
more receptive to such offers and requests were ‘not pushed to the edge’. As Krejča put 
it, ‘even though we stand by [the facts] in the majority of cases, it is not worth getting 
into a dispute, if we can broadcast another report to simply add further information about 
the issues’. Krejča also believed that doing so served the claimant’s and public’s interests 
better than a trial and broadcasting an apology years later. 
Newsrooms were generally reluctant to offer redress in cases perceived as 
unjustified when certain about their “truth” and having sufficient legally admissible 
evidence. Acknowledging that Ringier ‘considered the risk [of losing]’, Mihálik argued 
that as long as they were sure they ‘didn’t make a mistake’, they were ‘definitely less 
inclined to offer a settlement to the other party’. TA3’s Čekirda maintained, ‘we either 
rectify our mistake within a broadcast or we are prepared to face a dispute’. Krejča 
asserted that where they were ‘hundred percent sure’ about the impugned statements, they 
would ‘go and fight’ in court in preference to broadcasting a correction. Given the anti-
establishment attitude characteristic of the ‘critical change agent’ journalistic culture and 
the mutual animosity between media professionals and political elites, the media 
perceived high-ranking public officials’ requests as largely unjustified and tended to 
reject them. Múdry (2017) explained that many media professionals preferred to ‘remain 
on the barricades’ and perceived politicians’ requests for corrections as attacks on their 
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editorial freedom and credibility in the eyes of the public. L01 believed that because ‘the 
media were against PM [Fico]’, ‘it was more beneficial for them to “spit at him” and 
preserve the spittle [mark] … than to make amends or even admit a mistake’.  
Balogová acknowledged that politicians might have felt that SME a priori rejected 
all their correction and/or apology requests, but argued that this was untrue. Public 
officials’ correction requests tended to be rejected due to their failure to comply with 
statutory requirements. These stipulated that corrections were only available in relation 
to factual statements and could not include a publisher’s apology. The latter was 
presumably why P02’s correction request was rejected. Balogová, also admitted that 
apologising to public officials was extremely sensitive in the context of media-politics 
relations where the prime minister publicly labelled journalists as ‘prostitutes’ and 
hyenas’ paid for their biased anti-government reporting (Kužel 2010, 1; Šimečka 2009, 
3; Školkay 2011a) or as ‘dirty anti-Slovak prostitutes’ who ‘don’t inform’ but ‘fight with 
the government’ (Reuters 2016), and where traditional media were under attack from 
disinformation outlets (Jurina 2015; GLOBSEC 2016, 10-11; MacFarquhar 2016;  
Cunningham 2017, 7). From experience, the media knew that politicians tended to misuse 
previously published apologies to ‘undermine [their] credibility’ or tie journalists’ hands 
regarding future reporting.  
Media professionals further felt that before-action monetary compensation claims 
were misused by claimants who sought to gain personal riches rather than fast redress. 
Kubina argued that JOJ increasingly received before-action requests for substantial sums 
from private individuals who threatened to ‘sue for something that doesn’t make any 
sense’. Willing to provide ‘an adequate’ moral satisfaction, Kubina was prepared to 
litigate if a claimant insisted on financial compensation. Čekirda maintained that TA3 was 
‘definitely not inclined to any settlement in relation to non-pecuniary damages’. 
Respondents suggested that the rise in speculative claims in the 2010s was associated 
with the public’s increased awareness of their personality rights and the large damages 
obtained by public officials in controversial disputes. 
The interviews confirmed that serious newsrooms, including SME, HN, Trend, 
RTVS and .týždeň, tried to communicate their justification for rejecting before-action 
requests because of a conviction that after claimants’ initial anger passed, ‘often a threat 
of a lawsuit [wa]s fended off by [their] ability to disprove the claimant’s arguments’, as 
explained by Diko. In contrast, NMH’s outlets tended to ignore most before-action 
requests, because a response ‘essentially solves nothing’, according to Schwarz. Ninety-
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nine percent of the requests concerned press corrections/replies, did not comply with the 
formal criteria so were ignored. Schwarz believed that ‘from the strategic viewpoint’ it 
was better not to react to meritless requests for monetary compensation as it helped to 
filter out speculative claimants trying their luck but who were not prepared to pay the 
court fee and pursue litigation. Schwarz admitted that failure to respond might prompt 
some claimants to sue even where they would have been satisfied with an apology. He 
believed settlement with such ‘irritable’ persons was unlikely so it was ‘statistically more 
effective not to react than to react’. NMH lawyers tended to negotiate only with claimants 
alleging particularly serious violations. Several respondents acknowledged that as a 
result, some public officials might see litigation as the only means of vindicating their 
reputation. Balogová believed that where claimants were driven ‘purely [by] their belief 
that they [we]re in the right’ and had been wronged by the media, despite newsrooms 
being convinced of ‘the truth’ of their outputs, it was legitimate for the conflict to be 
‘decided in court’. Krejča believed that the majority of high-profile claimants were 
primarily interested ‘in clearing their name’ whilst admitting that Markíza had ‘definitely 
caused harm in the past’, and that claimants unjustly accused of wrongdoing just needed 
a de jure proof of their innocence to show future employers or business partners.  
7.2.2.2 Perceptions of Unethical Media  
The perceived behaviour of the media before publication, was another important factor 
considered by plaintiffs that has not previously featured in the literature. Several plaintiffs 
perceived litigation to be the only available means to defend themselves against 
intentional freedom of expression abuses perpetrated by the media. They were convinced 
that journalists had knowingly or unknowingly participated in smear campaigns either 
by disseminating false or misleading facts, often for bribes, with the malicious intent of 
discrediting them or through negligence by failing to verify the information they had 
obtained. P02 was convinced that the author of the impugned article failed to verify 
information leaked by law enforcement officers who wanted revenge on P02. P04 
believed that the defamatory broadcast was produced at the request of a certain public 
official who wanted to discredit her. P03 believed that the reporter deliberately published 
false accusations despite his genuine attempts to explain the issues and how he was unable 
to be completely open about his leisure activities for security reasons: ‘The arrogance, 
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attitude and … conduct of reporter R … completely exasperated me … the lie – I had 
asked him politely to understand why I cannot disclose [the information], and I read in 
the newspaper that I forbade [him] to write about me!’ P03 was certain that the piece was 
based on information leaked out of spite by a vengeful source with the intent of creating 
a scandal and smearing him before the election. As P03 put it, the reporter ‘posed his 
questions in such manner that I knew he tried to discredit me’.  
Lawyers also mentioned unethical journalistic practices. Adamčík took on 
plaintiff work because some ‘media exercised their rights in an extremely offensive way’. 
Ikrényi gradually moved from defending the right to freedom of expression to 
representing plaintiffs because he realised that ‘the media need some sort of control’. He 
was convinced that, ‘at times, totally shallow human motives lie behind many articles’ 
and that sometimes journalists produced defamatory stories ‘with malicious intent’. 
Sedlačko recognised that there were many ‘genuinely decent journalists’. Journalism 
often required simplification and reporters were not experts so made mistakes without 
malicious intent. Nonetheless, he argued that journalists did publish, for bribes, 
hypothetical statements capable of destroying reputations: ‘Media organisations are in 
private hands. Media can be bought and it is possible to discredit a person in the media’.  
Vozár had experience of a ‘sophisticated’ media smear campaign against a 
candidate for public office. Vozár suggested that ‘if we talk about [corruption in] society 
at large – in politics, in the police force, in the judiciary – corruption will also be present 
among journalists’. According to Vozár, ‘if some twenty percent of people are 
problematic within any occupation’, among journalists there ‘will surely also be some 
weaker links, who will write an article upon request, in which they discredit you in a 
sophisticated manner’. L09 was aware of instances ‘where journalists produced anything 
for money’. According to L09, ‘intelligence games’, whereby ‘an article or an attack 
appears on the web, which the media immediately consider a public source they can use’ 
were commonly used in competition among corporate entities. 
The constant criticism of government, implying that ‘all politicians are corrupt’ 
(Kollár 2013b) arguably contributed to the fact that, high-profile public figures felt 
unjustly persecuted in the press. L09 maintained that his client, ‘a common businessman’, 
a former communist minister and the father of a controversial secret service director under 
Mečiar, together with ‘the whole family became the target of an [unjust] attack’ because 
the press did not have enough material on his infamous son. L09 was convinced that ‘as 
soon as you start fighting the media they will start attacking you …directly or indirectly’. 
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Since the media ‘are relatively powerful and have many contacts’ with politicians or law 
enforcement employees, they can discredit one indirectly or they ‘write directly about 
you or strike next to you, [and write] about your family’. Ľalíková acknowledged that 
‘truthful criticism’ of wrongdoing moved the criticised and all society forward 
constructively. However, she repeatedly argued that rather than trying to ‘draw attention 
to wrongdoing’, the media tended to ‘focus on a single person’ with the intent of ‘causing 
harm’ and ‘degrading’ him/her by publishing falsehoods, even though he/she had ‘act[ed] 
with all honesty’.  
Ľalíková observed that many people committed ‘terrible deeds’ but there was ‘not 
a line about them in the newspapers’ as they ‘pay[ed] for so-called protection’ and/or 
‘pay[ed] for smears about others’.  Ľalíková believed that early 2000s’ reporting singling 
out judges who had remained active after purportedly trying political cases under 
communism represented such journalistic practice. She said, ‘they continuously described 
who sentenced whom and where’, ‘slandering those [judges] by name in the newspapers’ 
through questioning ‘how it [wa]s possible that they [we]re still at the Supreme Court … 
although they had done such evil deeds’. Ľalíková described the case of Stiffel v. Petit 
Press as a prime example. Judge Stiffel publicly refuted claims that he ‘sentenced people 
for expressing their beliefs’ (Žemlová 2002b) and ‘adjudicated in political trials’ (Pataj 
2002). Stiffel argued that ‘[o]ne cannot recriminate and condemn a judge for adjudicating 
in accordance with the legal code valid at the time of proceedings’ (cited in Pataj and 
Vražda 2004). Ľalíková likewise asserted that Stiffel had to respect current law, which 
did not recognise religious freedom. She believed that Stiffel was unjustly singled out for 
sentencing the priest even though the decision in question was made in a senate. If the 
daily pursued ‘justice and redress’ the focus would centre on ‘the senate as a whole’, 
Ľalíková said. ‘[B]ecause voting within a senate is confidential’, it was possible that 
Stiffel was outvoted. However, since ‘they did not mention anyone else, did not slander 
anyone else, but only wrote about him’, Ľalíková was convinced that the articles were 
‘personal’ and represented an unjustified attack on her client. 
Ľalíková thought Harabin was one of those ‘appallingly pilloried’ in news media. 
Echoing the interpretation by ordinary courts that was criticised by the Constitutional 
Court, she believed that the headline “Harabin protects murderers” constituted 
unfounded, impermissible criticism. Ľalíková argued that ‘if it simply had a different 
headline, it would be no big deal’. Having read the word “murderer”, every person must 
have imagined ‘something terrible’. Ľalíková was adamant that even criticism of 
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politicians should be rooted in fact: ‘let them write that … he has done something wrong, 
that he was supposed to do this and that. Let them write, let them criticise him. But they 
cannot do it in this way when nothing is going on’. Reiterating that ‘the headline cannot 
diametrically differ from the article’, Ľalíková was convinced that such sensationalist 
pieces were published to increase circulation and to harm their subjects rather than being 
a genuine attempt to inform the public.158  
Harabin frequently professed his low opinion of journalists, stating that ‘the lies 
that certain journalists write about [him] have gone beyond the limits of tolerance and 
decency’ (cited in Košíček 2008). According to a Supreme Court press release, reports 
about Harabin’s alleged phone conversation with the Albanian drug lord ‘concerned a 
political-intelligence game originating with Mr L. whose collaborators [we]re former or 
current, information service agents’ (Jurči 2007). Ľalíková considered the impugned 
programmes at the heart of Harabin v. RTVS as another smear campaign in which ‘they 
once again slurred Dr Harabin [accusing him] of causing the death of two judges even 
though ‘he did not know one of them, he had absolutely never seen her in his life’.  
P03 thought the story involving him was part of the outlet’s battle with Harabin, 
whom he characterised as ‘a controversial figure for the media’. P03 was convinced that 
the daily ‘tarred him with the same brush as Harabin’ because in 2007, as Justice Minister 
the latter appointed P03, even though he had come second in the selection process for 
Special Court Chairperson. Professing he had no prior knowledge of Harabin’s intentions, 
P03 believed that since the outlet ‘fought and to this day fights against Harabin’ he was 
perceived as a person close to Harabin. 
Arguing that ‘one gets angry when [journalists] write falsehoods’, L01 described 
numerous instances of incorrect facts published about Fico or herself. While she 
acknowledged the fast pace of journalistic work, L01 believed that it was largely the 
product of, particularly tabloid, journalists’ negligence and, at times, motivated by an 
intent to harm Fico. L01 stated, ‘recklessness in failing to verify information played a 
role’ and ‘they might have even published something false with intent because at that 
moment before elections … it was more expedient for them’. L01 perceived an unjust 
 
 
 
158 A Justice Ministry press release (Jurči 2007) similarly characterised the claims as ‘a manifestation 
of [the author’s] deplorable character and hatred rather than an endeavour to inform objectively’.  
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hostility towards Fico on the part of the media. She believed it prompted Fico’s refusal 
to tolerate any publication of false allegations about him. L01 conceded, ‘from my 
viewpoint, [mutual animosity] was there. I don’t know what the PM would say, but from 
my perspective it was there’. L01 strongly rejected that Fico was overly sensitive towards 
legitimate criticism, stating that he was ‘a generous person who really [wa]s not easily 
offended’ and did not sue ‘at all costs’. According to L01, Fico ‘never filed a lawsuit 
against another politician’ acknowledging that having entered public life he had to 
tolerate greater criticism. However, ‘if it was a journalist who wrote falsehoods, he had 
no reason [to tolerate it]’ because the latter ‘had had time to verify [the facts] and did not 
act in the heat of the moment’. During proceedings, Fico repeatedly complained of 
personal attacks against him, pointing to publishers’ ‘endeavour to scandalise’ him (Fico 
v. Spoločnosť 7 Plus No. 2, 3, 6; Fico v. Spoločnosť 7 Plus No. 3, 2) by publishing false 
or truth-distorting information about his or his relatives’ conduct. Fico objected to, what 
he perceived as, publishers’ ‘vicious and malicious, condemnable conduct and misuse of 
the press’ (Fico v. Spoločnosť 7 Plus No. 4, 2), ‘spiteful and malicious conduct’ (Petition 
to commence proceeding in Fico v. Trend Holding, 3) and mocking and laughing at his 
his serious health condition (Fico v. Petit Press No. 2).  
Slota also felt unjustly attacked by news media, calling the publication of 
allegedly unsubstantiated cronyism accusations a day before mayoral elections as 
‘politics, a method of influencing the voters’ and attempt at ‘his discrediting’, particularly 
given that the report’s author was the wife of another candidate (Slota v. Spoločnosť 7 
Plus No.2). Slota similarly claimed that the publisher’s ‘endeavour was not to provide 
readers with objective information about [his] past, but …to discredit [his] person in the 
eyes of the public’ when reporting on his conduct whilst emigrating (Slota v. Ringier 
No.2), or that the impugned statements could ‘be considered an unsubstantiated attack’ 
against him (Slota v. Petit Press). 
Some lawyers recognised that the red tops employed reporters without basic 
journalist skills or knowledge who might inadvertently infringe individuals’ personality 
rights. Lukášek argued that journalists were ‘sometimes unaware that personality 
protection is desirable and that certain individuals ought not to become the subject of 
stories’. However, plaintiffs and their lawyers more frequently perceived privacy 
intrusions and sensationalism as an integral part of the tabloids’ business model. L13 
claimed to have represented clients intentionally scandalised in the tabloids. P01 believed 
the publisher in her case deliberately neglected its duties and responsibilities by allowing 
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offensive opinions to appear in the weekly because it ‘profited’ directly from them. ‘The 
editorial staff of course knew about it’, P01 maintained, ‘but they probably counted on 
the fact that no one would speak up’. P05 argued that tabloids ‘deliberately break the law’ 
and ‘represent a form of business founded on cynical manipulation of emotions’ and 
perpetually ‘finding new victims whose privacy is recklessly intruded under the banner 
of press freedom and “public interest”’. P05 claimed that ‘a literal persecution of 
members of the political class, which fails to differentiate between legitimate control by 
the media regarding politicians’ conflicts of interest or abuses of power and bullying by 
the media, intruding into the most intimate sphere of the politician and their family’, 
became the norm. In addition to repeatedly having her intimate sphere invaded and her 
private details published, P05 and her family experienced weeks-long harassment by 
reporters and further humiliating attacks on the pages for non-cooperation. P05’s was 
blackmailed by reporters who demanded he provided their wedding photographs 
otherwise they ‘would write what they s[aw] fit’ about the wedding. 
7.2.2.3 Civil Action as the Sole Available Means Left to Stop the Infringement and 
Vindicate Reputation or Privacy 
Having unsuccessfully sought an apology or correction, the interviewed plaintiffs saw no 
alternative recourse to civil action to set the record straight and defend their reputation or 
stop privacy intrusions and gain moral satisfaction. Maintaining that ‘an apology would 
absolutely have sufficed’, P03 filed a lawsuit when the outlet failed to respond to his 
before-action letter. P03 repeatedly emphasised, ‘how shall you defend yourself against 
falsehood or lie? You can do nothing; you simply have to sue’. P02 decided to litigate 
after his correction requests had been rejected as he found no other way to restore his 
reputation. Having failed to secure an apology, P04 pursued legal action two years after 
the infringement as she ‘had repeatedly been confronted with doubts of third parties’ 
about her work and because she wanted to prevent her daughter becoming ‘the target of 
such doubts’.  
Plaintiff lawyers also believed that the majority of claimants seeking speedy 
vindication to reputational damage would have been satisfied with alternative remedies 
to civil action if offered prior to the start of proceedings. Ľalíková, thought there would 
be fewer disputes if the media settled prior to the commencement of proceedings because 
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‘once the case is in court, almost no one is willing to settle’. L01 also suggested that the 
media’s rejection or ignorance of discursive remedy requests might propel some people 
towards litigation. L01 was certain that in many cases Fico would not have resorted to 
litigation had a correction been published because he wanted the public to learn the truth. 
 
Achieving confirmation of the falsity or uncertainty of the published statements 
The interviews confirmed the ILP findings (e.g., Bezanson 1986) that while the aim of 
legal action is to vindicate reputation, such vindication does not necessarily have to come 
in a final judgment. P04 ‘did not doubt’ her ‘ability to prove the falseness of the broadcast 
facts’, and strived ‘to achieve a written apology … without the need to publish it’. P04 
further asserted that securing damages was not her primary aim despite the significant 
material loss she had suffered following the broadcast. P04’s case suggested that some 
plaintiffs pursued litigation as a means of obtaining confirmation of the falsity or 
uncertainty of the published statements, which could be used in future cases of 
reservations concerning their professional conduct. The judicial decision and defendant’s 
apology did not need to be public to serve this purpose. The apology also did not need to 
be published following a court order. Since P04 was able to obtain the apology in a 
personal letter as part of an out-of-court settlement, she withdrew her action. In Harabin 
v. P., Harabin claimed that he wanted to protect his professional honour: ‘If someone 
publicly and without proof falsely accuses you … under the rule of law you have the right 
to seek protection of your name and honour’ (cited in Kostelanský 2012). Ľalíková argued 
that Harabin withdrew his lawsuit against P. after she had apologised in a personal letter 
because the dispute ‘was really not about money … he merely wanted to clear his name’. 
Although he would originally have been satisfied with cessation of the 
infringement and an apology, the publisher’s failure to remove his personal data from its 
website infuriated P06 who ‘simply became angry because it really caused [him] 
problems’. That was why he ‘filed the lawsuit’. P06 repeatedly maintained that he ‘wasn’t 
after the money’ or ‘after making a profit’. Since P06 was able to attain his primary 
objective – the infringement cessation and moral satisfaction as part of the out-of-court 
settlement – he was content to drop his damages claim. 
 
Litigation as an instrument of self-help 
While desiring a judicial award for moral satisfaction, public plaintiffs viewed the lawsuit 
as an instrument of self-help to be used to mitigate any potential impact on their 
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professional career. The act of suing represented a public reaction to what they viewed as 
unjust allegations and a public demonstration of their assertions of falsehood. This kind 
of PR exercise had to be done quickly to prevent future career harm. P03’s remarks best 
illustrate this rationale: ‘the impugned article, if I hadn’t fought back, would have been 
absolutely liquidating for me’. P03, a judge, believed that the accusations might have 
sparked disciplinary proceedings against him as he ‘was accused of unethical behaviour 
and misuse of [his] position’. Fico repeatedly claimed that in comparison with himself the 
defendants were ‘at an advantage’ because only publishers ‘decide[d] about the content’ 
of their papers, and thus also about which statements about him would reach the public 
(Petition to commence proceedings in Fico v. Trend Holding, 3). Fico argued that ‘he 
d[id] not have such an option’ at his disposal and if false information was published about 
him, ‘his only way to defend himself out-of-court [was] to submit a correction request’ 
(Fico v. Petit Press No. 1, 2). However, as the media rejected or ignored his requests, as 
L01 suggested, there ‘simply was no [other] option to explain’ the alleged media 
misrepresentations of Fico’s conduct than through lengthy litigation. L01 believed that 
the situation was exacerbated by the deteriorating mutual relationship between Fico and 
the press which escalated into ‘considerable animosity’, whereby all parties became 
‘allergic to each other’ and were unwilling to compromise. L01 was, nevertheless, 
convinced that Fico’s primary objective was to vindicate his reputation through fast 
correction of untrue facts and/or public apology. Hence, following lengthy proceedings, 
in many media disputes he forfeited all pecuniary damages claims and settled with a public 
apology. 
7.2.2.4 Civil Action as the Sole Available Means to Combat Injustice, Punish the 
Media, Gain Monetary Satisfaction and Deter Further Infringements 
Plaintiff-respondents who considered themselves to be victims of unethical behaviour by 
the media and those who perceived the publication of an apology to be a further 
infringement believed that they could achieve redress only through legal action. Their 
aims were punishing the media, standing up to injustice and preventing further personality 
rights infringements. While the first motive was reported by the ILP (e.g., Bezanson 
1986), the latter two have not been much discussed in the literature. L04 explained, ‘there 
are such serious allegations that one would go into a dispute no matter what’. According 
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to Schwarz, a public apology ‘essentially [constituted] defamation’, as it ‘revitalise[d] the 
trauma [originally] caused’. ‘Many people ridiculed in the media’ were thus ‘not 
interested in featuring on the cover again’. P01 was ‘absolutely not interested in an 
apology from either the [impugned article’s author] or the publisher’ since ‘an apology 
from a churl ha[d] no value whatsoever’ for her and she did not want it to be published 
‘in the same [awful] medium’. P01 immediately decided to take legal action on learning 
about the infringement. Given the appalling behaviour of the reporters seeking 
photographs and information who harassed her and her family, P05 ‘saw no reason to 
communicate with the tabloid outlets’ and was ‘convinced that one cannot react to a 
deliberate violation of the law through admonishment or by requesting an apology’. 
Although all the interviewed plaintiffs claimed non-pecuniary damages, only P05 
explicitly admitted that when she decided to litigate she pursued monetary compensation 
for the harm suffered.  
 
Punishing the media 
 By litigating and claiming monetary compensation, some plaintiffs strived to punish the 
media. Admitting that a damages award ‘comes in handy’, L01 was convinced that Fico 
‘did not do it for the money … [but] as also Strasbourg says, the sanction needs to punish 
the medium in a way’. Benedik recognised that plaintiffs’ motivation to sue might include 
anger or revenge. P03 expressed disgust and anger at what he perceived to be the unethical 
and corrupt behaviour of the reporter: ‘The fact that he … portrayed me as a person 
morally disqualified for the office … pissed me off! And at the cost of lies and 
falsehoods!’ Given his indignation, P03 decided to file a lawsuit unless he obtained an 
apology. As his anger intensified during proceedings, P03, like other plaintiffs, resolved 
to persist with legal action: ‘I am going to sue them until I am able to’, he claimed. P01 
commenced civil action for damages to make publishers understand that ‘freedom of 
expression has its limits’ and that if misused ‘punishment may follow’.  
 
Standing up to injustice 
For several plaintiff-respondents, it was also crucial to stand up to injustice and show the 
tabloids that freedom of expression had its limits. The act of suing itself represented a 
means of empowering the victim of an illegitimate infringement who thereby 
demonstrated to the defendant and society that individuals were not powerless in face of 
unlawful behaviour and that fighting injustice was possible. This aim might be connected 
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to the socio-political developments in a democratising country where the rules of the game 
regarding responsible journalism standards are far from settled. P05 decided to sue 
because she wanted to upset the tabloids’ ‘business calculation’ that ‘injured parties will 
give up on filing a lawsuit for personality protection due to the related financial costs, the 
risk their lawyer won’t be good, and a realistic expectation that even if they achieve 
justice, it will be years later’. P05’s aim was to demonstrate to the publishers that she ‘did 
not fear them’ and would pursue the protection of her and her family’s privacy. ‘As a 
judge, whose mission it is to make sure that the law is respected everywhere and under 
any circumstances’, P05 wanted to show the tabloids that she would not ignore their 
deliberate violation of the Judges Act. P01 understood litigation in similar terms, stating, 
‘I insist on my moral integrity’; ‘I will not allow anyone to call it into question in such an 
undignified manner’; and ‘I will defend myself within the remit of democratic society. 
You will not be able to get away with it just because you feel, you can [do] everything’. 
P01 believed that overlooking the sensationalist press’s illegitimate behaviour might have 
a detrimental societal impact: ‘I find it important to let others know, if injustice is done to 
you, that you will not silently tolerate it. People have to speak up’. According to P01, ‘one 
cannot forsake some issues just because there is no point. Because there is a point’ and 
‘[t]hese singular issues affect the whole society’.  
 
Preventing future unlawful personality rights violations 
A few plaintiffs explicitly described litigation as an attempt to prevent future unlawful 
violations of theirs and others’ personality rights, in other words, an attempt to create a 
benign chilling effect. P02 resolved to sue because ‘someone need[ed] to stop’ the media 
as ‘they cannot go about slandering without facing consequences’. P05 ‘felt the duty to 
protect’ herself and her fellow judges ‘from further attempts at violating the Judges Act’. 
Her ‘objective was thus also to act in a preventive manner’, making journalists ‘think 
hard’ about reporting on P05’s private life in future. Ľalíková argued that rather than 
wanting to enrich themselves, plaintiffs sought damages so that ‘the publisher feels it and 
takes more care in future’. Some of Harabin’s public statements also suggest that through 
litigation, he pursued a chill on, what he maintained was, illegitimate speech. Commenting 
on a 31,000-euro damages award for incorrect reporting (Báraba 2009), Harabin stated: 
‘it will always end up like this when a certain part of the media falls for the delusions and 
lies of opposition politicians’ (cited in Košíček 2009b).  
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Monetary satisfaction, personal enrichment and financial harm for the media 
Yet, his statements ‘[a] million always helps in times of economic crisis, I am going to 
help my relatives and others’ (cited in Košíček 2009b) and ‘a publishing house made me 
a millionaire’ (cited in Habrmanová and Dömeová 2007) suggested that personal 
enrichment was a welcome side effect of litigation albeit not necessarily the primary aim. 
According to Ľalíková, ‘if courts decided personality protection matters very strictly and 
awarded higher damages, publishers would be forced to start informing objectively or face 
liquidation’. Benedik also experienced a would-be plaintiff who desired to ‘liquidate the 
outlet’ that published false statements about him. The use of terms such as ‘liquidation’ 
by respondents in this regard implied that some plaintiffs’ use of personality protection 
law bordered on abuse. 
7.2.3 Remedies Claimed 
The remedies sought by plaintiffs largely reflected their motivations for filing the lawsuit. 
Most interviewed plaintiffs requested both an apology and non-pecuniary damages. None 
recollected seeking pecuniary damages. Plaintiffs determined the level of damages after 
consultation with lawyers as to the highest achievable amount. The damages claim of 
those who disclosed them ranged between 33,194 and 150,000 euro, with an average of 
71,500 euro. Contrary to Constitutional Court case-law, Ľalíková argued that public 
figures with a prominent social status suffered larger reputational harm than private 
persons, unknown beyond their immediate circle of acquaintances. In his media disputes, 
Harabin, for instance, requested between 33,194 and 200,000 euro; Stiffel claimed 99,000 
euro; Fico requested between 8,300 and 99,000 euro and Slota between 166,000 and 
332,000 euro.  
These relatively large sums159 were not only a reflection of the perceived harm 
suffered but also a means of punishing the media for the infringements and deterring them 
from future illegitimate behaviour. Acknowledging a defendant lawyer’s argument that 
 
 
 
159 The national average annual wage in the late 2000s, when many of the lawsuits were filed, was 
below 9,000 euro, reaching 10,944 euro in 2016. 
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damages requested by well-off public figures were disproportionate, Ľalíková justified 
the amounts as a means of compensating for reputational harm which could never be 
completely vindicated: ‘once damaged, one’s good name cannot be restored because even 
if an apology was published straightaway not all the people, who had read the defamatory 
article, might read it’ and ‘suspicion remains’. Ľalíková said ‘With money, it’s different’.  
P05 was convinced that ‘the level of non-pecuniary damages should have a preventive 
effect on tabloid press publishers’. When determining her damages claims, P05 
considered that her ‘personal integrity as a judge was strikingly violated’, that a ‘real 
threat’ that her personal information ‘could be misused by former or future parties to legal 
proceedings’ existed and that her reputation as a judge and woman was tarnished. P05 
found the way that reporters harassed her daughter and parents and photographed them 
from a hide-out ‘particularly cruel’.  
While the responsibility for the decision on the level of damages sought belonged 
to plaintiffs, most lawyers maintained that they tried to guide clients as to what was 
realistic. They otherwise risked only a partial costs reimbursement award. L12 
unexpectedly declared that if a client refused his advice because he/she perceived the harm 
extremely intensely, he might ‘teach’ him/her how to transform his/her subjective feelings 
to fit the law or ‘create a situation in which he/she can carry the burden of proof’. As 
examples, L12 mentioned asking the client’s friends to write a condemning letter, or 
putting up a copy of the impugned article by the entrance of the client’s partner’s 
workplace. Lukášek believed that ‘as a rule, you are always able to prove the 
consequences [of an unlawful infringement] if you advise the client’ because ‘as long as 
he/she has enough witnesses, you are able to prove the loss occurred’. Harabin’s family, 
colleagues and friends featured frequently as witnesses in his disputes with the media. An 
analysis of four court decisions in Harabin’s personality protection disputes (Prušová 
2012) found that Harabin’s wife, eldest son and brother provided incredibly similar 
testimonies in each case. In contrast, according to available district court decisions and 
some defendant lawyers, Fico hardly ever provided any proof of the harm suffered other 
than stating that his reputation in the eyes of voters suffered because he was accused of 
negatively perceived conduct. 
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7.2.4 Costs of Legal Action 
The interviewed plaintiffs had been aware of the risks of proceedings. Some recognised 
that the costs had deterred other claimants from pursuing civil action. P05 believed that 
because ‘personality protection litigation is expensive and waiting for the result is 
disproportionately long’ tabloid press publishers, who ‘profit on privacy intrusions’ can 
‘depend on the fact that only a fraction of injured parties will sue’. Nonetheless, the 
respondents perceived the harm caused or threatened by the infringement as so serious 
that the perceived benefits of suing outweighed its costs. The most frequently mentioned 
costs of litigation replicated the assumptions of the conceptual framework (Chapter 2) 
and included financial costs, the emotional distress caused by proceedings and the 
potential harm to high-profile claimants’ reputations.  
7.2.4.1 Financial Costs 
The interviewed plaintiffs were relatively well-off and could afford the costs of 
proceedings. The interviews suggested that compared to the 1990s and 2000s, financial 
costs of proceedings ceased to be a hindrance to access to justice. Ordinary persons’ 
access to justice significantly improved, allowing impecunious persons with meritorious 
claims to defend their rights. L09 argued that before 2007, when court fees in personality 
protection disputes were halved to three percent of the damages sought, personality 
protection litigation ‘used to be very expensive’. When P02 filed for legal action, the 
court fee was calculated as 66 euro plus four per cent of the claimed damages’ value. 
Having failed to secure a court fees waiver, if he wanted to claim damages, P02 had to 
pay more than seven-fold the average national monthly wage. According to P02, the court 
fee discouraged other parties mentioned in the same article from suing. Schwarz 
emphasised that even following the changes to court and lawyers’ fee rules ‘not everyone 
ha[d] the money to litigate on end’ as the costs accumulated with each level of judicial 
action.  
In contrast, Adamčík believed that since the late 2000s, justice in personality 
protection matters had become much more accessible for ordinary plaintiffs and their 
material risk had been reduced: ‘access to justice is relatively easy and the situation is 
rather favourable’. Acknowledging that if charged the usual hourly rate, most plaintiffs 
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could not afford his services, L04 emphasised that personality protection cases were 
usually based on the basic tariff rate, which was affordable for private persons. Lukášek 
also did not find the costs of proceedings ‘restrictive’ and agreed that litigation had 
become more accessible for plaintiffs as district court judges increasingly tended to 
summon multiple witnesses to a single hearing in order to reduce delays in proceedings. 
This also reduced the number of hearings lawyers were remunerated for. Ikrényi did not 
think the costs were in any way ‘extreme’, as he perceived the main purpose of the 
disputes to provide the plaintiff with moral satisfaction.160 
However, given the amount of work for relatively low remuneration, private 
plaintiffs wishing to sue merely for moral satisfaction might have found it difficult to 
engage an experienced lawyer, and were either forced to abandon the suit or claim 
damages.161 According to Sedlačko, most lawyers with expertise in personality/goodwill 
protection would not take an action for satisfaction only or would try to discourage the 
client from suing: ‘There is so much work regarding personality protection and the result 
is so far away that if a client comes to me wishing to sue for an apology only, it needs to 
be a very influential person for whom the apology is of real value’. 
7.2.4.2 Emotional distress 
Would-be plaintiffs had to consider the emotional distress caused by the personal nature 
of proceedings where, in Sedlačko’s words, ‘every little detail of one’s personality is 
laundered and recorded’ into the court file and where the defendants ‘dig more dirt’ on 
the plaintiff. According to Benedik, the trauma and length of proceedings were ‘two 
important factors making many people change their mind about suing’. P03 maintained 
 
 
 
160 At the time of the interview, the court fee for action for moral satisfaction was 66 euro. 
161 Given the small market size, the relative complexity of personality/goodwill protection work and 
low financial rewards, specialist personality/goodwill bar does not exist in Slovakia. According to 
respondents, no firm could survive on personality/goodwill protection or media work alone. There 
were ten to fifteen law firms that had systematically and continuously represented media-defendants 
and/or plaintiffs. In contrast to the defendant lawyer segment – populated by a few firms with 
considerable expertise – the plaintiff lawyer segment was rather fragmented. Bar the few defendant 
lawyers who did plaintiff work, there were a handful of firms in Bratislava known for representing 
personality protection plaintiffs. Most plaintiff lawyers therefore got involved in personality 
protection work infrequently, which was reflected in their knowledge of the case-law and procedures. 
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that the other party mentioned in the same article as him ‘didn’t have the nerve to sue’ 
the media and decided against litigation.  
7.2.4.3 Further Reputational Harm 
In line with the ILP’s findings (Bezanson, Cranberg, and Soloski 1985, 230-233), some 
lawyers argued that high-profile public officials needed to consider the risk to their 
reputation and political career caused by a widely publicised defamation dispute. L21, 
lawyer with extensive experience representing high-profile plaintiffs in the Czech 
jurisdiction, believed that, given the emphasis on the defence of truth, litigation risked 
further harm to a public official’s reputation if the court found the impugned allegations 
to be factually correct. There was a further risk that the allegations would be disseminated 
in the reporting of the dispute to a much wider audience. L21, therefore, tried to dissuade 
politicians from suing the media: ‘I tell them thrice, “Reconsider. What will you gain and 
what will you lose?  What is the value of information published about you? No one will 
remember in fourteen days, or [even] tomorrow”’.  
Sedlačko apart, Slovak lawyer-respondents did not mention the potential threat of 
litigation to a public plaintiff’s reputation. According to Sedlačko, in certain cases it was 
‘better to explain to the client that it was more beneficial not to sue but to let the 
infringement be forgotten, rely on the “chilling effect” and move on’. Rather surprisingly, 
Sedlačko understood the concept of the chilling effect as the effect of time which made 
the injured party and the public forget about the defamatory allegations without causing 
excessive harm to the former’s reputation. Sedlačko admitted that in recent years he had 
managed to discourage half of would-be public plaintiffs who approached him, from 
suing.  
The silence of Slovak lawyers on the issue might be explained by the fact that 
Slovak society was distrustful of the media and apathetic to the various allegations of 
wrongdoing they uncovered. Politicians’ repeated denunciations and verbal attacks 
against journalists (Belakova 2013), the active involvement by some of the journalistic 
profession in politics, the constant criticism and negativity towards the political elite, and 
the occasional attempts of owners to instrumentalise news media arguably contributed to 
an erosion of public trust in journalism as an independent agent (Johnson 2012; European 
Commission 2016).  
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The Slovak levels of media literacy were low (Ondrášik 2010a). Most people were 
unable to ‘tell the difference between sensationalism and good quality investigative 
reporting’ (Kužel 2010, 3). Moreover, many people struggled with existential issues and 
other everyday problems and remained indifferent to public affairs. According to Milan 
Kruml, rather than further tarnishing his/her reputation, litigation against the media had 
the potential to thrust a Slovak politician into the limelight and even increase his/her 
popularity. In contrast, suing the media threatened Czech politicians’ reputations more 
than the original infringements.162 Consequently, they tried to ‘find different weapons 
against the media’.   
7.2.5 Plaintiffs’ Legal Considerations  
The previous section showed how the plaintiffs’ cost-benefit calculus was strongly 
influenced by the media’s conduct before and after publication. Contrary to the 
assumptions of the reviewed literature (Chapter 2), legal considerations in terms of 
interviewed plaintiffs’ perceptions about the fairness, certainty and promptness of the 
personality protection regime did not seem crucial in their decision to sue because they 
saw litigation as the only available means to secure redress. However, as suggested by 
lawyers, other plaintiffs might have been influenced by these considerations.  
7.2.5.1 Personality Protection Regime’s Fairness and Certainty 
The perceptions of the regime’s fairness and/or predictability of result was not found to 
be influential on the plaintiffs’ decision to sue in the interviews. Plaintiff lawyers 
recognised the undesirable unpredictability of adjudication outcomes and an increasing 
pro-media bias, which rendered substantial damages awards considerably less likely. 
Nonetheless, they did not indicate that these would deter a considerable number of would-
be plaintiffs from suing. Some, as Ikrényi, argued that the personality protection regime 
 
 
 
162 Kruml mentioned a well-known case of a politician who ‘absolutely failed to understand that suing 
for a … caricature depicting him naked with his wife, would be counterproductive’ as the reporting 
on his legal action would make ‘almost everyone’ aware of its existence.  
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should be about moral satisfaction and putting the record straight. Therefore, monetary 
compensation achieved through litigation was not considered to be the most effective 
remedy for low to medium extent reputational damage. The predominantly public 
plaintiffs I interviewed also did not mention legal uncertainty or unfairness of the system 
as factors influencing their decision. Their decision to sue was driven by a complex 
concoction of motives, the attainment of most of which did not necessitate a final judicial 
decision in the plaintiff’s favour. Moreover, some of them, like P01 decided to litigate 
immediately after finding out about the infringement, regardless of uncertainty. Similarly, 
P06 and P03 resolved to litigate as they were unable to gain moral satisfaction through 
alternative means.  
7.2.5.2 Promptness of Adjudication  
The interviewed plaintiffs were all aware that they were unlikely to obtain prompt redress 
through litigation. However, having failed to achieve fast vindication through discursive 
remedies, or having felt the infringement and malicious intent so intensely, they believed 
that civil action was the only means to achieve adequate redress. Nonetheless, according 
to the lawyers, some would-be plaintiffs were deterred from pursuing legal action due to 
the inordinate delays in adjudication. 
7.2.6 Other Contextual Factors Influencing Plaintiffs’ Calculus 
The plaintiffs’ interactions with lawyers, support of their employer and their 
understanding of the media’s role in a democratic society were revealed as other 
influential contextual factors. The latter two hardly featured in previous empirical 
research on plaintiffs’ motives. 
7.2.6.1 Lawyers’ Role 
Similar to the ILP (Bezanson, Cranberg, and Soloski 1985), the interviews with plaintiffs 
suggested that lawyers played a limited role in their decision to defend their rights against 
perceived abuses of freedom of expression in the media. The lawyers’ role was to 
recommend the most appropriate strategy and act on the client’s behalf. However, most 
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interviewed plaintiffs made their decision to sue either independently of their lawyer 
immediately after seeing the impugned publication or once they had failed to achieve 
alternative redress. Most were sure about the illegitimate nature of the infringement. 
Ikrényi suggested that lawyers may play an important role in facilitating out-of-
court settlement before- or during-action. He argued that when he used to represent 
defendants his decision whether to advise clients to negotiate a settlement was based on 
his perceptions about the opposing counsel. If the recognised the counsel as a well-known 
practitioner in the area of law and if the claim was formulated in a qualified way, he was 
more inclined to advise his client to settle. Ikrényi argued that he was able to settle 
disputes on plaintiffs’ behalf with a broadcaster following its legal representation change. 
As Ikrényi was acquainted with the lawyer and respected him for his expertise, when 
approached with a settlement offer, he was willing to look for a solution agreeable to both 
parties. 
The lawyer-interviewees suggested that they might play a more pronounced role 
in other claimants’ decisions to sue. Firstly, many of the established lawyers insisted on 
assessing the merit of prospective clients’ claims in order not to jeopardise their success 
rates. Lawyers recognised that most individuals perceived subjectively infringements into 
their personality as acute and unjustified. Many were thus unable to recognise that they 
were objectively incapable of threatening their reputation and thus not actionable. This, 
according to Ikrényi, was also the case with would-be plaintiffs among judges as ‘some 
irrational element enters the equation, rendering the person unable to evaluate [the alleged 
infringement] in the same way as the cases of other people’ in court.  
In light of the public figure doctrine, lawyers assessed the claimant’s legal status 
because, as Sedlačko put it, ‘the more publicly active he/she is, the more criticism he/she 
needs to tolerate and must expect that someone will try to smear him/her’. Distinguishing 
between factual statements and value judgments, lawyers reviewed the impugned 
publication sentence by sentence, assessing whether factual statements were true, 
misleading or truth-distorting, whether they were published in the correct context, and 
whether the claimant’s views were reflected. Some required would-be plaintiffs to 
provide evidence of impugned statements’ fallaciousness. Lawyers evaluated the factual 
basis of disputed value judgments and whether they could be considered as sound and 
fair comment. Given the importance attached to the truthfulness defence by ordinary 
courts, lawyers principally focused on factual inaccuracies. L01 ‘almost always went after 
factual statements’ because these made the easiest cases. Benedik considered ‘incorrect 
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factual statements are alpha and omega of these disputes’ because ‘if you are able to prove 
the inaccuracy of factual statements, in line with case-law, including that of the European 
Court, as a rule, not even value judgments pass muster’. With alleged privacy 
infringements, where the defence of truth is not permitted, as long as the information 
related to the person’s intimate or family life was published without prior consent, 
lawyers considered the proportionality and extent of the intrusion – whether it was 
constituted by the publication of factual statements, photographs or recordings and how 
the latter were attained.  
The lawyers stressed that where they were unconvinced that the case had a real 
chance of success, they would recommend the client to abandon an action or look for 
another lawyer. Apart from the case’s merit, lawyers also considered the potential costs 
and benefits of legal action, and, as discussed above, often encouraged clients to seek fast 
moral satisfaction through before-action notices first. A few even actively discouraged 
public claimants from suing the media and looking for other platforms to put the record 
straight so the public would quickly forget about the misleading publication. 
7.2.6.2 Employer’s Support 
Employer’s support, particularly where the infringement concerned professional activity, 
might be decisive for some people. Organisational backing was crucial in P01’s decision 
to pursue legal action. She ‘would not have gone into such a lawsuit without the 
knowledge of the firm’, since the defamatory publication partially related to her public 
activities. In contrast, P02 felt that the infringement was so serious that he decided to file 
a lawsuit without his employer’s support. 
7.2.6.3 Understanding the Media’s Role in Society 
Several respondents suggested that a public official’s propensity to sue the media might 
depend on their individual political culture, their understanding of the media’s role in a 
democracy and the ensuing mutual relationship between the public figure and the media. 
Kamenec, who did not think that ‘suing for a caricature was the best PR move’ Fico had 
ever made, believed that whether public officials sued the media depended on their 
understanding of journalism and ‘their ability to effectively communicate with the 
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media’. Kamenec was convinced that, in contrast to Fico and his coalition partners, Iveta 
Radičová – the prime minster between 2010 and 2012, understood the democratic role of 
the media. In Kamenec’s opinion, Radičová, whose communication style and media 
strategy were opposite to Fico’s, would never contemplate suing for an unflattering 
caricature.  
Radičová herself recognised163 that the media did not respect press and 
broadcasting correction provisions, leaving the public claimant no other option but to 
‘turn to the court’ or give up on defending his/her rights. As Radičová put it, ‘the institutes 
which should ensure redress if a mistake occurs are not functioning’. Radičová, described 
an introductory shot in a crucial live TV debate during the 2009 presidential election 
campaign as ‘absolutely manipulative’, putting her at a disadvantage against the other 
candidates. Although the Broadcasting Council found several violations of the law, the 
television channel in question failed to issue an apology or correction. Despite her 
apparent belief in the injustice of the infringements Radičová, admitted that she did not 
consider suing the outlets. 
While not explicitly discussed, Radičová’s responses indicated that her repeatedly 
professed belief in the media’s role as a watchdog and her aversion to attempts to control 
the media by public officials played a role in her decision not to sue. Without prompting, 
Radičová insisted she was a proponent of ‘values like freedom, the right to [press] 
freedom in conjunction with responsibility, protection of privacy and individual 
freedoms’. Radičová recognized that ‘the media had been equally critical of each [post-
1989] government’ and had always, from the moment a government assumed power 
‘performed the function of a critic of the government, regardless whether the latter was 
left-wing or right-wing’ and regardless of the outlet’s political orientation. However, as 
a politician, she accepted that ‘this is the role of the media’. 
Radičová insisted that her government’s objective in amending the 2008 Press Act 
was to ‘ensure normal and standard functioning of the media’, and to anchor 
‘responsibilities of the media such as to inform, truthfully inform, ensure truthfulness but 
 
 
 
163 I interviewed Radičová twice in 2013 in her capacity as Professor of Sociology and former Prime 
Minister. One of the interviews was published as part of the MDCEE project (Radičová 2013) . 
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also privacy protection in conjunction with the rights of the media’. Radičová believed 
that the 2008 Act provided ‘excessive, inappropriate protection to public functionaries’, 
which given ‘the value system of the coalition parties’ of Fico’s first government, 
represented a ‘clear attempt’ to ‘gain control over the media who acted as a watchdog’ 
(Radičová 2013). Radičová was convinced that as a rule, political leaders’ value 
orientation and their understanding of the role of the press affected their attitude to 
litigation. In Radičová’s view, Mečiar, Fico, and Dzurinda’s political style and attitude 
towards their opponents, including the media, was based on utilizing existing legal and 
political institutions, regardless of ‘decency and certain culture of the conflicts’, which 
she rejected.  
7.3 The Regime’s Ability to Protect Reputation and Privacy  
In order to examine the extent to which the personality protection regime was, from the 
viewpoint of the plaintiffs, able to safeguard their personality rights, the respondents were 
asked how satisfied they were with their litigation experience and results, and whether 
they attained anything through litigation. They were also asked whether they would sue 
again in a similar situation. Some plaintiffs were satisfied with their experience and their 
dispute outcome, which brought relatively swift redress through the final decision in the 
case or an out-of-court settlement. Others, even if successful in their dispute and able to 
attain their ultimate goals, were left frustrated by the judicial system, particularly the 
delays and intrusive nature of proceedings and the biases inherent in the adjudicatory 
practice of ordinary courts.  
The interviewed lawyers suggested that following their experience with 
adjudication, some plaintiffs might be deterred from pursuing legal protection of their 
rights in the future. Despite the frustration with the legal process, all interviewed 
plaintiffs, regardless of the outcomes of their case, reported that they attained some of 
their objectives and that they would sue again. These findings were consistent with those 
of the ILP (Bezanson 1986, 799). Most plaintiffs were able to obtain some reputational 
and privacy vindication through the act of initiating the suit itself. Filing the petition 
represented a public declaration of the contested statement’s fallacy and empowered the 
injured party, which symbolized to the world that he/she was not afraid to stand up to 
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injustice. Some plaintiffs felt that through the lawsuit they managed to punish the media 
for their perceived unethical conduct and/or reluctance to settle on alternative forms of 
redress. The respondents, however, largely agreed that the law was rather inefficient at 
deterring the unscrupulous parts of the media from future personality infringements to 
the detriment of the injured parties and the public.  
7.3.1 Swift Attainment of Redress and High Satisfaction Levels  
Those plaintiffs who managed to win or settle their case out-of-court within a relatively 
short time since publication felt that they had managed to restore their reputation, stop 
the ongoing infringement and/or achieved the necessary satisfaction. P01 viewed her 
experience positively since she managed to swiftly vindicate her reputation through the 
judicial determination of unfoundedness of the impugned value judgments and to 
demonstrate to the media organisation that she was not afraid to confront its malicious 
behaviour. The damages award accomplished the punitive objective P01 pursued by 
litigation.  
The interviews suggested that once proceedings commenced, moral satisfaction 
might still be an effective means of restoring reputation. However, it needed to be offered 
before the plaintiff became so resentful that punishing the media became his/her main 
objectives. Describing her litigation experience as ‘markedly positive, including the 
speed of proceedings’, P04 was satisfied with the written apology received, which she 
could ‘show to everyone who doubted her role in the impugned reportage’. A personal 
apology from the publishing house’s CEO for wrongdoing and the removal of his 
personal data from the website provided P06 with sufficient moral satisfaction and 
reduced the security risk he faced. However, according to Sedlačko, a public apology 
offer made several years into the dispute – when defendants realised that litigation would 
not proceed favourably for them – represented ‘an absolutely unacceptable satisfaction 
for the [injured] person; it is too little for him/her by then’. Such an offer only ‘infuriate[d] 
the client to the extreme’, creating a vicious spiral, whereby the plaintiff was ‘forced to’ 
carry on with the lawsuit because she/he was ‘bitter by then’. The dispute was ‘no longer 
only about an apology’. The plaintiff was ‘angry, fe[lt] a sense of injustice and want[ed] 
more … want[ed] money’. 
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7.3.2 ‘Frustration with Justice’ 
Most plaintiffs expressed frustration with their litigation experience. In contrast to the 
experience of US defamation plaintiffs investigated by the ILP (Bezanson 1986), the 
sources of frustration for my respondents did not lie in the failure of the judicial system 
to respond to their claims of falsity or the intrusiveness of the infringement and to 
recognise the harm claimed to be suffered. Most of the plaintiffs interviewed were 
frustrated by the inordinate delays, the intrusive nature of proceedings and the perceived 
unfairness and arbitrariness of the adjudication in their cases. Lawyers also 
overwhelmingly argued that the law was failing to adequately protect individuals’ 
reputation and privacy and to provide suitable redress. According to Sedlačko, suing the 
media in the mid-2010s was like ‘tilting at windmills’ as it was ‘very difficult to win a 
legal action for personality protection in an effective manner’ – i.e., ‘to get decent money 
or an early apology’. Many lawyers believed that their clients experienced, what Sedlačko 
called, ‘frustration with justice’ which often left successful plaintiffs dissatisfied, 
regretting having commenced civil action and discouraged from future lawsuits. As 
Sedlačko explained, even if plaintiffs were ‘awarded an apology or money, the feeling of 
satisfaction rarely materialise[d]’ and clients ‘too often’ came to regret having entered 
into a dispute. L13 believed that many of his clients would not sue the media again 
because the litigation experience had a ‘deterrent effect’ on them. Ľalíková insisted that 
after the difficulties of proceedings, ‘nobody has the strength to fight further and file a 
petition before a court again’ even if their rights were infringed anew by published 
comments accompanying a court-ordered apology. 
7.3.2.1 Emotional Distress  
The interviewees characterised proceedings in personality protection matters as 
‘unpleasant’, ‘traumatic’, or as ‘torture’ as they were forced to relive the emotional harm 
felt at the time of publication. Ľalíková explained that personality protection litigation 
‘burdens’ the plaintiff because instead of focusing on his/her job, ‘he/she has to attend 
hearings [and] constantly prove something, which is very hard on one’s mental health’. 
Sedlačko described having to ‘go to hearings for three to four years, to fret about it, to 
keep it foremost in one’s mind, to explain to people whether one is litigating or not’ as 
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‘torture’ for the plaintiff. P04 claimed that she found the need to ‘constantly replay the 
reportage [in her mind] before the hearing to be able to instantly react [to questions] and 
to keep all the facts and how they proceeded in memory’ as the most difficult aspect of 
her experience.  
The distress was often exacerbated by the highly personal nature of evidence 
examination and witness questioning during public hearings. In P03’s words, ‘going to 
court is pleasant for no one, even more so when the public sits there, and [you have to] 
talk about your private matters’. According to Lukášek, ‘for certain types of people’ 
litigation ‘can be a traumatic process because … witnesses who should give evidence 
about a controversial topic will be summoned’. While P01 acknowledged that it was 
necessary for the judge to consider the factual basis of the impugned value judgments, 
she felt awkward when asked questions about her private life, particularly as she was not 
‘thrilled to be discussing her private affairs in a public hearing’. Nonetheless, P01 
considered it as a pre-requisite for defending her personality rights and demonstrating to 
the publisher that his/her unlawful behaviour would not go unpunished: ‘Naturally, the 
feeling was exactly “That’s none of your business” (laughs). Nonetheless, of course, I 
answered his questions as it was necessary’. 
Several lawyers observed that the fact that the plaintiff’s personal and/or intimate 
matters were examined before the public at the hearing, or at least recorded in the minutes, 
created the risk of further dissemination of that information and thus of additional 
reputational or emotional harm. According to Sedlačko, novel personal information about 
the plaintiff ‘gets out and you are no longer able to control that regardless of how the 
dispute ends’. L01 argued that witness questioning in high-profile cases was sometimes 
even more upsetting because ‘the pressure from the media [present at the hearing] was 
enormous’. L01 believed that giving evidence in the caricature dispute ‘was very 
disquieting’ for Fico as he had to ‘return to the trauma’ of the pain, which no one could 
understand unless they themselves were in pain.  
Some plaintiffs were further upset by the behaviour of defendant lawyers – 
particularly of those representing the tabloids – during witness examination. P05 found 
the defendant’s counsels’ efforts to make her ‘do some soul searching’ as if she ‘deserved’ 
the articles disturbing. P05 also believed that defendant lawyers tried to set press freedom 
above their legal obligation not to publish personal details of a judge without consent as 
they ‘regard[ed] the freedom to write anything about anyone as superior to other human 
rights and the law’. Although P01 considered herself a resilient person, and understood 
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litigation in terms of showing the defendant that they would ‘not get away with’ defaming 
people, she felt ‘uncomfortable’ when the opposing party’s lawyer asked her questions 
which ‘just by their nature’ she found ‘insulting’.  
7.3.2.2 Delays in Proceedings 
Because speed is of the essence when it comes to restoration of reputation, lawyers and 
plaintiffs regarded the length of proceedings as the most important factor limiting the 
effectiveness of civil personality protection. The delays in proceedings exacerbated the 
plaintiff’s trauma and emotional distress and erased the intended effects of the claimed 
remedies, or forced the frustrated plaintiff to abandon the lawsuit. P02, whose dispute 
was pending for sixteen years from the date of publication, saw the length of adjudication 
as the biggest problem facing plaintiffs. The vexation some plaintiffs felt regarding the 
length of proceedings was apparent from P03’s words: ‘I am a judge and I have been 
unable to uphold my rights for seven years. What about the [ordinary] citizens then?!’ 
The protracted nature of litigation prevented many plaintiffs and their families 
from reaching closure. P02 argued that the infringement constantly featured in his 
thoughts and that wife and daughter were still distressed about it. Schwarz argued that for 
the plaintiff, the lengthy litigation meant that his/her ‘negative experience will, from the 
psychological viewpoint, remain with him/her and his/her wound will constantly be 
ripped open and will not heal’. This, Schwarz explained, was because the plaintiff was 
forced to ‘relive it again’ with each adjourned hearing. While losing a personality 
protection lawsuit often left the plaintiff emotionally broken, a win represented a Pyrrhic 
victory because the person was ‘traumatised for four or five years’, losing a substantive 
amount of money through litigation. ‘Had he/she just shrugged it off, even if he/she 
experienced a financial loss at the beginning, he/she would have forgotten it within the 
five years – a memory from five years ago is very old, but a five-year-long legal dispute 
is a memory that is terribly fresh’, according to Schwarz. 
Most respondents believed that obtaining an apology after protracted proceedings 
largely failed to vindicate the plaintiff’s reputation and was also of little value for the 
public’s right to receive factually correct information in a timely manner. Lukášek 
believed that ‘an apology essentially has no effect on the [plaintiff’s] relationship with the 
public because it comes too late and not everyone follows it, respectively not everyone is 
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able to search for it’. Benedik argued that an apology published after several years 
‘naturally doesn’t have the necessary effect’ because the public cannot remember what it 
concerned. Therefore, the lawyer had to phrase the apology in the petition so that it had 
information value for the audience years later. ‘Given the speed of our courts’, Ikrényi 
maintained, ‘if the apology was to come in five years, it would have no impact and there 
would be no satisfaction’. Vozár stressed that ‘since proceedings take several years, and 
the outlet’s publisher and readers often change, the effect of an apology is often lost’. 
Ľalíková was convinced that after the protracted proceedings, an apology could not restore 
a public claimant’s reputation because ‘five years is such a long time that no one knows 
anymore what Harabin [for instance] said or didn’t say, what he was or wasn’t. … 
Therefore, the vindication effect, the redress within society that [learns] he was harmed’ 
will be lost.  
The fact that the extended nature of proceedings rendered civil litigation an 
inadequate means of protecting the individual’s and public’s reputation interests was also 
acknowledged by media professionals. Milan believed that litigation was not the means 
through which claimants would be able to effectively vindicate their reputations because 
after a five-year-long dispute, ‘no one will know that the [impugned] article existed’. He 
believed that the powerful persons that the media were interested in had sufficient 
platforms to immediately put the record straight.  
Several interviewees suggested that an apology published years after the original 
infringement might cause the plaintiff additional emotional harm, or ‘further trauma’, as 
L12 put it. Calling it a ‘psychological nonsense’, P01 explained, when ‘you managed to 
deal with something, ordered it somehow within’, a judgment pronounced after many 
years ‘just reopens the relatively healed wound’ and ‘reminds the public’ of the 
defamation. L05 claimed that delayed judicial decisions themselves constituted an 
infringement, for which the courts should financially compensate the plaintiff. Sedlačko 
perceived an apology published two years or more after the infringement as ‘counter-
productive’ because it ‘needlessly reopens the matter which everyone has already 
forgotten about’, leaving one ‘under a cloud of suspicion’. Plaintiffs therefore tended to 
request non-pecuniary damages in addition to or instead of moral satisfaction.  
Lawyers on both sides observed that the delays prompted some plaintiffs to 
abandon or settle meritorious claims without restoring their reputation or obtaining 
appropriate compensation. L13 had been asked by several plaintiffs a few years into their 
dispute, whether it was still worth pursuing. Sedlačko recollected cases where he was 
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convinced of the validity of the plaintiff’s claim, but ‘the person was so sick of the process 
that they withdrew the lawsuit’. Kamenec mentioned a thirteen-year-long case that had 
gone through several rounds of appeals, which was finally settled out-of-court as the 
plaintiff reached an advanced age and was exhausted by the suit. 
7.3.2.3 Adjudication Unfairness  
The perceived arbitrariness and relative unpredictability of judicial decision-making 
tended to erode the plaintiffs’ trust in fair and independent adjudication, leading many to 
believe that there was no equality before justice in personality protection matters. Such 
perceptions caused plaintiffs unnecessary distress and spoiled the intended effects of 
awarded remedies. As Vozár explained, given the unfairness and arbitrariness of 
adjudication practice, until one reached ‘a fair, final decision’ one had to ‘go through the 
whole judicial system’, which took years. Plaintiffs thus tended to become ‘frustrated by 
the proceedings and even a victory [did] not provide the satisfaction it might have if 
achieved at the first instance and upheld by [appellate] courts’. P05 attained only partial 
satisfaction because, it came ‘after a very long time and the behaviour of some judges 
caused her ‘further stress’. P05 argued that the regional court ‘changed seriously prepared 
and argued decisions of district courts’, whereby it displayed ‘huge incompetence’ and 
‘absolute lack of knowledge of ECtHR and Supreme Court case-law’. This forced her ‘to 
use extreme means’ and appeal before the Supreme Court. She characterised one of the 
regional court decision as ‘so scandalous’ that she was ‘unable to evaluate whether 
personal, malicious bias or colossal incompetence of the members of the senate’ was in 
play. P05 became so aggravated that she ‘didn’t believe that justice existed in that 
moment’. 
The discrepancy between damages awarded to high-profile politicians or judges 
and other plaintiffs reinforced the belief among interviewees that the personality/goodwill 
protection regime worked for the chosen few powerful enough to blindfold the goddess 
Justice, but not for the rest. L13 explained, ‘the not chosen ones take the shorter end of 
the stick’ in adjudication. P01 felt perplexed about the extreme difference in non-
pecuniary damages awards to ordinary people in comparison to members of the political 
class. She found it ‘outrageous’ that in contrast to an infamous politician – a ‘generally-
known sot’ in P01’s words – she would not have been able to claim hundreds of thousands 
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of euro in damages. P01 was left with the impression that ‘there are various social classes 
for which different laws apply’. P01 believed that even ‘simple’ people, ‘must feel that if 
they suffer injustice, they will get, figuratively speaking, the same 200,000 euro, even if 
they don’t belong to the [privileged political] class, because they are citizens of this 
country and their honour is equal to the honour of anyone else’. P01 found there was little 
evidence of equality before the law in Slovakia despite her conviction that it was 
‘undoubtedly vital for society … to share an understanding that everyone is equal before 
law’.  
7.3.3 Partial Attainment of Redress 
While the frustration with their experience might deter some plaintiffs from further 
litigation, all the plaintiff-respondents maintained that they would pursue legal action 
against the media again, but might seek lower non-pecuniary damages (P02) or file the 
petition sooner (P04, P05). Even those plaintiffs whose disputes were pending for years, 
were prepared to sue again because, they saw civil action as the only effective means to 
protect their rights. P05 stated, ‘I was and still am deeply convinced that I cannot 
compensate the harm that my family and I had experienced in any other way than through 
a personality protection lawsuit’. ‘I would go for it’, declared P03, ‘because I think that 
if I as a judge will completely lose an illusion of justice, what about the other people? I 
still believe that … [the district court will decide in my favour again]’. 
All the interviewed plaintiffs achieved some of their objectives in using litigation. 
Those for whom legal action was a means of self-help when vindicating their reputation, 
those who wanted to punish the media, and those who believed that individuals must 
stand up to injustice and use all the available means to defend their rights took some 
satisfaction from the act of suing itself. Acknowledging that many of his clients became 
exhausted during proceedings, Adamčík argued that they continued with litigation as a 
matter of principle because they sought to ‘prove that in theirs and similar cases it is 
possible to successfully protect their rights’. P04 was also convinced that ‘many more 
people should defend themselves through personality protection lawsuits’ to stand up to 
manipulative behaviour of some media and journalists. 
A judicial decision declaring that the allegations were false, even if reached years 
after the original publication and not helpful in the immediate aftermath of the violation, 
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represented moral satisfaction and reputational vindication for many plaintiffs. Ikrényi 
maintained that a personality protection dispute ‘is not about money, it is entirely 
about moral vindication’, about the plaintiff’s ‘honour [and] dignity’, particularly for 
individuals in positions that rely on these attributes, such as judges and lawyers. 
According to L05, ‘under the current conditions, only the judicial decision, that is, the 
dicta from the court, possesses some vindication power for the person who seeks to assert 
their rights’. This also seemed to apply if the court decision was not final. Describing the 
district and regional court judgments in his case, which were quashed and returned for 
further proceedings by the Constitutional Court, P03 emphasised, ‘What is essential and 
what resonated was that false information was published’. P03’s responses also seem to 
suggest that if the focus of adjudication shifted from determining the truth of the contested 
statements solely to whether journalists acted responsibly, plaintiffs might feel unable to 
achieve any reputational vindication. According to L04, the fact that a higher judicial 
authority set a decision aside and returned the case for further proceedings represented 
‘proof of injustice’ in the original judgment, providing a form of satisfaction for the 
plaintiff. Since the degree of satisfaction increased with public awareness of such a 
decision, L04’s firm decided to opt for a press release on their website after a high-profile 
case was returned for further proceedings following a successful constitutional complaint. 
7.3.4 Protection of the Public Interest in Reputation and Privacy  
The respondents suggested that personality protection law ‘merely fulfil[ed] the 
satisfaction function’, as L13 put it, but failed to perform its preventive function.164 As 
such, the law not only seemed to have failed to safeguard plaintiffs’ rights but also the 
public interest in reputation and privacy. P05 found that her damages awards were no 
guarantee that her family would not become ‘the target of another attack’ on their privacy, 
especially since one of the tabloids purportedly took revenge on her husband by 
publishing humiliating photographs. Ľalíková, pointed out that it was not uncommon for 
the media, when subject to a court order to publish an apology, to also provide their own 
 
 
 
164 The public interest in expression, which is intimately linked to the preventive function of the law, 
is discussed in more detail in Chapter 8. 
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‘explanation’ in which they ‘again portray the plaintiff in a negative light’ by implying 
that the decision was unjust. Such media behaviour was also visible in P03’s case when 
alongside the third apology in a row (as ordered by courts) the daily published the 
newsroom’s statement on the dispute where the editor-in-chief explained why they did 
not agree with the decision, suggesting that solidarity between judges played a role in 
adjudication. The media risked by doing this, making the public perceive all public 
apologies with suspicion, making them worthless for the individual whose reputation had 
been tarnished as well as for the public who will no longer have faith in them. According 
to Ikrényi, the wide publicity given to controversial decisions and depictions of unfair 
adjudication in media risked prompting the public to start questioning the legitimacy of 
every judicial decision and of every plaintiffs’ conduct.   
The interviews further suggested that the legal regime was ineffective at ensuring 
that the public received corrected information about public plaintiffs in a timely manner. 
Due to delays in the adjudication, if found liable, media organisations were ordered to 
publicly apologise years after the original false or misleading information had been 
published. On the other hand, it was shown that some public plaintiffs publicly vindicated 
their reputation and privacy through the act of initiating litigation, which symbolised a 
public response to the contested statements, signalling to the public and/or professional 
community that the allegations were not true. Even if unable to obtain discursive 
remedies, plaintiffs were able to keep the public informed and get some form of redress. 
Arguably, given the rise of social media and the wide use of various platforms by 
politicians to communicate with their voters, the need to use litigation as a form of public 
relations exercise might have diminished in the 2010s. 
The interviews also indicated that the serious print outlets and television 
broadcasters were willing to swiftly rectify what they viewed as genuine 
personality/goodwill rights violations involving factual mistakes. According to some 
respondents, this amounted to ninety percent of all received claims. Media organisations 
typically provided redress without admitting their own fault in follow-up editorial 
content, maintaining that doing so was beneficial not just for them, but also in the interest 
of the claimants and their audiences. The public were able to learn the truth or the views 
of the injured party quickly and in an intelligible way, allowing them to form their own 
opinion. It is, however, questionable whether the original reputational harm would truly 
be remedied unless the follow-up content got equivalent prominence to the original 
infringement, which did not always happen. While serving individuals’ reputational 
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interests, provision of advertorials and/or free advertising hardly aided the public’s 
interests in reputation, privacy or expression. Last but not least, given the tabloids’ 
circulation and their arguable reluctance to transparently put the record straight or provide 
the claimants’ views, it could be argued that the public’s interests were rather poorly 
protected by the law. 
7.4 Conclusion 
This chapter examined the extent to which and how the Slovak personality protection 
regime was able to safeguard the private and public interests in reputation and privacy. 
The chapter found that between 1996 and 2016, the regime was generally successful in 
safeguarding the private, and to a lesser degree, public interests in reputation and privacy, 
albeit not necessarily through a final resolution of a civil dispute. Over time, the regime 
succeeded in safeguarding access to justice for all plaintiffs, particularly after procedural 
rules changes in the 2000s. Despite ‘the frustration with justice’ stemming from the 
unfairness, arbitrariness and protracted nature of proceedings, through litigation, public 
plaintiffs were able to attain their pursued objectives, which would not have been possible 
through other means. Private plaintiffs seeking to put the record straight were able to 
achieve some redress outside of the legal process, as a fraction of before-action claims 
ended in litigation. Keen to avoid legal disputes and unduly harming personality rights, 
serious media outlets sought to provide quick redress to genuine claimants. Since 
admittance of fault was seen as a risk to their credibility, media organisations preferred 
to provide an opportunity to put the record straight and/or express the claimants’ views 
in follow-up editorial content or advertisement. 
The general assumptions of the conceptual framework about the need to 
investigate operation of laws in context and in the interactions between principal plaintiffs 
were confirmed. Many of the conclusions of previous empirical research about the 
‘complex calculus of plaintiffs’ motives’ (Bezanson 1986, 806) were replicated. The 
findings, however, revealed some previously unreported elements which served as a basis 
for the refinement of the plaintiffs’ cost-benefit calculus model (Figure 7.1). This refined 
model is well suited to guide future empirical investigations in jurisdictions beyond 
Slovakia. 
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The chapter confirmed that plaintiffs decide to sue when they perceive litigation 
as the only available means to achieve adequate redress to harm to their reputation or 
privacy suffered in the media. Like the ILP (Bezanson 1986), the chapter indicated that 
plaintiffs might pursue different objectives to those assumed by law. The interviews 
corroborated ILP’s finding that plaintiffs primarily seek the cessation of the infringement 
and reputational redress, and that these do not need to come through a final judicial 
decision, but can have the form of a formal letter admitting falsity of published 
statements, out-of-court settlement or a PR exercise to mitigate potential impact on their 
professional career. The chapter revealed other motives assumed by the law or mentioned 
in the literature, including punishment of the media, monetary satisfaction and prevention 
of future infringements. One previously unexplored plaintiff motive that stood out was 
pursuit of litigation as a means of the injured parties’ empowerment in the face of injustice 
carried out by reckless journalism. This might be more pronounced in democratising 
societies where common understanding of the roles and duties of various institutions, 
including the press, is still developing. 
The findings relating to costs of pursuing litigation largely agreed with those 
indicated by previous research and included financial costs, emotional distress and further 
reputational harm. They suggested that in civil law systems, where litigation costs are 
generally lower than under common law, financial costs do not generally deter plaintiffs 
from suing, particularly if appropriate procedural rules are adopted. 
The findings suggested that while research needs to pay attention to plaintiffs’ legal 
considerations, particularly the perceived fairness, arbitrariness and uncertainty ingrained 
in the law-on-the-books and judicial decision-making, these are of greater importance for 
private than public plaintiffs. This largely confirms the findings of the ILP. In line with 
assumptions in the literature (e.g., Mazák 2002, 318), the chapter also showed that the 
fairness and effectiveness of decision-making in defamation and privacy disputes might 
be pivotal for its ability to provide effective redress. In the Slovak case, the delays, 
perceived bias towards high-profile plaintiffs and intrusive nature of the judicial process 
often diminished the remedy’s effectiveness or caused the individual further harm, and 
made some plaintiffs abandon their claim or deterred them from defending their rights in 
the future.  
The chapter confirmed that contextual factors are key for explaining plaintiffs’ 
decision to sue and by extension a defamation and privacy regime’s ability to safeguard 
optimal protection of reputation and privacy rights. Above all, this chapter highlighted 
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the crucial role played by the plaintiffs’ perceptions of the media’s behaviour prior to and 
after publication. The belief in media’s unethical behaviour and malicious intent and their 
reluctance to provide fast redress for what the plaintiffs saw as unjustified attacks 
propelled most to file legal action. The media tended to reject public officials’ before-
action requests due to non-compliance with statutory requirements or lack of merit, while 
some tabloids did not respond to claims as a matter of policy. In the context of mutual 
hostility between the media and public officials, media professionals feared that 
admittance of fault was likely to be misused to discredit them in the eyes of the public. 
The chapter revealed a deep rift between the perceptions of plaintiffs and defendants 
concerning the merit of claims, suggesting that these differences were rooted in divergent 
views on the role and responsibilities of the media in a democratic society, the public 
interest and the need of public figures to tolerate higher levels of scrutiny. Political culture 
and understanding of the media’s role were also suggested as an important factor which 
might prompt some public officials to sue and deter others. 
Overall, the chapter underlined the importance when studying the interplay 
between reputation, privacy and freedom of expression in new democracies of exploring 
the cultural factors operating on individual (plaintiff’s understanding of the role of media 
in a democracy) and societal level (journalism culture, political culture) and their 
influence on the mutual relationships between principal protagonists, which are often 
rooted in the socio-political struggles prevalent during democratisation.  
The plaintiffs’ interactions with lawyers and support of their employer were 
revealed as other potentially influential contextual factors affecting plaintiffs’ calculus. 
Like the ILP (Bezanson, Cranberg, and Soloski 1985), the chapter found that in the 
Slovak case, lawyers were more instrumental in recommending the appropriate legal 
strategy than in affecting the decision to sue. Rather than immediate legal action, lawyers 
recommended alternative remedies, particularly in the form of a quick, public apology. 
Some actively dissuaded public plaintiffs, particularly politicians, from suing, as 
litigation risked further harm to their political career. Good professional relationship with 
media lawyers allowed plaintiff lawyers to achieve effective reputational vindication for 
their clients though out-of-court settlement before or during litigation. 
The chapter indicated that the Slovak legal regime was unable to fulfil the 
preventive function, as particularly the tabloid press was not deterred from making 
unwarranted attacks. Since the preventive function of the law is closely linked to the 
protection of the public’s interests in expression, the ability of the regime to create a 
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benign chilling effect on illegitimate speech and promote responsible, truth-seeking 
journalism is discussed in more detail in Chapter 8. 
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 The Benign Chill and Promotion of Responsible 
Journalism 
8.1 Introduction 
I have argued in the introduction to this thesis that adequate triangulation of the 
conflicting interests at the heart of defamation and privacy regimes involves attainment 
of three specific objectives: the protection of reputation and privacy, the creation of a 
benign chilling effect and the prevention of abuses of the law by plaintiffs with the 
consequent invidious chilling effects. The previous chapter examined the extent to which 
the law achieved the first of these aims. It concluded that the law failed to produce a 
benign chilling effect and promote responsibility within journalism from the viewpoint 
of plaintiffs and their lawyers. This chapter takes the viewpoint of defendants and lawyers 
to investigate the extent to which the regime generated a benign chilling effect by 
deterring irresponsible practices harmful to reputation and privacy and promoted 
responsible journalism that provided the public with important, reliable information about 
matters of general concern.  
The conceptual framework used for this research (see Chapter 2) suggests that the 
practical distinction between benign and invidious effects on freedom of expression in 
legal regimes that afford constitutional protection to all the the competing interests and 
balance them in an ad hoc manner is very hazy. In those systems, including the Slovak 
one, individuals’ perceptions about the desirability or undesirability of the chill are 
subjective, dependent on the value assigned by the individual to each of the conflicting 
interests and his/her understanding of what constitutes responsible journalism and the 
public interest. Drawing on previous studies of the chilling effect, the conceptual 
framework devised for this project inferred that practical manifestations of the desirable 
chill on journalistic speech might include adoption of measures by media organisations 
to avoid irresponsibility and reputation or privacy infringements, including vetting by 
senior editors and/or lawyers and legal training for employees (see, e.g., Cheer 2008, 
2005; Weaver et al. 2006). These measures resulted in what could be characterised as 
direct benign chills, including non-publication of unlawful material in light of specific 
legal considerations (Cheer 2008, 149), delays to secure additional evidence for serious 
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allegations reworking content to make it more balanced (Weaver et al. 2006, 166-167), 
or toning down the allegations and/or language without losing the message (Cheer 2008, 
149). According to the conceptual framework, structural benign chilling effect could be 
demonstrated in media professionals, as a rule, not venturing into topics that are not in 
the public interest, such as private individuals’ intimate life. 
The conceptual framework further suggested that the perceptions or practical 
manifestations of the chilling effect differs between individuals and media organisations 
set in the same defamation and privacy regime, depending on the level of fear of 
punishment for the contemplated publication felt by the organisation or individual (see 
Schauer 1978). The greater the fear of potential harm incurred as a result of publishing a 
contentious article, and the lower the benefits, the higher the probability that an 
organisation or individual will be deterred from publication. The punishment or harm 
caused by personality/goodwill protection litigation is not solely judicial sanction and the 
resulting financial costs, but may include other financial and non-material costs involved 
in defending and/or losing a dispute. The benefits of publishing unlawful speech might 
include financial rewards for doing so or promotion of the owner’s or reporter’s vested 
interests. The cost-benefit calculus is expected to be carried out against a backdrop of the 
perceptions about the operation of the defamation and privacy regime, particularly its 
fairness, certainty and effectiveness, which affect the risk of the potential harm resulting 
from litigation, as discussed in general in Chapter 2, and in the Slovak context in Chapters 
5 and 6.  
According to the conceptual framework, the ability of the regime to produce a 
benign chill further depends on contextual factors operating at the micro, meso and macro 
levels, including the structure of the media market, the size of the organisation and its 
culture, journalism and political culture, individual values and predispositions, and the 
relationships within the newsroom, between media organisations and their lawyers and 
between the subjects of stories and the defendants. 
After briefly discussing the interrupted process of professionalisation of 
journalism, which has been suggested as the main factor explaining the absence of 
journalistic responsibility that plagued Slovakia and other post-communist countries in 
the period of democratisation, the chapter explores the views of media managers, 
professionals and their lawyers about the extent to which and how the law created a 
benign chill on carelessness and promoted a greater focus on responsible journalistic 
practices. It then examines the limits to the regime’s ability to create a benign chill.  
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8.2 ‘Interrupted Process of Professionalisation’ 
Editorial decisions and journalistic content in the studied period had been affected by ‘an 
interrupted process of professionalisation’ (Örnebring 2013, 10), and the resulting fragile 
professional ethics and low levels of journalistic expertise  (SPW and DBM 2008; 
Školkay et al. 2010, 13-14; Šípoš 2008, 2007b, 2007a).165 To develop, independent 
professionalism requires a period of political and economic stability (Mancini 2015, 34).  
However, the continuity of editorial work, and the process of nurturing awareness of 
journalistic ethics were disrupted as a result of communist party control over the press 
and the sweeping personnel changes within the profession during the 20th century 
(Köpplová and Jirák 2008, 204). 166  
The profession became more open after the fall of communism (Holina 1997, 103) 
as ideological prerequisites were lifted and few formal requirements introduced (Školkay 
et al. 2010, 15). While the changes allowed people with valuable perspectives to enter the 
profession (Holina 1997, 103; Školkay 2017, 195), they also opened the door to 
unprofessionalism and irresponsibility. As an entire older generation of experienced 
journalists was missing,167 the new-comers – majority of whom lacked journalistic 
training and/or university education (Johnson 2012, 159; Holina 1997, 108) – had no 
mentors to instil in them professional standards and oversee the quality of content 
(Tóthová 2007). Lacking a model of practice aligned with democratic standards, 
journalists turned to the Western professional standards of independence, objectivity and 
neutrality. However, as these had themselves changed with the rise of the twenty-four-
hour news cycle, the external guidance was ambiguous (Klvaňa 2004, 50), and 
 
 
 
165 In a 2008 survey of 165 Slovak media professionals (SPW and DBM 2008), respondents considered 
journalists’ low levels of expertise (75%) and low levels of journalistic ethics (57%) as the two main 
factors negatively affecting media quality. 
166 The Czechoslovak journalistic profession experienced a high turnover of editorial and journalistic 
staff in 1945, after the communist takeover of 1948, following the Prague Spring in the early 1970s, 
and again after the fall of communism in 1989 (see Jirák and Köpplová 2012, 190-91). 
167 During the ‘post-communist clearing’ (Mocek 2015, 106), many journalists were forced to leave 
(Ondrášik and Škop 2011, 112–13). Journalists discredited as Mečiar’s nationalistic lapdogs were 
forced to the margins when their outlets closed (Šimečka 2009, 4-5). Others were unable to adapt to 
the demands of the new competitive environment, and left the profession on their own accord (Johnson 
2012, 158-59; Tóthová 2007).  
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professionalisation was outpaced first by political activism and later by 
commercialisation. 
8.3 The Law and Responsible Journalism   
Respondents suggested that considerable improvements in responsible journalism and 
respect for personality and goodwill rights occurred since the early 1990s. They disagreed 
as to whether these were promoted by the legal regime or were just a natural development 
within the journalistic profession. 
8.3.1 Rise of Responsible Journalism Regardless of the Law 
Like respondents in Marjoribanks and Kenyon’s studies (2004; 2008a), many Slovak 
interviewees were reluctant to attach any importance to the effects of the regime, arguing 
that regardless of litigation risks, the media and journalists had gone through a process of 
maturation which resulted in greater journalistic responsibility. Kamenec recognised that 
the quality of journalism and the tendency to thoroughly verify facts was much better 
than in the late 1990s when ‘journalism looked differently’ and journalists were less 
diligent – ‘they received information and [simply] published it in the name of the [public] 
good’. Kamenec believed that the more responsible approach was a result of societal 
developments and the generational and technological changes within the profession rather 
than the law stating, ‘I don’t think that personality/goodwill protection disputes have had 
a fundamentally positive effect’.  
Šimečka believed that the media had evolved and that, serious papers became 
increasingly careful not to publish unsubstantiated allegations having ‘respect for facts’ 
and ambition to ‘be fair’. Rather than ‘internal censorship’ it was ‘normal journalistic 
responsibility’ and rather than fearing lawsuits, the journalistic profession feared its ‘own 
failure’. As editor-in-chief, Balogová actively participated in fact-checking of contentious 
allegations because it mattered to her that SME did not make mistakes. Kubina tended to 
tell reporters to consider whether they would be ‘able to tell it to the person’s face’, 
whether they were sure they were ‘not causing him/her harm’ and that they were ‘not 
misusing the television’ or someone was not misusing them when publishing sensitive 
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material. Kubina called this the ‘first point of self-censorship’, stressing the importance 
of ‘being sure about your claims so that you don’t ruin someone’s reputation because 
something has allegedly happened’.  
Journalists also stressed that ethical considerations played a much more important 
role in editorial decisions than liability risks. When developing a story, Petková first and 
foremost focused on fact-checking not because she wanted ‘to avoid a lawsuit but to avoid 
harming someone – not to cause them civic damage’. Reiterating that her motivation ‘not 
to ruin someone’s reputation’ was ‘definitely stronger than’ the risk of a lost lawsuit, 
Petková suggested that the inclination for thorough fact-checking was down to a 
journalist’s experience and maturity as he/she realised his/her societal responsibility and 
the possible consequences of his/her work. Mikolášiková maintained, ‘we always take 
care … in order not to violate [someone’s] rights’.  
Senior editors and journalists acknowledged instances when it was impossible to 
sufficiently verify serious claims, particularly from an unknown source, leading to 
‘killing’ or shelving stories as their publication was deemed unethical. According to Fila, 
‘there have been claims we didn’t consider sufficiently verified to dare publish them. That 
happens often’. Fila could not recollect non-publication ‘due to fear’. As long as editors 
were convinced they had ‘uncovered something and were able to prove it, not in the legal, 
but journalistic sense’, it went out. Balogová claimed, ‘if you cannot verify certain claims 
you will not publish – that has happened. However, it isn’t about fearing a lawsuit. We 
perceived it was not right to publish because we were unable to verify it’.  
Kubina argued that newsrooms had to be extremely cautious with information 
leaked by anonymous sources, particularly concerning politicians and organised crime 
figures, as they risked being misused in feuds between rivals, or ‘intelligence games’. 
Kubina explained, ‘you consider whether it is worth it to broadcast something about a 
Mafioso who, as a matter of principle, interests no one’, because it is often impossible to 
verify the allegations. While Kubina saw little public interest in reporting allegations 
concerning “Mafiosi”, he perceived a clear ‘risk of publishing inadequate information’, 
which the outlet would ‘never be able to prove’. Since politicians ‘tend to leak 
[information] willy-nilly’, and there was a ‘danger one could influence the election’ 
Kubina also perceived breaking political scandals based on anonymously obtained email 
conversations or audio-recordings shortly before elections as ‘dangerous’. As the 
allegations were often impossible to verify, Kubina, in contrast to some other editors, was 
reluctant to broadcast them as he was ‘old enough to jump on such hooks’. Vagovič, 
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advised it was normal to pull stories shortly before publication or to remove certain 
contentious claims if they proved impossible to verify: ‘It happens that you halt 
something literally before the last stop and in the end you don’t let it out even though 
you’ve worked on it for a month’.  
8.3.2 Benign Chilling Effect and Increased Focus on Journalistic Responsibility 
Similar to previous empirical studies (e.g., Marjoribanks and Kenyon 2004; Weaver et al. 
2006; Cheer 2008) a considerable number of interviewees argued that legal 
considerations significantly affected the editorial process, encouraging fact-checking and 
avoiding publication of insufficiently substantiated allegations, and contributing to the 
provision of better quality information. In light of the perceived unfairness of ordinary 
courts’ adjudicatory practice of the 1990s and 2000s (see Chapter 6), 
personality/goodwill protection posed huge risks to media organisations, particularly in 
relation to certain public plaintiffs and businesspeople. Within a personality/goodwill 
protection regime that was perceived as public plaintiff-friendly, arbitrary and 
unpredictable, for political and business outlets the potential of being sued and incurring 
large litigation costs was high, whilst the benefits of publishing defamatory, privacy 
intrusive or borderline speech were few. Zlámalová explained that media organisations 
started paying more attention to ‘the legal side’ of journalism in the 2000s because one 
could ‘never anticipate where [litigation] will lead’, in order to minimise costs. While in 
the late 1990s, ‘reporters were minimally interested in the legal aspect[s]’, in 2014 they 
strived for more legal knowledge and increasingly consulted lawyers prior to publication. 
This helped them to better understand the issues and develop stories accordingly, 
according to Zlámalová.  
Since the mid-2000s, many leading national media outlets introduced measures to 
promote responsibility and preclude personality/goodwill infringements. Obradovič was 
convinced that given the uncertainty and pro-plaintiff bias of courts, newsrooms had to 
be professional and ‘focus on quality’ of journalistic outputs not to give someone a pretext 
to take them to court, stating ‘If you do your job well, you will not get there’. Obradovič, 
observed that in the early 2010s when the printed press ‘simply battle[d] to be able to 
survive on the market’, HN and other outlets did ‘not have the resources to afford to make 
mistakes’. Kubina maintained that personality/goodwill protection costs might have been 
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‘liquidating’ for TV JOJ, ‘if [the newsroom] had not been very cautious’ to avoid rights 
infringements. Brunovský argued that Trend did ‘not have too many active disputes’ 
because they tried to ‘involve lawyers’ and ‘work as cleanly as possible’. Petková 
believed plaintiffs filed fewer petitions as media organisations became ‘really careful 
about what they write and [started to] use legal firms’ advice, realising ‘it is cheaper to 
pay lawyers for prevention than to pay the dispute costs’. Mihálik maintained that Ringier 
was successful in most recent personality/goodwill protection disputes because it did not 
‘publish a load of rubbish’ and because it would very ‘rarely write something that [wa]s 
untrue’. Diko also believed that the personality/goodwill protection regime had a positive 
impact on journalism ‘as it force[d] journalists to increasingly verify information and act 
responsibly’.  
The following paragraphs examine the benefits, costs and risks involved in 
publishing potentially defamatory or privacy intrusive material for self-defined serious 
outlets in more detail. The measures employed and the ways and extent to which legal 
considerations created a benign chill and promoted responsible journalism are also 
described. 
8.3.2.1 Few Benefits of Publishing Potentially Unlawful Speech  
Media professionals working for serious outlets argued that publication of defamatory or 
borderline stories brought no rewards. Brunovský strongly refuted the idea that 
publishing fraud or corruption allegations would be profitable. ‘Those who object to 
[stories] we write about them often blame us for doing it in order to increase our 
circulation. The opposite is true’, Brunovský argued. ‘Breaking contentious stories … 
does not increase circulation’; ‘[y]ou’d gain nothing’ by deliberately publishing untrue 
facts because ‘rather than increasing circulation, it causes financial damage’ resulting 
from litigation. ‘Therefore’, Brunovský reiterated, ‘it does not make any sense for us to 
write an article which does not correspond with facts’. Balogová claimed that she would 
not ignore lawyers’ recommendation against publication in order to generate extra profit 
because ‘the money the one article would have earned would be spent on lawyers and 
lengthy legal proceedings’.  
Defendants resolutely denied all accusations of malicious intent when covering 
public officials’ conduct stressing journalistic ethics whilst acknowledging that public 
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plaintiffs might feel unjustly pilloried in the media. Trend ‘s aim was not for ‘people to 
be angry’ because ‘a good journalist is one who writes borderline articles but can also 
call the people next time’. Brunovský believed that fairness towards subjects of stories 
was crucial because ‘a decent newspaper cannot live without [their and readers’] respect’. 
Balogová asserted that there was no ‘intentional [malicious] campaign’ against politicians 
while admitting that public officials might perceive media coverage of their conduct as 
‘one-sidedly negative’ and that journalists ‘sometimes increase the pressure if a politician 
surrounded by corruption allegations doesn’t resign’. Balogová was convinced that such 
beliefs stemmed from the political culture and public officials’ misunderstanding of the 
media’s role, some of whom ‘have the absolutely erroneous idea that we ordinarily decide 
during the morning editorial meeting that today, we will bring down a minister or have a 
go at Fico’. ‘This absolutely isn’t true’. All mistakes were ‘down to individual human 
error’, according to Balogová.168 She was convinced that democratic politicians ‘simply 
must accept that media are watchdogs who will yell if they see injustice, see, or suspect, 
that a criminal offence is being committed or that someone handles state assets in an 
uneconomical way’.  
8.3.2.2 Litigation Costs 
Consistent with the expectations of the conceptual framework, the costs of litigation for 
media organisations and media professionals consisted of actual and potential financial 
costs associated with legal action and the reputational costs stemming from litigation 
itself and/or the need to admit fault and apologise. Moreover, media professionals faced 
the potential time commitments and emotional distress associated with having to deal 
with litigation threats or participation in proceedings. 
 
 
 
 
168 Petit Press repeatedly argued that it did not have malicious aims when reporting on Fico, claiming 
in Fico v. Petit Press No. 2, for instance, that ‘the caricature’s author’s aim was in no way to ridicule 
the [neck] pain’ Fico suffered, and that Fico’s claim to the contrary was ‘absolutely unfounded’, 
attesting to his ‘misunderstanding of the nature of a caricature’. In Fico v. Petit Press No. 1, the 
contested statements’ author declared that ‘he nor his superiors had a malicious intent and didn’t want 
to depict the plaintiff in a negative light’. 
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Financial costs 
The actual financial costs included the organisation’s costs of proceedings, that is, 
lawyer’s fees, costs of furnishing evidence, and the out-of-pocket expenses incurred by 
lawyers and/or employees when summoned to testify. Media houses also risked damages 
payments and reimbursement of the plaintiff’s proceedings costs. Legal services were 
relatively affordable. Many media organisations secured continuous legal services with a 
retainer contract, or benefitted from discounted hourly rates and a reduced basic tariff 
(see Chapter 5). In disputes begun after the changes to court and lawyer’s fees were 
introduced in the 2000s (Chapter 5), damages awards represented the most substantial 
cost. Prior to that, plaintiff’s reimbursement often equalled or exceeded damages awards, 
particularly in long-lasting, complicated disputes. Schwarz reckoned a lost personality 
protection dispute with a private plaintiff in the early 2010s might cost a publisher 5,000 
euro in damages, 3,000 euro in plaintiff’s reimbursement and 2,000 euro in lawyer’s fees 
and out-of-pocket expenses. This was expected given the generally lower legal services 
costs in civil law countries than in common law and US jurisdictions, where costs of 
defending legal actions often exceeded the potential damages awards (Soloski and 
Bezanson 1992, Anderson 1992; Glanville and Heawood 2009; Mullis and Scott 2012a; 
Barendt et al. 2013). 
The cumulative total of claimed damages represented substantial sums for many 
media organisations, potentially threatening their existence. Trend faced in excess of half 
a million euro in potential damages payments between 2002 and 2013. The total amount 
of damages claimed by plaintiffs in actions against Petit Press reached almost six million 
euro by 2014. As of 26 May 2014, Petit Press was party to at least eighty-one active 
disputes involving damages claims short of 3.2 million euro. 169 For a series of articles 
Ringier was sued for 1.94 million euro. As also noted by Schauer (1978, 697), most 
interviewed media professionals were aware of the potential consequences of large 
damages awards for their outlets, and feared redundancies. Vagovič explained, ‘[e]ach 
media organisation has a certain number of lawsuits for a certain level of damages. Were 
all of them lost … each firm would feel it. As a consequence, they would have to make 
 
 
 
169 An obligation to pay a fifth of the total claimed damages in the active disputes would cause Petit 
Press considerable difficulties as its declared profit in 2013 was just 523,000 euro (Finstat 2018). 
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people redundant and implement other economic measures’. Brunovský admitted that 
reporters showed ‘sensitivity’ about potential financial losses as they understood that the 
money spent on lawsuits would not be available for other things and might result in 
redundancies. Šimečka argued that although ‘the publisher was absolutely fine’ and 
understood that many defamation lawsuits represented ‘an attack on the media’, he 
nevertheless ‘put pressure on the newsroom to be more careful’ and avoid unnecessary 
mistakes because he was not willing to pay millions of Slovak crowns. 
Media organisations were obliged by law to create capital reserves by assessing 
the risk of losing its pending or imminent lawsuits and estimate the amount of capital 
needed to cover the associated costs. Given the uncertainty surrounding 
personality/goodwill protection disputes, this was a rather complex task that often created 
conflicts with auditors. While publishers knew that damages claims were often inflated 
and represented only a fraction of the amounts paid to plaintiffs, they found it challenging 
to justify their estimate in their annual financial statement. Fulmek said Petit Press 
executives ‘always have long discussions with auditors’ due to the high nominal cost of 
the disputes, arguing ‘that it does not make sense to create a reserve amounting to thirty, 
forty or fifty percent for the disputes’ because they only tended to lose around ten percent 
of them. 
The statutory budget reserve limited the financial resources that media 
organisations could use to produce journalistic outputs or develop new products, and 
restricted their ability to seek credit. Zlámalová explained, ‘no client wants to make 
unnecessary payments. When there is a risk – and some companies sue for abnormally 
large sums … – the client must eventually count with it’. Krejča added, ‘if we receive a 
lawsuit with a certain sum [of damages claimed], we immediately have to incorporate it 
in the budget because we never know how the proceedings will end. And this limits our 
access to money’. Múdry viewed setting up ‘a reserve for these fines … impedes 
publishers in their business operations’. As suggested by previous research (Anderson 
1992, 17), Čekirda advised that the requirement to create capital reserves caused issues 
when seeking credit. 
Journalists were not personally liable for infringements of personality/goodwill 
rights, as long as they were employed by a media organisation and the publication was 
approved by newsroom management. Therefore, they did not have the financial burden 
of litigation in most cases. Journalists who were officially self-employed, even where 
they worked permanently for a specific outlet – i.e. the majority of Slovak journalists by 
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2010, according to some respondents and commentators (Brečka and Keklak 2010) – 
risked becoming a party to the proceedings if the publisher failed to support them. Soltész 
was a freelancer when he wrote the article for which he was sued and had to bear the costs 
personally. Besides his legal fees, Soltész was obliged to pay the plaintiff within three 
working days of receipt of the final decision 16,600 euro in damages and costs 
reimbursement, for which he had to take out a loan. In the end, Soltész argued that the 
financial burden was ‘not such a big problem’. However, if he had to pay the 43,000 euro 
as awarded by the district court, or the almost 143,000 euro the plaintiffs sought, it would 
have meant ‘the end’ for him. 
The interviews suggested that in the context of legal uncertainly stemming from 
the adjudicatory practice and vagueness of legal rules, journalists might fear salary 
deductions or being made redundant for breach of duties, even if convinced they acted 
legitimately. Múdry (2014) stated, ‘you’ll become more cautious because if you have 
three-four cases when a lawsuit or criminal complaint has been filed for your articles, you 
will become concerned that the publisher will tell you “I really don’t need this”’.  
 
Reputational costs 
The interviews confirmed that potential reputational harm might increase the fear of being 
find liable for defamation or privacy intrusion and thus create a chilling effect on speech 
(Schauer 1978 697, 700). Leading media organisations perceived reputational costs of 
personality/goodwill protection to be more serious than the financial expense because, as 
Múdry explained, during his first government, Fico ‘managed to discredit the media in a 
genius way – along with various judges and the like – as he sued whoever’. HN’s 
Obradovič argued that for media organisations, the primary fear of personality/goodwill 
protection concerned credibility loss: ‘In the first place, there is the fear of credibility loss 
and then, of course, the fear that the fine could be liquidating, which the publishing house 
cannot afford’. Milan believed that it was ‘worse for a medium to suffer harm to its 
credibility, [and as a consequence] the loss of readers than a hundred thousand [euro in 
damages]’. Soltész thought that ‘it doesn’t look good if two to three apologies appear [in 
the paper] every day’. Concerning the result of Fico v. Trend Holding, in which Trend 
had to apologise and pay 8,000 euro in damages, Brunovský stated ‘we had to publish the 
apology on the cover, which was rather humiliating’. ‘From the viewpoint of the financial 
settlement, there was no problem’; the issue was ‘the apology and the moral 
condemnation of the medium for what it had done’. 
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Time costs 
The interviews confirmed that other non-material costs, like the time spent preparing and 
maintaining a defence (e.g., Marjoribanks and Kenyon 2004) feature in media 
professionals’ calculations regarding editorial decisions. The interviewees recognised 
that dealing with claims, petitions and hearings cost them valuable time that they could 
have used for other work. Balogová observed that dealing with requests and lawsuits 
‘steals the time you could use for other matters. Therefore, it is irritating’. Obradovič, 
found personality/goodwill protection ‘wasting time [and] anxiety’. Characterising court 
hearings as ‘a nuisance’, Petková explained that ‘the basic inconvenience is that one could 
dedicate the time to something more useful’.  
 
Emotional costs 
Assumptions of the conceptual framework that media professionals might find the 
intimidation attempts of influential individuals, preparation and participation in hearings 
and the uncertainty surrounding judicial decision-making distressing have been 
confirmed (Glasser 2009, xi; Schauer 1978, 700). Brunovský recognized that pre-
publication notices ‘definitely frustrate’ journalists ‘because they know that they are 
right’ and pursue the public interest. Nicholson argued that him ‘put[ting] on some twenty 
kilos’ was a reaction to stress [caused by pre-publication threats] that he encountered 
‘every week’.  
According to Múdry (2014), most journalists found hearings ‘frustrating’, because 
‘[y]ou have to testify before people who don’t understand it at all. It is irritating; it is a 
waste of time. You have to prepare for it and they don’t. They shoot from the side and 
literally frustrate you so that for a while you don’t feel like doing anything’. Several 
respondents found the ignorance of the basic principles of journalistic work and emphasis 
on miniscule details during court hearings vexing. Šimečka explained that it ‘was always 
unpleasant’ to sit through hearings because ‘it was always totally clear that the judge did 
not even try to understand the context of the given text, the message we wanted to convey 
and what it concerned’. Instead, the judges and plaintiffs ‘ultimately carped about details 
that were irrelevant’. 
Court testimony or simply having to justify one’s outputs before the editor-in-
chief and/or lawyers often caused media staff distress. Krejča found going to court as a 
witness ‘terribly hard’. Prušová, advised that it ‘was not a pleasant feeling’ to be 
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questioned by a ‘terribly aggressive’ plaintiff lawyer during a hearing. Vagovič found the 
need to justify his claims in court ‘terribly frustrating and unnerving’. It made him ‘most 
anxious’ having to ‘laboriously prove every sentence in court’ even though ‘everything’ 
in the text was ‘substantiated by evidence’. Balogová was convinced that dealing with 
personality/goodwill protection claims was ‘a slightly traumatising event’ for reporters 
as they were forced to contemplate the hearing, meet the lawyers and discuss the defence 
strategy. Balogová did not ‘assume that it would cause any self-censorship’. Nonetheless, 
she believed that ‘the reporter’s [emotional] comfort [wa]s impaired’ by the experience.  
8.3.2.3 Delays in Proceedings 
The interviews suggested that the delays in legal proceedings increased the costs. Media 
organisations and/or journalists risked increased financial litigation costs as a result of 
the protracted nature of judicial decision-making. Media professionals also potentially 
faced greater emotional distress and time costs. Nicholson explained, ‘the proceedings 
carry on for much longer than they should, and you simply hang in the balance 
somewhere’. According to Balogová, the need to ‘study [the case] anew’ each time it was 
returned for further proceedings was ‘rather frustrating’ given ‘everything else one has to 
do’.  
The protracted proceedings increased the risks of not being able to prove the truth 
of contested statement in court as it was sometimes impossible to secure evidence several 
years after the original publication. According to Brunovský, the ‘terribly long disputes’ 
might lead to ‘a huge problem’ for the publisher as by the time the proceedings commence 
some evidence might be lost. With ‘a seven-year-long dispute, no one knows any longer 
how it was at the beginning – the people don’t work here any longer, you have difficulties 
with testimonies’. Balogová argued that it was sometime ‘very difficult to get in touch 
with’ former employees, putting the editor ‘in the role of a beggar’ because it was ‘only 
up to the goodwill of the author whether he/she decides to help’ or not. The drawn-out-
nature of proceedings, therefore, sometimes prompted publishers to settle long-lasting 
disputes, regardless of their merit. Trend co-founders ‘tried to eliminate’ the risks of 
litigation and thus ‘actively initiated out-of-court settlements’ in some of their long-
running disputes, according to Brunovský.  
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8.3.2.4 High-risk Content 
Media professionals were not always able to predict which content posed the greatest risk 
of being sued and incurring financial and reputational costs. Prušová believed that ‘a 
problem can arise with every [item], even unexpectedly’. For Milan it was ‘unpredictable’ 
because ‘sometimes they sue for such poppycock which you would never expect’. 
Zlámalová often found stories perceived as ‘topics about nothing and of little interest’ to 
the public to be the most dangerous. Reporters claimed to strive to develop each item so 
that it was non-actionable given the unpredictability. Mikolášiková argued, ‘we always 
try to develop a topic as to minimise the risk of a potential dispute’.  
Stories concerning allegations of illegal and unethical conduct, including fraud, 
corruption, suspect public procurement contracts, links between powerful businessmen 
(oligarchs) or organised crime figures and political parties, non-transparent financing of 
political parties; and coverage of elections were perceived as the most likely to attract 
litigation. ‘Investigative journalism [thus] represent[ed] top risk’, according to Soltész’s. 
A particular type of public affairs programmes, the so-called civic affairs journalism, 
covering disputes between neighbours, family disputes and consumer problems, was 
perceived as particularly risky by television broadcasters. 
Stories concerning especially litigious persons and legal entities that enjoyed 
protected legal status or possessed the economic or social capital necessary to secure a 
favourable judicial decision were considered the most dangerous. The highest risk was 
associated with persons or companies who tended to request the largest damages amounts 
and had the wealth, influence, knowledge or informal networks that virtually guaranteed 
their success in ordinary courts. Ogurčák said, some persons ‘either know that they will 
be able to arrange it [a favourable judgment] or they will be able to get around it’. Fulmek, 
advised these claimants pursued disputes ‘when sure about their successes’ and typically 
won 50,000 to 100,000 euro in damages. Media professionals were extremely cautious 
when reporting about powerful businessmen, investment groups and companies involved 
in public contracts, often with alleged links to political parties and/or organised crime; 
and public officials, including certain politicians, judges, prosecutors, and police officials 
in leading positions within their fields.  
Benedikovičová believed that the most sensitive articles concerned the affairs of 
large corporations and alleged organised crime groups ‘because they ha[d] many lawyers 
behind them’ and tended to pursue complaints in court. According to Vagovič, ‘when a 
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large firm you could seriously harm is concerned you consider whether you have 
everything [sufficiently] substantiated to dare [publish] and whether it is worth it’. For 
Šimečka, ‘the worst lawsuits’ came from ‘large firms with good lawyers, and judges’. 
Krejča stated: ‘while we are not scared of any companies in the world, we take 
tremendous care when we say something about Google … Mercedes or Unilever. These 
are simply huge titans. We could harm their sales with a single reportage’.  
Defendants and their lawyers found a certain group of public officials as 
exceedingly sensitive, taking subjectively legitimate public scrutiny as intentional 
personal attacks. Benedik found that many high-profile public figures like Mečiar170 
tended to ‘think too much of themselves’, valued their honour too highly, and held an 
unfounded ‘belief that their negative portrayal in the media  was somehow programmatic, 
that it was intentional, that they did nothing to provoke it and that the aim was to destroy 
them’. Ogurčák argued that ‘some politicians, in particular, ha[d] been rather sensitive 
about the information published about them’, sometimes having insisted on its ‘utter 
accuracy’, which, given the nature of journalistic work, was nearly impossible. Čekirda 
perceived ‘touchiness and lack of professionality’ of public officials, believing they 
‘should tolerate intense public interest’.  
Newsrooms had to be careful when covering certain politicians. Adamčík 
explained that the first personality/goodwill protection actions appeared between 1992 
and 1994, peaked during Mečiarism and declined again after 1998 as ‘one could feel a 
different attitude of politicians towards the media’. Šimečka argued that during 
Dzurinda’s premiership, politicians sued rather infrequently because most of them were 
not interested in harming the media and ‘realised they would lose in Strasbourg’. 
Therefore, he ‘was not afraid of politicians’ despite SME having faced legal action for 
166,000 euro from Dzurinda,171 whose relationship with the press had deteriorated over 
time. Many interviewees believed that during Fico’s first government (2006 – 2010), 
litigation and threats thereof were ‘part of the establishment’s politics’ and its ‘evident 
 
 
 
170 Mečiar and his female assistant filed personality protection actions against Ringier, claiming 
166,000 euros in damages in total. The disputes involved a 2004 Nový Čas article that likened Mečiar’s 
state of mind after the 2004 presidential elections to a ‘nervous collapse’ and included photographs 
depicting the politician and his young assistant hours after the defeat around a camp-fire in his garden 
(see TASR 2004; Kernová 2014).  
171 Dzurinda later withdrew his lawsuit. 
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efforts to exert pressure on journalists’, as Nicholson put it. Brunovský suggested that 
‘the way in which Fico treated the media definitely included an element of wanting to 
deter and intimidate them’. The most prominent politicians of that government – Fico, 
Slota and Harabin – were not only considered the most prolific but also the most 
successful plaintiffs. In the first half of 2009 alone they obtained a total of 177,000 euro 
in damages (Augustín 2009b),172 and, according to respondents, encouraged other public 
plaintiffs to sue. Nicholson argued, ‘Having people like Harabin and ... Fico … who are 
leaders in various spheres [of public life] and file exemplary lawsuits, threaten journalists 
and label them hyena dogs and prostitutes, creates a [certain] atmosphere in society’. It 
became ‘natural for other members of Smer or other judges to do the same’ as they could 
‘gain the respect of their boss or at least ... their praise’.  
Harabin was widely perceived as the most dangerous plaintiff. Respondents 
believed that any critical story about Harabin would almost certainly lead to litigation that 
the media organisation was extremely likely to lose. Brunovský characterised Harabin as 
‘a typical example where one needs to be exceptionally careful about how and what is 
possible to write’. According to Kamenec, Harabin was ‘a very sensitive topic’ for media 
professionals and ‘a very unpredictable person’. Schwarz called Harabin ‘a phenomenon’ 
who tended to achieve ‘above-average success in defamation disputes’. In Tódová’s view, 
Harabin ‘watches for each word, sues for whatever he can, and as Supreme Court 
President wins everything’. Milan perceived liability risk with Harabin, ‘who sued for 
and cashed in on every trifle’, as enormous because one could ‘be hundred percent sure 
that … it will end up in court and that he will get the hundred or two hundred thousand 
[euro]’. Milan felt that Harabin’s success was virtually guaranteed because his 
‘subordinates decide on his petition and compensation when he litigates’.  
Some media professionals believed that politicians gradually came to understand 
that they had to tolerate more intense public scrutiny and avoided litigation. Leško 
 
 
 
172 Harabin received approximately 180,000 euro in his disputes with the media (TASR 2009; Košíček 
2008, 2009b; Augustín 2009a). Harabin was also awarded 150,000 euro in his dispute with the General 
Prosecutor’s Office, which involved confirmation of the existence of a recording of an alleged 1994 
phone conversation between Harabin and a drug-lord (Balogová 2013b). Slota received damages 
totalling almost 196,000 euro (Augustín 2009b; Leško 2013; Augustín 2009b); and Fico obtained at 
least 182,000 euro (Košíček 2009b; 2009a; 2009c) Some of these ordinary courts’ decision were 
quashed by the Constitutional Court (see Chapter 6). 
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maintained that ‘when politicians see that they have a great chance to succeed – [such as] 
when an outlet makes a mistake … they use it’ but they ‘do not have a tendency towards 
[litigation] because they know that it would ultimately harm them’. Nicholson believed 
that politicians ‘don’t sue frequently’ because ‘they know that as public figures they have 
to endure more [scrutiny]’. According to Fulmek, ‘politicians eventually always come to 
their senses and withdraw lawsuits’. The change in politicians’ attitudes to litigation, 
which started with Radičová’s government, continued during the first half of Fico’s 
second term in office as he settled all this remaining disputes with the press and ‘issued 
a new directive when he assumed office [in 2012] – “No disputes with the media”’, as 
Múdry (2013) described it. 
As already revealed in Chapter 4, the operation of the Slovak regime was 
distinctive in relation to the fact that judges belonged to the most frequent and successful 
claimants. Interviewees found it ‘absolutely absurd’, as Kollár put it, that judges became 
such frequent plaintiffs claiming hundreds-of-thousands of euro. Kamenec, felt it was 
‘hard to imagine’ such a disproportionately large number of disputes involving judges 
elsewhere ‘in the democratic world’. Being sceptical about some judges’ ability to 
‘correctly interpret the demands and requirements of democratic rule of law’, Kamenec 
questioned whether ‘judges who permanently litigate[d] against media organisations’ 
were compatible with democracy. Prušová believed that judges were convinced of their 
own ‘truth’ and ‘untouchability’, believing they were not required to publicly explain 
their actions and that journalists did not have the right to ‘write about them at all’. 
Nicholson characterised judges as ‘much more sensitive as well as arrogant and greedy’ 
than politicians. Múdry (2013) argued that some judges ‘began to value their honour 
above human life’, which he found ‘terrible’ and ‘disproportionate’.173 
Judges were extremely successful plaintiffs since they enjoyed protected legal 
status, possessed legal knowledge and were part of an informal network of persons 
adjudicating defamation disputes. Reporting allegations about them was thus considered 
very dangerous. Leško explained that disputes with judges were considered extremely 
risky because they had ‘the advantage of legal knowledge’, were familiar with ‘the way 
 
 
 
173 According to Petit Press’s records, judges were the single largest category of plaintiffs to claim 
damages above 66,388 euro, followed by lawyers. They claimed almost 1.68 million euro in total. 
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their colleagues at courts adjudicate’. The judiciary was ‘a closed environment of 1,400 
people where everyone knows everyone and can meet everyone’. Leško believed that if 
newsrooms tried to avoid something, it was ‘anything that would provide a reason for a 
judge to sue’ as the probability of judge’s success was ‘disproportionately above-
average’.174 Harabin, Polka and Soročina were repeatedly mentioned as, ‘the kings in 
terms of [achieving] decisions in their favour’.175  
8.3.3 Measures to Avoid Careless Mistakes 
The most frequently employed measures to avoid mistakes stemming from carelessness 
were legal training for newsroom employees and increased scrutiny during editorial 
process. These largely corresponded with those reported in previous studies (Cheer 2008; 
Townend 2014) and outlined in the conceptual framework in Chapter 2. In contrast to the 
English media (Barendt et al. 1997; Weaver et al. 2006; Townend 2014), none of the large 
broadcasters and publishing houses interviewed carried personality/goodwill insurance. 
Having explored the possibility of such cover, the interviewed media organisations 
concluded that it was either unavailable or too expensive. Fulmek, reported that some 
insurers offered a customised insurance policy. However, the price tended to be ‘utterly 
absurd’ because it was based on the cumulative amount of damages claimed in disputes 
led against the organisation, as compared to its actual litigation costs. Several managers 
 
 
 
174 As of November 2013, Petit Press had to pay over 182,000 euro in damages to judges. While some 
of the decisions were quashed by the Constitutional Court, the publisher had been obliged to pay the 
damages once a final decision was reached in the ordinary courts 
175 In five personality protection disputes, Polka was awarded 229,000 euro by district courts. Polka 
received approximately 119,000 euro in his dispute with the Justice Ministry and further 110,000 euro 
in legal actions against a publishing house (StratégieOnline 2002; SME 2002b, 2002a; Leško 2004). 
None of the decisions were final at the time it was reported and further information was not public. 
Petit Press paid Polka short of 7,000 euro in personality protection disputes, including an action for 
publication of a reply. Soročina won an apology and 33,000 euro from Rádio Viva (Tódová 2008b) 
and 66,000 euro from the Justice Ministry (Jesenský 2009). The former decision was quashed by the 
Constitutional Court and sent for further proceedings (II. ÚS 326/09). According to court decisions on 
file with the author, in two separate actions against Spoločnosť 7 Plus, he was awarded further 73,000 
euro by district courts. None of the decision was final. Data about appellate proceedings was 
unavailable. Soročina also lodged two separate personality protection actions against Petit Press, 
seeking almost a million euro in damages. 
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were aware that journalists carried the relatively inexpensive employee liability 
insurance.  
8.3.3.1 Legal Training 
Most media organisations offered employees some sort of lawyer-led training. This 
typically focused on educating reporters about the limits of journalistic work, which 
differed between broadcasters and the press. According to Langer, it was very important 
to ‘educate clients’ through workshops for journalists because ‘whether in broadcasting, 
in the press or on the internet … [the media] wield enormous power’. Lawyers tended to 
review recent legislative developments, disputes instigated against the organisation 
and/or significant judicial decisions, explaining how to develop non-actionable stories. 
As Langer put it, the aim was to demonstrate to journalists ‘how to put their writing right’ 
and ‘how to formulate sentences’ in order to avoid liability. In print press outlets, the 
focus was mainly on wording used in articles regarding innocence presumption; using 
full names of subjects; verifying and citing sources; distinguishing between value 
judgments and factual statements; the basic principles of the proportionality test; or 
archiving sensitive information. Training for television reporters furthermore included 
issues concerning objectivity; disclosing persons’ faces; filming on private property; and 
prior consent.  
Training took different forms, including obligatory seminars for all journalists, 
lectures for new employees and/or selected reporters, informal meetings among lawyers, 
senior editorial staff, and journalists whose stories were most likely to attract litigation. 
The frequency ranged from twice a year to every couple of years. Publishing houses 
owning several tabloid and life-style publications particularly felt the need for regular 
lawyer-led seminars due to high employee turnover. Other organisations tended to hold 
legal training on an ad hoc basis upon request of newsroom management.  
Given the rather high turnover within the profession, the more junior journalists 
particularly benefitted from legal training. Several lawyers believed that following legal 
training journalists were able to avoid personality/goodwill rights infringements. 
According to Ogurčák, having attended legal seminars, journalists were ‘more careful to 
identify the exact stage of any given criminal proceedings’ and thus avoid liability for 
innocence presumptions violations, prevalent beforehand.  
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8.3.3.2 Newsroom Codes  
The media increasingly focused on in-house introductions to journalistic ethics and the 
obligation to abide by the organisation’s ethics code. In collaboration with media 
professionals from leading news media organisations (Mocek 2015, 112), in 2011, the 
Slovak Syndicate of Journalists (SSN) adopted a modern Code of Ethics (APJE 2017), 
which reflected the main issues plaguing Slovak journalism, including the use of covert 
sources or publication of information concerning an individual’s private life (Štětka 2012, 
16; Terenzani 2010). Several outlets, including Denník N, HN and RTVS, committed to 
adherence to the Code. Trend and SME had their own codes of ethics. Nový Čas followed 
Ringier’s code and Plus 7 dní and Plus 1 deň were supposed to abide by NMH’s code of 
ethics. 
Fila stressed that new reporters attended an induction where SME’s ethics code 
and journalistic work principles were discussed. Diko highlighted the importance of the 
SSN Code and RTVS’s bylaws for programming employees and collaborators (RTVS 
2011), which provided detailed and solid ‘guidance how to behave in certain situations’. 
Diko insisted on adherence to the codes within the newsroom to ensure ‘the chance to be 
held liable’ was ‘really small’. In most outlets, the primary responsibility to follow ethical 
journalism and consult superiors regarding contentious stories lay with reporters. In some 
organisations, journalists faced penalties for breach of responsibilities, or ‘a fine for 
carelessness’ in Obradovič’s words. Diko claimed that naming and shaming journalists 
whose fault resulted in the obligation to broadcast a correction had ‘a didactic effect’, as 
it motivated reporters to avoid future mistakes. 
8.3.3.3 Pre-publication Scrutiny 
Most content was reviewed by several editors before publication.176 In many outlets, the 
editor-in-chief was heavily involved in the review process and trusted to be able to assess 
 
 
 
176 According to Obradovič, HN commentators were typically experienced professionals, trusted to 
follow the rules of responsible journalism. They enjoyed ‘extra freedom’ when developing content, 
which was only reviewed by the commentaries section editor without involvement of other senior 
editors or lawyers. 
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whether a story involved liability risks, and, if so, how best to minimise them. Under 
Šimečka, SME used a ‘format of at least three editors’. It ‘was the editors’ role to guard 
over these issues’ and to be involved in ‘permanent work with reporters’. Šimečka himself 
contributed to editing the ‘most prominent articles’. According to Kubina, senior editors 
had to understand the law to avoid violating personality rights. Legal knowledge was 
acquired with each new lawsuit instigated against JOJ because ‘[e]ven if you organise 
any kind of training …, each case is different’. Obradovič was convinced that HN’s rather 
strict three to four level pre-publication control mechanism explained why the newsroom 
‘did not have any large issues’ with personality/goodwill protection in the 2010s. Múdry 
(2014) argued that many of the before-action claims received by SITA did not reach the 
courts because editors were ‘thorough’ and ‘mindful of the facts’, which the subjects of 
stories ‘were unable to dispute’. 
Journalists and/or editors in all bar one of the interviewed outlets, had the option, 
at their own discretion, to seek pre-publication advice from lawyers. Paradoxically, 
according to Vagovič, legal vetting were not available at .týždeň, even though the weekly 
often covered ‘risky issues that might infringe personality rights of various people [or] 
firms’. Unlike English newspapers (Barendt et al. 1997; Weaver et al. 2006; Townend 
2014), none of the media organisations employed night lawyers to review content before 
publication. Obradovič was astonished to learn about this, and stated that while it would 
be ‘absolutely ideal’, he could not imagine ‘who in Slovakia would have the money for 
that’. With the exception of RTVS, which had its internal legal department, media 
organisations contracted one or several external law firms for legal services, including 
vetting. Most newsrooms had a lawyer available on call or email 24 hours a day.  
The proportion of items reviewed by lawyers varied over time, between outlets 
and various content types. Compared to the 1990s and 2000s, media professionals 
consulted lawyers more frequently. However, it was still an exceptional occurrence in 
many newsrooms. Vetting was ‘not routine practice’ at HN, according to Obradovič. It 
was used concerning ‘very sensitive topics’ up to ‘three times a year’. In contrast, 
Mikolášiková argued that at Nový Čas, pre-publication consultations occurred ‘routinely’, 
or as Benedik, put it, ‘in essence on a rather regular basis’, ranging from every three days 
to several times a day. At SME Balogová used pre-publication legal advice ‘rather 
intensively’ – up to several times a week, while under her predecessor, lawyers were 
consulted only once every three to six months. The use of “legalling” partly depended on 
the periodicity of the publication or programme. Due to the different work pace, serious 
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weeklies were more likely to be reviewed by lawyers than dailies. More complex, 
investigative stories or public affairs programmes prepared over a longer period tended 
to be regularly reviewed. 
Admitting that “legalling” could not eradicate all infringements, those editors and 
journalists who frequently used pre-publication advice, were convinced that it helped to 
save considerable amount of funds that would otherwise have to be spent on litigation. 
As Balogová put it, ‘thanks to our lawyers we don’t lose that many lawsuits’. Brunovský 
argued that ‘work with lawyers in a preventive manner’ ultimately reduced financial costs 
and ‘solve[d] many complications’. Media lawyers also found that the practice 
substantially contributed to the reduction of justified claims. Zlámalová believed that, she 
enjoyed a good rapport with her clients, that reporters were used to requesting vetting and 
that if the editor-in-chief motivated them to do so, lawsuits would be prevented. Langer’s 
firm was ‘very glad’ when clients consulted about content pre-publication because those 
who did so regularly, had ‘an absolute minimum of lawsuits compared to those who 
d[idn]’t’. 
8.3.3.4 Editorial Scrutiny in Light of the Personality/goodwill Protection Regime 
The primary emphasis during pre-publication review was on fact-checking and 
availability of legally admissible evidence in light of the decision-making practice. As 
Benedik explained, ‘given the [adjudicatory] practice, it is above all crucial for all the 
information – factual statements – comprised in the article to be true, to be verified’. 
Value judgments also needed to be ‘supported by undisputed factual statements’. 
Šimečka ‘insisted on verification of facts’ because ‘the biggest problem arises when we 
write falsehoods that are easily actionable’. Therefore, ‘everything simply had to be 
substantiated’ and ‘verified, be recorded’. Balogová felt, ‘one doesn’t really have a 
different option’ to prevent lawsuits than to ‘verify everything’. Vagovič argued that ‘the 
crucial points needed to be substantiated’. One could only dare use words like ‘allegedly’ 
or ‘purportedly’ for less sensitive claims that were unlikely to attract litigation. Milan 
asserted that unless he had ‘something 100% verified’ or ‘on paper’, he would not write 
it. Soltész maintained that the focus on fact-checking was ‘a normal, elementary instinct 
of self-preservation’ that did not ‘always concern a dispute’ but served to prevent ‘having 
to apologise in the newspaper, which is very frustrating’.  
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SME was ‘extra cautious’ to ‘substantiate and verify’ allegations concerning 
Harabin, because ‘one knows that it might not end up well’. The caution was not reflected 
in endemic ‘self-censorship’ or a ‘fear to write’ about Harabin, according to Prušová. 
Everything simply had to be substantiated. Prušová claimed to have learned from her 
litigation experience to ‘be more cautious’ and ‘pay more attention’ when drawing on 
information published by other outlets. Krejča professed particular care regarding 
allegations concerning private companies. In order to avoid ‘liquidating someone’s 
business based on one reportage’ containing unverified facts, stories were ‘intensely 
scrutinised as any other scandal or controversial case’ and had to be ‘damn well proven’ 
to be aired.  
The perception of the adjudicatory practice influenced the type of evidence used. 
Given the courts’ preference for palpable evidence, journalists and newsrooms had, 
according to Ogurčák, become ‘more careful about the way they write’ and the evidence 
to substantiate their claims. The most complicated editorial decisions involved 
information received from anonymous or semi-anonymous sources. Fila explained that 
‘the problems start with anonymous sources. There, definitely, the rule applies not to rely 
on a single [source]. However, there even two might not suffice’. Obradovič argued that 
in cases of controversial off the record allegations to which the involved parties refused 
to respond, facts had to be verified from at least two sources – otherwise ‘it cannot go to 
press, it cannot go on the web. Nowhere’. Journalists tried to corroborate claims with 
documentary evidence like contracts, criminal proceedings files, public register data, or 
documents acquired from authorities through FOI requests. Documenting the claims with 
email conversations or audio-recordings, and trust in sources’ willingness to testify before 
court were also stressed. According to Prušová, ‘you have to verify [information] as much 
as possible, build a network of sources you can trust unequivocally, who you can be sure 
will testify in case of a dispute’. In Trend, an anonymous source’s promise to testify was 
considered ‘too little’ to publish potentially defamatory claims because, as Brunovský put 
it, ‘unfortunately, the burden of proof is on our side’. Múdry argued that in SITA, ‘the 
basic facts needed to correspond with the truth’ and ‘had to be substantiated’. 
Journalistic “duties and responsibilities” promoted in the established case-law of 
the ECtHR and recent jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court were also emphasised in 
editorial decision and scrutiny. Šimečka claimed that under his editorship, they ‘had a 
relatively clear [editorial] line’ in not publishing things that were not in the public interest, 
such as information about private individuals’ records in the then newly-opened archives 
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of the Czechoslovak Secret Service (ŠtB). Šimečka explained, ‘That doesn’t interest us. 
I don’t want to get into such dirt. However, when it is a public figure, it is different’. 
Petková stated that to pursue a story it had to ‘involve public interest’ and be of 
‘importance’. In stories concerning ‘a public figure, the public interest is straightforward’ 
as opposed to an individual who ‘doesn’t hold a public office or is not in politics’.  
Soltész believed that ‘nowadays the decision process in newsrooms is healthier to 
a certain extent as it takes into account the same factor as the law, that is, the status of the 
individual – whether it is a public official or not – [and] the societal importance’ of the 
news item. Nicholson resolutely declared that ‘the societal relevance of the topic or 
article’ were key when deciding whether to pursue a story or not. In case ‘there is no 
wider context or significance for the public, I won’t go for it’. Tabloid lawyers frequently 
considered the public interest in privacy intrusions or publishing serious allegations about 
private persons and relatively public figures. Television lawyers emphasised objectivity 
and news impartiality.  
8.3.4 Manifestations of the Personality/goodwill Protection Regime’s Benign Chill  
The personality/goodwill protection regime produced a degree of benign chilling effects. 
Their manifestations did largely correspond with those reported by previous empirical 
studies of defamation in common law countries, as discussed in Chapter 2. The benign 
chill of the personality/goodwill protection regime did vary across the news media sector. 
Structural benign chilling effect on expression was present when publication of 
insufficiently substantiated, potentially defamatory claims or privacy intrusions was 
deterred, according to respondents. When potentially defamatory allegations that were 
believed to be in the public interest came up, the direct benign chill was manifested in 
publication delays to allow for further verification of claims and in provision of more 
precise and/or civil speech. The following paragraphs explore these various examples of 
the chills in more detail. 
8.3.4.1 Deterring Insufficiently Substantiated Allegations and Privacy Intrusions 
According to some respondents, the increased liability risk of the 1990s and 2000s created 
a direct benign chilling effect by preventing numerous instances of publication of 
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illegitimate speech and thus contributed to enhanced protection of personality/goodwill 
interests. Zlámalová argued unprompted, that the regime had a beneficial effect on 
journalism. She acknowledged that on Markíza high risk liability programmes were not 
aired ‘numerous times’. Rather than harming expression, it represented ‘a certain form of 
psycho-hygiene for the television’ because it was not ‘possible to shoot and broadcast 
everything’ and ‘largely minimise[d] the risk of airing something untrue or something 
that would markedly infringe someone’s rights’.  
Acknowledging that reporters sometimes might feel unjustly censored, Múdry 
(2014) explained that editors and managers often merely tried to prevent publication of 
illegitimate speech. Múdry (2014) recognised the existence of ‘a certain self-regulatory 
mechanism’ in the media. As SITA managing director, he had ‘stopped a lot of 
information’ because he could ‘not afford a personality protection lawsuit for large 
damages which would liquidate the agency’. Múdry often had to dilute reporters’ claims 
when he possessed contradicting information. In those cases, some journalists perceived 
him as ‘a censor’. Yet, Múdry (2014) claimed the he ‘was just cautious and protected the 
agency’. Some journalists recognized the need to act responsibly and respected the 
editor’s right to pull stories he/she considered insufficiently substantiated so posing undue 
liability risk. Stressing that this was a ‘rare and extreme case’, Milan mentioned a 
colleague’s article concerning allegations of past criminal activity of a well-known 
individual pulled by the publisher and editor-in-chief. Although the allegations were 
‘very cautiously written’ and were believed to be true, it was concluded that the risk of 
losing a potential lawsuit was too large as the allegations were based on the Communist 
Secret Police files that the courts did not consider to be reliable evidence. ‘I am a friend 
of freedom of speech, freedom of opinion to the maximum’, Milan declared. ‘On the other 
hand, I have to respect the owners’ decision that they simply don’t want to risk the loss – 
financial loss or reputational loss. Therefore, we have to write responsibly’.  
Vagovič believed that the media and ‘investigative journalists ha[d] learned their 
lesson’ and became ‘much more diligent and responsible, taking much more care about 
what they publish’. Vagovič pursued a story concerning an alleged meeting between 
Harabin and a criminal suspect. Since the information came from an anonymous and a 
semi-anonymous source, photographic evidence was lacking, and ‘Harabin represented a 
great risk that we would lose’, the story was never published. Vagovič argued that ‘it was 
not [undue] fear’ that prevented the publication but that ‘it was natural’ because he was 
‘unable to follow it through as the last step was missing’. Vagovič also pulled a follow-
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up article about a company threatening a 20-million-euros lawsuit shortly before 
publication because he ‘felt that it could cause us problems’ and was ‘not hundred percent 
sure’ whether it was objective, sufficiently substantiated and whether other firms were 
not involved in a similar practice.  
Benedik recognised that the litigation threat had contributed to increased 
responsibility within the journalistic profession, precluding publication of illegitimate 
speech. Benedik recollected numerous instances when following pre-publication 
consultation, it was decided against the development of a story because it was ‘an 
exclusive private matter having nothing to do with a legitimate public interest in receiving 
information’ or because the claims were ‘simply so poorly substantiated that the [liability] 
risks would be gigantic’.  
All the above examples correspond to a direct benign chill; whereby harmful 
speech is deterred by direct legal considerations. The structural benign chilling effect, by 
definition, requires internalisation of responsible journalism standards under the 
influence of a defamation and privacy regime. Claiming that he was rather successful at 
explaining to the tabloids he represented that certain practices were ‘inappropriate’, and 
helping change them, Benedik indicated that the Slovak personality/goodwill protection 
regime succeeded in gradually creating a degree of structural benign chilling effect. 
8.3.4.2 Delaying Publication 
Another sub-type of direct benign chilling effect was demonstrated when publication of 
potentially defamatory statements, which editors and/or lawyers assessed as insufficiently 
substantiated, was delayed to allow for further fact-checking. Krejča tended to ask 
reporters ‘to wait with the reportage and finalise it to be perfect’ when dealing with 
sensitive allegations. Acknowledging that sometimes another outlet might break a story 
first, Krejča believed that this subsequent reportage was typically ‘twice as good and more 
accurate’. Adamčík found it was sometimes not possible to immediately publish ‘certain, 
interesting information’ because its source was insufficiently legal. It was typically 
published ‘after a while’ after the outlet had ‘managed to verify it’. Mikolášiková delayed 
publication of larger investigative stories until she was able to check all facts. Diko 
declared, ‘If we don’t have certain statements sufficiently substantiated or we know we 
might have a problem, we verify further and broadcast later’. Diko believed that 
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journalism was not merely about ‘being the first to bring information’ but involved 
‘responsibility’. Therefore, it was ‘better to keep something for ourselves or verify it and 
only then publish rather than hurt someone’.  
8.3.4.3 Providing More Balanced Reporting 
Most lawyers advised approaching subjects of stories for comment, or to allow them ‘to 
formulate a contrary opinion’, as Lukášek put it. This was another practical manifestation 
of the direct benign chill of the personality/goodwill protection regime on journalistic 
speech. Obradovič claimed that with each justified correction/apology request, a 
temporary, positive ‘psychological effect’ occurred as the increased pressure to avoid 
mistakes led to enhancements in professional responsibility and content quality. 
Journalists ‘become more cautious in a positive way ... Suddenly, you see they’ve 
approached all [interested] parties’ without having instructed them to do so’. However, 
respondents also suggested that subjects of reporting often refused to respond or failed to 
respond in time for publication. Benedik explained that he insisted on contacting the 
subjects involved prior to publication because ‘the truth might be, as they say, somewhere 
in the middle’ and that this gradually became ingrained in journalistic practice without 
specific liability considerations. As such, this could be considered as an example of a 
structural benign chilling effect. 
8.3.4.4 Language Precision 
Lastly, the regime promoted responsible journalism, and thus produced a direct benign 
chilling effect, by encouraging greater language precision. Newsrooms tried to phrase 
contentious information in a legally airtight way by toning down potentially defamatory 
statements when breaking news or stories of great societal importance which necessitated 
publication without delay. Brunovský explained, ‘we alter formulations in order to be 
able to withstand a potential correction request or lawsuit’. Brunovský believed that in 
some cases pre-publication protestations forced journalists to take greater care about 
‘what they write or don’t write to be able to defend it’. To a certain extent, Brunovský 
perceived pre-publication notices as ‘a positive phenomenon’ that contributed to greater 
responsibility and well-argued, ‘fair’ claims. Plus 7 dní articles were reviewed by the 
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veteran editor-in-chief who ‘knew the case-law and how courts think and what [plaintiffs] 
clutch at’, and, according to Milan, tended to suggest rephrasing or removing contentious 
statements of lesser importance. ‘As long as it d[idn]’t change the article’s message and 
really [wa]s merely playing with words’, Balogová tried to ‘take great care not to bleed 
on some twaddle’. SME consulted lawyers regarding articles about past successful 
litigants in order not to ‘go against an existing decision’, advised Fila. While Fila did not 
‘want to say that self-censorship or some kind of panic would be in operation’, he did 
admit that ‘unfortunately, our experiences are as they are. And there we are cautious’. 
Ogurčák, thought the media became ‘more straight with the reader’ and the information 
was ‘correctly presented’ with more precise wording. While Balogová doubted that 
‘readers would benefit’ from the increased precision because they ‘do not notice things 
to such an extent’, she admitted to being forced ‘in a perverse way’ to learn about legal 
issues concerning personality/goodwill protection.  
Legal vetting typically involved ‘recommendations how to suitably rephrase a 
potentially risky formulation’ or ‘water down certain claims’, according to Lukášek. 
Adamčík ‘reviewed draft articles and proposed recommendations how to ‘change 
[certain] expressions’ that were ‘significant [or] risky’. Langer provided 
recommendations on how to make certain expressions more exact so that they 
corresponded with the actual state of affairs or respected presumption of innocence. He 
believed that some journalists unduly simplified certain phrases and instead of stating that 
‘allegedly, according to such and such source such and such should have occurred in this 
way’ claim that ‘a certain person committed such and such’.  
Television lawyers advised against including journalists’ subjective opinions. 
Lukášek explained, ‘the feature itself doesn’t have to be neutral; it has to carry a neutral 
view of the journalist on the issues;’, that is, ‘the journalist has to be neutral in his/her 
conduct’. He thus tried to ‘push reporters to leave … subjective evaluation of the covered 
issues to the viewer’. Zlámalová urged journalists to ‘state things precisely and claim only 
what has been proven and is true; to avoid speculation, commentaries and value 
judgments, and hypothetical concluding statements that might influence the viewer in 
his/her beliefs or opinion about any of the involved parties’. 
In line with the adjudicatory practice, lawyers and editors tended to avoid 
identifying specific private persons or entities when publishing allegations, only reporting 
on the wider issues considered to be in the public interest. Often, ‘one waters it down’ by 
not showing a person’s face, and ‘not giving such precise clues, Kubina advised. Whoever 
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wants will take the hint’. According to Fila, lawyer consultations often revolved around 
the extent to which someone’s identity should be revealed, and whether personal details 
or the exact location of a company should be published. If reporters insisted on naming 
someone in a potentially defamatory broadcast, Zlámalová asked reporters to consider 
whether they wanted to describe an important issue or just wanted to ‘walk over 
someone’.  
When developing stories, journalists tried to phrase sensitive information 
carefully to reduce liability risk. Milan tried to ‘write [any] article so that it is 
nonactionable’. Having experienced disputes initiated for ‘tiny mistakes’, Milan learned 
to be ‘more careful about details’, not to include unimportant value judgments, and 
‘formulate statements in a legally clean way’. Milan admitted that ‘to a certain, small 
extent’, his litigation experience contributed to improvements in his writing. However, 
like Marjoribank’s and Kenyon’s (2004) findings, he suggested that the effect of the law 
was only secondary to a journalists’ maturity and experience because ‘as one 
[professionally] develops, works, has more experience, one improves’. Recognising he 
was ‘far from immune’ from liability, Leško looked at writing commentaries ‘through the 
optics of potential court proceedings’ and strived to minimise expressive, insulting or 
derisory language that could offend someone. Benedikovičová was ‘definitely more 
watchful of each word, not to give a pretext for contesting the article’ and tried to avoid 
‘ambiguities that could be interpreted in an unintended way’. She recognised that media 
professionals’ increased caution concerning language might be considered a positive 
effect of the personality/goodwill protection regime because it contributed to improving 
the quality of journalistic outputs. 
8.4 Limits to the Regime’s Benign Chilling Effect 
Despite the improvements to journalistic professionalism since the 1990s, respondents as 
well as analysts recognised that the law had not been able to prevent many 
personality/goodwill rights infringements. These continued to occur in both serious and 
tabloid news media in differing forms and intensity levels.  
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The red tops 
Plaintiffs and their lawyers were convinced that unethical and deliberately unlawful 
behaviour continued particularly in the tabloids. Believing that they were considerably 
softer than their Czech counterparts, interviewees working for serious outlets were also 
openly critical of the red tops’ practices and lack of professionalism. Leško claimed: ‘I 
don’t like if someone sells newspapers on the basis of fabricating something or prying 
into matters… which are of no public interest’. Soltész believed that tabloids often 
produced their own B-list celebrities ‘in order for the paper to sell well when they pillory 
them. They have the project thought-out from the beginning to the end’. Šimečka 
acknowledged that some tabloid outlets were ‘involved in filthy practices’. Mentioning a 
lost case involving Plus 1 deň reporting that Fico allegedly labelled its reporters “dirty 
bastards”, Obradovič maintained that ‘we have to come clean and say that it was simply 
a lack of professionalism on their part’ because there were no witnesses and Fico’s words 
were not on record.  Obradovič believed that even if they might have been right, they had 
to ‘have it substantiated’. Therefore, ‘we can criticise Slovak courts’ as ‘the results are 
catastrophic’ but ‘when you make a mistake, you cannot say it was the fault of biased 
courts’.  
 
Serious publications 
Managers and reporters admitted that even the leading news media made mistakes. 
According to Krejča, ‘[i]t would be naïve to pretend that each programme is perfect and 
that each journalist is a perfectionist who has truly been careful about every fact’. He 
admitted that ‘given the sheer amount of reportages and facts they have to process every 
day, even our people can occasionally go astray’. Múdry (2014) considered it ‘very, very 
bad’ when he had to ‘agree with a politician, particularly Robert Fico’, who said that ‘he 
would waste his time explaining something to SME’ as ‘SME had no interest in the truth 
as SME had its own truth’. Múdry believed that Fico was ‘unfortunately … too often 
right’ as SME at the time was ‘an exclusive group of people who formed their right to the 
truth’, which was ‘not journalism’.  
Fulmek argued unprompted, that SME was ‘full of mistakes and flaws’ and that if 
he read the content before publication (which he deliberately did not) he would prevent 
the publication of a myriad of things. Fulmek was particularly exasperated by the ‘blunt 
unfairness’ that sometimes appeared in journalistic texts about influential politicians and 
companies. It was demonstrated in the way journalists posed questions and in their 
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unwillingness to accept facts disproving their ‘version of the truth’, ignoring the 
arguments provided by subjects of reporting concerning the issue at hand and obstinately 
insisting that the given case involved wrongdoing on the subjects’ part. Fulmek was 
convinced that such unfair practices were ’ruining the good image of the newspaper’ but 
did not think that they often led to personality/goodwill protection disputes.  
It was suggested that following the drain of advertising revenue after the global 
economic crisis of 2008-2009, even serious publications began to focus on profitability, 
supressing liability or public interest considerations. Soltész felt that an increasingly 
important factor for editors-in-chief was ‘how [the story] will sell the newspaper’. Soltész 
believed that ‘if the headline is good, if it sells well at the newsstand’ even self-defined 
quality outlets increasingly ‘supress considerations of liability or societal importance’. 
Citing wide-spread media coverage of a car accident involving a government minister 
whose pockets included allegedly a large amount of cash and items of intimate nature 
(Krempaský 2013), Soltész claimed that he ‘wouldn’t publish it under any circumstances’ 
because regardless of the minister’s public figure status, the information was of ‘no 
societal importance’. 
The following section explores which legal and contextual factors combined in 
limiting the personality/goodwill protection regime’s effectiveness in producing a benign 
chilling effect and promoting responsible journalism. 
8.4.1 The Red Tops: Profitability of Sensational Stories and Smears 
The interviews suggested that in light of the adjudicatory practice (see Chapter 6) tabloids 
had little to fear from the personality/goodwill protection regime regarding the highly 
profitable practice of publishing unsubstantiated sensationalist allegations or intrusive 
stories about celebrities, politicians, or private persons. There were also indications that 
for certain media owners, publication of smears or character assassinations might have 
brought larger rewards at relatively little cost.  
8.4.1.1 Rewards of Publishing Illegitimate Speech 
The interviews confirmed the findings of empirical studies focusing on common law 
countries (Barendt et al. 1997; Weaver et al. 2006) which suggested that sometimes 
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tabloids knowingly publish sensationalist articles carrying high liability risks because of 
their profit-making potential. According to several respondents, the tabloid press’s 
business model was based on deliberately publishing sensationalist allegations and 
unjustified privacy intrusions attractive to their readers (see Chapter 7). This increased 
circulation and profits, far outweighing any potential costs. P05 believed that for the 
tabloid press, ‘freedom of expression merely represents the banner under which the 
struggle for profit is led at the expense of [individuals’] personality rights’. Kubina 
believed that the red tops’ ‘newsroom philosophy’ was to consciously ‘work on the line’ 
between legitimate and illegitimate speech, ‘knowing that they will get into lawsuits’. 
They venture into sensationalist, privacy intruding publications knowing in advance that 
they ‘will end up in court’ but ‘even if they lose it will still be worth it’ because ‘it will 
increase their circulation’.  
Analysts argued that the profit-driven foreign media owners of the 2000s were 
little interested in nurturing quality journalism. Instead, to attract the largest number of 
consumers and advertisers in the highly competitive market they focused on scandals and 
sensationalist news (Brečka 2002, 12; Dobek-Ostrowska and Glowacki 2008, 19; Stetka 
2012, 438; Štětka 2012, 18). To keep running costs at a minimum, the tabloids in 
particular, welcomed applicants with unfinished higher education degrees or, with high 
school qualifications only, who were willing to work for lower salaries and/or did not 
object to breaching ethical standards (Köpplová and Jirák 2008, 202–3; Krútka 2006, 
236-37; Školkay 2017, 195).  
Milan believed tabloids followed two objectives that influenced editorial 
decisions: ‘we can idealistically pretend that the press should provide the public with 
[important information], that it should support democracy, [public] discussion etc. It is 
one of its functions. On the other hand, it is a business as any other’. Milan said that Plus 
7 dní’s business model was ‘clear’ – ‘we bring information which people are interested 
in and therefore we can profit from people’. While Milan admitted that the decisive factor 
affecting Plus 7 dní’s editorial decisions was the consideration of the publication’s ability 
to attract readers, he reiterated that it was ‘very much intertwined’ with public interest. 
‘One weights up whether it is worth the risk that we make some profit out of it but [might] 
get into a lawsuit and lose all the profit or even more’. Milan argued that the magazine 
simultaneously tried to ‘justify [publication] with public interest’. Milan illustrated the 
workings of the business model on coverage of an allegedly close relationship between 
Fico, who had cultivated an image of a family man, and his young female assistant, paid 
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for by the tax-payer. Milan claimed that the information was in the public interest and 
would simultaneously increase circulation. 
Having been confronted during the interview by a judge sitting nearby about the 
press’s relentless exploitation of some stories, Milan refuted accusations of revelling in 
the persecution of certain public figures such as Harabin or intentionally causing them 
harm. ‘It doesn’t work like that – [to harm someone] out of spite’, he maintained. 
However, Milan admitted that ‘in case of a fruitful story with true economic potential’, 
the newsroom would ‘naturally pursue it further’ but  with ‘no objective to harm’ 
anyone.177  
The interviews suggested the influence of ownership in relation to editorial 
decisions and the legal regime’s ability to produce a benign chilling effect. Many public 
plaintiffs believed that they were unjustly pilloried in the media. Smears were spread 
about them with malicious intent in order to serve the owner’s or reporter’s vested 
interests (see Chapter 7). Ikrényi described a journalist apologising to his client for a 
defamatory article, claiming he ‘was instructed to do it’ as it served the owner’s interests. 
Ikrényi also experienced some journalists writing smear articles for bribes and argued 
that at other times, ‘totally shallow human urges’ like ‘journalist vanity’ were behind 
sensationalist articles. Ikrényi claimed to have encountered cases where the rejection by 
a man of a female journalist’s attentions gave rise to unwarranted attacks. Vozár believed 
that it was financially beneficial for some media organisations to publish defamatory 
stories. He mentioned the daily Slovenská republika which used to receive subsidies from 
Mečiar’s government for publishing smears about opposition politicians. According to 
Vozár, its senior editors openly proclaimed that they had ‘money set aside for this’ and 
would ‘write whatever [they] want[ed]’. The co-founder and CEO of Markíza until 2007 
also used his media to advance his political career (see Štětka 2012, 10; Ondrášik 2010a, 
129–30). 
The influence of ownership and owners’ vested interests became pronounced 
again following the 2008-2009 global economic crisis as foreign owners and Slovak 
 
 
 
177 The publisher, against whom Fico led myriad disputes, also repeatedly denied claims that it 
‘recurrently, intentionally scandalize[d] and slander[ed]’ Fico, justifying its reporting about Fico’s 
conduct by ‘a legitimate interest of the media … given his societal standing’ (Fico v. Spoločnosť 7 
Plus No. 2, 3). 
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legacy investors were gradually replaced by local oligarchs – very influential local 
businessmen, often with alleged links to political parties and little experience of media 
sector investment (see, e.g., Štětka 2013; Balčytienė et al. 2015; Štětka 2015). By 2015, 
a single local investment group – Penta – acquired Trend, Plus 1 deň and Plus 7 dní and 
controlled forty-five percent of shares in Petit Press. By 2013, Pravda and HN were also 
owned by local businessmen (Stetka 2012, 439; Kernová 2013; Medialne.sk 2014; 
Cunningham 2015, 614). 
These acquisitions came at a time of declining profits. Commentators and 
journalists were therefore sceptical about the new owners’ motives, suspecting media 
were to be tools to promoting the owners’ vested interests through political PR, 
suppressing about competitor coverage, and attacks on opponents (Stetka 2012). This 
seemed to have been confirmed by Penta’s co-owner, who referred to its media portfolio 
as a ‘nuclear briefcase’ and ‘insurance that it w[ould] be more difficult for anyone to 
attack [Penta] irrationally’ (cited in Mikulka 2015). By 2017, many experts saw little 
indication of interference in Penta-owned media, particularly in the quality outlets SME 
and Trend (Cunningham 2016, 6, 2017, 7; Múdry 2017). However, others recognised ‘a 
clear negative impact on editorial independence, including self-censorship in coverage of 
politically-sensitive topics’ (cited in Terenzani and Petková 2016). The resignations of 
the three most senior Plus 7 dní editors (Medialne.sk 2016, 7; Poláš 2015) seemed to have 
suggested some interference. One editor cited differences in views on editorial freedom 
between herself and senior management as her reason for leaving (Kernová 2017). 
Commentators also observed a switch in Pravda’s editorial line after the 2010 ownership 
change, with an evident reporting bias towards Fico’s party Smer and against his 
opponents (Školkay 2017, 199-201; Johnson 2012, 160; Czwitkovics 2010; Štětka 2012, 
18). The ownership change was followed by rapid dismissals and departures of newsroom 
management and journalists critical of Smer (Czwitkovics 2010; Školkay 2017, 201), and 
by reports of purported attempts at diluting critical coverage of businessmen close to 
Smer (Milan 2010).  
8.4.1.2 Costs of Publishing Illegitimate Speech 
Respondents believed that the relatively low non-pecuniary damages awards in cases that 
did not involve the discrete group of particularly dangerous public officials and 
  320 
businesspeople failed to deter the tabloids from unethical and deliberately unlawful 
behaviour. The tabloid press had little to fear from the subjects of its reporting – 
celebrities, ordinary citizens who feuded with their neighbours, car accident victims, 
politicians or ex-politicians. They were aware that most would not sue, and even if they 
did, the damages awards that they would be obliged to pay were likely to be negligible. 
Kubina described the tabloid modus operandi as follows: ‘They pursue celebrities more. 
It works on the principle of mutual blackmail – you give me dirt on that person and we 
will not spill your dirt’. Milan ‘was not scared of the lawsuits’ because the law did not 
work properly. He was convinced that if courts were able to adjudicate cases involving 
publications of made-up claims within six months and ‘impose a fine, newspapers would 
be more careful’. Milan believed that given the delays in adjudication and the need to pay 
the court ‘no one sues’ and, with the exception of some litigious individuals, ‘the risk that 
someone will is generally relatively low’.  
Lukášek maintained that ‘sensationalist print outlets have no fear or motivation to 
correct their conduct because a system that would somehow prompt them to change their 
attitude or be slightly more careful when developing certain topics does not exist’. 
Lukášek was convinced that media sensationalism was a consequence ‘of them facing no 
risk that could later “kick them in the butt”’. Lukášek, believed ‘in essence, print and 
electronic media d[id] not face any excessive loss’ as 30,000 euro represented ‘two 
minutes of advertising’ for a television broadcaster. Prior to the global economic crisis, 
100,000 euro would not be a dramatic amount for the larger publishing houses, 
particularly for those having tabloid publications in their portfolios.178  
Some plaintiffs and their lawyers believed that the personality/goodwill protection 
regime failed to deter unwarranted attacks because the tabloids were easily able to pay 
damages from ‘special funds’ or ‘budgets’ they put aside to cover potential litigation costs. 
Ikrényi argued that ‘many publishing houses have budgets to fund lost lawsuits for articles 
that whip up circulation and viewership. They will no longer care in five years [if they 
have to pay] and it will still pay off’. P05 was convinced that ‘tabloid press publishers 
 
 
 
178 In 2008, Ringier achieved a profit of 9.6 million euro. Spoločnosť 7 Plus earned almost 2.4 million 
euro. The 2010 profit of Petit Press reached 1.3 million euro and that of Ecopress – publisher of HN –
200,000 euro. See https://finstat.sk/. 
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establish special funds to cover the costs of legal proceedings because they know that by 
publishing, often fabricated, information about their targets’ privacy they are constantly 
on the edge [of the law]’. P05 explained that the author of one of the articles concerning 
her stated in court that ‘it is sufficient if such article contains twenty per cent of truth, and 
the rest can be “whipped up”’. P05 contended that the fact that tabloid press publishers 
had special funds to cover costs of disputes provided evidence that legal action concerned 
deliberate newsroom politics rather than journalists’ freedom of expression. L01 similarly 
argued that the damages awards were not ‘bankrupting for the media’ since many of them 
had special funds to cover litigation expenses, and were usually able to pay immediately.  
Tabloid newsrooms denied existence of such special funds. Ringier’s Mihálik 
explained that the only funds they had set aside were the budget reserves required by law. 
As discussed above, those reserves tended to hinder serious outlets rather than encourage 
them to publish borderline information. Milan stated he ‘would not be surprised’ if some 
publishers held financial reserves as a buffer to permit them to write borderline stories, 
but maintained that Plus 7 dní strived to produce stories responsibly. Milan continued, 
‘depositing funds on some special account or setting them aside because we expect that 
someone will sue us – that doesn’t exist. We always try to write the articles in a way that 
doesn’t provide any reason for suing’.  
Plaintiff lawyers were convinced that if courts awarded higher levels of damages, 
tabloid media and journalists would be compelled to act in line with their duties and 
responsibilities (e.g. L04, L05, L21). According to Lukášek, damages should act as a 
warning to the defendant that certain behaviour, including knowingly publishing incorrect 
facts or distorting truth that unlawfully infringes one’s personality rights was 
unacceptable. This would, according to L04, also benefit the public’s rights because 
‘freedom of expression should not comprise the right to publish false information’.  
Interviewees further suggested that by publishing sensationalist information, 
tabloids’ credibility suffered little compared to that of quality papers. Recognising that 
there were newsrooms ‘which d[id] not enjoy … respect’ of subjects of stories or their 
audiences, and did not seek or require it, Brunovský considered SME, .týždeň and Trend 
as outlets ‘with an internal DNA’ reflected in ‘pursuing the essence of issues and striving 
to obtain information widely’. Kubina observed that the risk of incurring reputational 
harm was small for most of the tabloid journalists, who often remained anonymous to the 
public, and who adopted predominantly the practices characteristic of the ‘popular 
disseminator’ model of journalistic culture (as developed by the World Journalism 
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project, see, e.g., Hanitzsch 2011).179 Compared to the tabloids and some oligarch-owned 
outlets,180 the credibility loss risk if found liable for personality/goodwill infringement, 
was high for the quality press and its journalists.  
8.4.2 Protracted Adjudication and High Staff Turnover 
The interviewees suggested that delays in proceedings were one of the key factors 
limiting the benign chill of the personality/goodwill protection regime. While Múdry 
(2014) recognised a positive impact of the regime on the youngest generation of 
journalists in terms of rigour employed during development of stories, he argued it had 
had a negligible effect on the previous generations. This was because by the time the 
verdicts were reached, most reporters ‘were no longer in the media’. Similarly, according 
to Brunovský, ‘the length [of proceedings] [wa]s a fundamental problem’ that defeated 
the preventive function of the law because by the time a final judicial resolution finding 
the publisher liable was reached, the author of the impugned statements usually long left 
the outlet. ‘Therefore, no correction mechanism exist[ed]’, as Brunovský put it.  
The delays combined with political economy factors to further weaken the 
personality/goodwill protection regime’s ability to create a benign chilling effect. Media 
managers had long recognised that improvements to responsible journalism in general 
had been undermined by the lacking economic resources and the resulting inability of 
quality media organisations to attract and retain high-quality reporters. The high outflow 
from the profession was seen as the main reason for the deterioration of 
professionalisation experienced in the 2010s (Kollár 2013b). Journalism experience was 
such ‘a rare commodity’ (Johnson 2012, 158) that reporters who spent five years in the 
media were considered old-timers. In light of the low remuneration (Glovíčko 2011; 
Fulmek 2013), increasingly demanding working conditions and deteriorating job security 
(Krútka 2006, 235-36; Brečka and Keklak 2010; Freedom House 2011a), low societal 
appreciation of the profession (Pacherová 2010), little impact of their work on public 
 
 
 
179 Journalists in this milieu are very audience oriented and predominantly focus on news that attracts 
the widest possible audience. 
180 At the time of the interview, Trend did not belong to Penta’s NHM portfolio. 
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affairs (Múdry 2013; also Krútka 2006, 235), and the lacking prospect of career 
progression some of the most talented journalists left for PR, government spokespersons 
posts or politics (Štětka 2012, 16–17; Johnson 2012, 159). 
8.4.3 Uncertainty in the Context of Poor Education and Weak Institutionalisation 
The uncertainties stemming from the vagueness of the concepts at the centre of 
personality/goodwill protection (see Chapter 5) and the unpredictability of judicial 
decision-making (see Chapter 6) combined with the interrupted process of 
professionalisation, weak institutionalisation and poor quality of journalism education in 
limiting the law’s ability to deter reputation and privacy infringements. Across the post-
communist region, including Slovakia ‘organizational fragmentation is the norm’ 
(Örnebring 2013, 12). Professional organisations enjoy little legitimacy to strengthen 
shared values and ensure adherence to ethical standards. The SSN – historically the 
largest professional association – comprised only around 20 percent of all journalists 
(Štětka 2012, 16), lacked authority among younger journalists and was unable to ensure 
adherence to its Ethics Code (Školkay et al. 2010, 17). To avoid restrictive statutory 
regulation, a self-regulatory body to enforce compliance with the Code – the Press 
Council – was founded in 2002 (Czwitkovics 2006; Brečka 2002, 21). Envisaged as a 
moral authority whose censure the newspapers will try to avoid (Pisárová 2002), the 
underfinanced Council (Czwitkovics 2006) lacked real powers to enforce its decisions. It 
was considered a ‘toothless organisation’, as Múdry (2013) put it, whose decisions were 
generally ignored or resisted (Štětka 2012, 16; Belakova and Tarlea 2013, 21; IPI 2009, 
7; SME 2007). In light of the poor quality of formal journalistic training (Školkay et al. 
2010, 14; Školkay 2007; Múdry 2013; Štětka 2012, 16), senior quality media editors had 
long complained about difficulties with filling places with decently trained journalists’ 
(Tóthová 2007; Glovíčko 2011).  
Given the perceived arbitrariness and inconsistencies within the adjudicatory 
practice, editors and lawyers sometimes found it difficult to provide reporters with 
guidance regarding the lawful nature of conduct in borderline cases. Múdry (2014) argued 
that it did not come to ‘the positive effect’ of the law because the ‘courts were not willing 
to tolerate anything’ concerning past controversial cases. ‘It was impossible to discuss 
[ethics issues] with them’. Fila could not think of ‘a fundamental, educational’ court 
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decision for journalistic practice, which would ‘correct any blazing injustice’ perpetrated 
by the media. The issue, according to Fila, was that the decisions were ‘so terribly badly 
reasoned’ and ‘often purposeful’ that it was difficult to learn anything positive from them. 
He believed that it would be different if the disputes were about people who actually 
experienced some injustice and the legal discussion led and the decisions made ‘in good 
faith with the aim of protecting the public interest’, as was the case in the Czech 
jurisdiction. Arguing that in editorial decisions SME ‘definitely’ accentuated the public 
interest before litigation risks, he also acknowledged that it was ‘a fuzzy’, unmeasurable 
‘category’. To illustrate his point, Fila mentioned lawyer consultations whether to reveal 
the faces of attackers battering innocent bystanders in front of a pub. According to Fila, 
the newsroom ‘managed to persuade’ the lawyer ‘that it was in the public interest for the 
faces to be visible’.  
Kamenec argued that to ‘correct their future conduct’ and prevent unlawful 
infringements, the media had ‘to have a clue where they erred’. Kamenec and others did 
not find the adjudicatory practice, of ordinary courts in particular, as sufficiently 
predictable and decisions reasoned well enough to have an effect (Chapter 6). Soltész 
believed that ‘decision-making in Slovak courts is so chaotic, confusing and non-uniform 
that it is impossible to predict. Therefore, practically anything is actionable’. Diko 
perceived ‘a certain degree of legal uncertainty whether in court judgments or 
Broadcasting Council decisions’ meaning that ‘based on decisions in very similar cases’ 
he was unable to provide his reporters with ‘guidance as to how to behave avoid damaging 
someone’s [good] name’. Prušová believed that to eschew future mistakes, journalists 
needed decisions that were ‘logically argued’ to understand ‘why the judge decided in 
that way’.  
8.4.4  ‘Critical Change Agent’ Journalism Culture and the Mutual Hostility 
between Media and Officialdom 
The ability of the personality/goodwill protection regime to produce a benign chilling 
effect relating to unfair journalistic practices reflected in some reporters’ insistence on 
their truth and unwillingness to give proper consideration to public officials’ arguments 
was undermined by the cultural legacies of Slovakia’s democratisation process. It 
stemmed, according to several respondents, from the ‘critical change agent’ journalism 
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culture and the mutual animosity between public officials and the media. Fulmek 
explained, the journalistic ‘excesses’ were down to the ‘relatively strong trend present 
here since the 1990s’ that he called ‘an anti-establishment trend’ and that was reflected 
in the fact that ‘journalists de facto want to define themselves against influential firms 
[and] influential politicians’. While Fulmek believed it was ‘natural’ that journalists 
wanted to hold the powerful to account, he was convinced that they could not ‘ignore the 
facts and arguments of the other party’. Fulmek hoped that at Petit Press they were 
‘successful at gradually eliminating’ this approach ‘from the heads of reporters’. 
The belief in the need to constantly criticise leading politicians and judges was 
strengthened by the perceived unfairness of ordinary courts’ decision-making in cases of 
high-profile public plaintiffs. Fila thought that experience with controversial disputes had 
impacted on ‘journalists’ opinion on the functioning of the judiciary’. Fila explained, ‘the 
people know how it was – that in good faith a text is produced about the fact that the 
Special Court boss actually hunts for free and it ends up like this’.181 Fila believed that 
the only lesson journalists could take from the adjudication practice was ‘to intensely 
cover the situation in the judiciary’. The perception that public officials somehow 
deserved critical coverage, which might inadvertently have grown into ‘boundless 
criticism’, according to Múdry (2014), was implicit in Prušová’s response to how 
considerations of the personality/goodwill protection regime influenced her work. 
Prušová argued that when reporting on ongoing legal disputes involving children, she 
often seriously considered delaying publication until the final verdict because she feared 
‘harming … the child or the parties’, who, in contrast to public figures’, ‘would not 
deserve it’. 
Diko thought the greatest risk faced by the journalistic profession was that 
accusations of injustices in judicial decision-making would be used to mask journalistic 
irresponsibility. Diko believed that one could not ‘overgeneralise’ and claim that ‘the 
judgments are only bad, whereas the media are only good’. ‘Journalists simply are not 
infallible’ and ‘many judgments are definitely justified and in order’. Therefore, in Diko’s 
view, ‘it would really be very bad’ if ‘journalists blamed every instance of 
 
 
 
181 Petit Press was obliged to apologise to P03 on the cover on three consecutive days and was later 
ordered to pay 90,000 euro in damages. 
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unprofessionalism on the courts’. Similarly, Múdry (2014) argued that while he would 
‘always defend [journalists] before the powerful, before judges’, journalists had to 
acknowledge that they ‘also make mistakes’ and stop acting as if they did not. 
The perceived unfairness of the personality/goodwill protection regime and 
adversary relationship with public figures was also associated with the frequently present 
lack of appreciation of the value of legal vetting. As discussed above, vetting was not a 
routine occurrence in many newsrooms. Lawyers themselves admitted that at times media 
professionals ‘should have come earlier’, as Benedik put it. Acknowledging that 
cooperation with lawyers intensified, Múdry (2014) regarded it ‘a problem’ that vetting 
did not occur routinely, because it led to many unnecessary personality/goodwill 
infringements. Recognising that some publishers might be unwilling to pay for pre-
publication legal services, Múdry (2014) believed there were enough experienced media 
lawyers willing to provide their services almost pro bono. According to Múdry, the issue 
was that newsrooms were not used to regular vetting and instead relied on the decision of 
the editors-in-chief, who often lacked experience or maturity. Múdry (2013) argued that 
the absence of experienced editors who would ensure the quality of media content was a 
serious structural deficiency even in leading broadsheets. Fulmek was also convinced that 
factual errors and occasional unfair journalistic practices in SME, were caused by the 
inability of the newsroom to find ‘quality editors’.  
The experience and maturity of newsroom managers affected the availability of 
legal training in outlets that arranged for it in on an ad hoc basis. During the interview, 
Fulmek, mentioned that ‘just recently’ SME declined the opportunity to organise another 
legal seminar as there was no need. Of the nine journalists with whom I discussed legal 
training, four had no recollection of ever having attended any. Vagovič and Nicholson, 
two of the most prominent Slovak investigative journalists, claimed that they had not 
attended legal training during their careers. Nicholson described Fulmek’s belief that 
SME journalists were ‘offered training to teach them how to write’ as ‘nonsense’. 
Nicholson suggested that contrary to publishers’ and newsroom managers’ opinion, some 
reporters consider the provision of legal training as inadequate. According to Nicholson, 
‘no one actually knows how to write’ about potentially defamatory material. In the past, 
for instance, ‘it was normal for people to write “as published in Nový Čas”’ thinking it 
would absolve them from liability. Nicholson asserted that when he explained to 
colleagues following a conversation with a lawyer-friend that it was not so, ‘the people 
were totally in shock that this was the case. We hadn’t known that’.  
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8.5 Conclusion  
Applying the conceptual framework developed in Chapter 2, this chapter explored the 
extent to which and how the Slovak personality/goodwill protection regime managed to 
produce a benign chilling effect on journalistic speech and promote responsible 
journalism standards. In doing so, it began unravelling the concept of the chilling effect 
of defamation and privacy regimes and its workings. 
The chapter revealed that the Slovak personality/goodwill protection regime 
created a benign chilling effect on a substantial part of journalistic speech and contributed 
to the promotion of responsible journalism, particularly in the quality news media 
segment. Despite the difficulties in discerning the extent to which the gradual increase in 
responsible journalism during the studied period was conditioned by the operation of the 
personality/goodwill protection regime, the interviews revealed that legal considerations 
played an important role in editorial decisions. The plaintiff-friendly personality/goodwill 
protection regime of the 1990s and 2000s and the high risk of being ordered to pay 
substantial damages encouraged many national media outlets, particularly those on the 
quality spectrum, towards greater responsibility and care during the editorial process. The 
regime’s benign chilling effect was most visible on investigative journalism, particularly 
covering litigious public officials (especially politicians and judges) and influential 
corporations and businesspeople. 
The findings confirmed the assumptions of the conceptual framework and Cheer’s 
work (2008) that benign chilling effects stem from measures adopted by media 
organisations to improve responsibility in the editorial process with the aim of avoiding 
risk of litigation. These included provision of legal training for employees, newsroom 
induction to professional standards and adoption of ethics codes, pre-publication scrutiny 
by editors and/or lawyers with a focus on fact-checking and availability of legally 
admissible evidence.  
The structural (or indirect) and direct benign chilling effects were the practical 
manifestations of these measures visible on both organisational (media outlets) and 
individual (media professionals) levels and largely replicated the findings of previous 
studies (Cheer 2008; Weaver et al. 2006). The chapter provided further detailed examples 
of these categories of chill to aid future research in detecting benign chilling effects in 
other jurisdictions. In the case of Slovakia, the structural benign chill was demonstrated 
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in gradual understanding in some newsrooms that privacy infringing stories or stories 
involving private individuals (and thus considered not in the public interest) would not 
be developed. It was also visible in the general practice of approaching all involved 
parties for comment to make reporting more balanced regardless of specific litigation 
threats. The direct benign chill was apparent in instances when due to specific legal 
considerations, insufficiently substantiated allegations or privacy intruding stories were 
pulled, when publication was delayed to allow for further verification or collection of 
evidence, and when all subjects were approached for comment to allow for more balanced 
reporting. It was also manifested in a greater language precision and information accuracy 
when claims were either toned down or rephrased to make them more accurate, when less 
expressive or harmful language was used, private individuals and firms were not 
identified but the reporting focused on the wider societal issue without losing the key 
message. 
The chapter also revealed limits to the ability of the personality/goodwill 
protection regime to produce a benign chilling effect and promote responsible journalism. 
The failure was most visible in the tabloids where lack of professionalism and privacy 
intrusions and occasional deliberate smear campaigns serving the journalist’s or owner’s 
vested interests were reported. The regime also failed to effectively deter unfounded 
criticism and unfairness in reporting on influential public officials and businesspeople in 
the quality press. 
In investigating the reasons for the limits to the regime’s ability to produce a 
benign chilling effect and promote responsible journalism, the chapter further explicated 
the mechanics of the chilling effect. The findings confirmed the assumptions of the 
conceptual framework that editorial decisions are based on a cost-benefit analysis that is 
underpinned by media professionals’ perceptions of the operation of the defamation and 
privacy regime, the relationships between the principal protagonists (especially the media 
and plaintiffs) and a multitude of contextual factors operating at different levels. 
It has been confirmed that contemplated speech is deterred when the risk of costs 
or harm caused by publication outweighs the benefits (Schauer 1978). In line with the 
reviewed literature (e.g., Mullis and Scott 2012b; Anderson 1992; Schauer 1978; 
Glanville and Heawood 2009; Glasser 2009; Marjoribanks and Kenyon 2004), the 
findings also indicated that potential costs of litigation for media organisations and media 
professionals included financial costs associated with legal action and the reputational 
harm stemming from litigation itself and/or the need to admit fault and apologise. Media 
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professionals also risk time costs and emotional distress associated with having to deal 
with litigation threats or participation in proceedings. The potential benefits of publishing 
borderline speech revealed by the chapter – financial gain and promotion of vested 
interests of journalists or owners – also largely replicated findings of previous research 
(Barendt et al. 1997; Weaver et al. 2006; Schauer 1992). 
The chapter highlighted the key role played in editorial decisions by legal factors 
pertaining to the operation of the regime, especially the to-date little explored fairness, 
certainty and effectiveness of the adjudicatory practice, and the risks of harm they posed 
to media organisations and professionals. Under Slovak law, given the bias in the 
adjudicatory practice in favour of high-profile powerful plaintiffs, the likelihood that they 
would sue and achieve large damages awards was extremely high. The potential costs of 
publishing insufficiently verified allegations about these plaintiffs for serious outlets thus 
outweighed the rewards of doing so. In contrast, the tabloids had little to fear from 
publication of profit-making sensationalist or privacy intruding articles or smears, as most 
subjects of the red tops’ stories were unlikely to sue and, if so, they faced little financial 
or reputational harm. The perceived unfairness of the personality/goodwill protection 
regime also contributed to some media professionals’ reluctance to accept judicial 
determinations and the fact that certain practices relating to public officials were 
unwarranted. The uncertainty created by the adjudicatory practice precluded the law from 
deterring certain reputation and privacy infringements as senior editors and lawyers were 
unable to provide journalists with watertight guidance regarding conduct in borderline 
cases. The ineffectiveness of the regime to resolve personality/goodwill disputes quickly 
meant that reckless journalists had little repercussions to fear. 
Ownership and organisational culture were revealed as key contextual factors 
affecting a defamation and privacy regime’s ability to produce a benign chilling effect. 
The profit-oriented foreign owners of commercial broadcasters and tabloids were not 
interested in upholding responsible journalism standards. They built their business model 
on sensationalist and privacy intruding journalism and hired staff willing to forego 
professional standards. The organisational culture affected whether publication of 
unlawful speech would result in reputational harm of the outlet in question. The influence 
of owners’ vested interests was particularly pronounced during the turbulent 1990s and 
following the 2008-2009 global economic crisis, as legacy investors were gradually 
replaced by local oligarchs who used the media to further their political and business 
interests by, at times, publishing smears about their opponents. 
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The contextual factors highlighted as particularly important in this chapter, but 
less pronounced in previous studies, could be characterised as legacies of Slovakia’s 
democratisation process in the 1990s and 2000s. They included political economy factors 
like market conditions and the resulting ability of media outlets to attract and retain high-
quality staff; media environment features, including weak institutionalisation and 
interrupted professionalisation; and specificities of journalism culture and relationship 
between the media and officialdom (also discussed by Kenyon 2010). The chapter 
demonstrated in detail how these factors can combine with the fairness, certainty and 
effectiveness of the defamation and privacy regime in limiting its ability to create a benign 
chilling effect and promote responsible journalism. As such, the findings strongly suggest 
that research into the interplay between reputation, privacy and expression in young 
democracies, needs to consider the key developments in the democratisation process and 
their institutional and cultural legacies, as these affect the interactions of the principal 
protagonists and thus the operation of defamation and privacy regimes. 
In exploring the ability of the personality/goodwill protection regime to prevent 
abuses of the law by powerful plaintiffs and the associated invidious chilling effect on 
private and public interest in freedom of expression, the next chapter seeks to further 
unpick the chilling effect concept and the mechanics behind it.  
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 Abuses of Law and Invidious Chilling Effects 
9.1 Introduction 
This study is based on the assumption that a defamation and privacy regime pursues three 
specific objectives in triangulating the conflicting private and public interests in 
reputation, privacy and expression (see Chapter 1). Chapters 7 and 8 examined the extent 
to which and the mechanics of how the Slovak personality/goodwill protection regime 
attained the first two of these aims. This chapter examines whether and, if so, how the 
regime safeguarded the media’s and journalists’ right to freedom of expression and the 
public’s right to reliable information on matters of general importance, by preventing 
abuses of the law by powerful plaintiffs who wish to prevent the media from publishing 
important, warranted reporting concerning their activities. It investigates the extent to 
which the regime prevented an invidious chilling effect on responsible journalism and its 
consequent undesirable effects on the public interest in information. 
Drawing on the findings of Chapter 6, the previous chapter examined the extent 
to which the Slovak personality/goodwill protection regime produced a benign chilling 
effect and promoted responsible journalistic practices. It found that in light of the 
perceived unfairness, uncertainty and ineffectiveness of the personality/goodwill 
protection regime, reporting wrongdoing allegations about public figures, judges and 
influential businesspeople risked incurring considerable harm and provided few financial 
benefits. The chapter also examined how the fear of being sued and found liable for large 
damages encouraged many national media organisations to implement responsibility-
promoting measures to avoid careless mistakes. In doing so, the regime produced a 
limited range of benign chills on unlawful expression and promoted responsible 
journalism particularly in the quality outlets. 
The invidious chilling effect of defamation and privacy law, understood as an 
undesirable deterrent of warranted publication on an issue of general interest for fear of 
potential harm associated with litigation, has, according to Barendt et al.’s seminal study 
(1997, 191–93), manifested in two major forms. Direct invidious chill denotes omissions 
or amendments to material developed for publication, whilst the structural invidious 
chilling effect leads to, often sub-conscious, avoidance of publishing material on certain 
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subjects. While the chills have been categorised according to their harmfulness for the 
private interest in freedom of expression (Townend 2017), a categorisation of their 
harmfulness for the public interest in expression is lacking. Like the benign chill of the 
law, drawing on the conceptual framework developed in Chapter 2, the invidious chilling 
effect on individual freedom of expression is expected to be felt with different levels of 
intensity by different media organisations and professionals. The cost-benefit calculus 
relating to publication is assumed to be contingent on a combination of various structural, 
cultural and international factors and relationships between the main protagonists of the 
defamation and privacy regime. 
Taking the perspective of defendants and their lawyers, the chapter first explores 
whether and to what extent abuses of personality/goodwill protection law were present 
within the regime. It then examines the perceptions of the main protagonists concerning 
direct and structural invidious chilling effects of the personality/goodwill protection 
regime on the right to freedom of expression of the media and media professionals. 
Acknowledging the subjective nature of the chill, the chapter then investigates the factors 
that might explain the various degrees to which media organisations and professionals 
perceived the undesirable effect on their freedom of expression. Before concluding, it 
explores the views of defendants and their lawyers on the practical manifestations of the 
invidious chills and their harmfulness for the public interest in receiving important, 
reliable information allowing citizens to make electoral decisions and hold the powerful 
to account. While by no means exhaustive, the practical manifestations of the chill 
identified in this chapter strive to provide further examples for researchers studying the 
interplay between reputation, privacy and expression beyond the case of Slovakia and 
contribute to a classification of chilling effects based on their harmfulness for the public 
interest in freedom of expression. 
9.2 Abuses of Law 
Media professionals were overwhelmingly convinced that unmeritorious litigious 
politicians, senior  members of the judiciary and influential businesspeople abused the 
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law by pursuing or threatening civil action claiming potentially bankrupting damages.182 
They were believed to seek to punish and intimidate the media and deter them from 
further legitimate coverage of their conduct rather than seek redress for genuine 
reputational or privacy harm. The respondents indicated that public officials welcomed 
the opportunity to enrich themselves in the process and encouraged private individuals 
who increasingly pursued speculative claims. Pre-publication notices from these 
individuals and firms were perceived as intimidation attempts. Diko believed they 
represented a form of ‘pre-emptive strike’ – an attempt to ‘hinder publication through 
threats’. Langer reported that businessmen who were not trusted by the business 
community often ‘vehemently protest[ed]’ against coverage of their activities. Petková 
illustrated how goodwill was abused to intimidate journalists on the case of an extremely 
successful public procurement contracts’ bidder, accused of failing to pay its 
subcontractors. Having worked on an article investigating the firm’s questionable 
practices and asked for comment, Petková received a legal statement warning that unless 
the company be allowed to amend the article civil and criminal actions for defamation 
would ensue. Having notified her superiors and consulted the organisation’s lawyers, 
Petková wrote the article without the company’s statement. The company, which was 
subsequently investigated by the General Prosecutor’s Office, filed a criminal defamation 
complaint and requested a reply from the publisher, and sued other media that covered 
these allegations (Burčík 2017, 2014). Petková believed that the company’s cumulative 
and repeated use of pre-publication threats and legal institutes was ‘evidence that they 
[we]re not merely interested in correcting the facts which might not have been accurately 
stated’.  
Kamenec argued that by repeatedly suing various outlets, employing experienced 
lawyers and keeping the case going for years these influential businessmen aimed to 
‘punish the media’ and communicate to them that they should refrain from all future 
reporting. Soltész was convinced that ‘in the overwhelming majority of cases’ the 
plaintiffs’ objective was ‘to intimidate, [and] shake one’s resolve’. Soltész was sued for 
 
 
 
182 According to Petit Press data, the damages claimed in the 19 recorded goodwill protection disputes 
were 882,000 euro. Among the 16 plaintiffs to claim damages, private companies were most likely to 
request 66,388 euro and above, with one insurance company claiming cumulative damages of 400,000 
euro. Public institutions or companies tended to request damages below 10,000 euro.  
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43,000 euro in damages (Soltész v. Slovakia) by a lawyer representing ‘the interests of a 
group who felt threatened by the existence of someone who might have ‘god-knows-
what’ stored in a bank vault and might find a newsroom with enough courage to bring it 
to light’. Soltész believed that civil action ‘was an ideal way’ to ‘stop’ him digging into 
their business because a judgment in the plaintiff’s favour would have meant his 
‘economic liquidation’. Nicholson recognised ‘recurrent attempts to sue you for bullshit’ 
to ‘achieve such a state of affairs where journalists are frightened … to dig into issues, 
not just write about the issues but even venture into opening certain subject matters’. 
Adamčík argued that in numerous cases, politicians, judges and government 
representatives filed personality protection lawsuits requesting excessive damages up to 
2.66 million euro with the ‘clear aim’ to intimidate the outlet. Adamčík, felt ‘it was 
apparent that the plaintiffs weren’t interested in settling, knowing very well that 
consensually they were unable to gain a third or even a tenth’. Instead, ‘they relied on 
their ability to find a judge who would award them [such damages]’. Fulmek considered 
many senior figures in the judiciary, prosecution and law enforcement as mentally stuck 
in the old regime, utilising their power ‘to make others act according to their wishes’. 
They ‘firstly want to intimidate and secondly, want money’ using litigation. Múdry 
(2014) perceived that certain public figures threatened and/or filed civil action to 
‘frustrate and discourage’ journalists covering their activities, stating ‘luckily, we don’t 
beat journalists, we don’t kill journalists, we don’t imprison journalists but we can 
discourage them lavishly’. Given their above-average litigation success rate, Šimečka 
considered the propensity of judges to sue ‘a premeditated attack against freedom of 
expression’. Leško similarly believed that some judges and politicians saw personality 
protection as ‘a profit making venture par excellence’ and ‘evidently’ strove to turn  it 
into ‘an additional income stream’.  
The ‘Bonanno case’, involving nine separate defamation lawsuits against Ringier 
seeking damages totalling 1.94 million euro (Balogová 2013a) was widely considered to 
be a prime example of personality protection law abuse by high-profile public officials. 
The actions were brought for Nový Čas coverage of a ‘perverse jamboree’ of judges 
(Mikolášiková 2011), based on images featuring a retired solicitor wearing blue ear 
defenders and holding an imitation assault rifle at the founding gathering of the Judiciary 
Oscar Association, held two months after a mass shooting during which a gunman 
wearing blue ear defenders and armed with an automatic assault rifle shot dead seven 
people (BBC 2010; Allen Green 2010; Balogová 2010b). 
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The then acting general prosecutor, four Supreme Court judges, the retired lawyer, 
another judge, the husband of the venue’s owner and the association filed lawsuits, 
disputing the authenticity of the images and links to the mass murderer (Czwitkovics 
2013; The Slovak Spectator 2014; Balogová 2013a). The interviewed media 
professionals, lawyers and experts believed that rather than pursuing reputational 
vindication, the plaintiffs sought personal enrichment and the muzzling of further 
coverage. Mikolášiková – the author of the impugned articles – characterised the damages 
claims as ‘exorbitant’ and believed the lawsuits might have been ‘an attempt at 
intimidation or discrediting’ of Nový Čas or herself. Mikolášiková felt the claims were 
meritless because drawing attention to ‘how the justice system elite behave’ was ‘in the 
public interest’. She and the daily had acted responsibly, having done their utmost to 
verify the photos received from an anonymous source and having approached all the 
participants for comment.183 Acknowledging that ‘journalists can behave repugnantly’, 
Múdry (2013) believed that the plaintiffs did not primarily seek to ‘discuss the issues’ 
because they did not pursue discursive remedies and filed the cases after a delay. 
Considering it ‘sick to remember two years after the controversy to sue’, Múdry was 
convinced that the plaintiffs’ objective was ‘clearly to earn money’ because ‘one can’. 
Ringier’s lawyer, L19, also found the delay ‘rather strange’, ‘illogical’ and 
counterproductive for the plaintiffs’ reputations as their alleged inappropriate conduct 
was ‘dragged through the media again’. L19 suspected that they were motivated by 
objectives other than moral satisfaction.  
The case demonstrated to Fila, that the situation concerning abuses of law did not 
‘improve in time’ because ‘suddenly a scandal appear[ed] and a group of people realise[d] 
that they can profit from it’. Kollár found it perverse that senior judges who seemed to 
have behaved inappropriately had the temerity to sue the media, instead of being ashamed 
when their actions were made public. He considered it a reflection of the ‘developments 
in the country’ because ‘in a normal country, they would at a minimum know that they 
have no chance to succeed with it or know that the moment they lodge such a lawsuit they 
 
 
 
183 The Ringier CEO argued that the articles were incapable of violating anyone’s rights as the claims 
‘concerned representatives of Slovak judiciary’ and therefore ‘were published in the public interest’ 
(cited in Czwitkovics 2013).  
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are finished in their profession, as one doesn’t do that in a decent society’. For Fulmek, it 
demonstrated the mentality and ‘atrocious arrogance’ of the plaintiffs, who ‘simply make 
fun of the public’ He found it ‘simply arrogant, disgusting, abominable’ because they 
were senior representatives of the state prosecution service and judiciary. Fulmek was 
convinced that a high-ranking public official ‘cannot do that … And if he does, if it seems 
fun to him to dance with an automatic rifle with ear defenders on, he should say “Yes, I 
am an idiot. I apologise [and] I cannot hold this post [any longer]”’.  
Respondents suggested that the large damages awards received by high-profile 
plaintiffs increasingly encouraged private plaintiffs to lodge meritless, ‘speculative’ 
lawsuits with the objective of enriching themselves. Ľalíková stated, ‘really, people come 
with various matters – more and also less honest’, in which ‘they want to make money’. 
Tabloids and commercial broadcasters most commonly encountered such claims. Langer 
reported, ninety percent of petitions filed against Markíza were ‘absolutely unjustified’ 
because private persons believed that the broadcaster had a lot of money. Adamčík argued 
that ordinary citizens and, at times, celebrities often tried to ‘cash-in on damages’.  
Mihálik was convinced that, typically, plaintiffs ‘try to make profit from the 
dispute’ and ‘welcome the opportunity of extra income’. Considering many petitions as 
‘irrational’, Benedik explained that ordinary citizens ‘have a completely mistaken notion 
about what they can request from the media and what they cannot in light of their 
conduct’. Having read in the papers that Harabin and Fico received tens of thousands of 
euros in damages, they ‘cite these examples [in court]’ and ‘try to achieve a similar sum’. 
According to media lawyers, plaintiffs and their lawyers often failed to realise large 
damages awards were ‘illusory’, in Kamenec’s words. Schwarz argued that private 
individuals had unrealistic expectations because the ‘benchmark’ created by Harabin’s 
above average results diverged from the adjudicatory practice in most other disputes.  
9.3 Media’s and Journalists’ Freedom of Expression  
This section explores the views of the plaintiffs, media professionals and their lawyers on 
the extent to which the law created an undesirable chilling effect on the media’s and 
journalists’ free speech rights. 
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9.3.1 The Plaintiffs’ View 
Having been asked whether they considered the possibility of an undesirable impact on 
freedom of expression when filing civil actions against the media, plaintiffs 
overwhelmingly said no because, in their view, the defendants had failed to act in 
accordance with their duties and responsibilities. P04 believed ‘that subjective opinions 
should be subject to censorship, and that public service television reporters should be led 
by sufficiently experienced superiors who won’t allow serious, untrue statements about 
concrete individuals to be broadcast without evidence’. P03 argued that the decisions of 
ordinary courts in his favour were ‘in no way’ capable of violating the defendant’s 
freedom of expression because ‘the whole leitmotiv of the proceedings was that they had 
lied’. It would only have been possible to violate their freedom of expression ‘if they 
wrote the truth’ and ‘did not purposefully lie, mislead, [and] provide information out of 
context’.  
9.3.2 The Absence of Invidious Chill 
Given the prevalence of abuses of the law, rather surprisingly, most respondents argued 
that the intimidation efforts of litigious plaintiffs failed to generate enough fear to impede 
their or their organisation’s freedom to publish important, legitimate information about 
the latter’s conduct. National media organisations’ managers saw few undesirable effects 
of personality/goodwill protection disputes on their organisations as a whole, on 
newsroom editorial freedom or on individual reporters’ freedom of expression or the 
public’s right to information. TA3’s Čekirda argued that defamation was not ‘a 
fundamental problem for the newsroom’. Trend’s Brunovský believed that undue caution 
or self-censorship due to risk of attracting a lawsuit was ‘definitely not [present] in the 
topics that represent the backbone of the paper’. Ringier’s Mihálik was unaware of a story 
ever being “killed’ or substantially watered down as a result of liability risk. Arguing that 
newsrooms were ‘rather independent of the management’, Mihálik asserted that if a topic 
was considered ‘interesting from the readers’ viewpoint’, it would ‘definitely be 
developed into an article’. Fulmek maintained that Petit Press’s outlets had never been 
banned from publishing anything and that personality/goodwill protection law did not 
threaten freedom of expression in Slovakia.  
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An overwhelming majority of senior editors were also adamant that litigation or 
threats thereof had little tangible impact on freedom within newsrooms. Balogová argued 
that under no circumstances ‘a legal dispute could change how we write or do anything 
in the newsroom’, reiterating that the personality/goodwill protection regime ‘doesn’t 
interfere with newsroom operations in any serious way’. Obradovič maintained that self-
censorship ‘fortunately doesn’t occur’ in HN. Krejča found it hard to believe that fear of 
lawsuits could deter investigative journalists.  
Respondents also overwhelmingly claimed that it was extremely rare for 
publishers and/or newsroom managers to kill or significantly amend important public 
interest stories purely for fear of personality/goodwill protection litigation. As Múdry 
(2013) explained, nowadays ‘a publisher cannot say to a reporter: “Don’t write about 
that!” That’s impossible because they have [newsroom] statutes’. Unsurprisingly, senior 
editors overwhelmingly denied killing or considerably watering down stories purely due 
to liability risks. Diko declared, ‘We have always done everything we could to get 
information to the reader or listener, regardless of where I worked’. Balogová argued that 
pre-publication notices ‘cannot stop any material we are developing’. Múdry (2014) did 
‘not remember having killed a story’ of public interest. SITA management ‘pushed such 
stories’. Defendant lawyers also rejected the practice of killing or significantly watering 
down stories for fear of liability. Adamčík never witnessed publishers telling editors not 
to break information because it was considered ‘too hot’. Legal consultations involved 
discussions about journalistic responsibility, and the extent to which the claims could be 
published.   
Editors resolutely rejected the idea that any subject would be off-limits in their 
newsrooms. ‘Essentially, no topic is taboo’ Krejča declared. ‘No one is banned from 
working on controversial cases, issues or scandals. I rather think that we have a very free 
environment here’. To demonstrate litigious persons were not off-limits for SME, Fila 
jokingly stated, ‘on average, we write a text a day about Harabin’. Ogurčák maintained 
that if publishers or editors-in-chief ‘tried to stifle’ journalists and prevent them from 
writing about certain subjects, the latter would leave. Ogurčák doubted that fear of 
litigation could ‘force [the newsroom] into the sphere of not writing about something’.  
Journalists also denied being unable to report on certain topics. After petitions 
were lodged in the Bonanno case, Mikolášiková did not feel she ‘wouldn’t have the space 
or that they would intimidate the editor-in-chief’ or the publisher so that they became 
afraid to publish her stories. Mikolášiková argued, ‘regarding politicians or public figures 
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it doesn’t exist in Nový Čas that because someone has filed a lawsuit we stop writing 
about him or her’. Benedikovičová ‘absolutely did not perceive’ that she ‘would 
somehow be constrained and [could] not write an article’ that was in the public interest.  
Declaring that fear of lawsuits ‘doesn’t deter us’, Vagovič claimed that the case involving 
the threat of a 20-million-euro dispute, was ‘an example where they failed to intimidate 
us’ as he wrote ‘four more articles, one of which was much more daring than the first 
one’. Many journalists maintained that if they felt unfree or censored, they would change 
newsrooms. Soltész ‘wouldn’t work in a newsroom where someone would interfere with 
[journalistic] texts to such an extent’ as to change their meaning.  
9.3.3 Others Might Be Chilled 
Many respondents recognised that other outlets, particularly non-quality ones, and 
journalists might not have ‘withstood the threat’ of litigation, as Adamčík put it. 
According to Múdry (2013), litigation threats ‘simply frighten some journalists, frighten 
some publishers who then wag their finger and say “I will not pay for your mistakes”’. 
Petková admitted that on numerous occasions she had been given materials by colleagues 
who were unable to develop the story in their newsroom. Fulmek, who was convinced 
that liability risk had no undesirable effect on freedom of expression, had been astonished 
when journalists started to contest his arguments during a public event, declaring they 
‘perceived pressures from publishers’ and ‘definitely felt it had an effect on their writing 
and on their caution’. Nicholson declared that he knew ‘from the journalistic viewpoint 
that … really only a maverick, only mavericks among journalist won’t get scared’ and 
that ‘self-censorship’ was ‘definitely’ burgeoning. While he ‘never had an issue with 
writing about serious’ matters, Milan admitted that ‘there are others who … are 
frightened’. Šimečka admitted that he ‘feared, or found it very unpleasant [to get into 
litigation with] … large firms’ that were his ‘enemies in a sense’. 
Langer recognised that intimidation ‘sometimes works’ and produces ‘a chilling 
effect’, as he described it. The chill affected individual reporters rather than the 
organisation: ‘The editors-in-chief and the newsrooms [we represent] won’t tolerate 
interference with editorial freedom and freedom of expression. However, this is not about 
the editor-in-chief and the management. Sometime it is in the [journalist’s] sub-
consciousness’. Langer argued that despite lawyers’ reassurances about the lawfulness of 
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contemplated publication, journalists sometimes excluded ‘the toxic content’ wishing to 
avoid problems. Múdry (2014) was convinced that following public officials’ 
intimidation attempts, some journalists asked themselves whether the trouble was ‘worth 
it’ and became ‘more cautious’. During his SME editorship in the early 2000s, Šimečka 
strongly perceived that the operation of personality/goodwill protection law forced him 
to self-censor: ‘I perceived is as an enormous nuisance. Definitely, it constrained me in 
serious matters’. Vagovič, believed that, at times, journalists displayed ‘undue 
cautiousness’ and ‘over-anxiety’ concerning warranted allegations, which ‘simply wasn’t 
appropriate’. 
9.3.4 Motivational Complexity  
Several respondents suggested that it was often impossible to discern whether the 
motivation behind a particular editorial decision was fear of being sued and erroneously 
found liable by courts, lack of newsworthiness, journalistic responsibility or the owner’s 
specific interests. Soltész suspected that considerations of litigation and liability risk were 
at play when his editor decided to pull his article concerning the actions of the organised 
crime group whose lawyer later sued him for a less significant segment of the report. 
While Soltész disagreed with the decision at that time, he respected the rationale of the 
editor-in-chief who probably considered the article to be having ‘such impact’ that he did 
‘not dare publish it’. Soltész admitted that it was ‘hard to say’ what the reason for killing 
the story was as the editor-in-chief might merely have considered it ‘insufficiently 
verified, lacking sufficient arguments and evidence’. Soltész stated astute editors-in-chief 
did not need to kill developed stories citing defamation liability risks or the owner’s 
specific interests as they could simply dismiss topics suggested by journalists as little 
newsworthy or uninteresting for readers. 
9.3.5 Between Benign and Invidious Chill: The ‘Gorilla’ Case 
The interviews further confirmed the expectations of the conceptual framework about the 
subjective nature of the chilling effect under Slovak law (see Chapter 2). The respondents’ 
opinions about the editorial decisions of two different newsrooms not to publish 
Nicholson’s articles based on the ‘Gorilla’ file clearly demonstrated that perceptions 
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about the desirability or undesirability of the effect of the law depended on the 
individual’s understanding of responsible journalism standards. The file was supposedly 
compiled by the Slovak Information Service (SIS) and purported to detail a wiretapping 
operation code-named Gorilla. The file contained an analytical summary of a dozen 
allegedly intercepted conversations between an investment group co-owner and several 
politicians, their aides and other public officials. The material purported that millions of 
euros in kickbacks were paid to public officials for fixed public procurement tenders and 
rigged privatisation sales (see, e.g., Balogová 2012; Cienski 2012; Economist 2012; 
Euractiv 2012; Nicholson 2012; Mesežnikov, Kollár, and Bútora 2013).  
Nicholson obtained the file from an SIS agent who wished to remain anonymous. 
While investigating the claims and trying to verify its authenticity, Nicholson handed the 
document to the police that ‘investigated and dismissed [it] within a month’ (cited in 
Balogová 2012). Nicholson also showed the material to editors at SME and Trend. 
Despite Nicholson’s belief in the authenticity of the file, the publication of several 
variants of his articles were halted in both outlets. Nicholson thus resolved to write a book 
about the alleged ‘Gorilla’ operation (Nicholson 2018). The existence and contents of the 
file became public shortly before the March 2012 parliamentary election. It was uploaded 
on the Internet and anonymously leaked to several media outlets, purporting to be an 
excerpt from Nicholson’s book. The rapid dissemination of the document through online 
media triggered mass demonstrations.  
The publisher and senior SME editors justified the decision to shelve Nicholson’s 
articles on the basis of journalistic ethics. Fulmek was probed as to whether publication 
of matters of public interest had ever been stopped in any of its outlets, Fulmek 
acknowledged that this was the case for the ‘Gorilla’ file. Arguing that he was not party 
to editorial decisions, Fulmek asserted that the reason not to publish allegations based on 
the material ‘was simple and logical, i.e., that no-one among politicians or law 
enforcement agencies confirmed the file’s authenticity, or confirmed it in a publishable 
way’.184 Fulmek stressed that while SME had not revealed the existence of the document, 
 
 
 
184 Fulmek (2012b) publicly argued that questions about the file’s origin, authenticity and credibility 
of information uttered in private conversations between a finite number of people, who freely 
commented on actions of others, created ethical dilemmas. Fulmek was ‘proud that daily SME 
newsroom had carefully been verifying the whole file and that two years back it had decided not to 
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journalists had ‘used information from that file and tried to verify it’. Therefore, ‘they 
clearly proved, when accused of withholding information from the public, that they had 
intensely worked around it, conducting and publishing interviews with the parties 
mentioned in the file.185  
Downplaying the importance of liability considerations, SME deputy editor-in-
chief Fila justified the decision not to publish the serious allegations due to the 
impossibility of corroborating the material’s authenticity. Fila claimed, ‘while we had 
tried to pursue it, whether someone might be able to confirm it in any way, we were not 
successful’. Since the document ‘was of such unclear origin not [just] from the legal but 
more so from the journalistic viewpoint it was problematic to take the decision on one’s 
shoulders to publish it because it was unclear what was going on’. The then SME editor-
in-chief, Kostolný, publicly argued that before 2011 SME ‘did not have sufficient 
evidence’, such as an audio recording or word-for-word transcript of the alleged wire-
taps, to be able to break the scandal. He stressed that ‘a recording’s literary adaptation’ 
was ‘a different genre’ than a recording with a voice closely resembling Fico’s (see 
below). Therefore, SME ‘did not have the right to publish’ the story (Kostolný 2012). He 
maintained that the reasons for non-publication went beyond liability threats and were 
rooted in journalistic ethics. ‘Not just fear of lawsuits, which we wouldn’t be able to fence 
off … was present’. SME ‘had nothing other than the feeling that ‘Gorilla’ was probably 
authentic’ because everyone Nicholson had talked to ‘kept silent at that time’. SME 
editors also feared ‘that it was all a set-up’. According to Kostolný, ‘[t]he media must 
seek the truth and prevent abuses of power’. This entailed verification of allegations 
because journalists ‘cannot become pawns in [intelligence] games’ and ‘have 
responsibility which prevents them from simply writing something and waiting to see 
what will happen’. These were the reasons why SME ‘attended to and chased’ the file 
 
 
 
publish it in full in the newspaper or secretly on the web’ because this testified ‘for the responsibility 
of the newsroom, not about its failure’. According to Fulmek (2012a, 7–8), it was possible that the 
leak was ‘an intentionally orchestrated smear campaign’ which left the media with the question of 
‘how to avoid becoming the target of intelligence games’ and simultaneously ‘not to supress important 
information from readers as a result of ethical behaviour’.  
185 Fulmek (2012b) publicly claimed that ‘the editors and daily SME executives as well as the then 
reporter Tom Nicholson tried to ascertain the facts, and what they had managed to verify, they 
published. Here, one can see an abysmal difference between new media and traditional print [press] 
with standard editorial processes’. 
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with Nicholson ‘spen[ding] months with it, verifying all that was possible’ and the paper 
‘publish[ing] several Gorilla-inspired texts’ (Kostolný 2012).  
Múdry (2013) argued that the ‘Gorilla’ controversy was ‘a classic example’ of rare 
situations where publishers had to ‘interfere’ and halt publication of stories likely to 
attract lawsuits from powerful financial groups. Múdry would do the same in the 
publisher’s place because ‘Gorilla’ was unverified material, the publication of which 
threatened the media organization’s very existence: ‘If I publish it and [they] sue me, it 
will liquidate my publishing house. I completely agree with it. It was not possible to do 
it’. According to Múdry (2014), media reporting before and after the alleged intelligence 
file’s publication online was a manifestation of the benign chill of the 
personality/goodwill protection regime, which promoted increased journalistic rigour 
regarding controversial topics. Múdry (2014) found that the Gorilla scandal was 
‘essentially handled fair and square’ by journalists who had dedicated considerable time 
and effort to verifying the allegations, making it hard to contest their claims or succeed 
with litigation.  
Kamenec, who participated in discussions with SME senior editors concerning 
Gorilla, acknowledged the complex nature of the editorial decision and the chilling effect. 
According to Kamenec, ‘the impossibility to verify the facts, to verify the story, in a way, 
deterred the media – also following consultations with lawyers – from publishing the 
material as such’. Kamenec explained, ‘it is not so simple to take the responsibility … in 
today’s economic climate to publish anything and in any way [especially] when you are 
unable to verify the story’ and ‘given that it can be anything from intelligence games, 
utter fabrication or the truth’. Moreover, ‘if the degree of the risk of an actual violation 
of someone’s rights and the [consequent] risk for the publisher [are great], it is not easy 
to conclude to publish’. 
Rather than a benign chill manifestation, other respondents considered SME and 
Trend’s reluctance to publish Nicholson’s articles as an example of the undesirable 
chilling effect of the law and abdication of the media watchdog role. Dismissing the 
argument that SME could not publish the stories because of the material’s unreliability 
and Nicholson’s inability to reveal his source, Tomáš Němeček – a prominent Czech 
media professional – characterised the editorial decision as ‘a failure of the Slovak press’ 
and a ‘cock-up’. Němeček, believed the documents released by the then interior minister 
and the articles covering Gorilla after the scandal broke confirmed the file’s overall 
veracity. Leško and Benedikovičová were convinced that fear of litigation played a 
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crucial role in the decisions, and that the outlets should have done more to verify and 
publish the information. Had he had an advisory vote,186 Leško ‘would have always 
argued that the absolute maximum must be done in order to be able to publish it’. Leško 
recognized that the decisions were made ‘for fear that the potential damage to the parties 
involved was so enormous’ that, if compensation was claimed, ‘it might have had serious 
consequences for the newsroom’. Notwithstanding the real risk of triggering several 
disputes with very influential people, Leško was adamant that the newsrooms ‘should 
have done the absolute maximum to publish [the information] as soon as possible’ 
because the press had probably never ‘laid their hands on anything as important as the 
Gorilla file’. Acknowledging SME’s attempts to fact-check the material and the 
publication of articles about some of the implicated persons, ‘from the journalistic 
viewpoint’, Benedikovičová nevertheless, considered it ‘a failure’ and ‘a shame’ that the 
daily ‘didn’t dig in [the allegations] with more vigour’ and ‘in more detail’. She believed 
that one of the reasons was fear of legal action because the allegations were ‘so powerful’ 
that doing so simply on the purported SIS file ‘might have bankrupted the publishing 
house’.  
Nicholson, who spent part of his journalistic career in Canada and the US, 
jurisdictions in which the understanding of invidious chilling effect differs from that 
under Convention law (see Chapters 1 and 2), perceived the reluctance of SME and Trend 
executives to publish his previously approved articles as manifestations of a direct, 
invidious chilling effect of personality/goodwill protection. Nicholson described, ‘[i]t 
went through the lawyers who had said that it was okay, that it could be published in the 
form I had written it. It was to be published on Monday. And yet, on Friday the editor-in-
chief told me: “I won’t let it out”’. According to Nicholson, the scenario was similar at 
Trend. ‘They had said: “This material is your priority, write about it”. However, when I 
submitted the article, suddenly, it was [too] risky for them and they did not publish it, 
without giving a reason’.187 Nicholson was convinced that executives in one of the 
 
 
 
186 Leško worked as SME political commentator when Nicholson presented his findings to the editors. 
He started working for Trend around the time Nicholson’s articles were rejected by its executives. In 
both cases Leško was unaware of the material’s existence. 
187 Nicholson (2012) described how one of the articles, produced after he had submitted the file to the 
police as evidence in their investigation of suspected ‘vote-buying’ in parliament (see, e.g., Jurinová 
2005; Terenzani 2009), was halted by SME executives: ‘I prepared an article about the Gorilla file, I 
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newsrooms were arguing that his ‘material [wa]s not trustworthy enough’ even though 
they ‘had known the whole time that it was true’ as one of the persons implicated in the 
file had admitted to a former employee that he had been seized by the police when leaving 
the purportedly wiretapped apartment. Nicholson thus concluded that ‘the chilling effect 
is very pronounced’.  
Nicholson also perceived the invidious chilling effect following the leak of the 
purported intelligence file. According to Nicholson (2012, 175), ‘daily SME and weekly 
.týždeň wrote a few articles but the majority of the media ignored the story about ‘Gorilla’. 
[The financial group] threatened legal action’.188 Diko partially confirmed Nicholson’s 
suspicions when he admitted that ‘the most significant interference concerned … the most 
complicated decision of my career was the decision in the ‘Gorilla’ case’. As editor-in-
chief, Diko decided that Markíza would not identify the persons named in the alleged 
leaked SIS file before obtaining their statements or documentary evidence corroborating 
the allegations.  
9.4 Explanation for the Perceived Degree of the Chill  
The following paragraphs explore why, against the background of the high risks of 
incurring litigation costs stemming from publication of contentious, but legitimate, 
reporting about the conduct of certain litigious individuals and entities, and low financial 
rewards of doing so (see Chapter 8) certain media organisation and journalists felt 
intimidated and constrained in their right to freedom of expression while others did not. 
The analysis paints a picture in which various structural, cultural and international level 
factors combined with the mutual relationships among the main protagonists in producing 
varying levels of the chilling effect. 
 
 
 
cited the director of the anticorruption unit [X]. I wrote that [X] anticorruption office “is still 
investigating a file according to which a member of Dzurinda’s cabinet allegedly secretly met with 
the owner of a financial investment group in order to prepare and agree privatisation decisions”. 
Nevertheless, they still considered it too risky and didn’t want to publish the article’.  
188 Nicholson (2012, 174) described how a TV station CEO told him and the station’s reporter, as they 
discussed Nicholson’s appearance on an evening talk show, to stop wallowing in it. 
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9.4.1  The Perception of Costs in the Context of Media Political Economy 
In line with earlier studies (Cheer 2008; Marjoribanks and Kenyon 2004; Barendt et al. 
1997), the interviews suggested that the perceptions of risks posed by potential costs 
associated with litigation largely depended on the size and financial strength of the given 
media organisation. By 2014, the large national media organisations I interviewed were 
able to manage the risk of personality/goodwill litigation and their managers therefore 
believed that the regime had a negligible undesirable effect on the editorial freedom 
within newsrooms. Through the measures adopted during the 2000s (see Chapter 8), the 
interviewed national media organisations were able to considerably reduce the risk of 
litigation caused by carelessness and thus also its actual and potential costs. The swing in 
the Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence and the gradual reduction of damages awards 
also significantly reduced the risk of bankruptcy for media organisations. Múdry (2013) 
indicated, ‘if the media claim that they have a problem with publishing, they don’t’ 
because ‘usually they don’t lose so much in courts’ anymore’. Moreover, only a small 
fraction of claims went to court (see Chapter 7) as Benedikovičová indicated ‘one always 
endeavours to settle with the other party and avoid the courts because it financially 
burdens the publishing house’.  
According to the interviewed executives, the financial costs associated with 
personality/goodwill protection disputes did not jeopardise the financial stability of their 
organisations. Mihálik claimed that litigation did ‘not have any significant impact on the 
running of the firm’. Čekirda did not consider personality/goodwill protection ‘a burning 
issue for the television channel’. Brunovský thought the disputes posed ‘no existential 
threat’. According to Trend’s records, between 2002 and 2014, the publishing house 
incurred just under 131,000 euro in damages and settlement payments. Fulmek believed 
that plaintiffs were not ‘so stupid to sue for such sums they know the publishing house 
cannot pay’, as one of their aims was to profit financially. Fulmek estimated that the 
company paid ‘roughly fifty or hundred thousand [euro] once in three years’ in damages 
and spent annually on average fifty to sixty thousand euro on legal services. That he 
regarded as ‘nothing catastrophic’. According to Petit Press’s records, by November 2013 
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it had to pay a total of 314,500 euro in damages. The claimed amount in those disputes 
was 646,000 euro.189  
For large national media organisations, the main cost of the personality/goodwill 
protection regime seemed to be have been the obligation to hold capital reserves to cover 
lost lawsuits. With the reduction in the number of lawsuits, the amount of capital needed 
to be put aside by the media decreased. Personality/goodwill protection litigation and its 
associated costs were thus perceived by them as an annoyance rather than an existential 
threat. Fulmek summarised it, ‘While it is annoying when I lose 100,000 euro, I cannot 
say it threatens the existence of the publishing house’. As a result, according to the 
executives, there was little fear of litigation and little pressure on newsrooms to avoid 
publication of contentions information.  
Many interviewees, however, acknowledged that smaller, less financially stable 
organisations might have worried more about the effects of personality/goodwill 
protection. Broadcasters’ budgets were believed to have been less affected than those of 
publishers. National media organisations were perceived to be more financially secure 
than local ones, and thus less likely to be deterred from publishing contentious 
information. Lukášek was convinced that ‘no one can really intimidate a television with 
damages’. Diko believed that there was ‘probably a difference between electronic media, 
which operates in different numbers, and print or radio. A sum that might jeopardise the 
existence of a print [outlet], will pose no threat to a television [broadcaster] because its 
turnover is altogether different’. Acknowledging that ‘luckily’ Markíza was ‘a strong 
medium’ with ‘the finances for the fine[s]’, Krejča claimed that the notice threatening 
legal action for 20 million euro served to .týždeň was ‘liquidating for such a magazine’. 
Adamčík admitted that the large damages claims ‘had to a certain extent a deterrent effect 
on some publishers because [publishing] was not such a profitable business as it might 
have seemed’ and ‘there was always a risk that several lawsuits for large sums, 
particularly from politicians, might have threatened the medium’s existence’.   
 
 
 
189 The records included disputes where a final decision was reached as well as those that were pending 
on appeal before the Supreme or Constitutional courts but where damages payment had to be made 
following a regional court decision.  
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Šimečka claimed that, given the considerable profits SME generated during his 
editorship, the relatively large damages payments, or ‘fines’ as he put it, ‘did not pose a 
threat to the budget’. Šimečka recognised that such financial costs might have been 
threatening for other outlets. Fila similarly argued that because SME’s ‘survival’ did not 
‘depend on one concrete dispute’, there was ‘an atmosphere of inner freedom’ concerning 
personality/goodwill protection. Balogová claimed that ‘since we are a large publishing 
house, those particular lawsuits [for high damages] are not liquidating for us’. Balogová 
admitted that pre-action notices might make ‘some media more cautious’, as outlets ‘that 
don’t have good lawyers or are smaller’ might want to avoid ‘the torture’ of a legal 
dispute. Múdry (2013) reported that personality/goodwill protection law was ‘a huge 
problem’ for local print outlets and it produced ‘certain self-censorship’. 
The interviews indicated that media market conditions, particularly the health of 
the market and its competitiveness, also influenced the perceptions of the chilling effect. 
The financial stability of media organisation, particularly the print media sector, had been 
seriously affected by the global economic crisis and the changing habits of audiences. 
The plummeting revenues exacerbated a fear of financial repercussions for losing a high-
profile personality/goodwill protection dispute and made some organisations and 
individuals more cautious with high-risk stories. Soltész argued that with the reduction in 
advertising revenues, a few lost disputes might push some publishers into bankruptcy. 
Soltész was convinced that, at times, his publishers were chilled by the law because ‘they 
really ha[d] to very carefully consider how many lawsuits and of what magnitude they 
[could] withstand’. Leško claimed, ‘when every newsroom has financial difficulties’, the 
personality/goodwill protection regime ‘significantly affects the way in which 
newspapers write about contentious and problematic matters’. Leško believed that given 
‘the fear of existential threats’, newsrooms, ‘try to minimise the risk of having to pay tens 
of thousands for casting doubt on someone’s dubious reputation in the case of a potential 
dispute’. 
Market competitiveness was revealed as a potentially important factor accounting 
for the ability of a legal regime to create a chilling effect. While Barendt et al. (1997, 187) 
found that the competitiveness of the UK media market sometimes led tabloids to reckless 
publication, my respondents suggested that market competitiveness and lack of solidarity 
between media professionals hindered meaningful cooperation on a public campaign that 
might have contributed to earlier changes in the adjudicatory practice and plaintiffs’ 
behaviour. This was experienced in the Czech Republic. Šimečka, believed the ‘pressure’ 
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and ‘the media environment in Czechia had always been stronger’ than in Slovakia, as 
the media tended report about other outlets’ lost lawsuits, presenting such cases as ‘a 
threat to freedom of expression’. In contrast, in the Slovakia of the late 1990s and early 
2000s inter-media solidarity was low. Šimečka argued that when SME lost a dispute, it 
was ‘in it alone’ as ‘no one cared’ and ‘the environment was simply not loyal enough’. 
Public discussion on the issue commenced ‘only when it started to be serious, when other 
outlets started to have the same problem with litigious judges. Only then was it perceived 
differently’. Múdry (2014) similarly believed that the lack of solidarity among media 
professionals was an ‘enormous mistake’. While publishers were able to work together, 
given the high turnover of employees and the consequent immaturity of journalists, there 
was little solidarity among them. Múdry (2014) was convinced that if they had stuck 
together and campaigned that they might have deterred the most blatant abuses of the law 
and the unfair adjudicatory practices.  
9.4.2 Journalists’ Status, Employer’s Support and Newsroom Relationships  
While managers of large national media organisations argued that editorial freedom 
within their newsrooms was not unduly restricted by legal considerations, the interviews 
with editors and journalists suggested that reporters might nonetheless perceive high 
levels of fear concerning potential action and consciously or sub-consciously self-censor 
to avoid costs associated with litigation or threats thereof. Replicating Townend’s (2014, 
299-300) findings, the interviewees indicated that the journalist’s perceptions of the 
employer’s backing and the relationships within the newsrooms considerably influenced 
the intensity of the chilling effect. The interviews also suggested that in struggling media 
markets and the current crisis of traditional journalism, the journalist’s employment status 
might be of importance.  
Many journalists argued that they did not fear personality/goodwill protection 
litigation and did not feel the need to supress true, albeit defamatory, statements about 
matters of public interest as long as they had their employer’s support in the case of a 
lawsuit. Milan felt it was ‘important what kind of status one has [in the newsroom] and 
whether the firm will stand up for them’. Recognising that according to the law the 
publisher or the broadcaster bears liability, Milan was certain that, as long as he acted in 
line with journalistic duties and responsibilities, his organisation would support him 
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during litigation: ‘If someone threatens me, I am confident that … the firm will actually 
stand up for me, … as long as I write the truth and stand by it, of course’. Milan had thus 
‘fortunately … never been scared’ because he ‘knew that in the worst case, it would be 
[his] employer to suffer the consequences’. Milan, however, admitted that the situation 
might be different if a journalist’s articles attracted numerous lawsuits that the publisher 
eventually lost.   
Several lawyers and editors also pointed out the importance of employer’s support 
for reducing the perceptions of the chilling effect. Benedik had ‘never encountered 
anyone who would be intimidated’ by pre-publication threats because ‘in Ringier, they 
are very sensitive about these things and take great care to ensure protection of their 
reporters’. Kubina believed that undue caution did not exist in JOJ’s newsroom because, 
the reporters ‘know that I will always stand by them, that they won’t be in trouble. 
Whenever someone has messed up, I’ve been in for scolding … I am the one … who 
should decide, the one who allows [publication]. If I hadn’t noticed it, it is my fault’.  
Interviewees suggested that the team spirit in some newsrooms functioned as a 
fear-reducing factor. Múdry (2014) indicated that the ‘tight-knit team’ or ‘the warriors in 
SME’ were in a relatively advantageous position compared to colleagues from other 
outlets. SME’s Prušová was not deterred from writing stories that would most certainly 
attract a lawsuit. As long as the editor-in-chief approved a story, she took it that the 
publisher was prepared to risk litigation and felt that her ‘back [wa]s covered’. Tódová 
perceived a sense of fellowship and mutual trust in SME: ‘We live the newspaper 
together; we create it together. It is a very friendly environment and there is great trust 
among us’. Therefore, she never felt she was a lone wolf reporter who would try to get 
a contentious topic through the editor-in-chief. 
However, as Múdry (2014) argued, journalists could ‘never be sure whether the 
publisher and the newsroom will actually stand by’ them and ‘protect’ them. The certainty 
of media organisation’s support was particularly crucial for those journalists who worked 
as freelancers. Soltész called the numerous Slovak journalists writing without an 
employee contract ‘suicides’. Since ‘in the instant a journalist is an employee he is off 
the hook’, Soltész maintained that following his experience, he ‘would never ever be 
willing to write anything, not even a horoscope, without being employed’. The 
uncertainty about employer’s support might increase the distress of pre-publication 
threats and increase fear of litigation. Nicholson, who did not feel supported by SME 
leadership when working on the Gorilla materials, argued ‘you cannot be sure you can 
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rely on the organisation. The newsroom is a good thing. Yet, even there everyone has 
their own interests. In my experience, it is rare to be able to enjoy the strong support of 
your boss’. Nicholson thus maintained that journalists had to bear the stress caused by 
pre-publication threats ‘on their own’.  
Moreover, several respondents were aware of instances when newsrooms failed 
to support self-employed journalists sued for personality protection and/or when 
employed investigative journalists left newsrooms because they had not felt sufficiently 
backed by management. Múdry (2014) believed that such examples might make 
journalists contemplate whether pursuing sensitive stories ‘is worth’ risking loss of 
employment, and/or the financial and emotional costs associated with litigation.  
Editors and journalists further suggested that the attitude of newsroom managers 
was key when explaining reporters’ perceptions of the chilling effect. Many interviewed 
journalists argued that good editors-in-chief were able to alleviate the emotional distress 
felt by reporters and thus prevent them from unduly self-censoring. Leško believed that 
SME reporters had always been lucky to have ‘had strong editors-in-chief’ who did not 
project on to them the potential pressures emanating from the business department or the 
publisher. Milan declared, ‘The boss is there to block out the pressures and protect his 
people’. In Soltész’s view, ‘a good editor-in-chief is able to completely insulate people 
from the pressures to the extent that the reporter only finds out that a lawsuit was filed 
for his article two years later when receiving a summons to appear as a witness in court’.  
Balogová believed that fear of personality/goodwill protection did ‘not interfere’ 
with the work in SME because she took particular ‘care through not mentioning the 
disputes, exert pressure on [her] colleagues’. Balogová communicated with lawyers and 
only discussed claims of lawsuits with the author of the impugned article, and strove to 
not unduly caution reporters to avoid certain phrases due to an increased liability risk. 
Balogová explained, ‘I have to be brutally self-reflective not to stop a reporter from 
writing something because the lawyer has told me that they can sue us for such a phrase 
if I believe the phrase is justified’. Schwarz did not think that fear of litigation would act 
as a ‘deterrent’ for NMH journalists because, in contrast to financial executives and 
editors-in-chief, they were not aware of the number and cost of disputes, and thus did not 
contemplate editorial decisions in terms of potential financial costs of litigation.  
Soltész advised that the newsroom management’s approach might, however, 
increase a reporter’s anxiety and self-censoring to avoid future trouble: ‘If my boss keeps 
informing me in fortnightly intervals that a lawsuit against me arrived again, 
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subconsciously, I will become less courageous and more cautious’. Nicholson suggested 
that the pressure from newsroom managers might increase reporters’ fear if combined 
with general ignorance among journalists concerning the actual costs of 
personality/goodwill protection incurred by media organisations. Nicholson argued that 
most journalists were unaware that media organisations only lost a fraction of the claimed 
damages. This information asymmetry explained why, contrary to some publishers’ 
beliefs, journalists might feel the need to self-censor. Nicholson put it, ‘for f*uck’s sake, 
the journalist doesn’t see the two hundred thousand [actually lost], he sees the nine 
million [claimed]. This is because the editor-in-chief comes [asking] “Tom, what have 
you done?”’  
9.4.3 Relationship with Lawyers 
The interviews confirmed arguments of earlier studies (Townend 2014; Marjoribanks and 
Kenyon 2004; Hansen 2000; Barendt et al. 1997) about the pivotal role lawyers play in 
explaining why some media professionals feel more chilled than others.  Editors and 
journalists working for outlets that use legal vetting regularly valued highly the 
cooperation with their lawyers. They recognised that the lawyers with a wealth of 
defendant work experience, understood the mission and principles of and journalistic 
work. They saw lawyers as their allies, not ‘censors’, who did their utmost to ensure 
stories in the public interest got published. Balogová advised, SME’s lawyers ‘usually 
suggest various alternatives’ how to proceed to be able to publish contentious information 
and avoid liability, and sometimes even strove to ‘find ways how to make things more 
courageous’. Brunovský, claimed that Trend’s lawyers ‘understand press law’ and 
‘appreciate the mission’ and ‘what a newspaper should do and are on our side also from 
the civic standpoint’. Stressing that rather than wanting to avoid trouble at all costs, 
Brunovský argued that Trend’s lawyers were ‘interested in the newspaper fulfilling its 
function’ and strived ‘to get things into the newspaper’. Mikolášiková characterised pre-
publication consultations as ‘absolutely super’ and ‘very helpful’. However, she 
recognised that other, less legally aware colleagues, might consider lawyers’ suggestions 
as an attempt ‘to muddle thing up’. Benedikovičová thought SME lawyers were ‘experts 
who know that the article needs to be very comprehensible and attractive for readers’ and 
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they tried to find a compromise that would make the content simultaneously lawful and 
attractive. 
Lawyers who did a lot of vetting work were convinced that their job entailed 
finding ways how to publish important information whilst minimising liability risks. 
Kamenec believed it was not the lawyer’s role ‘to prohibit publication. For the easiest 
way is not to publish at all. Then the risk of you being sued is minimal’. Counsels in 
Kamenec’s firm tried to ‘respect the privileged role of the press, or the media, [and] to 
enable discussions about questions of public interest and to edit texts in a way … that 
minimise[d] potential risks’. Zlámalová claimed that her ‘aim was always to think about 
how the important could be published while potential lawsuits be avoided’. Ogurčák, 
thought it was ‘possible to write about any topic’. The point was ‘to write it in a way to 
preclude a lawsuit’ and ‘to avoid getting in a position where it is impossible to stand one’s 
ground’ if a petition was filed.  
The interviews also suggested that as well as enabling publication, lawyers might 
be perceived as hindering the media’s exercise of freedom of expression. Occasional 
conflicts between lawyers and newsrooms emerged. Schwarz thought that pre-publication 
vetting was ‘not the absolutely most appreciated’ service given the tensions between the 
newsroom and publishers. ‘If you approve something without reservations, you might 
delight the newsroom, you flatter them so to say or at least you don’t place obstacles in 
their way’. However, the lawyer might leave the publisher vulnerable to liability risk. ‘If 
you take a negative stance towards something, it is not perceived to be ideal’. Schwarz 
believed that the lawyer should not take over the editorial authority because journalists 
were professionals, for whom lawyers organised training, and they should know the basic 
limits of journalistic work. Interviews with journalists suggested that those who had little 
experience of consulting a lawyer were rather sceptical of the usefulness of vetting. 
Several were aware of instances when vetted content gave rise to liability. Soltész 
believed that vetting did ‘not make much sense’ in light of the uncertainty and 
arbitrariness of the adjudicatory practice of ordinary courts. Some journalists also though 
that lawyers tended to be ‘too cautious’ (Tódová), that their advice often read ‘If you 
don’t publish, nobody can sue you’ (Soltész), or that they spoke ‘their own language that 
no one understands’ (Milan). In contrast, Milan thought the role of newspapers was ‘to 
write or speak in a language that everyone understands. And there a great conflict arises’.  
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9.4.4 Organisational Culture and Reporter’s Status 
The interviews confirmed suggestions of previous studies (Barendt et al. 1997; 
Marjoribanks and Kenyon 2004) which argued that organisational culture and reporters’ 
professional values affected a defamation and privacy regime’s ability to produce a 
chilling effect. This was because the weight ascribed to the benefits and potential costs 
of publication of important speech in the public interest largely depended on them. 
Several respondents indicated that quality print outlets were expected by their readers to 
remain independent and publish investigative stories that scrutinised the conduct of public 
officials, senior judges and influential businesspeople. According to Fila, SME’s 
‘company culture or the expectations of readers’ played an important role in alleviating 
the fear of litigation within the newsroom. Fila explained, the readers ‘expect that we will 
risk it and write something rather than be constrained by the legal context’. Fila believed 
that in this respect, SME was in ‘a very comfortable position’ among Slovak newsrooms, 
many of which either did not have ‘enough money to afford [venturing into sensitive 
matters]’ or ‘no one really expect[ed] it from them to be worth the risk’. Adamčík asserted 
that the quality publishers he used to represent, never pulled stories because they ‘strived 
for freedom of expression, wanted to do real journalism and not just business with 
journalism. And to an extent, they understood it as their mission’. Acknowledging that 
considerations of potential personality/goodwill protection disputes might sometimes 
induce ‘a more cautious approach to publishing certain information’, L20 argued that this 
was not a rule ‘because sometimes the interest in informing the public outweighs the 
threat of a damages pay-out’.   
The respondents who denied that their organisation or themselves would be 
deterred from publishing legitimate speech, argued that the fear of potential litigation 
costs was outweighed by their consideration of their role as watchdogs who had to hold 
powerful actors accountable by publishing the “truth” about their conduct. Čekirda 
claimed concerning high-risk broadcasts: ‘even if we perhaps potentially get ourselves 
into legal difficultly, there is the dimension of the duty to inform … the public. And we 
venture into it’. Prušová advised that as long as the contemplated publication was believed 
to be ‘true’ and ‘in the public interest’, SME did ‘not take into consideration whether 
someone will sue or not’. Obradovič was adamant that HN’s reputation was based on its 
‘not letting anyone meddle in its content’. Therefore, as long as an article was ‘founded 
on facts’ it was published, regardless of whether it concerned an ‘advertiser, subscriber 
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or influential person’. Fulmek claimed that he always tried to explain to high-profile 
complainants that Petit Press was ‘a democratically organized organisation’ where ‘each 
individual journalist [was] responsible for his/her performance’ free from the publisher’s 
control. Brunovský claimed that Trend’s management did not pressurise reporters to 
exercise undesirable caution. While the errors that led to lawsuits were discussed within 
the newsroom, the co-owners would ‘not embark on jeopardising the [paper’s] role’ 
because as former journalists, they understood liability risk to be ‘part of the business’. 
Brunovský, however, admitted that ‘it might work differently’ in ‘other types of 
newsrooms with different types of owners and investors’.  
Leško believed that his ‘societal role [wa]s to put [influential persons’] deeds, 
actions, their conduct into context and assess it’. Therefore, he did not think ‘it should be 
central’ to him ‘whether someone will feel aggrieved’ by his commentaries. Leško 
thought ‘it would be ideal’ if the aggrieved parties accepted his commentaries for ‘the 
public interest and factuality’ that he tried to promote. While ‘newspapers have a duty to 
do the absolute maximum to bring verified, corroborated, ascertained facts’, he was 
convinced that ‘journalists don’t have to be right about everything’. Leško believed that 
‘if something is in the public interest’, it is possible to postulate ‘a reasonable suspicion 
that things don’t happen according to accepted standards and principles. If the suspicion 
is truly reasonable and if the … article fairly states all the circumstances that make the 
suspicion credible’ it should be published. Tódová declared, ‘I am a journalist and it is 
my role to write about every public official whom I found is involved in wrongdoing. 
I cannot imagine I would be selective just because that person is rich and can sue me 
successfully’. When pursuing investigative stories, Milan was motivated by the need ‘to 
write about the crooks who steal … and live on embezzled public money’ because it made 
him ‘angry’. Milan wanted ‘to make them pay for their wrongdoing’ and for those 
involved in managing public procurement ‘to get a wakeup call’ and ‘for society to move 
forward’. Milan’s objective was ‘to write the truth’ rather than harming anyone. That the 
truth was ‘vexatious for someone’ was ‘another matter’. 
Several respondents also mentioned decisions to publish high-risk stories because 
the newsroom management considered their publication to be of such pressing public 
interest that it outweighed liability risks. Milan stated this was a much more common 
occurrence than killing stories for fear of litigation in newsrooms. Petková described ‘a 
heated discussion’ in SME’s newsroom concerning whether to publish allegations of 
illegal financing of the Smer party based on an audio recording featuring a voice strongly 
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resembling that of Fico, which suggested that there were undeclared campaign 
contributions (see Balogová 2010a). Petková reported that despite the article’s potential 
impact given the looming general election, ‘the public interest … won even though it was 
not absolutely certain … whether the voice did or did not belong to Fico’. SME did not 
possess an expert opinion concerning the recording.  
9.4.5 Journalism Culture and the Relationship between Media and Public Officials  
The interviews largely confirmed Kenyon’s (2010) argument that when investigating 
chilling effects in non-democracies or young democracies journalism practices and 
culture often play a key role. In the context of ‘critical change agent’ journalism culture 
and the mutual animosity between public officials and the media, pre-publication notices 
from the former were often perceived as intimidation and sometimes acted as a red rag to 
a bull to journalists and media organisations. Adamčík declared that stories about 
especially litigious public figures were pursued with extra vigour, rather than being 
consciously avoided for fear of litigation. Adamčík explained that what journalists and 
publishers perceived as intimidation attempts, ‘irritated them. And rather than [self-
censorship], the tendency was to discover as much as possible about that person, albeit in 
a legitimate way, and then to release it’. This was a part of ‘the battle’ between politicians 
and the media in the 1990s and 2000s. Vozár also believed that the intimidation attempts 
‘had a rather opposite effect’ because those ‘writing the truth weren’t easily intimidated’ 
and continued to scrutinise the behaviour of powerful actors. 
Rather than being frightened, many journalists claimed that they were more 
strongly motivated to uncover the alleged wrongdoing. Soltész advised it was ‘a very 
flawed approach to threaten one before publication’ because every time he was warned 
to stop sniffing around, he knew he was ‘on the scent of something’ and pursued the story 
further. Nicholson argued that receiving a pre-publication threat ‘reinforces your effort to 
uncover the issues’ because ‘of course, you know that you hit the nail on the head’. ‘The 
more someone threatens me, the more motivated I am to write about it’, asserted Milan. 
Prušová acknowledged that public officials’ failure to provide relevant information 
disproving the claims she investigated and threats of legal action tended to confirm that 
‘their conscience is not clear’ and that ‘one needs to write about it’.  
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9.4.6 The ‘Human Factor’: Personality Traits and Maturity of Media 
Professionals 
The interviews confirmed Schauer’s (1978) argument about the importance of the ‘human 
factor’ or individual reporter’s values and predispositions for editorial decisions about 
high-risk material. Several respondents suggested that the reporter’s character and 
maturity influenced the magnitude of fear of personality/goodwill protection he/she 
perceived. Asked whether receiving pre-publication threats impacted her decision to 
pursue stories, Petková stated ‘I am such a kamikaze that it doesn’t really’. Petková 
admitted, however, that such a personality trait might not be common among journalists. 
According to Soltész, ‘investigative journalism requires the whole person’. Therefore, 
while he felt some financial discomfort as the consequence of his lost dispute, he believed 
that his investigative work ‘was worthwhile’. Soltész declared ‘The mere fact that they 
sued me, that they expended some energy … means that the crooks are still afraid, at least 
sometimes and of something. And until it is so, there is a point in doing it [investigative 
journalism]’. Milan argued that the risk of being sued ‘belongs to [the] job’, of 
investigative journalists. Brunovský explained that following pre-publication notices, 
decent journalists ‘needed to properly analyse the problem within them’ and subsequently 
‘write about it as they feel it is’. They need to ‘deal with the conflict within themselves – 
that is part of the psychological requirements of today’s journalist. Who doesn’t have 
such personal characteristics to manage this, cannot work in journalism’. Brunovský 
argued that given the financial and emotional harm they risked, ‘journalists had to act on 
their conviction to do their job properly’.  
However, as Balogová indicated, veteran investigative journalists who had been 
through several testimonies, most probably perceived court summons differently to young 
reporters experiencing legal proceedings for the first time. Balogová also believed that 
the drawn-out nature of proceedings might have a traumatic effect on less experienced 
reporters, as they were often forced to discuss the defence strategy with editors and 
lawyers at organisations they no longer worked for and testify about content produced 
years previously. The experienced Mikolášiková found it irksome to have to recollect the 
details of producing a story and to locate old evidence. However, working for a daily 
involved ‘such stress and pressure’ that she just had to ‘find it and roll on’. Obradovič 
similarly considered the time costs and anxiety experienced as a result of having to deal 
with claims ‘a marginal issue’. 
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Benedikovičová argued that a journalist had to be ‘mature enough’ not to take pre-
publication threats too seriously, otherwise he/she ‘could write no critical articles’. While 
Nicholson admitted that pre-publication threats were ‘in no way pleasant’ and that they 
‘increase[d] one’s stress levels’, he considered them as ‘part of the job’ rather than 
‘something that intimidates one or that one is frightened of’. Tódová tried ‘not to think 
about’ pre-publication threats because ‘given Slovak courts’ she ‘would have to live in 
constant fear of potentially losing a lawsuit’. She ‘could not work like that’. According 
to Vagovič, ‘when a journalist is young’, he/she might perceive having an article pulled 
‘as injustice’ or ‘censorship’. However, ‘with time’ he/she might realise that the editors 
‘were perhaps right’. Vagovič admitted that when younger, he ‘perceived everything as 
interference’, while the instances often merely involved ‘common copy-editing or his 
claims were insufficiently substantiated’.  
9.4.7 The European Court of Human Rights 
Several respondents suggested that a country’s international legal obligations and the 
existence of an impartial international arbiter might affect a defamation and privacy 
regime’s ability to deter expression. The knowledge that, unless they failed to act in line 
with journalistic ‘duties and responsibilities’, they could receive reputational vindication 
and monetary compensation from the ECtHR reduced the fear for some publishers and 
reporters. Vozár, thought larger media were not intimidated by powerful plaintiffs 
because they knew that the money paid in damages would most probably be won back in 
Strasbourg. Soltész argued that he would publish the article at the heart of Soltész v. 
Slovakia again because he understood that ‘somewhere in Strasbourg, they will 
eventually prove me right, unless I make a gross mistake’. For Soltész, the ECtHR 
represented ‘the highest judicial authority’ where he was certain he would ‘find ultimate 
protection’. Although a complaint before the ECtHR did not delay his obligation to pay 
the plaintiff, moral satisfaction achieved by a judgment in his favour was most important 
for Soltész. 
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9.5 Manifestations of the Invidious Chill on the Public Interest in 
Freedom of Expression 
The views of the main protagonists on the desirability or undesirability of the law’s effect 
on freedom differed widely. While some denied the law had any effect, others like Diko, 
recognised that the personality/goodwill protection regime simultaneously produced 
benign and invidious chills on the media’s right to free speech. Several interviewees also 
suggested that many media professionals did not recognise they had been chilled as they 
subconsciously internalised the restrictions imposed by the regime. This section explores 
the perceptions of defendants and their lawyers about the practical manifestations of the 
invidious chilling effects and their harmfulness for the public interest in expression.  
9.5.1 Structural Invidious Chills 
Respondents perceived the harmfulness for the public interest in expression of the ‘undue 
cautiousness’, ‘self-censorship’ and ‘chilling effect’ on a scale. The manifestation of what 
could be characterised as the structural invidious chilling effect according to Barendt et 
al.’s (1997, 192) conceptualisation were perceived as the most harmful. These were the 
avoidance of publication of material about certain persons and/or companies by media 
organisations and/or media professionals. This was often so internalised that the 
individual did not recognise he/she was self-censoring. The withdrawal of investigative 
programmes from television screens and print, accompanied by the outflow of 
experienced investigative reporters to other professions were other examples of the 
serious harm to the public interests in freedom of expression caused by the 
personality/goodwill protection regime’s operation and its structural invidious chilling 
effect. The interviewees also mentioned the general reluctance of many reporters to cover 
corruption scandals broken by other media. 
According to some interviewees, undue caution or undesirable self-censorship 
concerning particularly litigious and/or powerful persons and companies was newsroom 
policy in some outlets. Without prompting, most interviewees mentioned judges and 
Harabin, in particular, as typical examples. Leško was convinced that allegations about 
wrongdoing of judges ‘don’t get out to such an extent as in the case of the government or 
other public officials’ because judges simply ‘strike greater fear, greater anxiety’. SME’s 
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Fila believed that ‘certainly, there are newsrooms where … one doesn’t write or writes 
[significantly] less about problematic persons’. According to Fila, ‘part of the media 
definitely takes a more cautious approach towards Harabin because they know that a 
problem could arise there’. Prušová believed that having to ‘pay terrible sums of money’ 
in lawsuits instigated by Harabin, had made reporters for a specific daily ‘more cautious’ 
than SME. Petková also heard from colleagues working for that outlet that, at some point, 
the newsroom policy was not to write about Harabin to avoid lawsuits.  
Milan admitted that one ‘writes very carefully about Štefan Harabin’. According 
to Milan, any article about Harabin had to be ‘very, very carefully written, if at all’. ‘I 
wouldn’t say I avoid writing … Nonetheless, Harabin is a case per se. Therefore, it is the 
case for the whole media sector … I am not the only one careful about what I write about 
him’. While adamant that his magazine published ‘matters the public should know’ and 
that can be proven by the coverage about Harabin’s family using his ministerial car, Milan 
acknowledged that ‘sometimes we really consider whether to write a trivial matter about 
him at all’. Benedik was convinced that Harabin was ‘everyone’s scarecrow’ and ‘that 
many journalists won’t write about his scandals because they don’t want to get into 
trouble’. He considered Fico as another extremely successful plaintiff that journalists 
might wish to avoid. Benedik, however, denied that excessive cautiousness was the 
reason why Nový Čas had never been sued by Harabin. Benedik suggested that the paper’s 
tabloid character precluded the political commentaries that he believed Harabin was 
sensitive about. 
Šimečka acknowledged that at times, SME gained information which it was not 
able to ‘verify in such a way’ that he ‘could release it’ or that SME ‘would be able write 
the text at all’ because SME was not in a strong enough position ‘given the Slovak justice 
system and a potential lawsuit’. Šimečka claimed that he ‘definitely did not dare’ publish 
some articles that he would have released in the Czech jurisdiction ‘without any 
problems’. Denying any undue caution, Obradovič admitted that following past 
experience with articles for which the publisher was threatened with a goodwill protection 
lawsuit unless a correction was published, HN had become reluctant to report about large 
state contractors failing to pay their subcontractors. Since ‘the reporter had nothing on 
paper’, only verbal testimonies of affected sub-contractors who ‘were unwilling to testify 
for fear of not receiving any payment at all’, HN would not have been able to withstand 
the court case and published the correction. Subsequently, HN management decided that 
they ‘would not publish such information in the future because it could turn against’ them. 
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Nicholson believed that ‘almost nothing gets covered’ for fear of litigation. As 
examples of no-go areas for Slovak journalists, Nicholson mentioned financing of 
political parties, links between organised crime and politics, and the ‘absurd’ and 
‘unhealthy’ practice of certain former judges, prosecutors or intelligence service officials 
who used their contacts to provide legal representation to organised crime figures. 
Nicholson rejected the arguments of some other respondents that a lot of information 
could not be published due to difficulties with its verification and obtaining legally 
admissible evidence, stating: ‘I don’t think that one would even search for evidence. ... 
And we know how it works. If I can find out how it works, other journalists know for 
sure’. Nicholson admitted that he himself had not released certain information even 
though he ‘had it confirmed by nine different people’ due to the litigious nature of some 
persons because he realised ‘what could happen’ to his publisher and himself.  
The uncertainty of the personality/goodwill protection regime and the requirement 
to keep budget reserves to cover lost lawsuits were viewed as having contributed 
considerably to the withdrawal of investigative programmes from commercial televisions 
and print outlets. According to Štětka and Örnebring (2013, 418), in the early 2010s, 
Slovakia belonged to CEE countries with the smallest number of investigative journalists 
and nationwide investigative media. While this manifestation of an invidious chilling 
effect has not been reported in empirical studies to date, with the traditional revenue 
streams drying up for investigative journalism, in extremely pro-plaintiff friendly 
defamation and privacy regimes, this might become a more frequent occurrence. 
In Petková’s opinion, the personality/goodwill protection regime’s ‘effect on 
journalism as a whole [was apparent] in the fact that investigative journalism almost 
vanished from television’. Petková perceived this as harmful for society ‘because 
television stations have a different and larger impact than the press’, which retained 
investigative journalism to some degree. Petková also recognised that the ‘intimidating 
effect’ of past disputes caused a decline in investigative journalism in some smaller print 
outlets, like .týždeň. Diko – the former editor-in-chief in Markíza – likewise argued that 
the capital reserves required to cover potential lawsuits, which exceeded its annual 
production costs, were ‘one of the reasons to terminate’ Markíza’s investigative 
programme. Describing the tensions between commercial and journalistic aims of 
broadcasters, Diko stated, ‘If something doesn’t add up in a commercial television, then 
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… Whatever noble aims [media professionals] might have, when a manager from outside 
comes and asks: “Why do you broadcast this if it is not profitable?”…’.190  
In the context of the pressures on newsrooms’ budgets experienced after the 2008-
9 financial crisis, the financial risks associated with personality/goodwill protection 
combined with high production costs, newsroom politics and the public’s disinterest in 
investigative journalisms, resulted in its gradual withdrawal from Slovak media.  
‘Investigative journalism died due to the public’s lack of interest’, according to Soltész 
He added, ‘As soon as it were at least a bit profitable’, media organisations would keep 
it. However, because ‘it is expensive in terms of resources’, as ‘you need people who are 
less productive in terms of not being able to spit out three texts a day’ and ‘it is expensive 
in potential litigation [costs]’ and it ‘attracts too few people, has low viewership’, it was 
not financially viable for the media to retain investigative journalism. Soltész argued that 
‘newspapers also realised that it causes them problems. If they don’t include it, no one 
misses it; it doesn’t influence circulation’. Nicholson acknowledged that the support he 
received from readers was not ‘reflected in the circulation’ and keeping investigative 
journalism was therefore not financially worth it. 
Nicholson suggested that relationship within newsrooms might also hinder 
investigative journalism. According to Nicholson, news reporters often ‘work[ed] upon 
the boss’ (editor-in-chief) asking why investigative reporters had different working 
conditions to them. Nicholson argued that while he was officially in charge of the 
investigative department at SME, the only other investigative reporter was regularly 
required to work on news and there was never ‘a firmly guaranteed space or time’ for 
publication of their reports. Since the newsroom management ‘only have a limited 
amount of money they have to operate with’, by granting investigative reporters ‘special 
status’, they made ‘their lives more difficult’. Therefore, despite the publisher’s intentions 
it proved ‘difficult to keep investigative journalism’ within SME. 
Several respondents believed that independent of newsroom policy some 
journalists might sub-consciously avoid high risk stories. Brunovský recognised that 
 
 
 
190 In reaction to the investigative format’s withdrawal, Markíza’s director argued that Markíza ‘had 
evaluated the efficiency of the programme as well as the legal risks associated with this type of format 
and their consequences’ (cited in Glovíčko 2010). 
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some journalists ‘don’t pursue particularly problematic topics or don’t write a contentious 
article in years’, while trying not to ‘unnecessarily complicate [their] life’. Petková 
acknowledged that ‘not every journalist has such character’ as her to ‘find pursuing the 
issues further and publishing worth the trouble associated with legal disputes’. According 
to Soltész, ‘no one really does [investigative journalism] anymore – perhaps Marek 
Vagovič is the only one who has an actual ambition’. Nicholson was convinced that in 
the post-financial crisis environment with enormous pressures on journalists’ 
productivity, powerful actors’ intimidation efforts were often successful. ‘If you have to 
produce a minimum of an article a day, sometimes two, why should you complicate your 
life by opening a sensitive story?’, asked Nicholson.  
The interviewees suggested that journalists were not only reluctant to pursue 
original investigative stories, but had become averse to report on scandals broken by other 
media for fear of litigation. According to Benedik, liability risk had ‘a dark side 
[manifested in the fact] that journalists were unwilling to embark on scandals where a 
colleague has burnt their fingers. They don’t pursue them; they are not as active, as 
aggressive as they could be’. Nicholson believed that in the past, journalists ‘used to be 
much more collegiate – when a story broke, everyone would take it up. You would not 
leave a [fellow] journalist in it on their own’. Characterising it as undue caution, Vagovič 
was surprised that an outlet, which would typically report corruption scandals broken in 
other media, did not cover the alleged VAT fraud case for which his publisher was 
threatened with a 20-million-euro lawsuit. Vagovič dismissed the argument of the outlet’s 
reporter about the story’s complexity and impossibility to verify the allegations: ‘It all 
seems to me like excuses, like they are far too afraid’.  
Some respondents believed that fear of litigation contributed to the decision of 
many investigative journalists to leave the profession. As Nicholson put it, ‘there are 
some who will say: “You know what? I’ve had enough”. And they change profession’. 
Nicholson lamented that there were ‘very few’ investigative journalists left in Slovakia 
as many of his former colleagues had ‘decided to give up … as a result of similar 
lawsuits’.  
  364 
9.5.2 Direct Invidious Chills 
The interviewees claimed overwhelmingly that pulling developed stories for fear of being 
unable to prove the claims before court, even if the newsroom believed them to be true 
and in the public interest – the classic direct invidious chilling effects identified by 
Barendt et al. (1997) – was extremely rare, they recognised other types of direct invidious 
chilling effect. These included reporting on serious wrongdoing, including corruption and 
clientelism, in an opaque manner, without identifying subjects of stories, and/or providing 
context or interpretation. In the extreme such reporting was so incomprehensible that it 
failed to capture the message of the story. This significantly harmed Slovak investigative 
journalism and the public’s ability to hold the public officials involved accountable. 
Some respondents considered these as unavoidable compromises that affected the 
quality of information received by the public, but did not excessively interfere with the 
public interest in freedom of expression. Kamenec, did not feel that the outlets he 
represented ‘would not write’ about the Supreme Court President at all whilst admitting 
that ‘self-censorship’ and caution were present around Harabin. Reporters approached 
stories involving Harabin in a very prudent manner. Fila admitted that there were some 
compromises, like not publishing judges’ photographs, that went ‘against fundamental 
journalistic principles and even common sense’ and the readers’ interests which the 
newsroom was forced to make to avoid violating the law. However, according to Fila, it 
was ‘nothing fundamental’. 
In contrast, other respondents found the practices damaging for investigative 
journalism, the public’s ability to comprehend crucial issues and hold those in power to 
account, and thus impeding the country’s fight with corruption. Benedik believed that the 
courts’ interpretation of the law regarding innocence presumption, not allowing 
identification of parties under criminal investigation, led to self-censorship of sorts and 
often rendered articles ‘totally worthless’ for the reader. Benedik felt obliged to 
encourage journalists to self-censor in this way: ‘These issues affect the content of 
articles, force them to, and, in fact, I force them to cover the faces etc. It is a form of self-
censorship even though I cannot identify with the legal opinion’.  
Langer recognised that following litigation threats in ongoing coverage of some 
scandals, journalists tended to replace ‘certain details, certain connections that used to 
resonate’ in past reporting with less contentious information. Langer saw this ‘chilling 
effect’ in avoidance of ‘such little things, certain collocations’, warranted value 
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judgments or associations. According to Langer, the chilling effect was also demonstrated 
by the use of ‘polemical [or] hypothetical terms’ concerning some litigious individuals. 
Langer believed, Harabin’s threats had led to the use of the phrase ‘alleged transcript of 
an alleged phone conversation’ between Harabin and the convicted drugs baron instead 
of more factual reporting justified by the general prosecutor’s confirmation of the 
existence of the transcript. Diko laughed when he stated that rather than avoiding 
mentions of the issue, RTVS kept reporting that Harabin had ‘links to the alleged drugs 
baron Sadiki – nowadays legally sentenced – based upon an alleged transcript of an 
alleged phone call’ similarly demonstrating how absurd he found the formulation.  
According to some of the most prominent media professionals, the 
personality/goodwill protection regime of the 2000s seriously damaged investigative 
journalism. Nicholson believed that while it was ‘not a popular opinion’ within the 
profession, most investigative stories were published in ways that rendered them 
worthless to the public as the media tended to publish ‘mere sketches, no names, no 
deeds’ while ‘the point was to publish who was involved, [and] how they did it’. 
Nicholson claimed the reporting tended to contain a ‘rough outline’ that left the public 
‘not much wiser’ even if evidence that could ‘prove to people what happened’ was 
available. Nicholson also argued that investigative reports of early 2010s became 
increasingly hypothetical. Asked whether he perceived a ‘chilling effect’ on journalistic 
speech, Nicholson declared: ‘Very much so. It is very strong, very strong’. He found it 
was ‘a shame’ that SME’s investigative reporting was much less hard-hitting and 
courageous than in the early 2000s when ‘they had no problem publishing secret service 
materials’.  
Vagovič confirmed his perception that some media were ‘unnecessarily cautious’ 
citing the coverage by another outlet of the carousel tax fraud scandal he had broken. The 
report only dealt with a minor part of the scandal, providing only broad outlines of the 
suspected fraud without mentioning the firm’s name, its alleged links to Smer or the 
potential motive for removing investigators from the case. Vagovič felt that fear of 
litigation rendered the report insufficiently clear to the public to understand the gist of the 
story. When later confronted by Vagovič, the reporter claimed that he would not have 
been able to justify the claims before the organisation’s lawyers.   
Šimečka acknowledged that when SME editor-in-chief, for fear of litigation he 
used to ‘dilute some statements exactly for that reason’. Šimečka argued that a 
‘complicated story’ concerning activities of an influential financial group threatening 
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litigation was an exemplary case ‘when you know that you can lose the lawsuit – and very 
easily because the courts are against you – and thus write it much more cautiously or you 
call it a day straight away’. According to Šimečka, the media’s approach towards 
sensitive matters was to ‘write some bare facts which one could substantiate’ without 
interpretation. As a consequence, ‘even corruption scandals of great magnitude were 
written in such an incomprehensible way’ that ‘no one actually understood the essence’. 
The articles were simply ‘clogged with verifiable facts but lacked a conclusion because 
you would not dare write it’. This, in Šimečka’s view, was ‘one of the reasons why 
investigative journalism in Slovakia is, or was at that time [of his SME editorship], in a 
rather poor condition’. Even if the public ‘felt there was a problem, that dirty practices 
were involved, because they did not get the leitmotif’, the story ‘remained hazy and 
naturally also without consequences’. Šimečka therefore believed that the 
personality/goodwill protection regime ‘considerably impaired Slovak media’. Šimečka 
realised the undesirable chilling effect of the law more clearly after he started working 
for a Czech magazine that published numerous ‘investigative stories with a considerable 
dramatic impact’. Šimečka ‘only felt the difference there because those were much more 
courageous texts’. The magazine tended to win its defamation disputes even though its 
language was less precise than SME. Šimečka believed that, given the difference in the 
adjudicatory practice in the two jurisdictions, SME would have lost half of those disputes. 
By 2016, investigative journalism, according to Šimečka, had not fully recovered from 
the experience of the 2000s. Šimečka argued that personality/goodwill protection regime 
was ‘a really big problem’ at least until Harabin stepped down from the position of 
Supreme Court President. This contributed to the protracted fight against corruption in 
the country. While ‘the difference compared to the Czech Republic’ was still ‘dramatic’, 
Šimečka believed that in 2016 the situation in Slovakia was ‘changing for the better’.  
Šimečka’s views were partially confirmed by Němeček, who denied any effect of 
the Czech personality/goodwill protection regime on his editorial freedom. However, 
Němeček believed that ‘in Slovakia it is basically a terrible problem’. He was convinced 
that ‘his fear of personality protection disputes’, which ‘he wouldn’t have felt in the 
Czech Republic’ forced Nicholson to call the main protagonists of the ‘Gorilla’ book by 
pseudonyms even though the public knew their identities.  
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9.6 Conclusion 
This chapter examined the extent to which the Slovak personality/goodwill protection 
regime achieved the third specific objective pursued by triangulating the conflicting 
private and public interests in reputation, privacy and freedom of expression – prevention 
of abuses of the law and of invidious chilling effect on media freedom with its undesirable 
consequences for the public’s right to information. The chapter found that the regime 
failed to deter abuses of the law by powerful, litigious public officials, particularly among 
senior figures within the legal system, and businesspeople, and was thus socially 
dysfunctional. Given the pro-powerful plaintiff bias in ordinary courts’ adjudicatory 
practice, attempts at intimidation of the media and journalists or personal enrichment 
through litigation or threats thereof were rife throughout the studied period, despite the 
shift in the Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence. 
The chapter painted a picture of a defamation and privacy regime that largely 
failed to prevent invidious chilling effects and as a result to secure provision of 
investigative journalism and important speech communicated in a comprehensible 
manner. The effects were particularly striking in comparison with the situation in the 
Czech jurisdiction, which some respondents were able to provide. It offered ample 
evidence of direct and structural invidious chilling effects on journalistic speech on 
organisational (media organisations) and individual (media professionals) level and their 
harmful consequences for the public interest in free expression. These will be of value to 
future research as they allow for easier identification of manifestations of invidious 
chilling effects and a classification of the chills based on their harmfulness for the public’s 
interest in expression.  
The chapter revealed that the most harmful are structural invidious chilling effects 
that operate at the organisational level, as these mean that the public never learn about 
serious wrongdoing allegations. In the Slovak case, these included the complete 
withdrawal of investigative journalism by commercial broadcasters and reduction of its 
provision by quality print outlets; and the avoidance of publication as a matter of 
newsroom policy of material about certain litigious plaintiffs, particularly within the 
highest echelons of the judiciary or business with involvement in contracts with the state. 
The structural invidious chilling effect operated on the individual level and was 
manifested in the outflow of investigative journalists from the profession or change in the 
  368 
journalist’s focus on less contentious types of journalism. It was also visible in a general 
reluctance of certain journalists to cover corruption scandals broken by other media 
outlets. These were considered the next most harmful as they still precluded the public 
from receiving important information, albeit on a smaller scale.  
The next type of chilling effect in terms of their harmfulness for the public’s 
interest in freedom of expression was the direct invidious chilling effect. This was 
manifested on organisational and individual levels with the latter being slightly less 
harmful. Examples included omission of important parts of (investigative) reports like 
links between different subjects, names of public figures, context, connotations, 
interpretations of facts and conclusions; using opaque language and providing mere 
sketches of described issues so that the message was lost. It has been suggested that such 
practices resulted in speech that was largely incomprehensible and thus of little value for 
citizens who were unable to act on it when holding the powerful to account and almost 
irreparably harmed the country’s ability to combat corruption. Other manifestations of 
direct invidious chilling effects, as identified by Barendt et al. (1997), like pulling 
developed stories were present on organisational level, but were much rarer.  
The findings highlighted the subjective nature of the concept of the chilling effect 
in jurisdictions where reputation, privacy and expression are all constitutionally protected 
and conflicts between them are resolved by ad hoc balancing, which has been identified 
in earlier studies of defamation and journalism (Cheer 2008; Townend 2014). These 
subjectivities were revealed in three main forms. Firstly, it was often difficult for reporters 
to distinguish whether undue fear of litigation was or was not behind an editor’s decision 
not to develop a story. Secondly, on the example of the ‘Gorilla’ case it was demonstrated 
that an identical instance of deterrence on speech might be considered by some as 
responsible journalism, a manifestation of benign chill of the law or a prime example of 
the direct invidious chilling effect harmful for the public interest in receiving valuable 
information. It was suggested that the seniority, maturity and thus greater tendency 
towards responsible journalism, might affect the perceptions of the existence, desirability 
and harmfulness of a chilling effect of defamation and privacy laws. Thirdly, Schauer’s 
(1978) argument that the fear of litigation and thus the extent of the chilling effect of 
defamation and privacy law will be felt differently by different media organisations and 
professionals operating in the same system has been confirmed. In the Slovak case, the 
respondents among some of the most prominent investigative journalists and media 
professionals mostly working for quality outlets denied chilling effects on their freedom 
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of expression. However, they recognised that other organisations and journalists might 
have been unduly chilled by fear of litigation in reporting on warranted corruption 
allegations about litigious powerful individual and companies.  
The chapter corroborated the assumptions of the conceptual framework developed 
in Chapter 2 that the cost-benefit calculus relating to editorial decisions and thus 
perceptions of a chilling effect by defamation and privacy regimes are affected by various 
contextual factors (structural, cultural and international) operating at different levels and 
the mutual relationships among principal protagonists operating within the regime. The 
constantly-evolving nature of legal regimes and the fact that they generate varying 
degrees of chilling effects over time have also been documented. It was most noticeable 
in the reduction of the invidious chilling effect perceived in relation to politician-plaintiffs 
following the gradual shift in ordinary courts’ adjudicatory practice and plaintiffs’ 
behaviour under the influence of the Constitutional Court and the increased media 
reporting of the controversial cases in the late 2000s.  
Media political economic factors, particularly the organisation’s size, financial 
stability and market conditions, and cultural factors, including organisational culture and 
reporters’ professional status, journalism culture and the related relationship between the 
media and officialdom were found to be of key importance in explaining the different 
perceptions of the invidious chilling effects produced by a defamation and privacy 
regime. While the interviewed organisations were large and financially stable enough to 
absorb the potential cost of several high damages awards and to keep capital reserves to 
unduly fear litigation risks, it was suggested that small and financially weaker regional 
and local media did self-censor considerably. The organisational culture of serious 
national outlets and status of prominent journalists rendered litigation risks stemming 
from publication of legitimate but critical speech about the actions of those in power ‘part 
of the business’ that was outweighed by their belief in their “mission” and the 
expectations of their audiences. In the context of the mutually antagonistic relationship 
between officialdom and media professionals resulting from the clash of journalism and 
political cultures during Slovakia’s democratisation and beyond, litigation threats from 
public officials encouraged rather than discouraged some media organisations and 
journalists from publication. 
It has been suggested that market health and competitiveness can increase or 
reduce the perceptions of the chill. The plummeting profits following the global financial 
crisis instilled more ‘cautiousness’ into Slovak publishers and journalists as they realised 
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the impact of a potential large award on the organisation and their employment prospects. 
The media market competitiveness in the 1990s reflected in the lack of solidarity between 
different outlets and media professionals impeded the journalistic community’s ability to 
effective collaboration to influence public opinion, encourage changes in the adjudicatory 
practice and plaintiffs’ behaviour, and thus reduce litigation risks.  
The chapter found that in addition to their personality traits and maturity, the 
nature of journalists’ relationship with their employer, with their organisation’s lawyers 
and senior newsroom managers are key for understanding their perceptions of the chilling 
effect. Mature, experienced journalists tend to take intimidation, the emotional distress 
and time costs associated with litigation as ‘part of the job’ while those less experienced 
might self-censor to avoid the trouble. The maturity of the reporter might also affect the 
extent to which he/she perceives editorial decisions as undue censorship. The employer’s 
support in case of a claim or dispute might prove vital for reporters’ editorial decisions, 
especially in a gig-type economy where the majority of journalists are self-employed and 
therefore face a greater personal liability risk. The approach of newsroom managers and 
their ability to shield reporters from the pressures of litigation was shown to be another 
important fear-reducing factor.  
The chapter corroborated arguments of common law studies (Townend 2014; 
Marjoribanks and Kenyon 2004; Hansen 2000; Barendt et al. 1997) about the pivotal role 
lawyers play in explaining why some media and professionals are more chilled than 
others. While lawyers played a largely publication-enabling role in the Slovak case, legal 
advice sometimes conflicted with journalists’ self-perceptions, creating tensions or 
resentment.   
The findings suggested that a country’s international legal obligations and the 
existence of an impartial international arbiter like the ECtHR might mitigate a defamation 
and privacy regime’s invidious chilling effects as media professionals know they can 
obtain a final reputational vindication and monetary compensation. 
The next chapter revisits the findings of all the empirical chapters and draws 
conclusions about the ability of the Slovak personality/goodwill protection regime 
between 1996 and 2016 to reach an appropriate triangulation between the private and 
public interests in reputation, privacy and freedom of expression; discusses the 
contribution of this thesis for our understanding of the interplay between defamation, 
privacy and expression; and draws ensuing lessons for future research. 
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Section 4: Conclusion 
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 Conclusions: No “Vicious Spiral” and Lessons 
for Future Research 
10.1 Introduction 
This study began with a description of the Slovak defamation and privacy regime, which, 
according to anecdotal evidence, was at risk of descending into a “vicious spiral” in its 
interplay with journalism. The fear was that this spiral would comprise simultaneous, 
deleterious consequences for all the protected interests at the core of the regime (the 
private and the public interests in reputation, privacy and freedom of expression). The 
media felt threatened by civil actions brought by high-profile figures from the spheres of 
politics, business and the judiciary. Plaintiffs seemed unequal before the law and in their 
ability to effectively protect their reputational and privacy rights. The public received 
poorly verified, misleading, trivial and sensationalist information instead of hard-hitting 
investigative stories. 
This depiction of the Slovak personality/goodwill protection regime in the context 
of journalism seemed particularly striking in comparison to the neighbouring Czech 
jurisdiction where identical substantive laws had applied for decades but where such 
complaints were rarely raised. This study has sought to investigate this apparent vicious 
spiral from the viewpoint of the regime’s principal protagonists. It examined whether, to 
what extent and how the defamation and privacy regime – as interpreted and applied by 
courts – triangulated the individual and social interests in reputation, privacy and 
expression between 1996 and 2016. The thesis explored in depth the extent to which and 
how the regime sought to meet its three interconnected, specific objectives: protection of 
personality and reputation interests by providing adequate instruments for the injured 
parties to defend their rights against unwarranted attacks in the media; creating a benign 
chilling effect and promoting responsible journalism; and preventing powerful actors 
from abusing the law to preclude warranted critical reporting on their actions, and thus 
preventing an invidious chilling effect on freedom of expression. 
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10.2 Complex Picture of the Effects of the Slovak Regime 
Drawing on Habermas’s theory of ‘discursive democracy’ and new institutionalism, the 
study conceptualised law as a social institution that operates in interactions between 
principal protagonists within the legal regime set in a specific context. Through 
systematically collating, comparing and contrasting and reflecting upon the experiences 
and views of the principal protagonists and setting them in their contexts, the study 
painted a rich but complex and evolving picture of the interplay between journalism and 
the personality/goodwill protection regime in Slovakia between 1996 and 2016. It found 
that the regime did not disintegrate into a vicious spiral, as it was able to partially achieve 
its objectives. It largely succeeded in protecting reputation and privacy, produced a 
benign chilling effect and promoted responsible journalism among a substantive part of 
the media. Given the excessive pro-public plaintiff bias, the regime, however, failed to 
prevent abuses of law and the resulting invidious chilling effects.  
The regime’s operation during the studied period was not static but changed over 
time, as the regime went through incremental re-centring towards freedom of expression 
and away from personality/goodwill protection in the early 2010s following a shift in the 
Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence. The effects of the regime’s re-centring on the 
private and public interests in speech were not yet clearly discernible by the end of the 
studied period. However, there were indications that the gross abuses of the law by 
powerful plaintiffs of the 1990s and 2000s would not be tolerated by courts. 
 
Protection of reputation and privacy 
The regime was generally successful at safeguarding the private and public interests in 
reputation and privacy, albeit not necessarily through the final judicial resolution of 
disputes. Through procedural rules changes in the 2000s, the regime succeeded in 
guaranteeing access to justice to virtually all plaintiffs. Despite wide-spread frustrations 
with the operation of the personality/goodwill protection regime, the public figures who 
dominated among plaintiffs during the studied period were largely able to achieve the 
reputational vindication, cessation of privacy infringements and other satisfaction desired 
through litigation. They would not have been able to attain their aims through different 
means. The satisfaction did not have to come through a final court decision, but was 
achieved through fast out-of-court settlements, or through the act of initiating suit itself, 
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which served as a public relations exercise signalling falsity of the allegations, or a means 
of standing up to unjust journalistic practices and empowering the victim.  
Due to lack of awareness, disinterest in defending their rights or general absence 
in news coverage, private individuals rarely featured as plaintiffs. Many private plaintiffs 
seeking to correct the record were able to achieve some redress outside of the legal 
process, at least in the self-proclaimed quality outlets, as only a small fraction of before-
action claims ended in court. Eager to avoid litigation and/or following professional 
standards, most outlets were happy to provide genuine claimants an opportunity to put 
the record straight and/or express their views in follow-up journalistic content or receive 
free advertisement space. The media were, however, less willing to publish corrections, 
replies or apologies because they viewed them as threatening their credibility.  
The regime was thus essentially able to fulfil its satisfaction function for both 
public and private plaintiffs. However, the rights and interests of a small group of 
particularly litigious politicians, judges and powerful businesspeople were 
disproportionately better protected than those of the other injured parties, as they were 
much more likely to succeed in disputes and receive large damages. Since they posed 
great risks to the financial stability of the media, the reporting on their actions was much 
more cautious and prudent than that of other parties.  
The law was less successful in protecting the public interest in reputation and 
privacy. Given the media’s general reluctance to transparently put the record straight and 
publish retractions, apologies and corrections, the public was able to learn the injured 
parties’ point of view in follow-up reports or advertorials, but might have found it more 
difficult to connect it to the misleading or distorted information previously received.  
 
Benign chilling effect and promotion of responsible journalism 
The Slovak personality/goodwill protection regime created benign chilling effects on a 
large proportion of journalistic speech, and contributed to the promotion of responsible 
journalism, particularly in the quality news media segment. At least since the late 1990s, 
legal considerations played an important role in editorial decisions and combined with 
the emerging professional standards in encouraging responsible journalism. To avoid 
careless mistakes and thus the high risk of being ordered to pay substantial damages 
awards by the plaintiff-friendly courts, many organisations implemented measures to 
improve responsibility during the editorial process. These included legal training, 
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newsroom induction to professional standards, ethics codes adoption, and pre-publication 
scrutiny by editors and/or lawyers.  
Adoption of these measures led to benign chilling effects on journalistic speech 
on both organisational and individual level. They were apparent in instances when 
insufficiently substantiated allegations were stopped from being published, when 
publication was delayed to allow for further verification or collection of evidence, and in 
certain instances when private individuals and firms were not identified but the reporting 
focused on the wider societal issue. The greater linguistic precision and information 
accuracy when claims were either toned down or rephrased to make them more accurate 
and when less expressive language was used were other examples. The benign chill was 
further demonstrated in instances when it was decided that privacy infringing stories or 
stories involving private individuals (and thus considered not in the public interest) would 
not be developed, and in the general practice of approaching all involved parties for 
comment to make reporting more balanced. 
The Slovak personality/goodwill protection regime’s success in producing a 
benign chilling effect on the tabloids and some ‘unfair’ practices prevalent in serious 
outlets was rather limited. Lack of professionalism, privacy intrusions and occasional 
deliberate smear campaigns persisted in the tabloids and oligarch-owned media. Despite 
publishers’ efforts, certain unfair journalistic practices, like presenting dissenting opinion 
next to a court-ordered apology or reluctance to accept public officials’ arguments 
contrary to their “truth”, remained in quality media outlets, often unrecognized by the 
media professionals themselves.  
 
Abuses of law and invidious chilling effects 
Throughout the studied period, the regime largely failed to prevent abuses of the law by 
leading politicians, judges and businesspeople involved in fulfilling state contracts. While 
the invidious chilling effect of the law was felt with different intensity among media 
professionals and across the sector, its manifestations on the public interests in freedom 
of expression were particularly damaging. Mostly as a result of the unfair pro-public 
plaintiff bias of the adjudicatory practice of ordinary courts, the Slovak 
personality/goodwill protection regime failed to secure the provision of investigative 
journalism and valuable speech communicated in an intelligible manner. The operation 
of the law combined with other factors to create invidious chilling effects on both 
organisational and individual levels that precluded the public from receiving important 
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information about certain litigious plaintiffs, particularly within the judiciary. The 
operation of the personality/goodwill protection regime apparently contributed to the 
complete withdrawal of investigative journalism by commercial broadcasters and to the 
reduction of its provision by quality print outlets. The fear of personality/goodwill 
litigation also contributed to the decision of many investigative journalists to leave the 
profession. The fear of being sued and having to pay large damages resulted in alterations 
to published speech that ranged from unavoidable compromises or greater prudence when 
reporting on certain litigious plaintiffs to publishing investigative stories comprising bare, 
proven facts without any interpretations or context, or omission of important parts of 
stories. These practices were viewed to have irreparably damaged the quality and 
comprehensibility of investigative journalism to the public, impeded the public’s ability 
to act on the information and hindered the country’s ability to combat corruption in public 
life. 
10.3 Contribution to Our Understanding of the Interplay between 
Defamation, Privacy and Expression  
This study sought to address the existing limitations in our knowledge about the interplay 
between defamation, privacy and freedom of expression in the context of journalistic 
speech. The thesis provided the first systematic, holistic, fine-grained, empirical analysis 
of these interactions in a civil law country set in the context of a young Central and 
Eastern European democracy. Covering a period of twenty years, the thesis was able to 
shed light on the complex problems involved in balancing the private and public interests 
in freedom of expression on the one hand and privacy and reputation on the other by a 
civil law defamation and privacy regime in an immature democracy. The thesis provided 
important new insights into the workings of the defamation and privacy regimes, not only 
in consolidating or recently consolidated democracies. Crucially, in contrast to existing 
empirical studies, the thesis provided a holistic picture of the operation of defamation and 
privacy laws in the context of journalism, as it looked at the ability of the regime to protect 
the legitimate interests of the plaintiffs, defendants as well as the general public.  
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10.3.1 Conceptual Framework for Research on Balancing Free Speech with Other 
Interests  
The thesis developed an innovative conceptual framework that can be applied to future 
studies of the operation of legal regimes that seek to balance competing protected interests 
in the context of public discourse, including hate speech, data protection or regulation of 
social media platforms (see Chapter 2). Drawing on Habermas’s (1984, 1987, 1996) 
theory of ‘discursive democracy’, new institutionalism (e.g., Suchman and Edelman 
1996), media communications studies and earlier socio-legal studies of defamation 
regimes, the framework conceptualises law as a social institution that is formulated, 
enacted, interpreted and applied in mutual strategic interactions between the principal 
protagonists, or the different social actors whose behaviour the law seeks to regulate. 
These mutual interactions occur within their structural, cultural and international 
contexts. A change within these interactions, in legal rules or in the context may re-centre 
the regime and have unintended consequences for any or all of the protected interests.  
According to the framework, in addition to the law-on-the-books, any 
investigation of the interplay between a legal regime and journalism must focus on the 
interests, experiences and mutual relationships between the principal protagonists whose 
behaviour the law tries to condition. The the actors’ behaviour is expected to be shaped 
by its structural, cultural and international contexts. Because legal regimes respond to 
changes in the broader environment in which they operate, democratisation is expected 
to trigger a process of renegotiating the power balance between the actors, often leading 
to conflicts. The particular constellation of the institutional constraints of transition, 
alongside cultural trajectories thus establish particular pathways that affect the regime’s 
ability to optimally protect the competing interests at its core. 
The legal considerations identified by the framework as key to defamation and 
privacy regimes’ ability to condition the principal protagonists’ behaviour and achieve an 
optimal balance between reputation, privacy and expression were the fairness, certainty 
and effectiveness provided by the given regime on the statute book and in its 
interpretation and application by courts. According to the framework, the law-on-the-
books and judicial decision-making are not identical analytical categories, as statutes 
might remain virtually unchanged, but the balance in adjudicatory practice might shift 
towards one of the protected interests and away from another.  
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The conceptual framework proved to be well suited to a study of the interplay 
between law and journalism. It allowed for the identification of the principal protagonists 
within the regime and focused the research on their mutual interactions, cost-benefit 
calculi and the contextual factors that combined with the principal protagonists’ legal 
considerations in conditioning their behaviour. At the same time, it was flexible enough 
to investigate previously unexplored key benefits and costs considered by plaintiffs 
and/or defendants, the contextual factors, relationships and the multitude of ways in 
which they combined to affect the regime’s ability to achieve its objectives. 
10.3.2 Protection of Reputation and Privacy: The Plaintiffs’ Calculus 
The study unpicked the little-researched cost-benefit calculus behind the plaintiffs’ 
decision to sue or pursue other non-statutory redress for reputational or privacy harm 
suffered by an unlawful publication in the media. Understanding why plaintiffs sue is key 
to our understanding about the extent to which and how defamation and privacy regimes 
protect reputation and privacy. Examining whether they are able to achieve their 
objectives, allows researchers to make inferences about the ability of the regime to 
safeguard reputation and privacy protection. In Chapter 7, I developed a plaintiff cost-
benefit calculus model (Figure 7.1) that can be used to guide future empirical research in 
this area. 
According to the model, plaintiffs decide to sue when they perceive litigation as 
the only available means to achieve adequate redress to the reputational or privacy harm 
they suffered. While plaintiffs might pursue different objectives to those assumed by law, 
they are primarily expected to seek the cessation of the infringement and reputational 
redress. These do not need to come through a final judicial decision, but can have the 
form of a formal letter admitting falsity of published statements, out-of-court settlement 
or a PR exercise to mitigate any potential impact on their professional career. Other 
motives pursued by plaintiffs might include punishment of the media, monetary 
satisfaction, prevention of future infringements or self-empowerment by standing up to 
injustice caused by reckless or malicious journalism. The latter motive may be 
particularly pronounced in democratising societies where common understanding of the 
roles and duties of various institutions, including the press, is still developing. The costs 
of litigation plaintiffs face, according to the model, are financial costs, emotional distress 
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and further reputational harm. In civil law jurisdictions, where litigation costs are 
generally lower than under common law, financial costs are not expected to deter 
plaintiffs from suing, particularly if appropriate procedural rules are adopted. 
In addition to legal considerations, in particular the fairness, certainty and 
effectiveness of the law (including safeguarding access to justice for all) on the statute 
book and in its interpretation and application by courts, and availability of alternative 
discursive (statutory or extra-statutory) remedies the model assumes that various 
contextual factors will influence the would-be plaintiff’s calculus. Above all, like the 
Iowa Libel Project before it (Bezanson, Soloski and Cranberg 1987, Chapter 4), this study 
highlighted the key role played by the injured party’s perception of the media’s behaviour 
before and after publication. The belief in media’s unethical behaviour and malicious 
intent and newsrooms’ reluctance to provide fast redress can propel many to file 
avoidable legal action. Political culture and the would-be plaintiff’s understanding of the 
media’s role in a democracy can be an important factor especially in immature 
democracies, as it might prompt some public officials to sue while deterring others. 
10.3.3 Protection of Expression: The Chilling Effects 
This study also opened up the black box of the widely-used but much less understood 
chilling effect of defamation and privacy laws. To be analytically useful, the differences 
in the meaning of the concept that are partly jurisdiction dependent, and the complexities 
and subjectivities behind it need to be unpacked. The chilling effect of defamation and 
privacy law implies a restriction on a media organisation’s or an individual’s exercise of 
freedom of expression with its impacts on the public’s right to receive information. The 
chilling effect is a result of the fear of incurring sanction for publication of the expression 
in question. The ‘chill’ on freedom of expression may not always mean an outright 
obstruction of the media’s or journalists’ right to freedom of expression, as they may 
decide to publish the information in an altered form rather than not at all. While widely 
used pejoratively, the chilling effect of defamation of privacy law is not always 
undesirable. The literature distinguishes between benign and invidious chilling effects. 
The benign chilling effect on socially harmful expression or illegitimate speech is 
desirable for the protection of reputation and privacy and for the public interest in 
expression. In contrast, the invidious chilling effect deters media organisations and 
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journalists from publishing warranted, important information or as Schauer (1978, 693) 
put it, expression ‘which they lawfully could, and indeed, should’ publish. Such chilling 
effect is harmful not only for the organisation’s or individual’s right to freedom of 
expression, but even more for society. The chilling effects have further been classified 
into ‘direct’ that occur when expression is deterred or altered specifically in light of legal 
consideration and structural (or indirect) that operate in a preventive manner by 
preventing the creation of certain material (Barendt et al. 1997, 192-193). The chilling 
effects have also been categorised by their harmfulness to media freedom on a scale from 
desirable to excessively harmful (Townend 2017).  
10.3.3.1 Classification of the Chills by their Harmfulness to the Public Interest in 
Speech 
To be able to detect chilling effects empirically, researchers need to be aware of their 
various manifestations. The empirical findings of this study suggest that while important 
for understanding the mechanisms behind the chilling effect on media freedom, whether 
speech was deterred due to a direct litigation threat or general considerations of the law’s 
operation is of little value for researchers’ ability to recognise the manifestations of the 
chilling effect. This is particularly true because media professionals themselves often do 
not recognise that they have been chilled. A classification of chills by their manifestations 
on journalistic content is also helpful for evaluations of their harmfulness for the public 
interest in freedom of expression, on a scale from most harmful to least harmful or 
desirable. 
Drawing on the new specific examples of manifestations of the chill on the 
information the public receives revealed in this study, I argue that a classification of the 
harmfulness of the chilling effects of defamation and privacy laws on the public interest 
in speech must consider whether the chilling effect operates on the level of media 
organisations or on the individual level. Accordingly, their harmfulness for society will 
be of varying degrees. The classification proposed below (Figure 10.1) might be useful 
for guiding future research into the relationship between reputation, privacy and freedom 
of expression and be a first step in future classifications of the chilling effect. 
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Figure 10.1 Classification of Chilling Effects by their Harmfulness to the Public 
Interest in Freedom of Expression 
 
10.3.3.2 Subjective Nature of the Chilling Effect 
Like earlier empirical studies (Cheer 2008; Townend 2014), the findings of this thesis 
highlighted the subjectivities behind the chilling effect concept in jurisdictions where 
reputation, privacy and expression are all constitutionally protected and conflicts between 
them are resolved by ad hoc balancing. These are manifested in three main forms. Firstly, 
it is often difficult for reporters to distinguish whether undue fear of litigation was or was 
not behind an editor’s decision not to pursue or pull a story. Secondly, an identical 
instance of deterrence on speech might be considered by some media professionals as 
responsible journalism, a manifestation of benign chill of the law or a prime example of 
the direct invidious chilling effect harmful for the public interest. Thirdly, the findings 
clearly demonstrated Schauer’s (1978) proposition that the fear of litigation and thus the 
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extent of the chilling effect of defamation and privacy law is felt differently by different 
media organisations and professional operating in the same legal regime.  
10.3.3.3 The Varying Degree of the Chills within a Regime Explained 
The thesis further explicates the mechanics of the chilling effect. Editorial decisions 
whether to publish certain borderline expression are based on a cost-benefit analysis that 
is underpinned by media professionals’ perceptions of the operation of the defamation 
and privacy regime, especially its fairness, certainty and effectiveness and the resulting 
risk of being sued and having to pay large damages; the relationships between the 
principal protagonists; and a multitude of contextual factors operating at different levels. 
Contemplated speech is deterred when the risk of harm, or costs incurred by 
publication outweighs its benefits. The potential costs of litigation media organisations 
and media professionals face include financial costs associated with legal action and the 
reputational harm stemming from litigation itself and/or the need to admit fault and 
apologise. Media professionals also risk time costs and emotional distress stemming from 
having to deal with litigation threats or participation in proceedings. The rewards media 
or journalists might gain by publishing borderline speech include financial gain and 
promotion of vested interests. 
Several factors other than the legal factors and the relationships between the 
principal protagonists emerged as key to explain why the benign and invidious chilling 
effects might be felt with different intensity levels by different media organisations and 
professionals operating within the same defamation and privacy regime.  
 
Contextual factors affecting a regime’s ability to produce a benign chill 
The ability of a defamation and privacy regime to produce a benign chilling effect 
depends on the ownership, and resulting organisational culture and status of the media 
organisation in question. The findings suggest that law is more likely to produce a benign 
chill in the editorial practices and content of quality press outlets and the more strictly 
regulated television broadcasters. The quality papers are often owned by legacy investors 
whose main aim is not profit-making and their organisational culture and readership 
composition mean that publication of sensationalist, unwarranted allegations will not 
bring in extra profits. If sued, they risk large reputational loss, and if found liable a 
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financial one as well. In contrast, the owners of tabloid publications or non-traditional 
media owners among oligarchs are motivated either by profit or other vested interests in 
publishing borderline sensationalist or smear stories. While the public interest might be 
pursued in certain instances, it is secondary to the other motives. Given their 
organisational culture and readership, tabloids’ business model is based on deliberate 
publishing of sensationalist, borderline stories that attract large audiences. Ethical 
standards are not a priority for the publishers when recruiting staff who are not overly 
concerned by journalistic ethics or reputational loss resulting from their article attracting 
a lawsuit. For the oligarch media owners, the benefits of disseminating smears about their 
business or political opponents outweigh the negligible financial or reputational costs of 
litigation. 
The characteristics of the journalistic environment, such as weak 
institutionalisation, undeveloped professionalisation, and poor quality of journalistic 
education, and media market conditions, like limited amount of capital in the market to 
attract and retain high-quality staff, and an adversarial journalism culture can also limit 
the regime’s ability to produce benign chilling effects and promote responsible journalism 
standards. The individual reporter’s values and professional standards further affect the 
law’s success in creating benign chills. 
 
Contextual factors influencing invidious chills 
The findings highlighted the importance of media political economic factors – the 
organisation’s size and financial stability and market conditions – and cultural factors, 
including organisational culture and status, when explaining why some media outlets 
might be chilled while others are not. Large and financially stable media organisations 
can absorb the potential financial cost of litigation and the journalists employed there do 
not need to fear loss of employment. The organisational culture and status of quality 
outlets may render litigation risks stemming from publication of legitimate but critical 
speech about the actions of those in power ‘part of the business’, as these are outweighed 
by the organisations’ and journalists’ belief in their watchdog function. Broadsheets and 
political and/or economic magazines may be expected by their audiences to take the risk 
and publish critical stories. Deteriorating market conditions might instil more 
cautiousness into quality publishers and journalists as the risk associated with litigation 
increases with decreasing financial stability of the organisation. The competitiveness of 
the market might impede the media’s ability to generate an effective campaign to 
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influence public opinion, encourage changes in the adjudicatory practice and in plaintiffs’ 
behaviour, and thus reduce the risks associated with litigation.  
On the individual level, the personality traits and maturity of media professionals 
and their relationships with their employer and within the newsroom are key to 
understanding the extent to which individuals perceive the chilling effect. While the 
mature, experienced journalists tend to take intimidation by plaintiffs, the stress and time 
costs associated with litigation as ‘part of the job’, less experienced journalists might self-
censor to avoid the trouble associated with defending litigation. The reporter’s maturity 
also affects the extent to which he/she perceives editorial decisions as undue censorship.  
Recognition of employer support in case of a claim or dispute seems vital for 
journalists’ editorial decisions regarding the pursuit of risky stories in a gig-type 
economy, especially if self-employed journalists face a greater personal risk of liability 
than their employed colleagues. The approach of newsroom managers and their ability to 
shield reporters from the pressures of litigation is another important chill-reducing factor.  
10.4 Lessons for Future Research 
The analysis and the empirical findings of this study offer four general lessons for future 
research into the interplay between defamation, privacy and expression in jurisdictions 
beyond Slovakia. 
10.4.1 Lesson 1: Study the Adjudicatory Practice  
The findings of this study strongly suggested that the adjudicatory practice, particularly 
its fairness, certainty and effectiveness, as perceived by the principal protagonists, is 
critical for explaining a defamation and privacy regime’s ability to properly triangulate 
the private and public interests in reputation, privacy and freedom of expression. For the 
perceived unfairness, unpredictability and ineffectiveness of the adjudicatory practice can 
question the overall legitimacy of the regime in the eyes of the principal protagonists and 
the general public and seriously impact its ability to protect the private and public interests 
in reputation, privacy and freedom of expression.  
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 The overwhelming lesson for future research, not least in young democracies, is 
that to gain a complete understanding of the interplay between privacy, reputation and 
expression, it needs to explore the decision-making practice of courts and the mutual 
interactions between plaintiffs, judges and defendants. 
While, in the Slovak case, the law-on-the-books essentially achieved an 
appropriate triangulation of the competing interests, the adjudicatory practice had serious 
ramifications for the regime’s ability to duly protect reputation, privacy and expression. 
The adjudicatory practice was viewed as unfair and biased towards personality protection 
and failing to adequately value political speech and criticism on matters of public interest, 
particularly concerning powerful public officials, including politicians, senior judges and 
prosecutors. There was a clear disjunction between the large awards received by high-
profile plaintiffs for questionable reputation or privacy harm and those achievable by 
ordinary persons. The interpretation and application of the law by ordinary courts 
remained seen as unpredictable and arbitrary even after the shift of the Constitutional 
Court’s jurisprudence, as judges were reluctant or unable to properly apply the general 
principles developed by the Court and the ECtHR. The regime was largely ineffective as 
litigation was protracted and plagued by delays, in some cases lasting up to fifteen years.  
The largely unfair, uncertain and ineffective interpretation and application of the 
law by ordinary courts was a consequence of a multitude of interlinked factors, including 
the lacking resources and capability of judges, exacerbated by changes to court 
jurisdiction rules. The most pronounced cited reasons were nepotism in judicial selection 
and most markedly judges’ personal prejudices, their adversarial attitudes to the media 
and the prevalence of corruption, clientelism and informal networks in the judiciary – all 
legacies of Slovakia’s democratisation period. 
The thesis demonstrated that the perceived unfairness and arbitrariness of judicial 
decision-making can impede the ability of plaintiffs to achieve the desired satisfaction 
resulting from reputational or privacy vindication or monetary compensation. The study 
revealed that having gone through several appeals, even if eventually successful, many 
Slovak plaintiffs felt frustrated by the regime, believing that it worked for the chosen few 
but not for the rest. The perceived illegitimacy of decisions in many of the controversial 
cases, encouraged by media coverage of those cases, risked delegitimising the whole 
system and jeopardising individuals’ ability to gain reputational and privacy vindication 
and remedy the harm to their civic esteem. It further hindered the public’s ability to 
recognise whom to trust to do business with or vote for. In line with the expectations of 
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the conceptual framework, the findings strongly suggested that the length of proceedings 
is a key factor limiting a legal regime’s ability to safeguard reputation and privacy 
protection. Protracted litigation exacerbates the plaintiff’s and his/her family’s emotional 
distress and erases the intended effects of the claimed remedies, or forces the frustrated 
plaintiff to abandon the lawsuit without obtaining redress. Public apology obtained 
several years after the original infringement is counterproductive for the individual’s 
reputation and/or privacy interest and is of little value for the public’s right to receive 
factually correct information in a timely manner. 
The study has demonstrated how the biases and unfairness in adjudicatory practice 
can affect the regime’s ability to create a benign chilling effect. In the Slovak case, the 
likelihood that powerful public plaintiffs would sue and achieve large damages awards 
was extremely high. The potential cost of publishing insufficiently verified allegations 
about these plaintiffs was also high. Eager to avoid giving plaintiffs a pretext to sue, 
media organisations and professionals therefore took greater care to avoid mistakes 
stemming from journalistic irresponsibility. At the same time, the preferential treatment 
of the small group of high-profile plaintiffs compared to the rest effectively severely 
limited the law’s ability to prevent unlawful attacks on individuals who were believed by 
the tabloids and their lawyers to be unlikely to sue or to receive significant damages.  
 The findings further indicated that if media professionals perceive the defamation 
and privacy regime as highly unfair or corrupt, they might be reluctant to accept judicial 
determinations and accept that certain practices are unwarranted. The uncertainty created 
by adjudicatory practice can also preclude the law from deterring certain reputation and 
privacy infringements as senior editors and lawyers are unable to provide journalists with 
watertight guidance regarding conduct in borderline cases. The ineffectiveness of the 
regime and significant delays in adjudication limit the educational effect of the law as by 
the time the final decision in reached a new generation of media professional with little 
memory of the case will be in place.  
The study demonstrated in detail how unfair, biased or corrupt defamation and 
privacy regimes are socially dysfunctional as they fundamentally fail to prevent abuses 
of the law and invidious chilling effects. The findings clearly show that in such regimes, 
attempts to intimidate the media and journalists by threatening or filing suits are rife and 
that the perceptions of unfairness, bias and uncertainty of adjudicatory practice 
contributes to a fear of litigation which results in conscious or unconscious self-
censorship among media professionals. The effects of unfair and biased adjudicatory 
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practice on the public interest in speech were patently evidenced in the comparison of the 
Slovak situation with that in the neighbouring Czech jurisdiction, where for the most part 
of the studied period identical legal provisions applied. 
While earlier empirical studies of defamation and journalism all discussed the 
law-on-the-books and precedential case-law, they largely assumed judges were objective 
arbiters in the disputes. The Slovak case confirms the arguments of the conceptual 
framework and the political and legal scholars studying courts (e.g., ; Shapiro 1981; Segal 
and Cover 1989; Ducat and Dudley 1989; Ashenfelter, Eisenberg, and Schwab 1995; 
Baum 1997; Yates and Whitford 1998; Segal and Spaeth 1998; Steffensmeier and Britt 
2001; Miles and Sunstein 2008; Goldstein 2004; Guarnieri and Pederzoli 2002; Maravall 
2003) that to get a full understanding of the operation of legal rules, researchers need to 
examine how courts interpret and apply them, setting it in the context of judges’ interests, 
interactions with other principal protagonists within the regime and the wider socio-
political context. When studying the operation of legal regimes in immature democracies 
in particular, researchers have to focus on the judges’ values, interests and cultural norms 
prevalent in society, journalism and the judiciary. The operation of legal regimes needs 
to be researched in the context of the mutual relationships between the principal 
protagonists including judges. For if corruption, clientelism and political pressures 
prevail in the judiciary and if the society is polarised to that extent that judges perceive 
the media as their enemies, however well-balanced the law-on-the-books, the legal 
regime will not be able to achieve its aims in optimally triangulating reputation, privacy 
and expression. 
10.4.2 Lesson 2: Explore Institutional, Cultural and Relational Legacies of 
Democratisation in Young Democracies 
The above leads to a lesson specific to investigations into the ability of defamation and 
privacy regimes in democratising or recently democratised jurisdictions to properly 
triangulate the interests in reputation, privacy and freedom of expression. Studies of these 
jurisdictions need to explore the uncertainties and conflicts that arise during the process 
of democratisation, as these affect the legal regime’s ability to condition the principal 
protagonists’ behaviour. This thesis has clearly demonstrated that a country’s 
democratisation path can have lasting legacies for the institutions, including the media 
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market and judiciary, cultural norms and values, including political culture, journalism 
culture, individuals’ beliefs and deeply ingrained informal practices like corruption and 
clientelism, as well as relationships between the principal protagonists operating in a 
defamation and privacy regime.  
In the case of Slovakia, the period of democratisation represented almost constant 
struggle for the rules of the democratic game among different state institutions, political 
elites and, with notable interruptions, the political and judicial elites on the one hand and 
independent media on the other. These power struggles led to deep and long-lasting 
polarisation and pervasive corruption and clientelism within society (and judiciary in 
particular). The power struggles also shaped the developments in the media system and 
characteristics of the journalist environment, including weak institutionalisation, 
interrupted professionalisation and the hybrid ‘critical change agent’ and ‘popular 
disseminator’ journalism culture. They led to an adversarial relationship between 
political, business and judicial elites on the one hand and media professionals on the other, 
and, at times, instrumental use of the media by the owners, and the ability of several high-
profile litigious plaintiffs to abuse the law to intimidate the media and prevent coverage 
of their actions. 
These institutional, cultural and relational legacies played a key role in limiting 
the Slovak personality/goodwill protection regime’s ability to create a benign chilling 
effect, promote responsible journalism and prevent abuses of law and invidious chilling 
effects on freedom of expression with their harmful effects on the public interest in 
expression. They largely contributed to conditions in the judiciary and its inability to 
modernise and rid itself of political pressures and corruption during the studied period, 
with its consequences for the adjudicatory practice in personality/goodwill protection 
disputes involving the media described above. 
The ‘critical change agent’ journalism culture prevalent among journalists in the 
quality news outlets rooted in the collective experience of the government’s oppressive 
tactics under Mečiarism resulted in highly critical, and at times unfair, coverage of each 
government’s actions. It made many public officials feel unjustly attacked in the media, 
whom they believed acted unethically or even maliciously. In contrast, media 
professionals were overwhelmingly convinced that, with the help of corrupt or 
intimidated judges, powerful politicians, judges and shady businesspeople abused the law 
to intimidate or discredit them and/or to enrich themselves in the process. They were 
convinced that public plaintiffs had to tolerate a greater degree of public scrutiny and 
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were reluctant to provide quick redress to what they perceived as unmeritorious before-
action claims. This adversarial relationship between media professionals and officialdom 
stemming from the clash between the political and journalism cultures and divergent 
perspectives on the role of the media in a democratic society often led to litigation as 
many public plaintiffs believed they had no alternative means to defend their reputations. 
Public plaintiffs tended to request large remedies as they wished to punish the media and 
show them they were prepared to stand up to injustice.  
This only intensified the feeling among media organisations and professionals that 
the powerful few abuse the law and encourage others to do the same. In light of the 
unfairness of the adjudicatory practice, some outlets and journalists became reluctant to 
publish contentious stories about the highly risky plaintiffs, or pursue investigative 
journalism at all, harming the public’s interest in expression. In contrast, in this 
atmosphere of mutual hostility, litigation threats from public officials encouraged those 
media organisations and journalists who viewed themselves as watchdogs whose mission 
was to hold the powerful to account, to publish warranted critical stories about 
officialdom and those who profited from public contracts. However, to minimise the risks 
of litigation, they often had to publish the warranted allegations in a manner that was 
highly incomprehensible for the public who remained unable to act on the media’s 
findings. 
10.4.3 Lesson 3: Don’t Ignore Lawyers 
Another lesson for future research into the interplay between reputation, privacy and 
expression provided by this thesis is to study the role played by lawyers. For their 
expertise, self-perceptions and relationships with plaintiffs, defendants and fellow 
lawyers might be key to our understanding of the operation of a defamation and privacy 
regime, as has also been recognised in the literature (Townend 2014; Marjoribanks and 
Kenyon 2004; Hansen 2000; Barendt et al. 1997; Bezanson 1986).  
The findings suggested that lawyers play an important role in private plaintiffs’ 
decision to sue and that they might actively dissuade high-profile plaintiffs with weak 
cases from suing to avoid further reputational harm. The study replicated the ILP’s 
(Bezanson, Soloski and Cranberg 1987) argument that the essence of plaintiff lawyers’ 
role is in recommending the most appropriate strategy and acting on the client’s behalf. 
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The findings further imply that a plaintiff lawyer’s expertise, reputation and relationships 
with their counterparts in legal circles are key for his/her ability to secure early settlement, 
and thus effective reputational or privacy vindication for his/her client. In judicial systems 
that suffer from a backlog of cases or inexperience of judges, lawyers can direct 
overloaded judges to the relevant case-law and thus ensure a fairer adjudication of the 
case. 
The study indicated that in those media organisations that invested in legal 
services to avoid litigations costs, lawyers play a key role as promoters of responsible 
journalism standards and enablers of warranted publication in the public interest. Their 
ability to do so depends on their experience, understanding of the role of the press in a 
democracy and the frequency with which their services are used. It has also been shown 
that lawyers’ interactions with newsrooms can partially account for why some media 
professionals feel more undesirable chilling effect than others. In the Slovak case, media 
lawyers were mostly viewed as publication-enabling actors with solid understanding of 
the role of the press in a democracy.  Their efforts to reduce uncertainty about the legality 
of contemplated publications and to get important information out, while preventing 
careless mistakes and unnecessary litigation and associated costs, were praised by media 
professionals with whom they frequently cooperated. It has been revealed that lawyers 
with a wealth of experience in pre-publication advice often see their role as educators and 
promoters of responsible journalistic practices who simultaneously look for ways in 
which speech in the public interest may be published whilst minimising liability risks.  
The study also showed that legal advice can sometimes conflict with journalists’ 
self-perceptions and create tensions or resentment. Depending on the newsroom-
publisher dynamic, media professionals’ experience with pre-publication advice and 
beliefs about the role of the press, lawyers might be viewed as ‘censors’ restricting the 
media’s freedom of expression and the public’s right to receive comprehensible 
information. The findings suggested that journalists with little experience with legal 
vetting can be more sceptical of its usefulness, particularly in the context of prevailing 
uncertainty and arbitrariness of adjudicatory practice, and the lawyer’s ability to phrase 
information in a way that is intelligible for the general public. 
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10.4.4 Lesson 4: Consider International Arbiters Like the European Court of 
Human Rights 
The findings confirmed the argument of media and communications studies (Schudson 
2005, 178; Hallin and Mancini 2004, 41–44) and socio-legal scholars (Townend 2014, 
282) that research into the interaction between legal regimes and journalism ought not to 
ignore the international context in which these take place. It was strongly suggested that 
a country’s international legal obligations and the existence of an impartial international 
arbiter like the ECtHR might mitigate a defamation and privacy regime’s invidious 
chilling effects, as media professionals know they can obtain a final reputational 
vindication and monetary compensation. It has also been shown how the ECtHR case-
law in disputes involving the country in question can indirectly but decisively contribute 
to re-centring of domestic defamation and privacy regimes. The thesis also demonstrated 
that the Strasbourg Court’s established case-law can serve as guidance concerning the 
rules of responsible journalism and be viewed the as a benchmark of fairness in decision-
making against which domestic adjudicatory practice is assessed. This function seems 
particularly important in young, post-communist democracies affected by the interrupted 
process of professionalisation (Örnebring 2013, 10) where responsible journalism 
standards are far from set decades after the fall of the totalitarian regimes. 
10.5 Concluding Reflections 
This study opened up the black box of thinking about the triangulation of the competing 
interests at the heart of defamation and privacy regimes in the context of journalistic 
speech. It highlighted the complexities policy-makers and judges face when designing, 
interpreting and applying defamation and privacy laws. The study also illuminated the 
intricacies of the cost-benefit calculations of would-be plaintiffs and defendants when 
navigating the defamation and privacy regime that seeks to regulate their behaviour to 
strike an appropriate accommodation between the private and public interests in 
reputation, privacy and freedom of expression. The tehsis provided a nuanced picture of 
how legal and contextual factors combine with the mutual interactions between plaintiffs, 
defendants, judges and the lawyers on both sides to shape to create intended and 
unintended consequences for the protected interests. 
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The study painted a nuanced picture of the complexities behind the chilling effects 
of the law on media freedom and the right to information present in jurisdictions that 
constitutionally protect expression as well as privacy and reputation and take an ad hoc 
approach to their balancing. It highlighted several key factors specific to Slovakia’s 
personality/goodwill protection regime, and underlined more general contextual factors 
that might be key when examining the chills in other civil or common law jurisdictions. 
The highlighted complexities call for more research into the interplay between 
defamation and privacy laws and freedom of expression in different contexts. This 
chapter offered conceptual clarifications and some general lessons that future research 
might find useful. The focus of future investigations of defamation, privacy and 
expression should focus on the various manifestations of the benign and invidious chilling 
effects and on the mechanisms and the legal and contextual factors that explain why the 
chills are more pronounced in certain regimes than in others and why some media 
organisations and media professionals seem more chilled than others. Increased attention 
to the adjudicatory practice of courts and the interests and values of judges, especially in 
democratising or recently democratised societies, is particularly called for. 
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Appendix 1: Informed Consent Form 
INFORMOVANÝ SÚHLAS S ROZHOVOROM/INFORMED CONSENT FORM 
 
Názov štúdie/Name of Study:  Právo na ochranu osobnosti a médiá na 
Slovensku/ Personality/Goodwill 
Protection and the Media in Slovakia 
Výskumníčka/Researcher:  Nikola Beláková (PhD candidate,  
Department of Media and Communications, LSE) 
   
Ciele štúdie/Purposes of the Study:  
Táto štúdia je súčasťou dizertačnej práce Nikoly Belákovej na Department of Media and Communications 
na London School of Economics. Cieľom tohto projektu je preskúmať ako na Slovensku funguje právo na 
ochranu osobnosti v sporoch voči médiám a ako ovplyvňuje žurnalistiku v týchto krajinách. Táto časť 
projektu skúma skúsenosti, postrehy a názory médií, novinárov, žalobcov a ich právnych zástupcov, ako aj 
sudcov, ktorí rozhodujú spory o ochranu osobnosti, na fungovanie práva na ochranu osobnosti a jeho vplyvu 
na žurnalistiku na Slovensku./This study is part of Nikola Beláková’s doctoral project at the Department of 
Media and Communications at the London School of Economics. The aim of this project is to investigate 
how civil defamation law (protection of personality rights law) operates in cases involving media 
defendants and how it influences journalism in Slovakia. This part of the project examines the experiences 
with and views held by the media, journalists, plaintiffs, their legal representatives as well as of judges 
deciding defamation cases about the functioning of civil defamation law and its influence on journalism in 
Slovakia. 
  Hodiace sa, prosím, označte krížikom/Please cross the appropriate boxes 
Prečítal/a a porozumel/a som cieľom tohto projektu./I have read and understood the purposes of the study.
  
o 
Dostal/a som možnosť opýtať sa otázky o tomto projekte./I have been given the opportunity to ask questions 
about the project.  
o 
Súhlasím so svojou účasťou na tomto projekte. Moja účasť zahŕňa poskytnutie rozhovoru./ I agree to take part 
in the project. Taking part in the project will include being interviewed. 
o 
Rozumiem, že moja účasť je dobrovoľná. Z projektu môžem kedykoľvek odstúpiť bez toho, aby som musel/a 
vysvetľovať, prečo ďalej nechcem participovať./I understand that my taking part is voluntary. I can withdraw 
from the project at any time and I will not be asked any questions about why I no longer wish to take part. 
 
o 
 
Vyberte, prosím, jednu z nasledujúcich dvoch možností/Please select only one of the next two options. 
 
Súhlasím, aby moje meno bolo použité tam, kde sa moje slová objavia ako časť správ, publikácií a iných 
výskumných výstupov, aby môj príspevok do projektu bol rozpoznateľný./I agree for my name to be used 
where what I have said or written as part of this study will be included in reports, publications and other 
research outputs so that anything I have contributed to this project can be recognised.  
 
o 
Neželám si, aby bolo moje meno použité v projekte./I do not want my name used in this project.   o 
Hodiace sa, prosím, označte krížikom/Please cross the appropriate boxes 
Beriem na vedomie, že moje osobné údaje ako telefónne číslo a emailová adresa nebudú sprístupnené nikomu 
mimo tohto projektu./I understand that my personal details such as phone number and email address will not 
be revealed to people outside the project.  
 
 
o 
Beriem na vedomie, že moje slová môžu byť citované v publikáciách, správach, webových stránkach a iných 
výstupoch z tohto projektu, ale moje meno nebude použité, pokiaľ som tak vyššie neuviedol/dla./I understand 
that my words may be quoted in publications, reports, web pages, and other research outputs but my name 
will not be used unless I consented  above.  
o 
_________________________  ________________  ________  
Meno respondenta/Name of respondent Podpis/Signature   Dátum/Date 
Nikola Beláková_______________  ________________  ________  
Výskumníčka/Researcher   Podpis/Signature   Dátum/Date  
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Appendix 2: List of Interviewees 
 
Media managers and senior editorial staff 
 
Name/Code Position held at time of Interview (IV) Date of IV 
Lukáš Diko Head of News, Radio and Television of 
Slovakia 
09/04/14 
Martin M. Šimečka Former editor-in-chief, SME, editor Respect 
(Czech Rep.) 
16/03/16 
Igor Čekirda Director for External Relations, TA3  27/05/14 
Roland Kubina Director of News, TV JOJ 27/05/14 
Alexej Fulmek CEO, Petit Press 21/05/14 
Lukáš Fila Deputy editor-in-chief, SME  13/05/14 
Filip Obradovič Deputy editor-in-chief, Hospodárske noviny 13/05/14 
Martin Mihálik CFO, Ringier Axel Springer Slovakia 14/05/14 
Pavol Múdry (2014) Former CEO, SITA News Agency  08/04/14 
Henrich Krejča Head of News, TV Markíza  04/04/14 
Oliver Brunovský Editor-in-chief and co-founder, Trend 04/04/14 
Beata Balogová (Skype) Editor-in-chief, SME  04/03/17 
Tomáš Němeček  Editor Lidové noviny, former editor-in-chief 
Respekt (Czech Republic) 
18/03/13 
 
Journalists 
Name/Code Institutional affiliation at time of IV Date of IV 
Mária Benedikovičová SME  15/05/14 
Adpád Soltész Hospodárske noviny 28/03/14 
Lukáš Milan Plus 7 dní 02/04/14 
Júlia Mikolášiková Nový Čas  03/04/14 
Tom Nicholson Freelancer 27/05/14 
Marek Vagovič .týždeň 21/05/14 
Zuzana Petková Trend 07/04/14 
Marián Leško Trend  08/04/14 
Veronika Prušová SME 10/04/14 
Monika Tódová (email) SME 01/05/14 
 
Defamation lawyers 
 
Name/Code Plaintiff/Defendant work Date of IV 
L01 Plaintiff work 03/11/16 
JUDr. Andrej Schwarz Defendant and plaintiff work 03/11/16 
JUDr. František Sedlačko Plaintiff work 03/11/16 
L04 and L05 (joint interview)  Plaintiff work 02/11/16 
JUDr. Jozef Vozár, Csc. Plaintiff and defendant work 02/11/16 
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JUDr. Rudolf Adamčík Defendant and plaintiff work 25/10/16 
JUDr. Tomáš Langer Defendant work 26/10/16 
L09 Plaintiff work 26/10/16 
JUDr. Ivan Ikrényi, PhD Plaintiff and defendant work 31/10/16 
Mgr. Peter Lukášek Defendant and plaintiff work 25/10/16 
L12 Plaintiff work 03/03/16 
L13 Plaintiff work 16/03/16 
Mgr. Marek Benedik Defendant and plaintiff work 11/03/16 
JUDr. Elena Ľalíková Plaintiff work 09/03/16 
Mgr. Zuzana Zlámalová Defendant work 14/05/14 
Mgr. Tomáš Kamenec Defendant work 07/04/14 
JUDr. Marek Ogurčák Defendant work 10/04/14 
L19 Defendant work 11/04/14 
L20 (email) Defendant work 24/10/17 
L21 Plaintiff work (Czech Republic) 18/03/13 
 
Plaintiffs 
 
Name/Code Position at time of filing lawsuit Date of IV 
P01 Senior editor  16/03/16 
P02 Police investigator 05/03/16 
P03 Judge 07/03/16 
P04 (email) Solicitor 12/01/17 
P05 (email) Judge 15/01/17 
P06 Judge 09/03/16 
 
Experts 
 
Name/Code Institutional affiliation at time of IV Date of IV 
Iveta Radičová Former Prime Minister of Slovakia, Professor of 
Sociology, Komenského University, Bratislava 
05/02/13 
Miroslav Kollár President, Institute for Public Affairs  15/03/13 
Pavol Múdry (2013) Chairman, International Press Institute Slovakia 13/03/13 
Milan Kruml  University lecturer, Charles University, Prague, 
and media analyst  
18/03/13 
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Appendix 3: Media Manager/Media Professional Interview Guide 
Interview topic Questions/issues 
Defamation-related 
training  
Ask about provision of any training for journalists/senior editorial staff 
and about its form and periodicity. 
Defamation insurance  Does your media organisation have defamation insurance? 
Budget reserve Existence of a budget reserve for expenses connected to 
personality/goodwill protection lawsuits. 
Lawyer-client 
arrangements 
Legal department/outside law firms. 
Basis of contractual agreement with outside lawyers. 
Pre-publication 
scrutiny  
Typical procedures before publishing an article/report that carries a 
heightened risk of a personality/goodwill protection lawsuit. 
Legal vetting – initiation, frequency, final editorial decision 
responsibility. 
High-risk 
stories/factors 
considered in relation 
to liability 
Articles are deemed risky in relation to personality/goodwill protection. 
Factors/circumstances are deemed important when deciding whether or 
not to publish in light of legal considerations (factual correctness, 
available evidence, source reliability, public interest). 
Role of lawyers How do you feel about the cooperation with lawyers during vetting? 
Lawyers as enablers or inhibitors?  
Does legal vetting save litigation costs? 
Pre-publication notices Frequency, form, complainants. 
Proportion that reaches courts.  
Perceptions about motivations of complainants.  
Resolution procedures, involvement of lawyers, factors considered 
when responding, settlement. 
Impact – how do they influence the work in the newsroom or your work 
in any respect? 
Non-defamation 
factors considered pre-
publication 
What other factors or circumstances, legal considerations apart, are 
considered when developing a story /in decisions whether or not to 
publish?  
Do you remember a situation when an article, which would almost 
certainly attract a defamation lawsuit, was published regardless of the 
risk? If so, what were the reasons for doing so? 
Direct chilling effect Have you ever experienced a story, which you considered of great 
public interest, has been “killed” or substantially amended?  
Circumstances, frequency.  
Structural chilling 
effect 
Are there any subjects/individuals/firm that are deemed taboo in your 
organisation or in general?  
Are there any persons/entities covered particularly carefully, because 
they are especially litigious, for instance? 
Post-publication 
complaints  
Experience with, frequency.  
Procedure for resolving, involvement of lawyers. 
Attempts to settle, proportion that reaches courts. 
What do claimants request? 
Perceptions about claimants’ motives. 
Impact – how do they influence the work in the newsroom or your work 
in any respect? 
Experience with 
lawsuits 
Organisation and/or you personally sued?  
Frequency? 
Circumstances – type of story, plaintiff, remedies sought, result. 
Concern before publication? 
Legal vetting before publication? 
Motivation of the plaintiff. 
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Steps during litigation Defence strategy. 
Evidence.  
Settlement during proceedings.  
Perceptions of 
litigation 
Perceptions of experience. 
Perceptions of judge’s conduct.  
Satisfaction with result/justification. 
Trends in the operation 
of law 
Trends in litigation rates, most frequent plaintiffs. 
Explanations. 
Adjudicatory practice Perceptions about the adjudicatory practice. 
Courts’ ability to strike an appropriate balance between 
reputation/privacy and freedom of expression (e.g. through 
proportionality of damages awards). 
Effects of the law  Consequences for media organisation(s). 
Desirable/undesirable effects on own work/work in the 
newsroom(s)/journalistic content/society. 
Why? Why not? 
Problematic aspects of 
the regime 
Most problematic aspect of the operation of the law for 
organisation/individual. 
Comparison with the 
Czech Republic 
(optional) 
Familiarity with situation in the Czech Republic? 
Differences/similarities. 
Explanations.  
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Appendix 4: Defendant Lawyer Interview Guide 
Length and extent of 
defamation experience, 
client portfolio 
Length of experience. 
Media type. 
Also plaintiff experience? 
Ethical issues in relation to doing both defendant and plaintiff work? 
Structure of legal 
profession  
Specialist law firms.  
Defamation bar. 
Lawyer-client 
arrangements 
General contractual basis between media and lawyers. 
Interviewees’ contractual arrangements with clients. 
Defamation-related 
training 
Provision of training: 
Form, frequency.   
Pre-publication vetting Involvement in pre-publication vetting? 
Frequency, availability, form, focus. 
Who can contact you? 
Ultimate responsibility for editorial decision? 
Sufficient use of vetting? 
High-risk stories High-risk topics, subjects of stories, type of material. 
Role of lawyers Self-perceptions about own role during vetting process. 
Relationship with clients. 
Pre-publication notices Involvement? 
Frequency? 
Form and claimants, content?  
Motivations of claimants.  
Resolution procedures. 
Factors considered. 
Settlement. 
Impact on work/freedom within newsrooms.  
Direct chilling effect Have you ever recommended ‘killing’ or significantly watering down 
a story you considered too risky in regard to personality/goodwill 
protection liability? Frequency?  
Structural chilling 
effect 
Particularly litigious persons/entities.  
Media attitudes towards them. 
Topics, persons or companies considered taboo by the media 
Post-publication claims Involvement, frequency, form. 
Claimants and material involved. 
Resolution procedures, factors considered, recommendations, 
settlement. 
Motives of claimants. 
Proportion that ends up in court. 
Effect on newsroom/journalist work. 
Notable cases Circumstances – material, plaintiff, involvement in vetting. 
Result. 
Plaintiff’s motives. 
Defence strategy and 
evidence 
Defence strategy, evidence submitted.  
Arguments/defences 
accepted by courts 
What kind of arguments do Slovak courts accept? What circumstances 
do Slovak courts take into account when deciding personality/goodwill 
protection cases involving the media? Are there any important 
substantial or procedural rules which can determine the success of one 
or the other party?  
Costs of legal action Costs for media and their effect on access to justice? 
Costs for plaintiffs and their effect on access to justice? 
Length of proceedings Typical length and consequences for media organisations/journalists 
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Trends in legal practice Trends in litigation rates, most frequent plaintiffs. 
Explanations. 
Adjudicatory practice Arguments/defences accepted by ordinary courts.  
Circumstances taken into account.  
Existence of any important substantial or procedural rules which can 
determine the success of one or the other party? 
Assessment of consistency and predictability of adjudicatory practice. 
Courts’ tendency to take into consideration case-law of the 
Constitutional Court and ECtHR.  
Courts’ ability to strike a fair balance between personality/goodwill 
rights and freedom of expression. Explanations. 
Prevailing party. 
Perception of pro-public figure bias. 
Range of typical non-pecuniary damages awards? 
Level of damages awards adequate? 
Effects of the law Consequences for media organisations. 
Desirable/undesirable effects on own work/work in the 
newsroom/journalistic content/society. 
Why? Why not? 
Most problematic 
aspect 
Most problematic aspect of the operation of the regime for your clients’ 
rights.  
Suggestions for reform 
(optional) 
Policy suggestions. 
Comparison with the 
Czech Republic 
(optional) 
Familiarity with situation in the Czech Republic: 
Differences/similarities, 
Explanations. 
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Appendix 5: Plaintiff Lawyer Interview Guide 
Interview topic Questions/issues 
Professional 
defamation experience 
(length, extent, client 
portfolio) 
Client portfolio. 
Also defendant work? 
Ethical issues in relation to doing both defendant and plaintiff work?  
 
Legal profession 
structure  
Specialist law firms  
Defamation bar 
Contested material Typical contested material in personality/goodwill protection disputes. 
Harm suffered by 
clients  
 Typical harm suffered by injured parties as a result of publication. 
Perceptions of 
plaintiffs’ aims 
Type of redress clients usually want to achieve. 
 
Client consultation Factors considered before taking on a case. 
Recommendations. 
Determining level of non-pecuniary damages awards if sought. 
Notable cases Circumstances of notable cases (in general terms).  
Defence strategy and 
evidence 
Defence strategy, evidence submitted.  
Arguments/defences 
accepted by courts 
What kind of arguments do Slovak courts accept? What circumstances 
do Slovak courts take into account when deciding personality/goodwill 
protection cases involving the media? Are there any important 
substantial or procedural rules which can determine the success of one 
or the other party?  
Costs of legal action Costs for plaintiffs and their effect on access to justice. 
Length of proceedings Typical length and consequences for plaintiffs. 
Trends in the operation 
of law 
Trends in litigation rates, most frequent plaintiffs. 
Explanations 
Non-pecuniary 
damages awards 
Do you find the levels of awards for the compensation for non-
pecuniary damages as proportionate? From your experience, what is the 
range of damages award levels in Slovakia? 
Adjudicatory practice Arguments/defences accepted by ordinary courts.  
Circumstances taken into account.  
Existence of any important substantial or procedural rules which can 
determine the success of one or the other party. 
Assessment of consistency and predictability of adjudicatory practice. 
Courts’ tendency to take into consideration case-law of the 
Constitutional Court and ECtHR.  
Courts’ ability to strike a fair balance between personality/goodwill 
rights and freedom of expression. Explanations. 
Prevailing party. 
Perception of pro-public figure bias. 
Range of typical non-pecuniary damages awards. 
Level of damages awards adequate? 
Effects of the law  Does the regime offer effective personality/goodwill protection?  
Were clients were able to achieve their objectives through legal 
action? Perceptions of plaintiffs about litigation experiences. 
Would plaintiffs sue again? 
Most problematic 
aspect 
Most problematic aspect of the operation of the regime for your clients’ 
rights? 
Suggestions for reform 
(optional) 
Policy suggestions. 
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Effect of the operation 
of the law on freedom 
of expression 
Any effects on media freedom/right to receive information? 
Enables/hinders freedom of expression. 
Comparison with the  
situation in the Czech 
Republic (optional) 
Familiarity with situation in the Czech Republic. 
Differences/similarities. 
Explanations. 
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Appendix 6: Plaintiff Interview Guide 
Interview topic Questions/issues 
Standing/position of 
plaintiff  
Legal standing at time of infringement. 
Defendant Type of medium where infringement occurred. 
Focus of contested 
publication 
Focus of contested publication (private and family life, false 
wrongdoing allegations). 
Harm suffered Harm suffered as a result of publication. 
Consequences of publication (emotional, social, family and/or 
professional life). 
Contact with the media Contact with the media prior to litigation (personal, lawyer on your 
behalf). 
If so, what was requested? 
Media response. 
Perceptions about the response/communication with the media?  
Lawyer consultation Selection of lawyer. 
Issues considered. 
Recommendations.  
Decision to sue Timing. 
Reasons/objectives. 
Awareness of potential costs. 
Remedies sought. 
Determination of damages level, if sought. 
Litigation experience  Length, result. 
Feelings during proceedings. 
Satisfaction with experience. 
Objectives of suing attained? 
What was most difficult about it? 
Ability of courts to strike the right balance between personality rights 
and freedom of expressions? 
Thoughts about effectiveness of the personality/protection regime. 
Would you sue again? If so, would you do anything differently? 
Effects on freedom of 
expression 
Have you considered any potential undesirable effects of your dispute 
on freedom of expression? 
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Appendix 7: Sample Media Manager Interview Transcript Excerpt 
April 2014 
 
NB = Nikola Belakova 
M = Manager 
 
Interview starts 
 
… 
 
NB: I would be interested to find out about the process of programme production, whether you 
ever take into account the risk of personality protection litigation. And if there is a risk how do 
you proceed? Do journalists consult with their boss – either you or the editors-in-chief – or with 
lawyers?  
 
M: Each journalist, if they have the least dilemma, always come and ask the editor of the issue 
who is responsible for the day’s scheduling, or the editor-in-chief, how to proceed further. If the 
editor-in-chief cannot answer the question on the spot, they immediately contact our lawyer who 
is in charge of the reportage format. The lawyer either advises them over the phone or comes in 
person to watch the reportage whether it is okay. And, of course, I have to say that in around 
seventy percent of cases the lawyers intervene in order to minimise the risk. Nonetheless, the 
television world is so broad that even if we obeyed the law to the maximum, the law is stipulated 
in such a way that if a lawsuit is filed or a complaint submitted to the Board [The Board for 
Broadcasting and Retransmission], there are three hundred million interpretations of one issue. 
Even if the television really believes that the letter of the law has been obeyed to hundred and ten 
percent, the judge or the Board can have a different opinion on the matter. 
 
NB: And what programmes are considered risky in this respect? I mean the type of the 
programme, or a programme on a certain topic, person or firm, and what have you. 
 
M: Those attracting the greatest risk are … I would divide it into two streams. One stream is 
economic/business cases, in which many large firms are involved, together with cases concerning 
crimes and socio-political issues. Those are also often the focus of increased attention and 
lawsuits. Then there is a second type of lawsuits. Those are instances when we use an explicit 
picture, a picture which is rather distressing or when we by mistake just don’t blur the picture of 
a juvenile, that is if we fail to blur their face. This is the second line, in which the Board usually 
takes decisions. It typically imposes sanctions on us if we mistakenly use some more distressing 
shots without the reporter announcing in the beginning that viewers need to make sure their 
children and youngsters not to watch it, or if we fail to blur or cover an explicit picture after the 
announcement. We have active lawsuits in the first area I have mentioned. These have typically 
involved large companies, various distrainors, various legal entities, whereby their lawyers 
immediately contact the television to [inform us] that they are filing a lawsuit against us, or they 
request an immediate correction. If we stand by the reportage, [if we believe] that it was in order, 
we will not do it. Occasionally we try to find a solution by making another reportage where we 
put the issues in a more normal light. Nonetheless we don’t do this because we think that we have 
made a mistake. Instead we do this to calm the waters and to avoid unnecessarily going to courts 
because we never know what the result of the lawsuits will be. And even if we are hundred percent 
sure that we will win, the judge can have a different opinion. 
 
NB: You and your lawyers are thus of the opinion that decision making of Slovak courts is 
unpredictable in these cases. And consequently you rather try to somehow settle out of court, I 
don’t mean financially, but through a form of vindication or … 
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M: If we are hundred percent sure, we go and fight. Yet, in any case, we offer the subject that 
wants to sue us the option of a second reportage. In the majority of cases, the the vast majority of 
cases, they accept it. However, occasionally, they don’t. In that case they file a lawsuit. Then 
there is the other option of a so-called out-of-court settlement, when in such extreme 
circumstances when we can see that the courts are going in a direction when the television is 
likely to lose, we try to settle. And yet, we simply stand by the vast majority of our reportages, 
the vast majority of the reportages. It is very hard because we often work with sources, we often 
work with witnesses. In those instances, we are in a more difficult position of not being able to 
reveal the witnesses, the sources. Were we able to, the judges would perhaps say themselves that 
“Yes, it is so.” Yet, to protect our sources, which is a journalistic right, the court result often 
hinges on chance.   
 
NB: What did you mean when you said that there are instances when you can see that the courts 
are going in a direction where you are not likely to win? Could you explain it a little bit? 
 
M: Accidently, it can happen that we make a reportage whereby all the parts are not hundred 
percent okay or sometimes the journalist makes a mistake. We have to say that [we make 
mistakes]. In that case, if the other party does not agree with producing another reportage and 
wants to sue as at all costs, we try to reach an out-of-court settlement after some time. Yet, this 
has occurred only a few times during the existence of the television. I am, of course, not aware of 
all cases. However, from what I have been able to observe as editor-in-chief, there have been 
several attempts to end a lawsuit through an out-of-court settlement. To a certain degree, it is an 
indirect admission of fault. However, sometimes we simply have to say to ourselves that we have 
not been hundred percent [right] in everything. It would be naïve to pretend that each programme 
is perfect and that each journalist is a perfectionist who has truly been careful about every fact. 
Given the sheer amount of reportages and facts they have to process every day, even our people 
can occasionally go astray. Nonetheless, we also try to limit it through these legal trainings and 
daily discussions [with the reporters].  
 
NB: Sure. If it is possible to generalize, what stories do attract a liability risk? Are they stories 
within the main news programme or some investigative stories? Although I am not sure whether 
you have any investigative programme anymore. 
 
M: Unfortunately, we don’t. The last investigative programme was aired in 2010. Until the end 
of last year [2013] there was a programme called R which provided investigative journalism to a 
certain degree. It has now become part of [programme] E. We have kept the content of citizen 
public affair stories there. Some difficulties arise there as well. Occasionally, we receive some 
complaints for that as well. I am not saying that these are always lawsuits. From ten complaints 
perhaps one eventually leads to a lawsuit. Yet … I honestly have to say that out of those ten, eight 
are unsubstantiated and two are up for consideration when we really try to agree with the other 
party to produce a second reportage. Sometimes broadcasting the second reportage within a short 
period of time from the original one when the issue is still topical, it is much more effective than 
broadcasting a long apology with all the legal stipulations, which the viewers won’t understand, 
before the main news programme several years after the original reportage when no one really 
knows what it was about. And I think that they [the apology and legal stipulations] will in no way 
help the injured party. I thus often don’t understand why if we make a mistake and offer a second 
reportage immediately, the majority of claimants doesn’t accept it and wants to sue. 
 
NB: What do you think might be behind that? What is their motivation? 
 
M: At all costs, they simply want the court to publish a decision which exonerates them of any 
guilt, and which states [instead] that the television is guilty; to have it [confirmed] de jure, to be 
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simply able to show it. The stories’ content sometimes upsets legal entities or some more 
prominent persons. I thus understand that they want to drag it to court for the court to definitely 
prove that the television made a mistake. However, you have the district, regional and supreme 
[court level proceedings]. It thus sometimes takes a very long time. And much can change in the 
meantime, because it can take two years but also ten years. We have disputes that have lasted for 
very many years. Hence, if it for instance harmed him [the plaintiff] professionally, it’s been too 
long since then [by the time the court decision is made]. And the people who back then decided 
not to hire that person or to fire them might not even be alive anymore. I don’t know. I don’t want 
to speculate now. I have to admit that we have definitely illegitimately cause harmed in the past. 
And it is our duty to rectify it. Whilst none of us are perfect, we try maximally to avoid it at each 
front. Nonetheless, I have two hundred and thirty people working below me, out of whom 
approximately hundred and twenty are journalists or work with content. It is thus not a small 
group to keep an eye on on a daily basis. This is why we have a director of each programme who 
should oversee it. And yet, occasionally some things escape their attention.  
 
NB: For sure. And in relation to the complaints, the lawsuit threats or the lawsuits themselves 
what do the claimants or plaintiffs claim? Do they claim an apology or do they also claim 
monetary compensation for non-pecuniary damages? 
 
M: That [monetary compensation for non-pecuniary damages] almost always. 
 
NB: And how large are the sums they claim? 
 
M: Well, I remember a certain record. It was a large insurance company that claimed, I think, 
hundred and sixty million Slovak crowns [5,311,040 Euro]. Usually it is approximately between 
30,000 and 50,000 Euro, in that range. The problem for the television is that it simply has to 
incorporate it in its budget into such an extent that it has to set the sum aside in the event it is 
needed [for paying damages]. It needs to be there [available in the budget].  
 
NB: You thus have a certain sum in the budget reserved for these lawsuits. 
 
M: If we receive a lawsuit with a certain sum, we immediately have to count with it in the budget 
because we never know how the proceedings will end. And this limits our access to money. 
 
NB: I’m not sure whether it is available in Slovakia, but do you have an insurance for such cases? 
 
M: No, we don’t have insurance for such cases. Some of our journalists are insured within the 
limits of their work. However, they do not have such a liability and reach. We, as television, as 
the broadcaster as a whole, are liable for content. Hence no individual is liable … But we are not 
insured, no. 
 
NB: I would like to go back to the [plaintiffs’] motives. How do you perceive them? Of course, 
this is your opinion, this is not something given. However, if they claim such vast sums, do you 
think that part of the motivation might be financial enrichment or alternatively to intimidate or 
discourage the television in a way in order not to stop you dealing with such issues or to make 
you more cautious? 
 
M: Luckily, our television is a strong medium and it thus has the finances for the fine. Yet, take, 
for instance, magazine G, that is sued by a company for some twenty-four million [Euros]. This 
is liquidating for such a magazine. I would thus also divide it. There are some subjects trying to 
liquidate the media through the fine since it cannot be precluded that the court will grant it. Then, 
of course, there are also persons who want some money. Notwithstanding I think that Mr C, for 
instance, who has sued us as well as other media, that for him the money is not as important as 
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being exonerated. There are thus numerous judges, prosecutors, police officers who are definitely 
not so much interested in the money than in clearing their name. And I think that in the majority 
of cases it is also the case for other entities. 
 
NB: You have just mentioned Mr C. Are there any persons, companies or topics that are 
considered taboo in your news broadcasts or reportages because from experience you know that 
they will sue or that they have a tendency to sue? Or do you simply attach no importance to it? 
 
M: No. Essentially, no topic is taboo for us. We are more cautious when it comes to certain topics 
because these concern our advertising partners, large powerful companies, [or] large 
multinational companies, which would be able to defeat us through their lawyers. The 
cautiousness really works there [in the sense] that when preparing a story, we confirm the facts 
three hundred thousand times. We take great care there. In principle, we should do this with each 
story. And we do. However, this [stories about large business companies] goes through many 
external experts who evaluate it. Still, no one is banned from working on controversial cases, 
issues or scandals. I raher think that we have a very free [working] environment here. However, 
the laws are ever stricter towards us and thus do not help journalistic production. As a result, we 
have to be more agile in our work with words and pictures to be able to imply to the viewer, 
sometimes in allegories, what is going on … And … we are definitely not scared of politicians. 
While we are not scared of any companies in the world, we take tremendous care when we say 
something about Google, about, I don’t know, Mercedes or Unilever. These are simply huge 
titans. We could harm their sales with a single reportage. When producing a story about meat, for 
instance, being sold after its use by date, I don’t know, in D supermarket chain or in these huge 
companies, we have to have it damn well proven that it is true to air it. Such issues are intensely 
scrutinised as any other scandal or controversial case. And yet, I repeat that we are careful because 
these are large stores, large businesses that make the world go round. And if it were all fabricated, 
we do not want to liquidate someone’s business based on one reportage. 
 
NB: If I understand it correctly, it is important with such sensitive topics, entities or what have 
you that could give rise to a lawsuit to verify the facts for your statements to be based on facts 
that you are able to substantiate if it comes to court proceedings. 
 
M: I will start from the other side. We do not have a list of companies we cannot publish material 
about.  Naturally, in case of any private company, we are always very cautious. I simply ask 
journalists to have a testimony, to have it substantiated by documents, by evidence. If it is a police 
statement, for instance, to try to investigate and corroborate whether it is really so, even a few 
times. And we proceed in this way in relation to all companies. 
 
NB: Sure. I was mainly interested in what you have just said about having stuff verified and 
having the various statements. If we can get back to your cooperation with lawyers. How do you 
perceive the consultations with your lawyers in instances when you have a reportage which could 
infringe someone’s personality rights or good name? Do you perceive it positively that they are 
really trying to help you, or rephrase certain sentences in the reportage so that it is legally 
unassailable? Or do you find that the lawyers try [advising] ‘just to be sure, stop it, don’t air it?’ 
 
M: Certainly, each lawyer would be most satisfied if we did not air any, just potentially liable 
reportage. That is clear. However, my experience from the past clearly says that together we try 
to find a way to broadcast it. And they would occasionally face problems just because our laws 
on the book are one thing, and our courts are another. There is thus a vast gap between those. 
They have told me that according to the books it is absolutely okay, but according to our courts, 
it could be completely opposite, diametrically different. Hence they are also in a difficult position. 
And essentially all media lawyers are because it is always somehow on the borderline in a given 
society. Here, the laws, our laws have large holes and simply the courts do not work as they ought 
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to, and especially not as fast [as they ought to] in these matters. But yes, we have also made 
mistakes from time to time. We have received some [court] decisions that have taught us 
important lessons. As if some of the reportages have slipped through the control mechanisms. 
And the lawyers have simply not seen them. And they could have stopped them because they 
really had the right to do so as they simply were not alright. Hence, they do try to find an 
agreement with us for us to be able to air it. 
 
NB: Who does the final decision belong to? 
 
M: The final decision is, naturally, up to the head of the centre, that means me, or up to the editor-
in-chief. 
 
NB: Has a story, which you thought was in the public interest, not been broadcast due to the threat 
of a protection of personality dispute or after consultation with lawyers? 
 
M: Definitely not during my era [as head of the centre]. However, we had worked a little bit more 
on some reportages before they were broadcast. 
 
NB: Alternatively, has a story been altered to such an extent that the gist of the message got lost 
because you were only able to broadcast the material that was legally airtight? 
 
M: No. I will answer differently. I rather try not to broadcast a reportage if we are not certain. 
And I request from everyone to wait with the reportage and finalise it to be perfect, rather than 
… Occasionally it occurs that another medium publishes it before us. Nonetheless, even if in the 
majority of cases the journalists have to wait a day or two, the reportage is subsequently twice as 
good and more accurate.  
 
NB: Sure. And does the centre or television have experience with complaints or threats before 
you actually broadcast a story? Of course, when you a preparing a reportage, the concerned parties 
whose rights could be infringed, or who claim that an infringement occurred, contact you or the 
journalist in question with a threat or complaint that they will sue if you air it? Have you 
experienced that? 
 
M: Yes, million times. Definitely. They try it on the phone, via email, [or in] in person. It’s 
sometimes beyond the borderline of blackmail. But I enjoy it because it is sometime comical to 
dodge them and it is very funny sometimes to uncover who is behind it, who is their source and 
who knows whom and suchlike. Nonetheless, these things would never get through me, at the 
least. And I am very careful about this. For I sincerely care about it, in my heart, I am still a 
journalist. And if the journalist is any good, he simply has to work because he influences the 
history of the society, he solves many issues. It [journalism] is the fourth estate. And if he [the 
journalist] truly works honestly, fairly and in good faith, he can save many things, save the 
country money and send criminals to prison. This is the crux of it. 
 
NB: Despite these threats do you thus try to broadcast such stories instead of killing them? 
 
M: Yes. I also distinguish between the threats. At times the people who call are also in the right 
a bit because the stuff [aired] is sometimes not hundred percent correct. Recently, I do not 
remember anyone threatening me with death or prison or the like. 
 
NB: With death? 
 
M: It used to be so in the past. In was common in the 1990s under Vladimír Mečiar. Back then 
my car got smashed. Really, they wiretapped me, and the secret service as well as police followed 
  
 
 
408 
me. It was a very difficult period. Nonetheless, it did not matter to me as a journalist. Yet, since 
1999, since Ducký’s death … I apologise for mentioning this case, but it was a turning point when 
the society started to transform and when it became a bit more secure in the country. They have 
also tried to bribe me many times. They would come with briefcases full of money to make sure 
the reportage was never aired. These are also the forms [of influencing content], even if rarer. 
Hence yes, there have been tens of cases during my career as journalist, or a media manager when 
someone tried to blackmail me. 
 
…  
 
NB: You thus try to reach an agreement with them. 
 
M: With some people there’s silence [after the broadcast]. However, a month later arrives a formal 
complaint drafted by lawyers with a petition to commence proceedings or with a complaint to the 
Board. Still, in the majority of cases, they [first] call, and if we say ‘sorry, but it was okay’, they 
then file a lawsuit. 
 
NB: And could you estimate how many percent from these complaints eventually end up in court? 
 
M: It’s also around ten percent because we always try to settle somehow. However, in the majority 
of cases we stand by the stance that it is not worth for us to get into a legal dispute with the person, 
if we can broadcast another reportage to simply add further information about the issues, let’s 
say. Not to correct but to complement it. I take it as a complementary reportage. We stand by the 
facts. Often the stories [we broadcast] are not liked. Every day we deal with problems that a 
reportage is not liked by someone because … We have numerous investigative reporters who 
work on serious contentious issues and, of course, these do also touch large, powerful companies. 
But it’s up to me, I am the filter, I am the buffer. 
 
NB: So you are the filter. It is then surely on your consideration. Or do you also contact lawyers 
or does it depend on the character of the threat or complaint?  
 
M: If we don’t reach an agreement on anything that I am able to offer, it’s the lawyers’ turn.  
 
NB: I would now like to talk about the disputes themselves. Could you describe a dispute you 
have experienced as the head of the centre or before in the past in more detail? I know it was 
probably long ago, but if you could tell me what the dispute was about, what steps were taken, 
whether you won, what the other party claimed and the like. 
 
M: There have been disputes with judges, prosecutors, police officers, [and] with various large 
companies. A case involving a judge, for instance, related to the fact that he was friends with a 
businessman who was trying to seize some land in Eastern Slovakia. The judge was his friend, 
and yet he was deciding the issue in court. We mentioned it in the reportage and they sued us. 
Surprisingly, we won the dispute at the district level, but lost at regional level. So these are such 
interesting issues. These have mainly been protection of personality lawsuits. These are number 
one [among lawsuits]. Then there was the insurance company that sued us for the hundred and 
sixty million [Slovak Crowns]. We did mention then that their contracts were unfair and that they 
lie to people. And they sued us for hundred and sixty million as a result of that reportage. Then 
there was, for instance, the case of V where they also tried to illegally buy hectares and hectares 
of land at a fraction of its cost. The influence of state, of power of state officials. Now the D area 
where hectares of woodland were exchanged for other land and the forests logged, hundreds of 
trees logged. And these lawsuits have already arrived. We just mentioned a name of the person 
in question somewhere. And numerous such cases exist. I’m trying to recollect everything 
because I have to go to court as witness, which is quite hard. Then there were various, for instance, 
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medical doctors in case they erred in their work. We’ve had such a lawsuit as well. I’ll try to 
recollect some more. I could then send you something as well. 
 
… 
 
NB: My last question is very important and we have already touched on it in several of your 
responses. How do you perceive the influence of the right to personality/goodwill protection on 
journalistic work?  
 
M: The protection of personality law is alright. However, law enforcement in Slovakia is very 
weak. The interpretation of the law, for instance, the law that forces print media to publish a 
correction … Although there are simply numerous laws that do not aid journalism, I think that it 
does not discourage people and some media organisations to carry on with investigative work. 
But … 
 
NB: And how is it in your organisation? 
 
M: I am simply … I respect the laws of this country. I think that many of them are not stipulated 
in the best way, that they had not been consulted with the people who do the [journalistic] work. 
Nevertheless, they are [in force] and we have to put up with it and we have to be able to use the 
gaps in the law and interpret them in your advantage. I’m answering in a diplomatic manner 
(laughs). 
 
NB: Thank you. 
 
Interview ends. 
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Appendix 8: Sample Plaintiff Interview Transcript Excerpt 
March 2016 
 
NB = Nikola Belakova 
P = plaintiff 
 
Interview starts. 
 
NB: Could you please briefly describe your dispute and explain to me what made you file your 
lawsuit? Since your lawyer represented you during your dispute, I assume the petition [to 
commence legal proceedings] was filed. 
 
P: Yes, the petition was filed. And I or we won the lawsuit. The dispute concerned ... insults that 
violated certain standards. Although I work in the media and know that is not easy, certain 
standards were violated and it was beyond the limits of what is permitted ... for me [beyond the 
limits of] acceptability of what can appear in the media under freedom of expression. 
 
NB: Could you describe it in more detail? You do not need to say the name. I assume it was 
a competitor weekly, daily or was a TV channel [that ran the story]? 
 
P: No, no, it did not concern [my magazine], it concerned my person.  
 
NB: What I meant was where it was published. 
 
P: Oh, of course, it was published in, in ...in ... What was it? Whether it was a weekly or what 
I really do not remember. I don’t even know whether it still exists in the same form. I think [it 
does] not, that it went out of business. And it was, it was ... a commentary. A commentary by 
a certain person that contained insulting, insulting statements ... based on absolutely nothing. 
 
NB: Sure. There was no true factual basis. 
 
P: No 
 
NB: I know it is very sensitive and I do not wish to open your old wounds, but could you please 
briefly elucidate, how this affected you? I do understand that it undoubtedly affected you as 
a person. But did the [publication of the] insults also trigger any reactions in your closest circle 
of people? 
 
P: In case of proceedings like these, of course, one most probably always needs to submit to the 
judge what you ask about, and one has to prove it. That means [you have to prove] in what way 
it [the allegedly defamatory statement] affected you both from within and from without, that is 
via the reactions of people. From within, ... what distressed me, ... despite being a strong person, 
above all was that my children started or were forced to deal with it … [because] their friends 
started to ask them how it was regarding their mother. And that is… something every parent finds 
difficult to bear. 
 
NB: Mhm. 
 
P: Thus it did not just concern me. And ... my community naturally reacted by asking questions. 
They see you in a different light. Your authority is questioned. Your moral integrity is questioned. 
And I insist on my moral integrity, because ... I insist. I simply do not have an issue with my own 
moral integrity. Therefore, I will not allow anyone to call it into question in such an undignified 
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manner. As a result, my children, ... colleagues ... whom the statements involved had to testify in 
court. We had to document such prosaic matters as the circulation of the medium in question to 
show how many people it [the defamatory statements] could influence etc., as this, of course, 
would determine, figuratively speaking, the extent of the harm and of what occurred afterwards. 
 
NB: Was it then a national medium outlet? 
 
P: Yes, it was a national medium. Yes.  
 
NB: And did it [the publication of the defamatory statements] have any other consequences for 
you in your workplace other than your colleagues asking questions? Of course, it had the personal 
ones you mentioned, that it primarily affected your children, because they were asked ...? 
 
P: No. I must say that the firm acted very, very decently. After all, after all, I am, I am ... I still 
hold the position, which I hold [in the firm], so ... The insulting commentary was aimed at myself 
also in my capacity ... not merely at me as a private person, but as a person who holds a certain 
position and represents a certain medium. The firm thus acted very, very decently and from my 
point of view very correctly. That means that I was provided with support and it had no influence 
on me... or my position, if this is where you question aims, because the firm, of course, knew 
where the truth was. I would not have got into such a lawsuit without the knowledge of the firm, 
since ..., as I have said, it [the defamatory publication] partially related to my public activities. 
 
NB: And had you considered any other means of redress than a lawsuit? Had you considered 
contacting the management of the outlet requesting to publish an apology and retract the false 
statements about you? Or had you considered [requesting] a press correction or reply? 
 
P: ... I don’t remember if an apology was part of the claim. But given that ... I personally definitely 
wasn’t interested in an apology from the person we sued. Actually, in the end, we sued the 
publisher that ..., because it is set like that [in law], which provided the space [for the allegedly 
defamatory statements] without any correction. I was thus absolutely not interested in an apology 
from either the person or the publisher, because it has no value for me whatsoever. For me 
personally, an apology from a churl has no value whatsoever. ... That is one thing. Another thing 
is that they apologise to you in the same medium, which is as [awful] it is. And thirdly, they 
apologise to you after ... two years from ... [the publication of the statements]. That is total 
nonsense. That is a psychological nonsense. This is due to ... Among other things, the problem of 
the Slovak justice system is that everything takes infinitely long. Thus ... when one, let’s say, has 
managed to deal with something, has ordered it somehow within, [and] if the judgment is made 
after two, three, in some cases in fifteen years, then it just reopens the wound which has been 
relatively healed by the scar or how to describe it. What is more, the public is reminded of it [the 
defamatory statements]. So what is the effect? 
 
… 
 
NB: And do you remember or do you wish to disclose the level of financial compensation you 
claimed.  
 
P: I do remember, but I do not wish to disclose it (laughs).  
 
NB: Sure (laughs). How did you arrive at the sum? Had you consulted it with your lawyer? 
 
P: I had certainly consulted it with my lawyer. I think that as the lawyer has experience with it, 
he knows ... what is realistic and what is not [and] that there is a discrepancy between what people 
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might feel, to what extent they might feel hurt and … This is, of course, a topic for a nice 
discussion, why my honour is less valuable than the honour of some ... I don’t know ... 
 
NB: ... Slovak politician, for instance. 
 
P: ... politician. But that is, as I’m saying, that is ... a discussion about morals. So, I don‘t 
remember details anymore, but it definitely was, the proposal originated from the ... legal counsel 
as to a realistic range [we can claim]. 
 
NB: You mentioned that you did not want an apology from the publisher in question or the person 
who wrote the article about you. What did you wish to achieve by [filing] the claim? What kind 
of vindication or compensation? 
 
P:  ... I find it important to let others know, if injustice is done to you, that you will not silently 
tolerate it. People have to speak up. And now I am saying this as the person whom people contact 
with requests [for reply, correction, retraction or apology]. You cannot forsake some issues just 
because there is no point, because there is a point ... These singular issues affect the whole society. 
I feel that cannot let someone ... [publish what they wish], and in this case it was someone well-
known, without them understanding the following: ‘If you say something, punishment may 
follow. So think about it well, because freedom of expression has its limits. And in general, 
democracy and freedom have limits. And ... and I will defend myself within the remit of 
democratic society. You will not be able to get away with it just because you feel, you can [do] 
everything. Well, you cannot. We will let the court decide, whether you can. And if you think that 
you can, but you cannot, it will hurt!’ That’s why [I claimed] the money. 
 
NB: So more-or-less it was a punishment for the illegitimate infringement [of your personality 
rights]. 
 
P: Certainly. 
 
NB: From what you are saying, it would seem that you wanted to prevent them from doing 
something similar to you or anyone else in the future.  
 
P: Of course. 
 
NB: We can now move to the court proceedings. How long did they approximately take? 
 
P: They did not take long. I definitely do not feel that they would have dragged. No. 
 
NB: And you said that you had won. 
 
P: Yes. 
 
… 
 
NB: You have already mentioned that your children and your colleagues had to give testimony 
as part of the examination of evidence as to whether an infringement was caused [by the 
publication of the defamatory statements], and, I assume, when the level of damages was 
examined. Do you remember any other evidence you had had to submit or how the evidence 
submission proceeded? Were you present at hearings? How did you feel about it or how did it 
affect you to have to go there and that your children and colleagues from work had to come to 
[court] to give testimony? Did you find it as something you have to go through to achieve your 
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aim? Or did it somehow open your old wounds as you had to relive the harm [caused by 
publication of the defamatory statements] again during the legal proceedings? 
 
P: ... In principle, it was in no way pleasant. And I am no sissy. I took it as ... as part of what I am 
convinced about, what we have discussed, that ‘you will not get away with that’. I remember that 
it was unpleasant, ... but this is, of course, part of the process, when the opposing party‘s lawyer, 
that is the defendant’s lawyer, asked me questions which, which ... just by their nature I found 
insulting. But again, since they wanted to prove the truthfulness of the, of those ... This in itself 
was ... odd. And there, in the corridor as we were waiting for the judgment, I can say this, I told 
the [defendant’s] lawyer that I understand that he is doing his job, because he is ... he is doing his 
job. But [I also told him] that I did not envy him, because what he was doing was nasty. I do 
remember that (laughs). And he, poor guy, got red in his face and he apologised to me [saying] 
that yes, he was doing his job ...  He had probably realised that ... that ... well. He did not feel 
comfortable about it. And what else was so ... unpleasant for me? Perhaps ... but this was nothing 
serious, when the judge asked about some of my private affairs, which were included in the 
commentary. And this really ... I am not the type who would ... be thrilled about discussing their 
private affairs in a public hearing (nervously laughs). 
 
NB: I completely understand. 
 
P: Thus ... well ... It was rather odd because I was inclined to say: ‘That’s none of your business!’ 
(laughts). Well ... so. But we managed it.  
 
NB: However, if it was the subject of the article, the judge was obliged to ... 
 
P: Certainly. I am just telling you about ... You asked about feelings. Therefore, I am telling you 
about feelings. Naturally, the feeling was exactly ‘that’s none of your business’ (laughs). 
Nonetheless, of course, I answered his questions as it was necessary. 
 
NB: Do you find that in your case the courts were able to appropriately judge and balance the two 
rights, that is your personality rights and freedom of expression? 
 
P: Well, I think so. Since I was successful, I find that this was the case. 
 
NB: You have possibly already answered my next question. What do you consider the most 
problematic during this dispute for you? Which of its aspects? It probably wasn’t the length as 
you have said that it took relatively short time by Slovak standards. I thus assume that it was the 
fact that you had to talk about your private affairs during the hearing. Was there anything else 
you consider as problematic and as an issue for plaintiffs in general in relation to the operation of 
defamation law? What could be improved in order to achieve better or more effective protection 
of [personality] rights? 
 
P: As I have said, in this concrete case, I had no negative experience with the court proceedings. 
Yet, I am talking about my case, about this single case. In my role [as an editor-in-chief] I have 
to attend court hearings quite frequently and I encounter various issues there. What I can say, how 
I perceive it, is that I think, but I have no backing for this other than my perceptions, that judges 
themselves often do not know where the limits of what is acceptable and what is not acceptable 
[to publish] lie; what freedom of expression in a democratic society is; what an insult and an 
argument are; and what the difference between a commentary and a factual statement is. They are 
not clear about this. But why they are not clear about it, I don’t know. 
 
NB: Of course. 
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P: I don’t know whether judges specialise in an area of law. I don’t think that judges specialise in 
an area of law. 
 
NB: No. 
 
P: Therefore, if someone ... deals with issues ranging from a needle to a tractor, well then ... It 
would probably be suitable if ... Well, I don’t know. I will not speculate. Nonetheless, they 
[judges] have reacted in various ways because some ... I really feel that they ... were at sea. 
 
NB: I understand what you mean. You are not the first respondent who sees it in this way. From 
what you have said, I think I know the answer to my next question. Nevertheless, I am going to 
ask. Given your experience, would you do it all over again? Would you file the claim again and 
would you get involved in the dispute again?  
 
P: Yes, sure. Yes, definitely.   
 
NB: Thus in the end, it did have the outcome for you [which you wished for] ... You wanted to 
somehow show the person that they cannot boundlessly accuse people or say whatever [they 
wish]. Did it [the dispute] serve that purpose? 
 
P: Yes, definitely. 
… 
 
NB: I have no further questions. Is there anything else you consider important, which we haven’t 
discussed or anything from your experience that got stuck in your mind or that has remained with 
you? 
 
P: ... Well, I don’t know, really ... Now, as I have talked to you, I feel that where a huge question 
mark remains for me and what ... what I would like to understand, how exactly is, in the case of 
defamation disputes, the amount of the ‘pain’ derived. I do not understand how this is done in 
Slovakia. I really, really find it outrageous that ..., let’s say in my case I couldn’t, I couldn’t have 
claimed, as I would have had no chance to succeed with such a lawsuit in Slovakia ..., I don’t 
know, I’ll make it up, 200,000 Euros. Whereas a ... sot, generally-known sot ... holding a political 
position etc., etc. is able to ... A court is able to award him ... for ... some untruthful statements in 
the media ... Thus the context eludes me. And this perception, I think that this perception is very 
detrimental for the Slovak society since it means that there are various social classes for which 
different laws apply. Thus I think that even the, and I am not talking about myself, that even the, 
let’s call them, ‘simple’ person has to feel that if they suffer injustice, then ... they will get, 
figuratively speaking, the same 200,000 Euros, even if they are, if they are not the [privileged 
political] class, because they are citizens of this country and ... their honour is equal to the honour 
of anyone else. And here I am missing such perception ... That’s what I have not understood.  
 
NB: I think that many still don’t know, don’t understand that. It often depends on the judge in 
question, how they evaluate it. 
 
P: ... Sure. Yet, it is undoubtedly vital for society, for the community that calls itself society, to 
share the understanding that, yes, we are all ... 
 
NB: ... equal. 
 
P: ... equal before the law. And such understanding in various matters, such understanding is 
missing here ... We have nothing to support that [understanding] because it is not so.  
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NB: I do understand. Thank you. I would have a very last question, if I may.  
 
P: Sure. 
 
NB: How did you take the fact that the periodical in question allowed the defamatory statements 
about you to be published? Was is done with the aim of harming, defaming, hurting you or was 
it just an unintentional mistake? 
 
P: ... Goodness! ... I don’t know ... 
 
NB: ... Or was it recklessness or how did you take it?  
 
P: ... It was, it was a regular space for a person ... Or more precisely, the periodical profited from 
the fact that this type of person who then insulted me, ... had a regular commentary column 
there. Thus the editorial staff of course knew about that [the defamatory statements], but they 
probably counted on the fact that no one would speak up. But I did speak up. And it ended up as 
it did. Because ... because this type of commentaries ... Well, simply, some people will read that 
very happily, because it is a type of a tabloid ..., a scandalously insulting or what have you 
[genre]. The publisher was thus aware of what was published but failed to correct it. ... Thus 
the duty ... 
 
NB: So from their side it was all about profit. They though to themselves that it [the defamatory 
commentary column] will attract readers and we will simply not take into account what’s written 
in there. 
 
P: Yes, yes. 
 
NB: Thank you. 
 
Interview ends. 
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Appendix 9: Personality and Goodwill Protection Civil Code Provisions 
Personality Protection 
 
Article 11  
Any natural person has the right to protection of his/her personality, in particular of his or her 
life and health, civic honour and human dignity, as well as his/her privacy, name and 
expressions of a personal nature. 
 
Article 12 
(1) Writings of a personal nature, images, photographs, and video and audio recordings which 
concern a natural person or his/her expressions of a personal nature may be taken or used only 
with his/her consent.  
(2) The consent shall not be required if the writings of a personal nature, images, photographs, 
and video and audio recordings are used for official purposes by virtue of the law.  
(3) Images, photographs, and video and audio recordings may be taken or used in an appropriate 
manner without the natural person’s consent also for scientific and artistic purposes, as well as 
for purposes of news services by way of the press, film, radio and television. However, even 
such use must not be contrary the natural person’s lawful interests. 
 
Article 13  
(1) Any natural person has the right to request that unjustified infringement of his/her 
personality rights be stopped and the consequences of such infringement eliminated, and to 
obtain appropriate satisfaction. 
(2) In cases when the satisfaction obtained under Article 13 (1) is insufficient, in particular 
because a person’s dignity and position in society has been considerably diminished, the injured 
person is entitled to monetary compensation for non-pecuniary loss. 
(3) The amount of the satisfaction under paragraph 2 shall be specified by the court with regard 
to the intensity of harm suffered and circumstances of the infringement. 
 
Article 14 – repealed  
 
Article 15  
After the death of a natural person, the right to protection of his/her personality may be asserted 
by his/her spouse or children or, if there are no spouse or children, his/her parents. 
 
Article 16  
A person who causes damage by unlawfully violating the right to personality protection shall be 
liable for this damage according to the provisions of this Act concerning liability for damages. 
 
Article 17 – repealed  
 
 
Goodwill 
 
Article 19b  
(1) Legal entities shall have their name; the name must be specified at the moment of their 
establishment.     
(2) Should the name of a legal entity be used unlawfully, the legal entity may demand in a court 
that the unlawful user terminates its use and remedy the unlawful state of affairs; the legal entity 
may also demand an adequate satisfaction, which may be monetary.     
(3) The provisions of paragraph 2 shall adequately apply to an unlawful infringement of a legal 
entity’s goodwill.  
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Appendix 10: Summary of the Most Important Findings of the ECtHR in Article 
10 Judgments Involving Slovakia 
Feldek v. Slovakia  
The case involved an article titled “For a better picture of Slovakia – without a minister with a 
fascist past”, written by the defendant and published shortly after a new cabinet was appointed 
following the proclamation of Slovak sovereignty in 1992. Among others, it contained the 
following passages: ‘S. became the Slovak Republic’s Minister for Culture and Education and 
the next thing was that his fascist past came out in public. … Is it good to have S. in the 
government when this fact will lead to the political, economic and cultural isolation of Slovakia?’ 
After S. publicly announced that he would sue the author for stating he had a fascist past, the 
latter explained: ‘when I speak of the fascist past [S.], I do not characterise him, I only think that 
the fact that he attended a terrorist training course organised by the SS falls within the term “fascist 
past”’. S. himself had revealed his participation in the training course in his autobiography 
published the previous year.  
The defendant called upon the ECtHR to examine the judgment of the court of cassation, 
which obliged him to endure the publication of a text declaring his statement defamatory (§77). 
The court of cassation argued that the defendant’s argument that the impugned statement “fascist 
past” was a value judgment ‘could only have been accepted if the statement had been 
accompanied by a reference to the facts on which [he] had based his conclusion’. Such expression 
of opinion would not have required any proof. While the court of cassation admitted that the 
defendant’s statement was not devoid of a factual basis for the opinion expressed, it held that the 
term “fascist past” implied that a person had actively propagated or practiced fascism. The court 
of cassation thus concluded that the impugned publication was a factual statement, which the 
defendant had failed to prove and thus unjustifiably infringed the plaintiff’s personality rights 
(§82). 
Emphasising the promotion of free political debate was ‘a very important feature of a 
democratic society’ and attaching ‘the highest importance to the freedom of expression in the 
context of political debate’, the ECtHR maintained ‘that very strong reasons are required to justify 
restrictions on political speech’ because ‘allowing broad restrictions on political speech in 
individual cases would undoubtedly affect respect for the freedom of expression’ (§83). In 
contrast to the court of cassation, the Court considered the impugned statement a value judgment, 
the truthfulness of which was not susceptible of proof, and which was made in the context of a 
free debate on an issue of general interest concerning a public figure for whom the limits of 
acceptable criticism were wider than for a private individual (§85). While the statement 
‘contained harsh words’, ECtHR found it ‘was not without a factual basis’ and was made ‘in good 
faith and in pursuit of the legitimate aim of protecting the democratic development of the newly 
established [Slovakia]’ (§84).  
The ECtHR did not accept the court of cassation’s proposition that ‘a value judgment can 
only be considered as such if it is accompanied by the facts on which that judgment is based’. 
Acknowledging that the necessity of a link between a value judgment and its supporting facts 
may vary from case to case according to the specific circumstances, it was satisfied that the 
impugned value judgment was ‘based on information which was already known to the general 
public’ (§86) and therefore was not excessive. The ECtHR was further critical of the Slovak 
court’s ‘restrictive definition’ of the term “fascist past” and its failure to ‘convincingly establish 
any pressing social need for putting the protection of the personality rights of a public figure 
above [the defendant’s] right to freedom of expression and the general interest in promoting this 
freedom where issues of public interest are concerned’. The ECtHR found, in particular, that by 
failing to persuasively establish that the publication affected S.‘s political career, professional or 
private life (§87), Slovak courts ‘failed to strike a fair balance between the relevant interests’ 
(§88). 
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Marônek v. Slovakia 
The ECtHR found a violation of Article 10 mainly due to the ‘disparity between the measures 
complained of and the behaviour they were intended to rectify’. In particular, the Court did not 
find that the reasons relied on by the domestic courts ‘sufficiently convincing to justify the 
relatively high amount [5,850 euro] of compensation awarded to the claimants’. 
 
Hrico v. Slovakia 
ECtHR found a violation of Article 10 in relation to a personality protection action against the 
publisher and editor-in-chief of a weekly brought by a Supreme Court judge mentioned as author 
of a judgment in the defamation proceedings at the heart of Feldek v. Slovakia, which was 
criticised in the impugned articles. Slovak courts ordered the defendant to apologise and pay the 
plaintiff damages for ‘grossly and without any justification’ interfering with his civil and 
professional honour (§12). The courts based their decision primarily on the ‘disproportionate’ 
character of the terms used, which ‘clearly showed that the purpose of the statements was to 
offend, to humiliate and to discredit the criticised person’ (§44). The district court ‘found that the 
limits of objective and acceptable criticism had been exceeded in that the above articles comprised 
such expressions as “tragicomic farce”, “shameful judgment”, “strange reasoning” and “legal 
farce”’ (§14). The court of cassation held that ‘because of their expressive character the 
applicant’s statements were disproportionate to the aim pursued, namely to criticise a judicial 
decision or the public activities of judge Š.’, clearly indicating ‘that the applicant had intended to 
offend judge Š., to humiliate and discredit him. Limits of acceptable criticism had thereby been 
exceeded’ (§20). 
Acknowledging that opinion, while, ‘by definition, not susceptible of proof’, may be 
excessive, ‘in particular in the absence of any factual basis’ (§40), the ECtHR considered the 
impugned publications ‘a value judgment on a matter of public interest which cannot be said to 
have been devoid of any factual basis’ (§45). The ECtHR observed that underlying the impugned 
articles was the undisputed fact that the plaintiff was a candidate for election on the list of a 
political party with a widely-known sympathetic stance towards the position taken by the Slovak 
authorities during World War II. Explicitly and implicitly, the articles expressed the view that a 
judge who had made public his intention to become involved in politics on the ballot paper of that 
party should have withdrawn from defamation proceedings that directly concerned the fascist past 
of one of the parties. Acknowledging that ‘the terms used in the impugned article … were strong’, 
the ECtHR noted that ‘the limits of acceptable criticism are wider in respect of a judge who enters 
political life’, reiterating that ‘the protection of Article 10 extends to opinions which may shock 
or offend’ and ‘that journalistic freedom covers possible recourse to a degree of exaggeration’. 
Considering the articles as a whole, the Court rejected the conclusion of Slovak courts that ‘the 
purpose of the statements in question was to offend, to humiliate and to discredit the criticised 
person’ (§47). Instead, it noted that the ‘judicial proceedings in which the criticised judge had 
been involved and which were commented upon in the articles under consideration related to an 
issue of general concern on which a political debate existed’ (§48). The ECtHR therefore 
concluded that the standards applied by Slovak courts were not compatible with the principles 
embodied in Article 10 and the reasons adduced to justify the interference were not sufficient, 
regardless of the ‘relatively small amount’ of damages. 
 
Radio Twist a.s. v. Slovakia  
The then state secretary at the Justice Ministry filed a civil action against a radio broadcaster for 
violating his right to personal integrity by broadcasting an illegally recorded telephone 
conversation between himself and a minister concerning the privatisation of a major national 
insurance provider. Slovak courts found the broadcaster liable on the grounds that in order to 
comment on the situation and present the broadcaster’s views, it had not been necessary to 
broadcast an illegally-obtained recording. Since the plaintiff’s dignity as a public official had been 
diminished as the recording had been widely commented on in other media, the court considered 
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it appropriate to award the plaintiff damages (§25). The appellate court acknowledged that 
‘imparting of information by the media was an important instrument for supervising political 
power in a democratic society’ and that ‘informing on and criticising matters of public interest 
were among the media’s most important tasks’. Nevertheless, since ‘protection of privacy 
extended to the conversations of public officials’, the court found that by publicly broadcasting 
the telephone conversation, the defendant unjustifiably interfered with the plaintiff’s right to 
respect for privacy (§27). 
The ECtHR did not accept the conclusion of Slovak courts that since the telephone 
conversation was ‘private in nature’ it should not have been broadcast. While the Court found 
that the context and content of the conversation were ‘clearly political’, it was ‘unable to discern 
any private-life dimension in the impugned events’ as the conversation in question was between 
two high-ranking government officials and related to a power struggle between two political 
fractions. The special standard of tolerance established in the Convention case-law was therefore 
not applicable. The ECtHR further noted that ‘questions concerning the management and 
privatisation of State-owned enterprises undoubtedly and by definition represent a matter of 
general interest’, particularly so ‘in periods of economic and political transition’ (§58). The Court 
also observed that it had ‘not been established before the domestic courts that the recording 
contained any untrue or distorted information or that the information and ideas expressed in 
connection with it by the … journalist occasioned as such any particular harm to the plaintiff’s 
personal integrity and reputation’ (§61). According to the ECtHR, ‘the mere fact that the 
recording had been obtained by a third person, contrary to law’ could not, deprive the broadcaster 
of Article 10 protection (§62). Finally, the ECtHR found no indication that the journalists ‘acted 
in bad faith’ or ‘pursued any purpose other than reporting on matters which they felt obliged to 
make available to the public’ (§63). The Court thus stated that it could not be concluded that the 
defendant ‘interfered with the reputation and rights’ of the plaintiff ‘in a manner justifying the 
sanction imposed on it’ and the interference with its right to impart information’ was thus not 
“necessary in a democratic society”’ (§64). 
 
Ringier Axel Springer Slovakia, a.s. v. Slovakia  
The application concerned civil defamation proceedings brought against the publisher of Nový 
Čas for a series of articles reporting about alleged indecent behaviour and public disturbance 
incitement by Ján Slota and the plaintiff – the then vice-president of the police corps. The district 
court found that the publisher had failed to establish the truthfulness of the facts – meaning the 
articles could not be considered a justified critique (§35) – and thus significantly, and without 
acceptable justification, damaged the plaintiff’s position in his employment, family, and society 
in general (§36). The court ordered the publisher to publicly apologise and pay the plaintiff 
approximately 23,000 euro in damages plus legal costs. The court of appeal applied the doctrine 
of “truthfulness of information”, according to which the law only protected journalists and/or 
publishers if they could establish the truthfulness of the impugned material as well as their bona 
fides in publishing it and the presence of a public interest in the matter. It further stipulated that 
information intended for publication was to be verified with adequate care by at least two credible 
and mutually independent sources (§42). 
The publisher contended that ‘by applying the incorrect test’ and insisting on proving ‘the 
absolute truthfulness of the published information’, while failing to assess the case under the 
criteria stemming from the Convention case-law, Slovak courts had arbitrarily found for the 
plaintiff (§82, 84, 90). The Court first summarised the established general case-law principles 
related to press freedom and its meaning under Article 10(2) of the Convention, in particular 
relating to the “duties and responsibilities” of the press when publishing allegations about third 
parties, which was frequently cited in its subsequent judgments (§§ 94 –100).  
The ECtHR took a critical view of the Slovak courts’ narrow insistence on the doctrine 
of “truthfulness of information” which essentially consisted of determining whether, as a matter 
of fact, the information contained in those articles was true (§101). According to the Court, Slovak 
courts failed to examine (in form and substance) whether the publisher acted in line with its 
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“duties and responsibilities” within the meaning of Article 10(2), including whether it acted ‘in 
good faith in order to provide accurate and reliable information in accordance with the ethics of 
journalism’ (§103). The ECtHR observed that the reporters took independents steps to verify the 
facts by visiting the location of the incident, interviewing its witnesses and the plaintiff. The 
ECtHR noted that it remained for the Slovak courts to examine whether these steps were in 
accordance with its “duties and responsibilities” because ‘domestic courts are better equipped to 
establish the facts relevant to the ensuing legal analysis’ (§109). Examination under these criteria 
would involve ‘individual and contextual assessment, with reference to the situation at the time 
when the impugned articles were published’ of the importance of the public interest at stake in 
correlation to the status of the plaintiff, in contrast to the status of Slota, the extent to which the 
plaintiff was involved in preparing the articles and the adequacy of the efforts on the part of the 
publisher to check the veracity of the information published from the perspective of journalism 
ethics (§106). The Court acknowledged that ‘the behaviour in public, while off duty, of officials 
and civil servants vested with public authority may arguably attract public interest’ (§108). The 
ECtHR, however, concluded that Slovak courts failed to assesses the case according to the 
established criteria and thus could not be said to have “applied standards which were in 
conformity with the principles embodied in Article 10” and to have “based themselves on 
an acceptable assessment of the relevant facts” pursuant to Kommersant Moldovy v. Moldova 
(§109). 
 
Soltész v. Slovakia  
In Soltész v. Slovakia, the ECtHR concluded that due to their failure to examine the case ‘under 
the criteria of “duties and responsibilities” within the meaning of Article 10 §2 of the Convention’, 
Slovak courts ‘cannot be said to have “applied standards which were in conformity with the 
principles embodied in Article 10” (§53). Doing so would have involved ‘individual and 
contextual assessment, with reference to the situation at the time when the impugned article was 
published, of such complex matters’ as the existence and importance of the public interest in 
correlation with the status of the plaintiff; the necessity of disclosing his identity; the bona fides 
of the defendant; the genuine aim pursued by the defendant in publishing the article; the extent to 
which the defendant could rely on the credibility of his source; and the adequacy of the level of 
adjudicated damages (§50). The ECtHR, however, found that instead, Slovak courts relied on the 
doctrine of “truthfulness of information” as their assessment of evidence and drew conclusions 
with a view to establishing the truthfulness of the factual basis of the article and its repercussions 
for the plaintiff’s good name and reputation (§45), while questions of intent, negligence, source 
of information and whether it had been quoted or not seemed to have been ‘of no or very little 
consequence’ (§47).  
 
Ringier Axel Springer, a.s. v. Slovakia (No. 2) 
The case concerned civil proceedings brought for reporting a traffic accident, which had claimed 
the life of the plaintiff’s son, and the circumstances of the ensuing investigation and pre-trial 
detention of the driver – A. Suggesting that in the course of the investigation and pre-trial 
detention, A.’s fundamental rights might have been breached, the article identified the plaintiff 
and his late son with their full names, citing a short statement by the plaintiff and indicating that 
he was the chief district prosecutor. The publisher, who had been ordered to apologise and pay 
damages, contended that the Slovak decisions ‘had been arbitrary, disproportionate and based on 
a one-sided assessment of the facts, focusing exclusively on the protection of the privacy of the 
claimant and completely disrespecting its right to freedom of expression’ (§41). 
The ECtHR found that Slovak courts did not appear to have taken ‘full judicial notice of 
the context and overall content of the impugned article’, particularly as concerned the 
investigation and detention of A. (§52) or considered the presence or absence of good faith on the 
part of the publisher, the aim pursued by it, the public interest at stake as related to the status of 
the plaintiff and his son, and the necessity of disclosing their identity (§53). The conclusions of 
Slovak courts were primarily based on the disclosure of the full names of the plaintiff and his son 
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(§50) and the harm caused to the plaintiff and his family as a consequence of the impugned 
publication (§51). Having acknowledged that the plaintiff was a public official who had to accept 
a higher degree of interference with this privacy, the district court, for instance, established that 
the reported accident had no link to his public functions and was, therefore, exempt from that rule 
(§21). The ECtHR thus concluded that Slovak courts had failed ‘to examine the elements of the 
case necessary for the assessment of the applicant company’s compliance with its “duties and 
responsibilities” under Article 10 of the Convention’ (§54). 
 
 
Ringier Axel Springer, a.s. v. Slovakia (No. 3)  
The ECtHR concluded that ‘the domestic courts cannot be said to have “applied standards which 
were in conformity with the principles embodied in Article 10” (§85) as no judicial attention 
appeared to have been given to whether the articles related to a matter of legitimate public interest, 
to the presence or absence of good faith on the part of the publisher, the aim pursued, or any other 
criteria relevant to the assessment of the publisher’s compliance with its “duties and 
responsibilities” (§84). The Court found that, instead, the Slovak courts resorted to a form of the 
“doctrine of truthfulness of information” apparent, for instance, in the district court’s conclusion 
that ‘qualifiers such as “seemingly”, “perhaps” and “suspicion” did not free the publisher from 
“liability for the truthfulness of the published information”’ and ‘that questions of intent, 
negligence, source of information and whether or not it had been quoted were of no consequence’ 
(§80). 
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